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Abstract	
Indonesia	was	one	of	the	first	countries	in	the	world	to	implement	legislation	mandating	
businesses	to	undertake	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR).		This	research	examines	how	CSR	
legislation	has	been	implemented	in	three	Oil	and	Gas	companies	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	in	
the	South	Sumatera	Province.		Oil	and	Gas	is	one	industry	that	has	applied	CSR	legislation	and	the	
district	being	researched	is	one	of	the	richest	districts	in	terms	of	mining	resources,	including	Oil	
and	Gas,	in	Indonesia.		Meanwhile,	the	legislation	cannot	be	separated	from	the	decentralization	
process	that	began	in	1999	where	government	power	has	been	transferred	to	local	district	
governments	including	Musi	Banyuasin	districts	and	their	local	community	rights	have	been	
acknowledged.		Adopting	institutional	and	stakeholder	perspectives,	the	research	examines	how	
the	CSR	legislation	and	local	stakeholder	pressures	influence	the	CSR	practices	of	three	Oil	and	Gas	
companies	in	Musi	Banyuasin	District,	South	Sumatera	province,	Indonesia.		The	research	focuses	
on	three	main	questions:		
(i) What	are	the	main	mandates	of	CSR	legislation	for	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia?		
(ii) How	do	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia	practice	CSR	and	treat	local	
stakeholders?	
(iii) What	are	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	mandated	CSR	and	their	perceptions	of	the	
practices	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia?						
An	interpretive	approach	was	adopted,	using	a	multiple	case	study	methodology	where	interviews	
and	focus	group	discussions	were	used	to	collect	primary	qualitative	data.		Document	analysis	of	
the	relevant	CSR	laws,	related	government	regulations	and	ministerial	decrees	was	also	
undertaken.		Three	Oil	and	Gas	Companies	operating	who	had	a	Production	Sharing	Contract	(PSC)	
with	the	Indonesian	government	were	selected:	an	Indonesian	Owned	Company	(IOC),	a	Foreign	
Owned	Company	(FOC)	and	a	State	Owned	Company	(SOC).		Research	participants	included	
members	from	each	of	the	three	companies,	their	local	stakeholders,	and	other	participants	
related	to	the	CSR	issue	in	the	area.		Interviews	with	managers	and	staff	from	each	of	these	three	
companies	provided	an	understanding	of	implementation	strategies	related	to	mandatory	CSR	
requirements.		Local	stakeholders	included	local	district	government	officials	as	well	as	local	
community	members	from	the	villages	located	nearby	to	each	company’s	operations.		Other	
participants	included	key	informants	from	a	national	business	association,	non-government	
organisations	(NGOs),	and	the	national	regulatory	body	for	Oil	and	Gas.			
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Analysis	reveals	that	mandated	CSR	legislation	requires	Oil	and	Gas	Companies	to	distribute	a	
share	of	their	wealth	to	local	communities.		The	legislation	has	directed	that	companies	should	
allocate	a	portion	of	their	profit	and/or	their	operational	cost	to	local	communities.		Whilst	the	
legislation	appears	to	be	‘hard’	in	mandating	companies	to	distribute	wealth	to	local	communities	
in	actuality	it	is	‘soft’	as	the	institutional	environment	lack	enforcement	and	the	political	
environment	allows	companies	to	negotiate	their	compliance	with	the	legislation.					
However,	mandated	CSR	legislation	is	an	important	institutional	symbol	that	legitimates	local	
stakeholders’	CSR	requests	from	companies.		The	findings	highlight	that	requests	for	company	CSR	
have	predominantly	been	made	by	heads	of	villages,	some	legislative	members	and	local	
government	officials,	which	are	characterised	by	research	participants	as	“raja-raja	kecil”	(little	
kings).		These	particular	stakeholders	have	the	power	to	control	territories	within	the	district	and	
influence	company	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	other	local	stakeholders.		This	limits	the	involvement	
of	more	marginalized	stakeholders	whom	the	legislation	is	primarily	intended	to	benefit.		The	three	
companies	have	implemented	the	legislation	differently,	depending	on	these	institutional	
environment	and	local	stakeholder	pressures.		The	IOC	was	owned	by	a	national	political	figure,	
providing	political	connections	to	counter	the	power	of	local	‘little	kings’.		The	IOC	was	thus	able	to	
establish	and	foster	a	direct	link	with	the	‘marginalized’	groups	of	local	stakeholders,	which	
included	farmers	and	women,	without	fearing	the	‘little	kings’	to	be	a	threat	to	their	legitimacy.		
The	FOC	viewed	the	‘little	kings’	as	having	power,	and	interacting	with	them	as	being	essential,	as	
being	foreign	owned	they	felt	vulnerable	to	resource	nationalism	claims,	regarding	their	
exploitation	of	natural	resources	in	the	area.			With	limited	political	connections,	the	FOC	needed	
to	rely	on	economic	influences,	and	so	provided	significant	CSR	funds	for	and	adopted	the	
development	agendas	of	‘little	kings’	as	the	basis	to	gain	their	legitimacy.		The	SOC,	due	to	their	
state	ownership	structure,	primarily	concerned	themselves	with	central	government	interests.		
They	experienced	less	pressure	from	local	stakeholders,	leading	them	to	lack	initiative	and	direct	
involvement	with	local	stakeholders	and	their	CSR	efforts.	As	a	result	the	SOC	company	mainly	
focused	on	projects	directed	by	the	central	government	such	as	the	soft-loans	program	ordered	by	
the	Minister	of	State	Owned	Companies.				
This	thesis	concludes	that	the	implementation	of	CSR	legislation	in	Indonesia	has	had	mixed	results	
to	date	in	achieving	its	stated	goal	to	improve	the	welfare	of	local	communities.		Specifying	the	
stakeholder	groups	companies	should	focus	on	and	providing	transparent	information	about	
company	CSR	are	necessary	to	improve	the	outcomes	from	legislation.		This	research	makes	a	
contribution	to	the	CSR	literature	by	illustrating	how	institutional	and	stakeholder	pressures	affect	
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CSR	implementation	in	the	context	of	mandated	CSR	legislation.		This	research	also	makes	a	
contribution	to	the	CSR	as	public	policy	literature	by	showing	how	implementation	and	
enforcement	are	often	weak	in	developing	countries	like	Indonesia,	where	weak	institutional	
conditions,	lacking	transparency	and	susceptible	to	corruption	frustrate	the	intentions	of	CSR	
legislation.		
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Chapter	1.	INTRODUCTION	
1.1. INTRODUCTION	
Chapter	1	provides	an	introduction	to	the	research	and	consists	of	seven	major	sections.		Section	
1.2	presents	the	background	to	mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia.		Section	1.3	presents	the	research	
objectives	and	questions;	whilst	section	1.4	provides	the	justification	for	the	research.		Section	1.5	
highlights	the	contribution	of	the	research.		Section	1.6	describes	the	scope	of	the	research.			
Section	1.7	presents	the	research	approach.		Finally,	Section	1.8	provides	an	overview	of	the	
structure	of	the	thesis.			
1.2. BACKGROUND		
The	development	of	Indonesia	must	address	the	growing	domestic	demand	for	better	
infrastructure,	services	and	social	security	for	its	population.		These	circumstances	have	caused	the	
government	to	start	to	looking	to	the	business	world	to	take	on	a	role	in	social	provision.		
Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR)	has	played	a	major	role	in	motivating	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia	to	involve	themselves	in	local	developments	assisting	the	government	in	providing	public	
goods	and	services.		According	to	Kemp	(2001),	CSR	in	Indonesia	is	a	relatively	new	concept	among	
companies,	starting	in	2000	after	the	fall	of	the	“new	order	regime”	under	President	Soeharto.		
After	experiencing	thirty-two	years	of	control	under	a	highly	centralized	government	regime,	local	
districts	have	successfully	requested	more	autonomy	and	authority	from	the	central	government	in	
the	decentralization	era.		This	includes	demands	for	company	contributions,	which	previously	
under	President	Soeharto	went	to	the	central	government	in	Jakarta.		Such	demands	have	forced	
the	new	reform	central	government	to	mandate	CSR	legislation,	requiring	businesses,	particularly	
those	related	to	natural	resources,	to	undertake	CSR.		In	2007,	two	CSR	related	laws	were	enacted,	
which	are	the	Investment	law	No.	25/	2007	and	Limited	Liability	Companies	(LLCs)	Law	No	40/	
2007,	which	laws	are	acknowledged	as	amongst	the	world’s	first	laws	for	mandatory	CSR	(Rosser	&	
Edwin	2010;	Waagstein	2011).		All	Indonesian	CSR	laws	emerged	after	President	Soeharto	stepped	
down	in	1999.		All	the	laws	on	CSR	discussed	in	this	thesis	were	issued	after	2000.		Therefore,	as	
there	was	no	CSR	law	under	President	Soeharto,	the	various	laws	on	CSR	have	occurred	post	2000.	
These	enacted	laws	have	made	CSR	mandatory	in	Indonesia,	creating	a	different	situation	from	
that	of	CSR	practices	in	developed	countries.		Regarding	the	latter,	according	to	Carroll	(1991),	CSR	
extends	business	practices	beyond	their	required	economic	and	legal	responsibilities	to	accepting	
ethical,	moral,	and	discretionary	responsibilities,	in	order	to	improve	society.		This	social	
responsibility	should	not,	however,	interrupt	the	main	responsibility	of	businesses	to	provide	
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economic	goods	and	services	to	community,	and	their	responsibility	to	provide	profits	to	
shareholders.		Within	the	frame	of	these	assumptions,	CSR	is	based	on	voluntariness	on	the	part	of	
companies	in	their	initiatives	(Carroll	1999b;	Friedman	2007).		The	presence	of	mandated	CSR	
legislation	in	Indonesia,	by	contrast,	impels	company	compliance	to	the	legislation	regardless	of	
any	interruption	to	their	economic	responsibilities.	
The	motivation	underpinning	this	study	is	the	need	to	explore	how	the	CSR	legislation	in	Indonesia,	
comprising	laws,	government	regulations	and	ministerial	decrees,	is	being	implemented	in	the	
field.		This	study	explores	the	implementation	of	mandated	CSR	legislation	in	three	Oil	and	Gas	
companies	operating	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	in	South	Sumatera	province.		The	selection	of	
the	Oil	and	Gas	industry	is	because	the	legislation	applies	to	companies	within	this	industry;	while	
this	district	is	well	known	as	a	district	that	has	rich	Oil	and	Gas	resources.		The	present	study	
explores	the	perspective	of	both	company	employees	and	local	stakeholders	on	the	CSR	legislation.		
Then,	the	study	further	analyses	the	companies’	strategies	for	implementing	CSR	and	the	
outcomes	for	their	local	stakeholders.		It	should	be	noted	that	the	study	of	CSR	implementation	
should	also	consider	the	dynamics	of	the	Indonesian	political	and	economic	context.		The	downfall	
of	the	centralized	“new	order	regime”	led	by	President	Soeharto	in	1998	created	an	opportunity	
for	local	governments	and	local	communities	to	demand	business	contributions.		As	a	result	of	
these	demands,	a	decentralization	process	transferred	much	of	central	government	authority	to	
kota	(municipality)	and	kabupaten	(district)	levels	of	government.		The	resulting	rise	of	local	
aspirations	and	demands	can	be	seen	in	the	dramatic	increase	in	the	number	of		municipalities	and	
districts,	from	292	before	decentralization	to	542	in	2013	(KPPOD	2013).		It	is	also	noted	that	the	
growth	in	number	of	municipalities	and	districts	occurred	mostly	outside	Java,	which	is	the	seat	of	
central	government.		However,	Indonesian	natural	resources	are	predominantly	located	outside	of	
Java.		This	is	likely	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	operations	of	companies	in	the	resource	rich	
areas,	including	in	their	CSR	implementation,	as	they	face	the	resulting	complexities	of	the	local	
environments	of	their	operations.			
1.3. RESEARCH	OBJECTIVE	AND	QUESTIONS	
The	key	objective	of	this	study	is	to	qualitatively	examine	the	implementation	of	CSR	legislation	in	
Indonesia.		To	attain	the	research	objective,	the	main	research	questions	framed	for	this	study	are:		
(i) What	are	the	main	mandates	of	CSR	legislation	for	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia?		
(ii) How	do	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia	practice	CSR	and	treat	local	
stakeholders?	
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(iii) What	are	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	mandated	CSR	and	their	perceptions	of	the	
CSR	practices	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia?						
1.4. JUSTIFICATION		
This	section	describes	the	justification	for	conducting	this	research	and	is	divided	into	two	
subsections.		Subsection	1.3.1	discusses	the	theoretical	justification.		Subsection	1.3.2	presents	a	
practical	justification.	
1.4.1. Theoretical	Justification	
The	Indonesian	government	has	taken	a	different	stance	from	most	other	countries	by	introducing	
mandatory	legal	requirements	for	CSR	through	legislation	(Lyon	2007;	Rosser	&	Edwin	2010;	
Waagstein	2011).		Thus,	Indonesia	provides	a	unique	context	for	researching	CSR.		This	legislation	
allows	government	intervention	in	company	CSR	decisions,	a	situation	differing	from	that	mostly	
found	in	the	CSR	literature,	which	assumes	voluntariness	and	self-determining	policies	in	company	
CSR	decisions	(Carroll	1991).		Moreover,	Donaldson	and	Dunfee	(1999)	argue	that	CSR	should	be	
seen	as	an	implicit	claim	by	local	stakeholders	because,	unlike	consumers,	suppliers	or	
shareholders,	local	stakeholders	do	not	have	any	explicit	contract	agreement	with	companies.		
However,	the	issuance	of	CSR	laws	in	Indonesia	changes	the	status	of	their	claim,	explicitly	granting	
local	stakeholder	demands	for	company	CSR	contributions.			
Together,	the	legislated	CSR	mandate	and	local	stakeholder	demands	for	companies	to	undertake	
CSR	create	pressures	for	companies	in	terms	of	their	CSR	strategies	(Lee	2011).		In	this	respect,	the	
two	external	pressures	are:	institutional	pressures	in	the	form	of	mandated	CSR	legislation	that	
provides	the	rules	of	the	game	for	companies	to	undertake	CSR	(Scott	2001);	and	local	stakeholder	
pressures	deriving	from	their	explicit	demands	that	are	legitimated	by	the	CSR	legislation		
(Freeman	2011).		This	research	explores	company	CSR	strategies	within	the	context	of	these	
institutional	and	stakeholder	pressures.		By	examining	company	perceptions	of	CSR	legislation	and	
how	they	implement	such	legislation,	the	present	study	offers	important	insights	for	
understanding	company	CSR	strategies	for	dealing	with	this	unique	set	of	external	influences,	
particularly	in	the	developing	country	context	with	the	integration	of	political	and	economic	forces	
in	the	business	environment	(Hillman	&	Wan	2005;	Scherer	&	Palazzo	2011)..				
1.4.2. Practical	Justification	
CSR	practices	have	become	very	prominent	in	Indonesia	subsequent	to	the	passing	of	CSR	
legislation.		However,	official	data	indicating	the	extent	to	which	companies	have	contributed	to	
local	communities	is	unclear,	due	to	a	lack	of	transparency	in	the	implementation	of	CSR	in	
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Indonesia	(Hadi	2011).		In	a	study	illustrating	CSR	practice	before	Indonesian	CSR	laws	were	passed,	
Chambers	et.al	(2003)	surveyed	the	top	50	companies	in	Indonesia,	India,	Malaysia,	Philippines,	
Singapore,	South	Korea	and	Thailand.		This	study	showed	that	only	24	percent	of	the	top	50	
companies	in	Indonesia	performed	CSR,	whilst	72.7	percent	of	this	number	provided	only	a	one	or	
two	pages	CSR	report.		The	focus	of	this	24	percent	of	companies	was	on	environmental	issues;	
which	was	different	from	the	CSR	practices	in	the	other	six	countries,	which	were	shown	to	have	
more	involvement	in	providing	public	goods	such	as	building	schools	or	providing	scholarship	
projects.		
Nor	Hadi’s	(2011)	study	of	62	companies	listed	on	the	Jakarta	Stock	Exchange	(JSE),	consisting	of	
mining	and	manufacturing	companies,	illustrates	the	CSR	condition	after	the	legislation	passed.		
This	study	revealed	that	there	were	898	CSR	projects	conducted	by	62	companies	in	2009,	which	
were	directed	mainly	towards	local	communities	(344	projects),	environmental	conservation	(142	
projects),	product	quality	assurance	(112	projects),	energy	savings	and	conservations	(22	projects),	
with	the	rest	(34	projects)	falling	outside	these	categorizations.		The	changing	of	CSR	focus	from	
environmental	to	social	issues	revealed	the	shifting	of	CSR	direction	after	CSR	laws	passed	in	2007.		
In	terms	of	CSR	financial	contribution,	based	on	a	Public	Interest	and	Research	Advocacy	(PIRAC)	
study	in	2001,	the	total	CSR	funds	from	180	selected	companies	was	IDR	115	billion	(USD	11.5	
million)	distributed	to	supporting	279	CSR	activities	(PIRAC	2002).		Although	there	is	no	existing	
formal	research	investigating	the	total	financial	contribution	of	companies	engaged	in	CSR	after	
the	CSR	laws	were	passed,	an	independent	CSR	consultant	in	Indonesia	named	La	Tofi	estimated	
that	the	funding	increased	to	around	IDR	10	Trillion	(USD	10	Billion)	in	2012	(Danurdono	2012).		
The	growing	CSR	practices	in	Indonesia	would	be	expected	to	have	a	positive	impact	on	
relationships	between	companies	and	local	communities.  In	fact,	Prayogo	(2010)	suggests	that	the	
relationships	between	mining	companies	and	local	communities	has	been	significantly	endangered	
in	this	decentralization	era.		A	report	released	by	Walhi	(Wahana	Lingkungan	Hidup	Indonesia	–	
The	Indonesian	Forum	for	Environment)	in	2013,	noted	that	the	number	of	company-community	
conflicts	in	2012	increased	sharply	over	the	previous	year,	with	369	cases	involving	139,874	
households.		In	addition,	they	also	found	that	within	a	period	of	6	years	(2006-2012),	there	were	
13	deaths,	125	victims	injured,	and	234	local	people	arrested	by	officials	as	a	result	of	company-
community	confrontation	during	protests	(Indrakusuma	2013;	Sudiarto	2013).		Prayogo	(2010)	
suggests	that	extractive	industries	such	as	mining	have	a	very	high	risk	for	conflict	with	local	
communities	due	to	the	direct	impacts	of	natural	resource	exploitation	on	local	communities,	and	
the	economic	disparity	evident	with	the	presence	of	such	companies	in	the	midst	of	rural	poverty,	
enhancing	local	community	jealousy.	
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1.5. CONTRIBUTION	
The	present	research	acknowledges	the	influence	of	CSR	legislation	and	local	stakeholder	
pressures	on	company	CSR	strategies	(Campbell	2006;	Freeman	2011;	Matten	&	Moon	2008).		Lee	
(2011)	has	provided	a	model	to	explain	institutional	and	stakeholder	influences	on	company	CSR	
strategies.		This	study	offers	a	different	perspective	by	investigating	how	companies	comply	with	
institutional	pressures	from	CSR	legislation,	consisting	of	laws,	regulations	and	ministerial	decrees,	
and	deal	with	the	often	intense	local	stakeholder	pressures.		In	addition,	differences	of	the	
Indonesia	environment	and	context	may	influence	the	application	of	certain	theories,	such	as	in	
the	definition	of	CSR,	the	form	of	government	intervention,	or	the	application	of	the	stakeholder	
concept.						
In	addition,	this	research	also	contributes	to	an	understanding	of	CSR	practices	in	Indonesia.		The	
increasing	number	of	CSR	projects	and	escalating	conflict	between	companies	and	communities	
raise	questions	about	what	has	happened	in	the	actual	CSR	implementation	in	the	field.		CSR	is	
potentially	a	bridge	for	companies	and	communities	to	build	harmonious	relationships.		CSR	can	
also	provide	benefits	to	local	communities	through	resources	distribution.		Through	examining	CSR	
legislation,	assessing	local	stakeholders’	perceptions	of	CSR	and	analysing	the	implementation	of	
CSR,	the	present	study	identifies	and	offers	explanations	for	the	weaknesses	of	Indonesian	CSR	and	
hence	offers	recommendations	for	improving	Indonesian	legislation	and	practice,	and	thus	for	
building	good	relationships	between	companies	and	local	communities.				
1.6. SCOPE	OF	RESEARCH	
The	present	research	focuses	on	the	Indonesian	Oil	and	Gas	industry,	by	studying	three	Oil	and	Gas	
companies,	comprising	an	Indonesia	Owned	Company	(IOC),	a	Foreign	Owned	Company	(FOC)	and	
a	State	Owned	Company	(SOC)	operating	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	in	the	South	Sumatera	
province.		The	three	different	cases	of	company	CSR	are	studied	in	order	to	explore	their	diversity,	
wherein	the	study	can	explore	multiple	practices,	describe	the	diversity	of	practice	and	explain	the	
critical	mediating	factors	(Yin	2009).		The	selection	of	the	Oil	and	Gas	sector	is	in	line	with	CSR	
legislation,	which	mentions	the	obligation	of	companies	related	to	natural	resources	to	undertake	
CSR.			
Figure	1.1	shows	the	location	of	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	in	South	Sumatera	Province,	Indonesia.		
Whilst,	the	district	location	is	shown	by	the	arrow,	the	colour	dots	in	the	figure	represents	Oil	and	
Gas	concession	infrastructures	established	in	Indonesia.				This	district	plays	an	important	role	in	
generating	electricity	for	Singapore	and	Java,	as	its	oil	and	gas	resources	are	distributed	through	
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pipelines	and	ship	transportation	to	those	areas	(BPS	2012).		The	district	is	the	fifth	largest	district	
in	oil	and	gas	production	in	Indonesia,	and	is	a	member	of	Forum	Komunikasi	Daerah	Penghasil	
Migas	(FKDPM	–	Communication	Forum	of	Oil	and	Gas	Producer	Districts).		The	population	of	this	
district	is	562,584	people,	with	approximately	20.06	percent	of	this	population	living	in	poverty	
(BPS	2012).		This	percentage	is	the	highest	in	the	South	Sumatera	province	and	higher	than	the	
average	level	of	poverty	for	all	districts	in	Indonesia	(Prayitno	et	al.	2014).		There	are	eleven	oil	and	
gas	companies,	both	domestic	and	foreign,	operating	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	(Ministry	of	
Energy	and	Mineral	Resources	2011).			
The	local	government	of	this	district,	supported	by	the	international	donor	organizations,	
European	Union	(EU)	and	United	National	Development	Programme	(UNDP),	established	a	CSR	
forum	in	2007	to	improve	consultation	between	companies	and	local	stakeholders	on	CSR	projects.		
The	forum	is	membered	by	all	companies	operating	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	District	and	managed	by	
several	district	government	officials.		The	main	aim	of	this	forum	is	to	synchronize	the	CSR	projects	
by	these	companies	with	government	development	projects	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	(Alizar,	
Zainal	&	Hayatuddin	2007).		However,	the	relationship	of	businesses	and	local	stakeholders	has	
often	been	difficult	in	this	district,	with	several	demonstrations	and	protests	from	local	
communities	(Zainal	2007).			
It	should	be	noted	that	the	primary	data	collection	was	undertaken	in	January	2013	–	January	
2014,	during	the	presidency	of	President	Soesilo	Bambang	Yudhoyono.		Some	changes	occurring	
during	the	research	period,	such	as	the	dissolution	of	BPMIGAS	(Badan	Pengelola	Usaha	Hulu	
Migas	-	Regulatory	Body	of	Oil	and	Gas	Upstream),	whose	responsibilities	shifted	to	SKKMIGAS	
(Satuan	Kerja	Khusus	Pelaksana	Kegiatan	Usaha	Hulu	Migas	-	Special	Task	Force	for	Upstream	Oil	
and	Gas	Business	Activities)	were	taken	into	account	in	the	thesis	discussion.		However,	other	
changes	in	government	policy	occurring	under	the	recently	elected	President	Jokowi	(October	
2014-present),	for	instance	the	change	of	the	local	district	authorization	process,	whereby	mining	
outside	Oil	and	Gas	are	now	under	the	control	of	the	provincial	government,	through	Law	No	23/	
2014	on	Local	Government,	are	not	captured	by	this	research.		This	law	may	influence	the	local	
environment	as	it	diminishes	local	district	authorization	of	mining	companies.		However,	the	
implementing	regulations	of	this	law	is	not	yet	issued	and	implemented.									
1.7. RESEARCH	APPROACH	
The	present	research	conducts	a	qualitative	study	by	adopting	an	interpretive	approach	to	
analysing	CSR	legislation,	the	perceptions	of	companies	and	their	stakeholders	to	CSR,	and	the	
implementation	of	CSR.		Cohen	and	Manion	(1994,	p.	36)	suggest	that	the	interpretive	approach	
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assists	researchers	to	understand	"the	world	of	human	experience”.		Furthermore,	Mertens	(2014,	
p.	12)	explicates	the	interpretive	approach	based	on	the	assumption	that	"reality	is	socially	
constructed”.		Therefore,	the	interpretive	approach	tends	to	rely	upon	"participants'	views	of	the	
situation	being	studied”,	with	the	researcher	then	comprehending	the	impact	of	these	participant’	
views	of	their	own	background	and	experiences	(Creswell	2013,	p.	8).		Interpretive	researchers	do	
not	generally	begin	a	study	with	a	theory,	as	is	common	for	post	positivists;	rather,	they	"generate	
or	inductively	develop	a	theory	or	pattern	of	meanings"	(Creswell	2013,	p.	9)	throughout	and	as	a	
result	of	the	research	process.		The	interpretive/constructivist	paradigm	generally	operates	using	
predominantly	qualitative	methods	(Silverman	2004),	however	quantitative	data	may	be	utilised	in	
a	way	that	supports	or	expands	upon	the	qualitative	data	and	effectively	deepens	its	description	
(Mackenzie	&	Knipe	2006).			
The	present	study	involved	the	application	of	qualitative	analysis	to	interviews,	observations,	
document	reviews	and	visual	data	(Creswell	2013).		The	document	review	analysis	is	essential	to	
analyse	the	various	CSR	laws	and	their	implementation	regulations.		Semi-structured	interviews	of	
managers	and	staff	from	three	selected	companies,	as	well	as	their	local	stakeholders	comprising	
local	government	officials	and	local	community	members,	were	conducted	in	order	to	examine	
their	perceptions	of	CSR	legislation	and	its	implementation.		Interviews	with	other	participants	
such	as	NGOs	activists,	businesses	associations	and	the	Oil	and	Gas	regulatory	body	are	also	used	
to	complement	the	data.		The	researcher	also	observed	the	interaction	of	companies,	communities	
and	government	participants	in	their	daily	CSR	activities.			
1.8. STRUCTURE	OF	THE	THESIS	
The	remainder	of	this	thesis	is	structured	as	follows.		Chapter	2	focuses	on	decentralization	and	its	
impacts	as	a	contextual	background	in	terms	of	historical	background,	the	distribution	of	power	
and	wealth,	and	oil	and	gas	resource	control.		The	impacts	of	decentralization	in	the	form	of	
decentralization	of	corruption,	and	business	and	local	stakeholder	relationships	are	also	
deliberated	in	this	chapter.		Chapter	3	presents	a	literature	review	relevant	to	this	research.		There	
are	three	major	streams	of	literature	discussed	in	this	chapter,	which	are	related	to	CSR,	
institutions	and	stakeholders.		Then,	the	combined	effects	of	institutions	and	stakeholders	on	
company	CSR	strategies	are	also	described	in	this	chapter.		Chapter	4	presents	the	research	
methodology	of	this	study.		The	chapter	discusses	the	qualitative	research,	research	design,	
research	settings,	the	participants,	ethical	considerations	and	limitations	of	methodology.		Chapter	
5	presents	the	mandate	of	CSR	legislation	and	the	local	stakeholder	perceptions.		Chapter	6	
elaborates	on	the	perceptions	and	implementation	of	CSR	legislation	by	three	selected	Oil	and	Gas	
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companies.		Chapter	7	presents	the	discussion	and	conclusion	sections	of	the	thesis.		Three	key	
findings	generated	from	this	study	are	discussed	in	this	chapter.		Finally,	implications	of	the	study	
and	contributions	to	practice	and	the	literature	are	also	presented	in	this	chapter.			
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Figure	1.1.	Map	of	Indonesia	with	Oil	and	Gas	Concession	Infrastructures	
 
Source:	(BPS	2012;	pwc	2013)	
Research	location	in	the	Musi	
Banyuasin	District,	South	
Sumatera	Province.	
• The	population	is	561,458	
people	consisting	of	288,450	
male	and	273,008	female.		
70.11%	is	in	the	productive	
age	range	15-55,	while	of	
the	rest	20.11%	are	in	the	0-
14	range,	and	9.8%	is	over	
56.		
• Total	area	is	14.265,96	km²	
• The	district	is	comprised	of	
14	Kecamatan	(subdistricts)	
and	216	desa/	kelurahan	
(villages).	
• Based	on	the	district	GDP,	
the	three	dominant	sectors	
of	the	district	are	mining	
(with	59.32%	of	total	GDP),	
farming	(14.80%),	and	
trading	(8.05%).		
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Chapter	2.	DECENTRALIZATION	AND	ITS	IMPACTS	:	A	CONTEXTUAL	
BACKGROUND	
2.1. INTRODUCTION	
There	are	three	main	levels	of	government	in	Indonesia,	consisting	of	the	central	government	led	
by	the	President,	the	provincial	governments	headed	by	a	gubernur	(governor),	and	kabupaten	
(district)	or	kota	(municipality)	government	headed	by	the	bupati	(head	of	district)	or	walikota	
(mayor/	head	of	city).		During	1967-1998,	under	the	‘new	order’	regime	of	President	Soeharto,	
the	central	government	practically	dominated	all	decisions	at	all	these	levels	of	government.		In	
1999,	a	radical	transformation	of	the	governance	system	from	centralization	to	decentralization	
occurred	in	Indonesia,	involving	the	delegation	of	certain	authorities	and	powers	to	the	district	
government	level	(Ahmad	&	Mansoor	2002;	Booth	2003;	Duncan	2007;	Holtzappel	&	Ramstedt	
2009).		Some	basic	services	such	as	education	and	health	are	now	delegated	to	the	authority	of	
local	district	government	in	order	to	make	authorization	of	the	provision	of	these	services	closer	
to	their	community	beneficiaries.		This	delegation	has	been	accompanied	by	revenue	sharing,	
transferred	by	central	to	local	district	governments	in	order	to	develop	their	territories.		This	
decentralization	and	the	delegation	of	power	to	local	district	governments	have	put	them	in	a	
more	powerful	position	in	terms	of	managing	their	territory	and	asserting	their	rights	(Ahmad	&	
Mansoor	2002).		On	the	other	hand,	the	end	of	the	privileged	protection	of	company	operations	
by	the	central	government	and	military	during	the	President	Soeharto	era	has	forced	companies	
into	the	situation	of	having	to	face	local	authorities	alone	or	with	less	assistance	from	the	central	
government	(Zainal	2007).		
The	implementation	of	CSR	legislation	by	companies	in	the	districts	is	influenced	by	this	
decentralization	context.		In	order	to	understand	such	pressures	within	this	context,	the	present	
chapter	elaborates	on	the	decentralization	process	and	its	impacts.		Section	2.2	discusses	
decentralization.		Section	2.3	elaborates	on	the	impacts	of	decentralization.		Section	2.4	presents	
the	chapter’s	conclusion.					
2.2. DECENTRALIZATION	
This	section	explores	the	decentralization	process	in	Indonesia	and	its	relation	to	Oil	and	Gas	
resource	control.		Subsection	2.2.1	discusses	the	historical	background.		Subsection	2.2.2	presents	
a	discussion	of	the	distribution	of	power	and	wealth	in	Indonesia.		Subsection	2.2.3	examines	the	
issue	of	Oil	and	Gas	resource	control.	
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2.2.1. The	History	of	Centralization	in	Indonesia	(1966-1998)		
Indonesia	is	an	archipelago	country	comprising	approximately	17,508	islands.		It	encompasses	34	
provinces	with	over	238	million	people,	making	it	the	world's	fourth	most	populous	country	
(Poesponegoro	&	Notosusanto	2008).		The	country	consists	of	300	distinct	native	ethnicities	and	
linguistic	groups,	such	as	Javanese,	Batak,	Melayu,	Bugis,	where	the	largest	and	politically	
dominant	ethnic	group	is	the	Javanese,	who	comprise	approximately	42	percent	of	the	population	
(BPS	2010).		According	to	the	2010	national	census,	58	percent	of	the	population	lives	in	Java,	
making	Java	the	world's	most	populous	island	(BPS	2010).			
Given	the	various	and	diverse	ethnicities,	languages	and	religions	in	this	country,	a	“new	order	
regime”	under	President	Soeharto	promoted	a	model	of	dekonsentrasi	(deconcentration	–	a	
model	of	central	control	on	budget	while	appointing	local	officials	to	deliver	public	services	and	
goods).		The	application	of	this	model	by	the	regime	created	a	lack	of	authority	for	local	officials	
(Ahmad	&	Mansoor	2002).		According	to	Thorburn	(2002),	the	Law	No.	5/1974	on	Regional	
Development,	which	rules	this	system,	forced	the	local	district	governments	to	“sweep	along	on	
the	coattails”	of	the	phenomenal	power	of	the	national	government,	which	developed	large	
bureaucracies	and	consolidated	its	privilege.	The	local	district	government	was	not	involved	in	
consultation	with	central	government	in	the	formation	of	territorial	policies.		Indeed,	local	district	
government	acted	simply	as	an	instrument	of	central	government	to	implement	its	policies.		Local	
legislative	powers	(DPRD-Dewan	Perwakilan	Rakyat	Daerah)	in	this	era	functioned	solely	as	
“rubber	stamp’’	bodies,	which	were	appropriately	rewarded	for	their	acquiescence	to	the	plans	of	
their	superiors	(Duncan	2007;	Thorburn	2002).			
This	condition	undermined	the	existence	of	local	communities’	rights.		The	prominent	terms	of	
musyawarah	(deliberation)	and	mufakat	(consensus)	used	by	the	central	government	were	
invoked	to	justify	a	range	of	political	measures	and	economic	policies,	and	to	censure	anyone	who	
tried	to	object	(Duncan	2007).		The	thirty-two	years	of	centralized	development	under	the	‘new	
order	regime’	of	President	Soeharto	weakened	many	indigenous	cultural	institutions	that	
mediated	access	to	and	use	of	local	resources	and	territories.		The	force	of	musyawarah	and	
mufakat	from	central	government	ensured	that	local	cultural	institutions	must	surrender	their	
rights	and	ownership	to	central	government	policies	for	the	larger	national	development	interest	
(Duncan	2007).		
A	dramatic	transformation	happened	after	the	Krismon	(monetary	crisis)	in	1997,	which	shocked	
Southeast	Asian	countries.		Indonesia’s	economy	was	hit	very	hard,	with	the	depreciation	of	the	
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Indonesian	Rupiah	currency	vis-à-vis	the	US	Dollar	being	231	percent	over	the	period	from	July	1,	
1997	to	February	16,	1998.		This	depreciation	was	the	highest	compared	to	other	countries	in	the	
region	such	as	Malaysia,	the	Philippines	and	Thailand,	which	suffered	a	depreciation	of	55.43,	
51.37	and	87.09	percent,	respectively,	during	the	same	period	(Stalker	2000).		It	was	noted	that	
the	economic	turmoil	in	Indonesia	was	inseparable	from	the	political	crisis	connected	to	bad	
governance,	involving	what	is	termed	KKN	(Korupsi,	Kolusi,	Nepotism	–	Corruption,	Collusion	and	
Nepotism)	in	the	government	(Davidson	2010;	Duncan	2007).		The	crisis	has	been	partly	
attributed	to	the	inefficiency	and	lack	of	accountability	of	Indonesia’s	then	highly	centralised	
system.			
The	systemic	abuse	of	central	government	power	caused	a	massive	reaction	from	students	in	all	
areas	of	Indonesia	during	early	1998.		The	ensuing	demonstrations	and	protests	over	Soeharto’s	
power	and	the	KKN	which	caused	krismon	(krisis	moneter	–	the	monetary	crisis)	in	Indonesia	
raised	demands	for	democratization,	equality,	justice	and	human	rights.		This	resulted	in	the	
resignation	of	the	President	Soeharto	regime,	whilst	also	providing	opportunities	for	regional	
leaders	to	issue	ultimatums	that	the	central	government	should	give	more	authority	to	them	to	
rule	their	own	territories	(Duncan	2007;	Rasyid	2003).		In	the	central	government,	politicians	and	
policy	makers	saw	decentralization	and	regional	autonomy	as	a	way	to	stabilize	the	country	by	
making	government	more	accountable	to	local	populations	and	by	addressing	demands	from	
regional	leaders	who	wanted	more	authority	over	fiscal	and	political	matters	(Firman	2013).			
This	dramatic	transformation	from	centralization	to	decentralization	has	been	called	a	‘big	bang’	
process,	as	the	distribution	of	power	from	highly	concentrated	power	under	Soeharto	and	his	
regime	to	distributed	power	for	around	400	districts	and	municipalities	occurred	in	a	radical	
manner	(Rasyid	2003).		The	decentralization	process	was	part	of	a	central	government	response	
intended	to	dampen	the	complaints	of	regional	leaders	who	were	tired	of	centralized	rule	from	
Jakarta	that	limited	their	authority	to	manage	their	own	territories	(Duncan	2007).		The	legislators	
also	hoped	that	transferring	power	to	the	districts	and	municipalities	would	placate	other	critics	
of	centralized	rule	(Booth	2003;	Duncan	2007).		
2.2.2. Decentralization	:	The	Distribution	of	Power	and	Wealth	
Decentralization	changed	the	relationship	between	central	and	local	governments	at	the	province	
and	district	levels.		Instead	of	delegating	power	to	the	provincial	level,	the	central	government	
decided	to	transfer	the	power	to	district	governments.		The	government’s	stated	reason	for	
selecting	decentralization	autonomy	at	kabupaten	(district)	and	kota	(municipality)	level	was	that	
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it	brought	government	closer	to	the	people.		However,	some	have	argued	that	the	‘whispered’	
explanation	is	that	if	autonomy	was	given	to	the	provinces,	they	could	be	large	enough	to	secede;	
and	that	it	is	thus	far	easier	and	safer	for	the	central	government	to	exercise	authority	over	a	
large	number	of	small	administrative	units	than	the	larger	and	fewer	provincial-size	governments	
(Duncan	2007;	Holtzappel	&	Ramstedt	2009).					
The	launch	of	the	decentralization	system	was	marked	by	the	issuance	of	two	pieces	of	
legislations	by	the	transitional	government	under	President	Habibie	in	1998-1999:	Law	No.	22/	
1999	on	Regional	Governance;	and	Law	No.	25/	1999	on	the	financial	balance	between	central	
and	local	government	(Ahmad	&	Mansoor	2002).		These	two	laws	ambitiously	planned	the	
transfer	of	fiscal	and	political	responsibility	from	Jakarta,	the	capital	of	Indonesia,	to	over	400	
districts	and	municipalities.		The	laws	were	drafted	within	less	than	one	year,	to	quickly	respond	
the	increasing	demand	of	local	governments	for	autonomy	in	administering	their	territories.		To	
rapidly	respond	to	these	demands,	the	laws	were	drafted	by	a	small	circle	of	officials	without	
involving	broad-based	stakeholder	participation,	resulting	in	the	laws	having	a	lack	of	clarity	
(Rasyid	2003).			
These	two	laws	were	later	amended	with	two	new	laws:	Law	32/2004	on	Regional	Administration	
to	replace	Law	22/1999;	and	Law	33/2004	on	the	Fiscal	Balance	between	the	Central	Government	
and	the	Regional	Governments	(provincial	and	districts)	to	replace	Law	25/1999	(Duncan	2007;	
Firman	2013;	Holtzappel	&	Ramstedt	2009;	von	Benda-Beckmann	&	von	Benda-Beckmann	2013).		
Law	No.	32/	2004	on	Regional	Administration	transferred	political	power	and	gave	authority	to	
districts	and	municipalities	in	areas	such	as	health,	education,	village	governance,	land	tenure,	
trade,	environment	and	resource	extraction;	while	the	central	government	remained	responsible	
for	national	defence,	international	relations,	justice,	security,	religion,	and	monetary	policies	
(Holtzappel	&	Ramstedt	2009).		The	districts	and	municipalities	were	now	able	to	obtain	revenue	
from	resource	exploitation	through	redistribution	of	natural	resource	revenue.		The	districts	now	
received	a	certain	percentage	of	revenues	generated	by	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources,	
particularly	oil,	natural	gas,	timber	and	mining	(see	table	2.1).		Officials	in	the	central	government	
hoped	this	legislation	would	address	long-term	resentment	from	people	in	resource-rich	regions,	
who	were	angered	over	perceived	outflows	of	wealth	to	Jakarta.		Furthermore,	the	new	
legislation	also	gave	the	districts	and	municipalities	in	Indonesia	the	authority	to	implement	new	
taxes	and	fees	to	increase	their	revenue	base	(Agustina	et	al.	2012).						
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Table	2.1	below	shows	the	fiscal	balance	between	the	central	and	local	governments	in	the	areas	
of	land	and	property	tax,	acquisition	of	land	and	building	rights,	natural	resources	and	income	tax.		
Unlike	other	sectors	that	give	the	larger	proportion	of	revenue	share	to	local	government,	oil	and	
gas	mining	give	only	a	small	portion	to	local	district	government.		The	central	government	gets	a	
larger	portion	of	oil	and	gas	production,	85	percent	for	oil	and	70	percent	for	gas,	compared	to	
the	local	government,	which	only	receives	15	percent	and	30	percent	of	oil	and	gas	production,	
respectively.		The	local	government	portion	of	15	percent	and	30	percent	from	oil	and	gas	
production	respectively	is	then	allocated	to	three	separate	local	governments,	which	are:	the	
provincial	government;	the	producer	district	government;	and	other	districts	in	the	same	province	
(this	will	be	discussed	in	Subsection	2.2.3).			
Table	2.1.	Fiscal	Balance	between	Central	and	District	Governments	based	on	Law	No	33/	2004		
Sources	 Central	Government	
(%)	
Local	Government	
(provincial	and	
districts)	(%)	
Land	and	Property	Tax	 10	 90	
Acquisition	of	land	and	building	rights	 20	 80	
Natural	Resources:	Forestry,	Public	Mining,	
and	Fishery	sectors	
20	 80	
Oil	Mining	 85	 15	
Gas	 70	 30	
Income	Tax	 80	 20	
Source:	(Agustina	et	al.	2012)	
The	other	substantial	change	with	this	transition	is	in	the	system	of	political	governance.		In	the	
decentralization	era,	the	head	of	regional	government,	such	as	governor	of	the	province,	walikota	
(mayor	of	municipalities),	bupati	(head	of	district),	and	kepala	desa	(head	of	village),	who	were	
previously	appointed	by	central	government,	are	now	directly	elected	by	the	local	people	(Hidayat	
2009;	Valsecchi	2012).		It	was	hoped	that	this	would	promote	better	governance,	as	local	officials	
would	be	more	aware	of	and	responsive	to	their	local	constituents’	needs.		The	local	governments	
would	be	more	accountable	to	their	constituents,	leading	to	better	policy	and	less	corruption	
(Duncan	2007).		Hence,	the	opportunity	to	control	their	local	natural	resources	would	improve	
natural	resource	management,	as	the	locals	would	be	more	able	to	adopt	sustainable	resource	
management	practices	with	reference	to	their	local	values	(Gibson	&	Woolcock	2008;	Siddiquee,	
Nastiti	&	Sejati	2012).							
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The	main	challenge	faced	by	this	decentralization	autonomy	is	the	growing	disappointment	for	
local	government	over	the	revenue	sharing	arrangements	between	central	and	local,	provincial	
and	district	governments	(Agustina	et	al.	2012;	Agustina,	Fengler	&	Schulze	2012;	Holtzappel	&	
Ramstedt	2009).		They	perceive	that	the	central	government	continues	to	“dominate	Indonesia’s	
public	finance”	through	the	share	of	income	tax	(80	percent),	revenue	from	oil	(85	percent)	and	
gas	(70	percent),	and	Value	Added	Tax	(100	percent)	collected	by	the	central	government;	whilst	
local	government	taxes	remain	limited	to	hotels,	restaurants,	entertainment,	public	
advertisements,	street	lighting,	quarrying	and	parking,	which	do	not	provide	adequate	funding	
(Agustina	et	al.	2012).		
Some	also	claim	that	local	district	governments	are	simply	not	yet	prepared	to	deal	with	their	new	
responsibilities,	due	to	limitations	in	their	human	resources	capability.		Bureaucrats	in	local	
government	have	shown	a	tendency	to	put	their	own	interests	first,	rather	than	the	people’s	
interests.		As	decentralization	gives	them	independence	and	more	control	over	their	finances,	
they	can	allocate	money	as	they	see	fit.	For	example,	in	the	district	of	West	Lombok,	the	
government	allocated	more	than	IDR	3.3	billion	(approximately	USD	330,000)	towards	the	
purchase	of	luxury	cars	and	motorbikes	for	district	officials	in	the	fiscal	year	2002.	In	contrast,	
they	allocated	no	money	towards	village	development	funds,	because	they	‘forgot’	about	it	
(Mawardi	et	al.	2002).		In	addition,	local	legislative	houses	(DPRDs)	are	at	present	also	‘weak’	and	
do	not	function	as	accountable	and	transparent	bodies.		The	continuing	predominance	of	political	
parties	in	the	electoral	process,	as	stipulated	in	the	decentralization	legislation,	virtually	ensures	
that	candidates	are	more	accountable	to	their	party	than	to	their	constituency	(Duncan	2007;	
Hadiz	2003).		
2.2.3. Oil	and	Gas	Resources	Control	
Although	central	government	has	delegated	much	authority	to	the	local	district	government	level,	
oil	and	gas	resource	remains	under	the	rule	of	central	government.		Article	33	number	2	of	
Indonesia’s	basic	constitution,	commonly	used	to	justify	this	decision,	states:	
“Sectors	of	production	which	are	important	for	the	country	and	affect	the	life	of	the	
people	shall	be	under	the	powers	of	the	State.”		-Article	33,	1945	Constitution	-	
Specifically,	oil	and	gas	resources	are	considered	important	for	the	country	and	affect	the	life	of	
Indonesian	people	in	terms	of	energy	supply.		This	rationale	is	used	to	maintain	the	status	quo	of	
central	government	control	over	oil	and	gas	resources.		Companies	in	this	sector	are	required	to	
report	to	central	government	in	terms	of	their	production,	as	ruled	by	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No.	22/	
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2001,	which	was	passed	immediately	after	the	two	year	period	of	decentralization.		However,	in	
terms	of	operations,	oil	and	gas	companies	have	to	consult	with	local	government	authorities	to	
secure	local	licenses	related	to	local	environment	and	local	communities.	
In	terms	of	the	national	energy	supply	policy,	the	central	government	has	imported	oil	to	fill	the	
increasing	domestic	demand,	as	is	illustrated	in	Figure	2.1	below.		
Figure	2.1.	Production	and	Consumption	of	Oil	in	Indonesia	(1980	–	2012)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source	:	(Budhiarto	2011)	
Figure	2.1	describes	production	and	consumption	of	oil	in	Indonesia	during	1980-2011	(in	
thousand	barrels	per	day).		The	red	graph	represents	production	while	the	blue	graph	indicates	
consumption	of	oil.		The	figure	illustrates	that	Indonesian	crude	oil	production	has	not	been	able	
to	meet	domestic	consumption	since	2003,	leading	Indonesia	to	withdraw	from	OPEC	
(Organization	of	the	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries)	in	2008	(Boyd	et	al.	2010).		Indonesia’s	crude	
oil	production	has	decreased	by	roughly	3	percent	per	year	over	the	last	15	years,	while	overall	
fuel	consumption	has	increased	by	roughly	4	percent	per	year.		The	ratio	between	crude	oil	
production	and	fuel	consumption	has	been	continuously	decreasing.		It	fell	from	205	percent	in	
1990	to	128	percent	in	2000	and	then	to	58	percent	in	2011.			The	decrease	is	mainly	due	to	lack	
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of	investment	in	exploration	for	new	oilfields,	declining	production	from	maturing	fields	and	
increasing	fuel	demands	of	the	growing	middle	class	population	(Ministry	of	Energy	and	Mineral	
Resources	2013).			
The	BPMIGAS	(now	SKKMIGAS)	annual	report	(BPMIGAS	2011,	2012)	indicates	that	one	
contributing	factor	to	the	decrease	in	oil	production	in	Indonesia	is	unconducive	local	
environments,	with	increasing	local	protests	and	rallies	directed	against	company	operations.		
These	protests	often	result	in	companies	temporarily	shutting	down	their	operations,	so	that	they	
are	unable	to	fulfil	their	production	targets	set	in	their	Production	Sharing	Contract	(PSC),	a	type	
of	contract	adopted	by	the	Indonesian	government	to	arrange	the	sharing	between	government	
and	a	company	(or	group	of	companies)	on	the	oil	and	gas	production.			
Political	Economy	of	Oil	and	Gas	Resources	
Because	of	these	production	deficits,	Indonesia	has	not	exported	their	oil	where	previously	in	the	
Soeharto	era	the	revenue	from	oil	exports	was	crucial	to	the	Indonesian	economy	(Seda	2005).		
The	contributions	of	oil	and	gas	to	the	Indonesian	economy	recently	has	relied	on	tax	and	non-tax	
revenue.		The	majority	of	Indonesia’s	oil	and	gas	output	has	been	extracted	under	contracts	with	
private	investors.	Private	contractors	share	their	revenues	with	the	government	through	revenue-
sharing	agreements.	The	revenue	shares	are	based	on	net	operating	income,	which	is	the	amount	
of	oil	production	revenue	minus	the	costs	of	production,	not	including	any	production	related-
government	taxes	and	charges.		Taxes	and	charges	include	the	corporate	income	tax,	interest	
dividend	tax,	royalties,	and	state	owned	companies	in	Oil	and	Gas	retention	fee	and	local	taxes.		
Table	2.2	presents	the	composition	of	oil	and	gas	revenue	in	Indonesia	from	2008	to	2010.	
Table	2.2	illustrates	Indonesia	domestic	revenue,	which	also	includes	Oil	and	Gas	revenue,	from	
2008-2010.		Components	of	domestic	revenue	consist	of	tax	revenues,	comprising	income	tax	and	
other	tax	revenue,	while	non-tax	revenues	comprise	revenues	from	natural	resources,	profits	of	
state	enterprises	and	other	non-tax	revenues.		The	contribution	of	Oil	and	Gas	to	this	domestic	
revenue	is	highlighted	in	this	table.		In	2010,	government	revenue	from	Oil	and	Gas	tax	and	non-
tax	revenue	accounted	for	one	fifth	of	total	revenue.		Around	5	percent	of	total	revenue	comes	
from	Oil	and	Gas	tax,	and	14	percent	comes	from	Oil	and	Gas	non-tax	revenue.		Non-tax	Oil	and	
Gas	revenue	represent	the	largest	share	in	total	natural	resource	revenue,	accounting	for	90	
percent	of	the	total.		Non-tax	Oil	revenue	itself	is	about	three	times	higher	than	the	non-tax	Gas	
revenue	in	2010.		The	gap	between	non-tax	Oil	and	Gas	revenue	is	widening	with	the	increase	in	
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oil	price,	such	as	in	2008,	when	non-tax	oil	revenue	was	almost	four	times	as	large	as	gas	revenue	
(Agustina	et	al.	2012).	
Table	2.2.	Oil	and	Gas	revenue	as	portion	of	National	Revenue	(IDR	billion)	
	 2008	 %	total	
revenue	
2009	 %	total	
revenue	
2010	 %	total	
revenue	
Revenue	and	Grants	 1,042,608	 100.0	 944,960	 100.0	 1,106,032	 100.0	
A. Domestic	Revenue	 1,039,643	 99.7	 943,293	 99.8	 1,103,009	 99.7	
I. Tax	Revenues	 687,800	 66.0	 682,627	 72.2	 795,159	 71.9	
a. Income	Tax	 318,028	 30.5	 317,583	 33,6	 357,046	 32.3	
- Non-Oil	and	Gas	 255,927	 24.5	 267,540	 28.3	 298,173	 27.0	
- Oil	and	Gas	 62,101	 6.0	 50,044	 5.3	 58,873	 5.3	
b. Other	tax	revenue	 369,772	 35.5	 365,044	 38.6	 438,113	 39.6	
II. Non	Tax	Receipts	 351,843	 33.7	 260,666	 27.6	 307,850	 27.8	
a. Natural	Resources	 228,961	 21.0	 125,752	 13.3	 125,733	 13.8	
i. Oil	and	Gas	 219,084	 21.0	 125,752	 13.3	 152,733	 13.8	
ii. Non-Oil	and	Gas	 9,877	 0.9	 12,807	 1.4	 16,092	 1.5	
b. Profits	 of	 State	
Enterprises	
35,044	 3.4	 26,050	 2.8	 30,097	 2.7	
i. State	oil	company	 12,400	 1.2	 10,472	 1.1	 9,509	 0.9	
ii. State	gas	company	 300	 0.0	 703	 0.1	 4,000	 0.4	
iii. Other	 state	
enterprise	
22,344	 2.1	 14,874	 1.6	 16,588	 1.5	
c. Other	non-tax	revenues	 87,838	 8.4	 96,058	 10.2	 108,927	 9.8	
Source:	(Agustina,	Fengler	&	Schulze	2012)	
The	fuel	prices	in	Indonesia	are	not	determined	by	market	mechanisms	but	set	by	the	central	
government.		These	prices	are	frequently	set	lower	than	the	international	market	price,	and	the	
government	has	to	fill	the	price	gap	with	subsidies.		These	fuel	subsidies,	therefore,	always	
dominate	the	nation’s	economic	policy	agenda	when	the	international	oil	prices	sharply	fluctuate.		
Fuel	subsidies	were	previously	distributed	to	five	fuel	products:	gasoline	(known	as	
Bensin/Premium),	kerosene	(known	as	Minyak	Tanah),	automotive	diesel	oil	(ADO)	(known	as	
Solar),	industrial	diesel	oil	(IDO)	(known	as	Solar	Industry)	and	fuel	oil	(known	as	Minyak	Bakar,	
mainly	for	industries).		Since	2005	the	government	has	subsidized	only	the	three	products	of	
gasoline,	kerosene	and	automotive	diesel	oil	(ADO),	for	the	reason	that	these	three	products	are	
mostly	used	by	people	for	transportation	and	cooking.		The	fuel	subsidy	is	essentially	subsidizing	
the	price	gap	between	the	domestic	retail	price	(administered	price)	and	the	economic	price	set	
by	the	market	and	operational	costs.	The	government	pays	the	subsidy	to	Pertamina,	the	state	oil	
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enterprise,	which	has	a	mandate	to	provide	and	distribute	subsidized	fuels	in	Indonesia.	The	
fluctuation	of	international	oil	prices	during	the	last	10	years,	according	to	Son	(2008),	forced	
Indonesia	to	spend	around	5	percent	on	average	of	its	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	on	energy	
subsidies.			
Table	2.3.	Fuel	subsidies	as	portion	of	Consolidated	National	Expenditure	(IDR	Billion)	
	 2008	 2009	 2010	
Rp	Billion	 %	of	total	
expenditure	
Rp	Billion	 %	of	total	
expenditure	
Rp	Billion	 %	of	total	
expenditure	
Personnel	 275,471	 24.3	 316,681	 27.9	 346,656	 30.4	
Material	 123,679	 10.9	 159,649	 14.1	 179,602	 15.7	
Interest	payments	 88,430	 7.8	 93,782	 8.3	 88,383	 7.7	
Subsidies	 275,292	 24.3	 138,082	 12.2	 192,707	 16.9	
• Energy	 223,013	 19.7	 94,586	 8.3	 139,953	 12.3	
o Fuel	 139,107	 12.3	 45,039	 4.0	 82,351	 7.2	
o Electricity	 83,907	 7.4	 49,546	 4.4	 57,602	 5.0	
• Non-Energy	 52,278	 4,6	 43,496	 3.8	 52,754	 4.6	
Social	assistance	 57,741	 5.1	 73,814	 6.5	 68,611	 6.0	
Other	routine	exp.	 84,651	 7.5	 109,838	 9.7	 88,554	 7.8	
Capital	exp.	 226,327	 20.0	 241,307	 21.3	 176,457	 15.5	
Total	 1,131,590	 100	 1,133,152	 100	 1,140,972	 100	
Source:	(Agustina,	Fengler	&	Schulze	2012)	
Table	2.3	presents	the	consolidated	national	expenditure	from	2008	–	2010.		National	
expenditure	consists	of	personnel,	material,	interest	payments,	subsidies,	social	assistance,	other	
routine	expenditure	and	capital	expenditure.		In	particular,	expenditures	for	Oil	and	Gas	are	in	the	
form	of	subsidies	to	fuel	and	electricity.		The	amount	of	subsidies	spent	during	2008-2010	
fluctuated	due	to	the	international	market	oil	prices.		As	the	total	fuel	subsidy	is	counted	from	the	
difference	between	the	market	price	and	the	subsidized	price	set	by	the	government,	any	
increase	in	the	international	oil	price	will	cause	an	increase	in	the	cost	of	the	fuel	subsidy.		In	2008	
when	oil	prices	reached	very	high	levels,	almost	20	percent	of	government	expenditure	was	
allocated	to	energy	subsidies,	similar	to	the	amount	allocated	to	capital	expenditures.	When	oil	
prices	fell	in	2008–09	due	to	the	Global	Financial	Crisis,	the	share	of	energy	subsidies	also	declined	
sharply	to	just	8	percent	in	2009,	before	increasing	to	12	percent	in	2010.		Recently,	because	of	
the	increased	crude	oil	market	price,	subsidy	for	fuel	has	increased	again.		In	2012,	the	total	
subsidy	reached	USD	346.4	million	or	34.33	percent	of	the	total	central	government	expenditure.				
This	burden	on	the	government	budget	has	resulted	in	debates	on	fuel	subsidy	policies.		The	
Ministry	of	Energy	and	Mineral	Resources	released	a	report	in	2011	on	the	beneficiaries	of	fuel	
	 Mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia:	Institutional	and	Stakeholder	Perspective	
 
20	
 
subsidies.		The	report	shown	that	77	percent	of	fuel	oil	subsidies	are	received	by	the	25	percent	of	
households	in	the	high	income	bracket,	while	low	income	households	only	benefitted	from	
around	15	percent	of	fuel	oil	subsidies	(Ministry	of	Energy	and	Mineral	Resources	2011).		Fuel	
subsidies	thus	worsen	income	distribution	in	Indonesia	as	most	of	the	subsidies	are	enjoyed	by	
the	non-poor	groups.		A	study	conducted	in	2008	shows	that	the	top	30	percent	richest	of	the	
income	groups	enjoyed	almost	72	percent	of	gasoline	subsidies,	while	30	percent	of	the	lowest	
income	groups	consumed	16	percent	of	kerosene	subsidies	and	only	4	percent	of	gasoline	
subsidies.		Those	in	the	lowest	income	group	rarely	own	a	motor	vehicle,	so	their	gasoline	
consumption	is	very	low.		The	study	concluded	that	in	general	the	richest	income	group	received	
state	fuel	subsidies	of	approximately	IDR	111,533/month/capita	while	those	for	the	lowest	
income	group	were	only	approximately	IDR	10,787/month/capita	(Dartanto	2013).			
However,	a	policy	in	2005–2006	(BPS	2006)	reducing	the	fuel	subsidy	caused	the	new	middle	class	
to	fall	back	into	the	low	income	class.		The	increasing	cost	of	energy	also	indirectly	impacted	non-
fuel	prices	such	as	the	cost	of	living,	food,	transportation,	etc.		The	reduction	negatively	affected	
household	welfare	as	well	as	poverty,	depending	on	the	importance	of	energy	and	private	
transport	costs	in	total	household	consumption	and	the	fuel	costs	in	the	production	of	goods	and	
services.	Since	the	low	income	groups	rarely	have	an	enough	savings	for	consumption	smoothing	
to	respond	to	an	increase	of	price	level,	they	can	easily	fall	into	poverty	as	a	result	of	such	
negative	changes	(Arze	del	Granado,	Coady	&	Gillingham	2012).		According	to	BPS	(Biro	Pusat	
Statistik	-	the	Central	Statistical	Agency),	the	number	of	poor	people	increased	from	16	percent	to	
17.8	percent,	the	equivalent	of	3.95	million	people	(1.8	percent	of	total	Indonesian	population)	
during	the	period	of	the	reduction	in	fuel	subsidy.		To	mitigate	the	negative	impact	of	phasing	out	
of	fuel	subsidies,	the	government	implemented	the	Program	Kompensasi	Pengurangan	Subsidi-
BBM	(compensation	program	for	fuel	subsidy	reduction)	in	2005	and	2008.	This	program	included	
cash	transfer,	health	insurance,	education	subsidies	and	also	rural	infrastructure	development	
(Beaton	&	Lontoh	2010).	
The	amount	of	fuel	subsidy	appears	to	rise	every	year	following	increases	in	crude	oil	market	
prices.		The	need	to	reduce	or	even	eliminate	the	subsidy	is	widely	discussed,	in	order	to	
reallocate	the	subsidy	budget	to	other	areas	in	Indonesian	society	such	as	improving	health	and	
education	facilities,	developing	food	security	and	also	promoting	economic	growth.		Such	policies	
have	gained	particular	attention	as	an	strategic	option	for	the	Indonesia	government;	but	it	is	
apparent	that	the	government	is	reluctant	to	reduce	the	fuel	subsidy	budget	so	as	to	spend	more	
on	these	other	programs	(Schmidt	et	al.	2008).		The	reluctance	to	change	the	fuel	subsidy	policy	
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occurs	because	there	are	certain	well-organized	groups	who	gain	a	benefit	from	this	policy,	and	
thus	are	prepared	to	block	any	reform.		Policy	reforms	that	generate	positive	benefits	thus	may	
not	be	viable	politically.		Therefore,	while	other	governments	have	reduced	similar	subsidies,	in	
Indonesia	the	cost	of	subsidies	has	actually	risen	sharply	in	recent	years	in	the	struggle	to	insulate	
consumers	from	the	full	rise	in	the	cost	of	fossil	fuels	(World	Bank	2009).	It	is	argued	that	the	
failure	to	reduce	or	eliminate	fuel	subsidies	lies	in	the	failure	to	counter	the	political	aspect	of	
subsidy	policies.		The	fuel	subsidies	still	exist	because	they	are	rooted	in	a	political	logic	that	is	
often	difficult	to	alter.		The	political	economy	reason	often	begins	with	the	basic	assumption	that	
government	leaders	act	with	the	goal	of	staying	in	power.		The	government	leaders,	who	are	
elected	politically	through	direct	vote,	can	channel	the	fuel	subsidy	resources	to	the	interest	
groups	that	can	affect	the	chances	of	government	survival.		The	subsidy	resources	therefore	aim	
to	fund	the	maintenance	of	political	power	(Resosudarmo	2005;	Victor	2009).			
It	is	noted	that	during	the	research	period	political	tensions	arose	due	to	the	direct	election	of	
Parliament	in	April	2014	and	President	in	July	2014.		The	decision	to	reduce	the	fuel	subsidy	and	
increase	the	fuel	price	may	have	made	the	voters	wish	to	punish	the	government	and	not	vote	for	
the	Democrat	Party	as	the	then	current	ruling	party.		The	then	current	president,	Mr.	Yudhoyono,	
would	not	have	forgotten	what	happened	in	2009	after	his	government	had	raised	the	fuel	prices	
in	2008,	and	then	cut	them	again	as	the	oil	price	fell	before	the	elections	in	2009,	though	the	
compensatory	cash	handouts	kept	flowing.		This	helped	Mr	Yudhoyono	to	a	landslide	victory	in	
2009.		Reducing	subsidies	during	this	recent	period	of	high	political	tension	may	have	risked	his	
party’s	chances	of	winning	the	elections.		The	President	did	try	to	raise	prices	in	2013,	but	this	
plan	was	denied	by	the	dominant	parliamentary	membership	(The	Economist	2014).		The	political	
interest	groups	that	maintain	the	fuel	subsidies	are	usually	well	organized,	and	the	provision	of	a	
subsidy	usually	makes	those	groups	even	more	aware	of	their	interest	in	sustaining	the	subsidy	
policy.	Further,	the	government	entities	that	supply	subsidies	often	find	political	advantage	in	
providing	this	costly	service.	These	political	facts	make	it	particularly	difficult	for	the	policy-
makers	to	separate	their	own	political	interest	in	and	the	many	“legitimate”	purposes	of	the	
government	fuel	subsidy	policy.		On	the	surface,	the	leading	power	in	government	or	legislative	
assembly	might	appear	to	use	a	subsidy	to	help	provide	energy	services	to	low-income	
communities	as	part	of	a	worthy	effort	to	redistribute	income	or	help	alleviate	poverty;	
meanwhile,	their	underlying	interest	in	maintaining	the	fuel	subsidy	policy	is	to	maintain	their	
power	by	gaining	more	votes	from	those	who	received	benefits	from	these	fuel	subsidies.			
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Oil	and	Gas	Resources	Control	:	Between	Central	Rules	and	Local	Claims	
The	shifting	of	Indonesia	governance	from	centralisation	to	decentralisation	appears	to	have	
changed	the	way	government	manages	their	mining	resources.		However,	for	Oil	and	Gas	
resources,	the	resources	remain	under	central	government	control,	while	local	government	only	
receive	a	revenue	share,	which	is	counted	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	central	government.		This	
situation	led	to	a	complicated	situation,	since	the	resources	are	mainly	located	outside	the	Java	
island.		Figure	2.2	presents	oil	and	gas	reserve	locations	in	Indonesia,	which	are	shown	to	be	
mostly	located	outside	of	Java	island.		As	shown	in	Figure	2.2,	only	19.4	percent	of	oil	reserves	are	
located	in	Java,	while	the	rest	are	spread	across	other	islands	such	as	Sumatera,	Kalimantan,	
Sulawesi	and	Papua.		The	figure	also	indicates	a	similar	case	for	gas	reserves,	which	in	Java	are	
only	6.5	percent	of	the	total,	with	the	rest,	93.5	percent,	are	found	at	other	locations.		The	oil	and	
gas	reserves	in	Java	Island	are	only	1,557.67	MMSTB1	and	10.1	TSCF2	for	oil	and	gas,	respectively.			
The	efforts	to	control	the	production	of	oil	commenced	from	the	Dutch	colonization	with	its	rule	
of	“the	East-Indies	mining	law”	in	1899	(de	Vries	2013;	Simamora	2000).		This	law	gave	a	position	
of	strength	to	the	Dutch	government,	to	manage	and	control	the	oil	and	gas	in	those	islands.		
With	this	law,	the	Dutch	colony	was	able	to	grant	a	concession	right	for	other	foreign	companies	
to	exploit	these	oil	and	gas	resources.		Concessions	gave	companies	a	right	to	buy	all	natural	
resources	in	a	particular	area	from	the	Dutch	colony	and	neglected	the	local	community	rights	
over	such	resources	(Wiriosudarmo	2001).		Under	such	a	concession,	a	company	as	concession	
holder	was	awarded	total	control	over	oil	and	gas	resources,	whereby	“they	could	produce	
however	much	they	want	and	whenever	they	want,	and	could	sell	it	to	whomever	they	want	at	
whatever	price	they	want”	(Radon	2007).		There	were	three	oil	and	gas	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia	during	the	Dutch	colonial	era:	International	Royal	Dutch/	SHELL	Oil	&	Gas	Company;	
and	two	US	companies,	Stanvac	(now	ExxonMobil)	and	Caltex	(now	Chevron)	(de	Vries	2013;	
Karim	&	Mills	2003).		The	concession	system	only	recognized	the	rights	of	foreign	companies	and	
the	central	Dutch	government,	while	the	communities’	rights	and	interests	were	never	included	in	
the	concession	agreement	(de	Vries	2013).		
President	Soekarno	attempted	to	terminate	this	foreign	company	domination	of	Indonesia’s	oil	
and	gas	resources	during	the	independence	era.		These	efforts	to	nationalize	the	oil	and	gas	
owned	by	foreign	companies	were	initiated	in	order	to	gain	the	economic	benefits	from	these	
resources.		The	Soekarno	government	acknowledged	that	nationalization	of	foreign	oil	and	gas	
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companies	was	an	important	way	to	obtain	revenue	for	foreign	currency	and	the	state	budget	for	
the	early	Indonesian	government	(de	Vries	2013).		This	plan,	however,	was	never	achieved,	as	
President	Soekarno	stepped	down	in	1967	due	to	the	economic	and	political	instability	during	that	
time.	
The	President	Soeharto	regime	continued	the	control	by	central	government	of	oil	and	gas	
resources	by	appointing	a	state	Oil	and	Gas	Company	named	Pertamina	(National	Oil	Mining	
Company)	to	manage	these	resources.		Pertamina	was	established	in	1968,	two	years	after	
Soeharto	was	proclaimed	as	President.		Pertamina	was	established	through	the	merger	of	two	
state	oil	and	gas	companies	from	the	President	Soekarno	era.		Pertamina	was	the	only	state	
owned	company	in	oil	and	gas	in	that	time,	and	was	expected	to	channel	revenues	from	oil	and	
gas	to	the	government	(Seda	2005).		The	company	acted	as	regulators	to	control	oil	and	gas	
resources,	while	also	acting	as	contractor	by	operating	their	own	oil	and	gas	fields	(Robinson	
1987).	
Looking	at	the	history	of	oil	and	gas	resource	management,	the	question	arises	as	to	who	were	
the	beneficiaries	of	this	type	of	resources	management.		The	control	by	the	Dutch	colony	of	oil	
and	gas	was	definitely	used	to	exploit	Indonesia’s	resources	for	the	benefit	of	the	colonizing	
country.		The	noble	idea	of	UUD	1945	(Indonesia’s	1945	Constitution)	to	control	resources	for	the	
prosperity	of	people	seemed	good	in	principle	but	not	in	practice,	as	the	control	of	oil	and	gas	was	
related	to	the	oligarchy	power	of	President	Soeharto	and	his	cronies.		The	control	of	resources,	
that	is,	benefitted	only	his	family	and	cronies	and	the	military	forces	that	protected	the	
production	of	oil	and	gas	in	the	regions	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2003,	2009).		In	the	
case	of	Pertamina	as	the	regulators	and	contractors	of	oil	and	gas,	this	company	was	only	
required	to	report	and	be	responsible	directly	to	President	Soeharto,	not	to	any	other	
government	officials.		In	addition,	Pertamina	also	gained	support	from	the	military,	since	the	
background	of	Soeharto	was	in	the	military,	protecting	the	corporation	from	public	scrutiny	and	
accountability.		Annual	balance	sheets	of	this	corporation	were	never	published	and	even	the	
Parliament	(DPR)	did	not	have	a	chance	to	question	Pertamina’s	finances	(David	1995).	
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Figure	2.2.	Oil	and	Gas	Reserves	in	Indonesia	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	(Ministry	of	Energy	and	Mineral	Resources	2011)	
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This	situation	gave	a	disadvantage	to	Pertamina,	in	that	it	caused	it	to	be	an	uncompetitive	
company.		The	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability	to	the	public	made	inefficiency	inside	the	
company	difficult	to	identify.		This	inefficiency	of	Pertamina	occurred	because	the	oligarchy	
power	that	linked	with	Suharto,	his	family	and	his	cronies	positioned	the	company	to	be	their	
“sapi	perah”	(the	cash	cow)	(de	Vries	2013;	Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2009).		This	
oligarchy	power	of	President	Soeharto	gained	benefit	from	the	company	by	forcing	the	company	
to	give	cash	or	projects.		This	created	inefficiency	in	the	company’s	financial	resources,	which	
could	not	be	identified	due	to	the	lack	of	accountable	and	transparency	to	the	public.		As	a	result	
of	this	inefficiency,	the	audits	conducted	in	2000	during	the	transition	process	found	that	the	
company	suffered	annual	losses	of	around	USD	2	billion	(Goodpaster	2002;	McPherson	&	
MacSearraigh	2007).		Furthermore,	the	position	of	Pertamina	was	in	danger	after	that,	as	the	
company	was	in	danger	of	becoming	the	weakest	oil	company	in	the	world,	wasted	around	USD	1	
billion	annually	through	inefficient	procurement	and	resources	allocation	procedures,	and	also	
around	USD	1.3	to	2	billion	annually	through	inefficiencies	in	its	exploration	and	production	
operations	(de	Vries	2013,	p.	7).		Significant	amounts	of	financial	resources	of	Pertamina	tended	
to	be	corrupted	to	fund	the	regime	power,	leading	to	Pertamina’s	contribution	to	state	revenues	
being	not	optimal	during	this	era	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2009).		Therefore,	
instead	of	benefitting	the	Indonesian	people,	this	practice	of	oil	and	gas	resource	management	
only	benefitted	people	that	had	ties	with	the	oligarchy	power.   
The	privilege	of	Pertamina	in	controlling	oil	and	gas	resources	was	replaced	during	the	
decentralization	era	through	Law	No	22/	2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	due	to	this	notorious	reputation	for	
corruption	and	waste.	 The	resentment	of	local	communities	toward	the	unfair	transfer	of	oil	and	
gas	revenue	to	Jakarta	resulted	in	pressure	on	the	central	government	to	change	their	policy	on	
oil	and	gas	resources	(Budiartie	2012).		Some	regions	with	rich	natural	resources	but	having	weak	
infrastructure	and	poor	public	goods	and	services	demanded	central	government	redistribute	its	
control	and	authority	to	the	regional	governments.		This	demand	was	granted,	with	regional	
autonomy	accorded	to	district	government	to	control	their	own	budget	through	fiscal	policy	
between	central	and	regional	development,	but	not	for	power	over	oil	and	gas	resources,	which	
remained	under	central	government	authority.			
Unlike	for	other	natural	resources	where	the	authority	of	local	government	is	acknowledged,	in	
the	case	of	oil	and	gas	the	central	government	only	sets	revenue	sharing	in	the	fiscal	balance	law	
No	33/	2004	for	local	government.		This	law	mandates	the	revenue	sharing	for	oil	and	gas	
between	central	and	regional	government	together	with	general	mining,	geothermal,	forestry,	
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and	fishery	(see	figure	2.3).		The	central	government	hoped	this	legislation	would	address	the	
resentment	from	oil	and	gas	rich	regions,	particularly	Aceh	and	Papua,	which	are	known	as	the	
richest	oil	and	gas	regions	in	Indonesia,	whose	peoples	were	angered	over	perceived	outflows	of	
wealth	to	Jakarta.		These	two	provinces	had	long-time	struggles	to	be	independent	from	central	
government	in	controlling	their	natural	resources.		Aceh	and	Papua	have	thus	received	special	
autonomy	from	central	government	based	on	Law	No.	21/	2001.		In	reference	to	this	law,	the	
provincial	government	of	Papua	receives	70	percent	of	the	revenue	from	oil	and	gas	exploitation	
for	the	first	twenty	five	years,	after	which	the	revenues	will	be	50	percent	for	oil	and	40	per	cent	
for	natural	gas.			The	province	of	Aceh	receives	80	per	cent	of	the	revenues	from	oil	and	gas	for	
an	eight	year	period,	and	then	the	revenue	will	be	reduced	to	50	per	cent.		The	other	aspects	of	
revenue	sharing	are	similar	to	that	of	other	provinces	(Agustina,	Fengler	&	Schulze	2012).				
Figure	2.3	below	describes	the	revenue	of	Oil	and	Gas	resources	distributed	to	central,	provincial	
and	district	governments,	apart	from	Aceh	and	Papua.		There	are	two	types	of	revenue	derived	
from	taxes	and	revenue	sharing.		Revenue	from	Oil	and	Gas	Companies	tax	is	delivered	to	local	
government	at	a	rate	of	26	percent.	Revenue	sharing	received	by	local	government	are	15.5	
percent	for	oil	revenue	and	30.5	percent	for	gas	revenue,	where	this	percentage	is	distributed	to	
provincial	government	(20	percent),	producing	district	(40	percent)	and	other	districts	in	the	
province	(40	percent).	
Figure	2.3	shows	that	the	portion	of	Oil	and	Gas	revenue	received	by	local	districts	where	the	
mining	is	located	is	still	low	compared	to	the	risks	on	their	environmental	and	social	economic	life	
as	impacted	by	resource	company	operations	(Mumbunan	2013).		Although,	under	the	new	of	Oil	
and	Gas	Law	No.	22/	2001,	the	authority	of	Pertamina	in	managing	oil	and	gas	resources	has	
been	removed,	the	control	of	these	resources	is	still	under	central	government	power	through	
the	appointment	of	two	new	regulatory	bodies,	BPMIGAS	(Upstream	Oil	&	Gas	Regulatory	Body)	
and	BPH	MIGAS	(Downstream	Oil	&	Gas	Regulatory	Body),	to	manage	the	natural	resources.		
BPMIGAS	was	established	in	2002,	a	year	after	the	oil	and	gas	law	passed,	while	BPHMIGAS	was	
established	in	2003.		All	PSC	agreements	have	since	been	controlled	by	BPMIGAS,	in	which	the	
body	has	authority	to	represent	the	state	government	in	selecting,	contracting,	and	withdrawing	
all	oil	&	gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia	(de	Vries	2013).		However,	as	with	Pertamina,	
BPMIGAS	is	required	to	report	directly	to	the	President	of	Indonesia,	making	it	difficult	for	other	
government	institutions	like	the	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Mineral	Resources	to	have	any	control	
over	BPMIGAS.					
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Figure	2.3.		Oil	and	Gas	Revenue-Sharing	arrangement	between	the	central,	provincial,	and	
district	levels	of	government	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	(Agustina,	Fengler	&	Schulze	2012)	
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The	position	of	BPMIGAS	was	questioned	by	some	community	leaders,	led	by	the	Head	of	
Muhammadiyah,	the	second	largest	Islamic	organization	in	Indonesia.		Their	concerns	about	
drilling	contracts,	which	are	dominated	by	foreign	companies,	led	them	to	demand	that	the	
constitutional	court	review	BPMIGAS’s	position	in	managing	oil	and	resources.		This	demand	
occurred	immediately	after	the	decision	by	BPMIGAS	to	renew	the	contract	of	foreign	company	
Exxon	Mobil	for	the	next	20	years	(from	2010	to	2030)	in	Cepu	Oil	Block	in	the	Middle	Java	
province.		Community	organization	leaders		criticized	the	decision	not	to	choose	a	national	
company	such	as	Pertamina	to	manage	the	oil	and	gas	fields,	which	they	assumed	could	give	
more	benefit	to	Indonesia	(Kwik	2006;	Sugiri	&	Adiputra	2011).		This	concern	caused	BPMIGAS’s	
position	as	regulator	of	oil	and	gas	to	be	disbanded	in	November	2012,	after	the	constitutional	
court	accepted	the	request	of	the	community	leaders,	judging	BPMIGAS	to	be	unconstitutional	in	
respect	of	Article	33	of	the	Constitution,	stipulating	that	the	management	of	the	resources	should	
benefit	the	welfare	of	the	people.		The	contracts	arranged	by	BPMIGAS,	which	were	dominated	
by	foreign	companies,	it	was	argued,	could	not	give	benefit	to	the	welfare	of	the	Indonesian	
people.		This	movement	to	disband	BPMIGAS,	according	to	Habir	(2013),	is	the	manifestation	of	
an	increasing	‘resource	nationalism’,	as	“the	efforts	to	maximize	revenues	from	and	exercise	of	
greater	state	control	over	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources”	(Habir	2013).			In	relation	to	the	
oil	and	gas	industry,	this	resource	nationalism	has	two	components:	limiting	the	operations	of	
foreign	oil	companies;	and	asserting	a	greater	national	control	over	natural	resource	
development.		
The	SKKMIGAS	(the	Workforce	Unit	of	Upstream	Oil	&	Gas)	under	the	Ministry	of	Energy	and	
Mineral	resources	was	then	established	to	replace	BPMIGAS’s	duties.		In	this	organizational	
structure,	SKKMIGAS	is	under	the	Ministry	of	Energy	and	should	report	to	the	ministry,	not	to	the	
President.		Unfortunately,	a	scandal,	when	the	head	of	SKKMIGAS	was	caught	by	KPK	(the	anti-
corruption	commission)	after	receiving	graft	payments	from	one	foreign	company	for	arranging	a	
PSC	contract,	made	this	institution	distrusted	by	Indonesian	society.		The	position	of	SKKMIGAS	
has	recently	come	under	review	by	Parliament	in	its	management	of	oil	and	gas,	and	a	new	law	
for	oil	and	gas	management	could	possibly	be	passed	in	the	near	future.								
Looking	at	the	issues	of	central	government	control	of	oil	and	gas,	the	emerging	power	at	the	
local	level	also	needs	to	be	examined.		Complaints	regarding	the	operation	of	companies	
increased	after	the	local	government	received	certain	powers	from	central	government.		These	
complaints	are	related	to	local	issues	such	as	environmental	issues,	local	labour,	and	even	basic	
infrastructures	in	health	and	education,	which	are	now	administered	at	the	local	district	level.		
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Many	rallies	and	protests	by	local	communities	have	occurred	demanding	company	contributions	
to	their	local	territories.		Indeed,	local	communities	now	view	CSR	as	the	only	way	for	oil	and	gas	
companies	to	be	involved	in	and	contribute	directly	to	their	interests	(Zainal	2007).		The	initiation	
of	attempts	to	exert	local	power	on	natural	resource	companies	can	be	seen	in	the	passing	of	
local	district	regulations	on	CSR	that	aim	to	control	companies’	CSR	in	the	districts	(Kotler	&	Lee	
2008).		
This	situation	reflects	the	failure	of	the	setting	of	revenue	sharing	arrangements	by	central	
government.		Some	local	district	governments	producing	oil	and	gas	have	been	dissatisfied	with	
the	way	central	government	calculates	the	revenue	sharing.		The	production	numbers	of	oil	and	
gas	mining	collected	by	central	government	has	seemed	‘mysterious’	to	local	leaders	in	provincial	
and	district	levels,	making	the	calculation	of	revenue	shares	less	than	accountable	to	local	
governments	(Prasetijo	2012;	Seda	2005;	Wardhana	2012).		Hence,	for	better	revenue	share	
implementation,	all	bupati	from	the	districts	producing	oil	and	gas	established	a	forum,	named	
FKDPM	(The	Communication	Forum	for	Districts	Producing	Oil	&	Gas),	to	communicate	and	
complain	about	problems	regarding	sharing	of	oil	and	gas	revenue.		With	these	issues	arising,	
recently	Law	No	22/	2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	has	been	under	review	by	the	legislative	assembly,	after	
the	constitutional	court	proposed	the	review	of	this	law	with	the	disband	of	BPMIGAS	as	the	
authority	holder	of	this	law.		Hence,	the	constitutional	court	also	demanded	the	government	
hand	over	the	oil	and	gas	fields	operated	by	foreign	companies	to	Pertamina	when	the	existing	
contract	agreements	have	finished.		The	new	oil	and	gas	law	is	currently	still	under	discussion	at	
the	legislative	assembly	and	will	most	likely	be	issued	towards	the	end	of	2015	to	replace	the	
existing	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No	22/	2001.		Thus,	the	present	study	may	offer	a	contribution	in	giving	
some	perspective	to	the	review	of	this	law.	
2.3. 	THE	IMPACTS	OF	DECENTRALIZATION	
This	section	discusses	the	impacts	of	decentralization	and	is	divided	into	two	subsections	
describing	two	major	impacts	that	are	relevant	to	this	research.		Section	2.3.1	discusses	the	
decentralization	of	corruption.		Section	2.3.2	examines	the	relationships	of	businesses	and	local	
communities.	
2.3.1. The	Decentralization	of	Corruption	
Aside	from	delegating	authority	from	central	to	local	government,	corrupt	practices	during	the	
era	of	oligarchy	power	of	the	Soeharto	regime	would	also	be	imitated	by	local	governments	in	
using	their	new	authority.		It	must	be	noted	that	this	trend	has	roots	in	previous	historical	epochs	
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under	the	centralized	regime	of	Soeharto,	and	cannot	be	solely	attributed	to	the	new	
decentralization	effort.		Valsecchi	(2012)	found	that,	instead	of	bringing	local	accountability,	the	
advent	of	local	direct	elections	evidently	has	increased	local	corruption	practices.		Money	politics	
during	campaigns	are	still	common	in	Indonesian	politics,	incurring	high	cost	campaigns	to	
candidates	in	provincial,	district	or	even	in	village	elections.		This	situation	causes	them	to	seek	
any	available	funding	possibilities,	including	those	involving	corruption,	to	recoup	the	costs	
incurred	during	the	campaign	once	they	have	attained	the	desired	position	of	power.				
The	term	“kerajaan	kecil”	(small	kingdoms)	refers	to	the	practice	of	oligarchy	power	conducted	
by	many	local	government	heads	(Bupati	and	Walikota),	who	possess	tremendous	political	power	
within	their	respective	regions.		These	raja-raja	kecil	(little	kings)	have	typically	used	their	
position	to	enrich	themselves,	their	families,	and	other	close	associates.		Positions	in	the	local	
government	are	often	held	by	such	affiliates.		A	recent	corruption	case	in	Banten	Province	
revealed	how	the	governor	built	a	small	kingdom	and	dynasty	power	by	supporting	his	brother,	
families,	and	relatives	to	be	a	bupati,	members	of	DPRDs	(local	legislative	assemblies),	and	other	
important	positions.		This	power	was	actually	inherited	from	the	governor’s	father	who	was	well	
known	by	the	local	traditional	communities	(Salman	2012).		The	direct	election	system	causes	
local	elites	to	gain	political	power,	which	is	thus	largely	concentrated	in	this	small	group	of	elite	
families	through	such	inheritance.		These	families	combine	the	traditional	adat	(customary)	
authority	with	the	power	of	government.		There	are	very	few	checks	and	balances	on	this	sort	of	
political	power.		There	is	concern	that	decentralization	could	in	fact	thus	be	encouraging	the	
creation	of	hundreds	of	authoritarian	“states	within	a	state”	(Thorburn	2002).	
Moreover,	the	“Putra	Daerah”	(the	native	son)	syndrome	characterizes	decentralization	in	
Indonesia.			Race,	ethnicity,	and	local	culture	are	particularly	sensitive	topics	in	multi-ethnic	
Indonesia.		Successive	national	governments	have	sought	to	supplant	“primordial’’	ethnic	
loyalties	with	a	sense	of	Indonesian	citizenship.		The	collapse	of	the	new	order,	however,	seems	
to	have	opened	a	“Pandora’s	box’’	of	separatist	and	regionalist	sentiments	and	actions.		
Government	jobs,	services,	projects,	and	contracts	are	allocated	to	members	of	the	indigenous	
population.		Local	governments	seek	to	monopolize	resources	for	local	use.		“Outsiders’’,	
including,	in	many	instances,	migrant	families	who	have	lived	in	a	region	for	generations,	or	even	
people	from	neighbouring	villages,	are	being	denied	access	to	local	resources	and	territories	
(Habir	2013).	
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These	circumstances	have	increased	corruption	at	the	local	level	practiced	by	local	government,	
legislative	assemblies,	and	even	businesses	operating	in	the	areas.		A	report	published	by	World	
Bank	in	2007	stated	that	decentralization	in	Indonesia	has	brought	the	shifting	of	power	within	
local	institutions,	namely	the	local	government	and	local	parliaments.		This	transformation	has	
opened	the	opportunities	for	‘money	politics’	by	the	head	of	districts,	to	gain	and	maintain	
support	from	the	legislative	assemblies	and	their	constituents.		In	return,	the	members	of	local	
legislative	see	this	as	setoran	(a	money	contribution)	to	their	political	parties	and	to	enrich	the	
individual	legislative	members.		This	cooperation	between	legislative	bodies	and	local	
governments	with	a	lack	of	public	control	or	oversight	is	in	fact	an	inheritance	from	the	Soeharto	
regime	era	(Rinaldi,	Purnomo	&	Damayanti	2007).		Moreover,	Indonesia	Corruption	Watch	(ICW),	
a	leading	NGO	investigating	corruption	practices,	mentioned	in	a	study	that	the	number	of	
corrupt	people	involved	in	the	corruption	cases	they	studied	increased	to	1,273	suspects	in	the	
period	of	2013.		More	than	50	percent	of	these	suspects	were	local	officials	such	as	members	of	
DPRDs,	gubernur,	bupati,	walikota,	and	Kepala	Dinas	(the	heads	of	offices	in	local	government)	
(ICW	2013).	
2.3.2. Businesses	and	Local	Stakeholders	Relationships	
The	transformation	of	the	Indonesian	governance	system	undoubtedly	resulted	in	a	complicated	
situation	for	mining	companies,	particularly	in	their	relations	to	local	communities.		The	old	law,	
No.	11/	1967,	on	mining	provided	mining	companies	with	some	facilities	from	the	government	to	
support	mining	operations	in	remote	rural	areas,	such	as	protection	from	central	government	
and	military	(de	Vries	2013).		Furthermore,	through	this	old	law	the	local	individual	communities’	
rights	under	adat	(custom)	law	was	eliminated	by	the	state	rights	on	the	basis	of	national	
interest.		The	law	suggested	that	the	adat	community	had	to	surrender	their	land	to	the	
companies	without	demanding	compensation,	as	stated	in	Article	26	of	this	mining	law	
(Wiriosudarmo	2001).			
The	role	of	the	adat	community	was	also	eroded	through	Law	No.	5/	1979	on	Village	
Administration.		This	law	replaced	the	customary	system	of	local	communities	with	a	
standardized	Javanese	village	model.		The	position	of	kepala	adat	(customary	leader)	as	leader	in	
communities	was	replaced	with	kepala	desa	(village	leader),	drawn	from	civil	servants	that	had	
responsibility	to	central	government	rather	than	to	the	local	communities	(Duncan	2007;	Jonsson	
2005).		With	the	kepala	adat,	local	customary	leaders	were	marginalized	and	local	communities	
had	to	follow	state	rules	that	were	often	contradictory	to	customary	rule.		Local	leaders	who	
formerly	administered	the	land	and	resource	use	allocation	lost	their	authority	to	village	heads,	
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who	now	implemented	policies	based	on	national	directives	that	often	showed	little	concern	for	
sustainability	or	local	needs	(Sigit	1991).		Another	support	from	central	government	to	the	mining	
companies	was	derived	from	military	individuals	who	took	the	role	of	facilitating	the	relationship	
between	the	mining	companies	and	local	communities.		The	takeover	process	of	community	land,	
and	resources	often	involved	military	individuals.		With	this	military	power,	the	communities	felt	
insecure	and	threatened,	even	afraid	of	rejecting	any	decision	made	by	the	central	government	
and	thus	accepted	any	compensation	offered	(Bachriadi	1998;	Booth	2003;	Simamora	2000).		
Furthermore,	individuals	or	communities	who	contested	the	seizure	of	their	land	were	seen	as	
agitators	by	government	officials	and	the	military,	rather	than	as	victims	seeking	just	
compensation	for	their	losses.	These	agitators	were	either	jailed	or	intimidated	with	threats	of	
violence	(Duncan	2007).		The	centralized	system	never	acknowledged	consultations	with	local	
communities	on	mining	concessions.		The	contracts	with	businesses	or	foreign	investors	were	
signed	without	involving	local	governments,	who	it	is	supposed	would	have	had	a	better	
understanding	of	local	people’s	interests	and	their	natural	resources	(Hadiz	2003;	Holtzappel	&	
Ramstedt	2009;	Nuh	&	Collins	2001;	Wiriosudarmo	2001).		Local	government	at	provincial	and	
district	levels	were	merely	instruments	for	the	central	government	to	implement	their	
agreements	(Duncan	2007;	Seda	2005;	Wiriosudarmo	2001).		The	locals’	rights	and	needs	were	
disregarded	and	subjugated	to	those	of	companies,	and	others	who	were	usually	connected	to	
the	Soeharto	family,	their	cronies,	or	the	military	(Duncan	2007).		
Decentralization	has	in	recent	times	provided	local	communities	with	involvement	and	
participation	in	government	policies.		Regional	leaders,	the	bupati	(the	district	head)	and	walikota	
(mayor)	are	now	more	accountable	to	their	constituents	since	they	are	directly	elected,	not	
appointed	by	the	central	government	in	Jakarta.		Furthermore,	the	head	of	villages	are	technically	
accountable	to	the	villagers	as	now	they	are	elected	by	the	community	and	controlled	by	the	
Badan	Perwakilan	Desa	(Village	Representative	Board).		The	Musbangdes	(village	development	
forum)	is	conducted	every	year	to	allow	the	aspirations	of	local	communities	toward	the	
development	projects	to	be	heard.		Moreover,	under	decentralization	the	villages	also	gained	
opportunities	to	return	to	local	customary	rule,	which	was	previously	lost	because	the	earlier	
central	government	system	only	recognized	the	Javanese	village	model.		Provinces	like	West	
Sumatera,	where	the	majority	is	of	Minangkabau	ethnicity,	have	revitalized	hukum	adat	
(customary	law)	in	their	governance	system.		The	provincial	government	has	passed	the	Nagari	
system	(customary	rule	of	Minangkabau)	and	given	legitimacy	to	indigenous	institutions	to	assert	
control	over	their	land	and	resources	(Hamilton-Hart	2007;	von	Benda-Beckmann	&	von	Benda-
Beckmann	2001).		The	ability	to	control	their	own	land	and	resources	has	enabled	some	
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communities	to	gain	profits	from	businesses	that	needed	access	to	their	land.		After	decades	of	
receiving	very	little	benefit,	if	any,	from	extractive	mining	industries,	local	communities	are	now	
able	to	demand	compensation	from	businesses	that	are	using	their	lands.		The	mining	companies,	
including	Oil	and	Gas	companies,	have	to	cooperate	with	local	communities	in	order	to	gain	
access	to	their	land	and	resources.		Many	local	communities	now	even	require	numerous	
promises	from	companies	such	as	jobs,	money,	and	agricultural	inputs	before	they	grant	
permission	to	use	their	land	(Engel	&	Palmer	2008;	Hamilton-Hart	2007).			
Despite	giving	power	to	the	local	authority	to	gain	control	and	access	over	their	territory	and	
resources,	decentralization	can	still	marginalize	minority	groups	in	the	communities.		Duncan	
(2007)	found	that	decentralization	may	only	benefit	certain	groups	in	these	communities,	
considering	that	political	power	in	local	districts	may	be	held	by	certain	elite	groups	only,	giving	
them	privileged	access	to	land	and	resources	within	the	territory.		Thus,	the	land	ownership	is	
often	granted	by	certain	individuals	rather	than	by	the	entire	community.		Some	minority	groups	
in	local	communities	who	are	unable	to	gain	access	of	ownership	over	land	and	resources	are	
thus	not	able	to	gain	any	benefit	from	decentralization.		It	is	therefore	agreed	that	
decentralization	is	able	to	increase	localism,	in	which	the	local	communities’	ownership	over	
resources	is	granted;	but	decentralization	may	only	recognize	the	larger	majority	group	in	a	
community	while	smaller	minority	indigenous	groups	who	do	not	have	access	to	political	and	
economic	power	remain	marginalized	(Duncan	2007).			
2.4. CONCLUSION	
This	chapter	highlights	the	‘big	bang’	process	of	decentralization	in	Indonesia	that	has	delegated	
power	and	wealth	to	local	district	governments.		Under	thirty-two	years	of	the	President	
Soeharto	regime	in	1967-1998,	the	authority	of	local	district	governments	had	been	abandoned,	
in	which		the	model	of	dekonsentrasi	was	applied	by	the	central	government,	whereby	they	held	
control	over	local	budgets	and	appointed	officials	to	manage	the	funds	to	limit	local	district	
government	power.		By	contrast,	through	decentralization,	local	district	governments	now	
receive	delegated	power	to	control	their	own	territories.		In	term	of	political	governance,	the	
bupati	(head	of	district)	and	kepala	desa	(head	of	village),	who	were	previously	appointed	by	
central	government,	are	now	directly	elected	by	the	local	communities.			This	system	has	resulted	
in	the	emergence	of	local	power	in	controlling	the	territory,	resources	and	their	own	local	budget	
as	set	by	the	fiscal	balance	policy.			
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Unlike	with	other	natural	resources,	however,	central	government	decided	to	keep	control	over	
oil	and	gas	resources.		This	is	due	to	two	reasons:	the	strategic	position	of	the	resources	to	
national	energy	supply,	where	most	of	electricity	in	Indonesia	is	still	generated	by	these	
resources;	and	the	position	of	these	resources	in	relation	to	fuel	subsidy	policies.		These	two	
factors	are	essential	for	political	dynamics	in	the	country,	since	the	lack	of	energy	supply	or	the	
reduction	of	fuel	subsidies	would	both	significantly	impact	the	national	political	power	influences	
in	Indonesia.		Therefore,	instead	of	giving	authority	to	local	district	governments	to	control	the	oil	
and	gas	industry	in	their	region,	the	central	government	has	preferred	to	set	the	revenue	sharing	
policy	between	companies,	the	central	government	and	the	producer	districts.		In	this	way,	the	
companies	in	this	sector	have	been	placed	in	the	middle	of	two	government	authorities,	in	which	
situation	they	should	report	to	central	government	regarding	their	production	target	as	stated	in	
their	Production	Sharing	Contract	(PSC),	while	on	the	other	hand	they	must	also	consult	with	the	
local	district	government	in	relation	to	their	operations	in	the	area.		This	policy	also	creates	
disappointment	for	the	local	district	governments	as	they	feel	the	revenue-sharing	does	not	
provide	adequate	funding.				
The	delegation	of	power	and	wealth	to	local	government	has	created	negative	impacts	as	well.		
The	rising	of	‘small	kingdoms’,	referring	to	provincial,	district	and	village	authority	in	managing	
their	territories,	has	created	‘little	kings’	stakeholders	that	hold	this	delegated	power.			However,	
instead	of	utilising	their	power	to	bring	public	goods	and	services	closer	to	local	communities,	this	
kind	of	stakeholder	appears	inclined	to	abuse	their	power	with	local	corruption	practices	evident.		
This	condition	has	often	marginalized	certain	groups	in	the	villages	such	as	the	poor,	the	farmers	
and	women	that	lack	power	and	access	to	the	benefits	of	natural	resources	in	their	territory.		This	
situation	is	likely	to	influence	companies	in	implementing	CSR	legislation,	as	the	way	in	which	
they	engage	and/or	with	whom	they	communicate	will	determine	who	benefits	from	CSR	
legislation.		Given	this	context,	in	the	present	study	the	question	of	with	whom	oil	and	gas	
companies	decide	to	associate	with	is	explored:	whether	with	the	little	kings,	in	order	to	gain	
local	legitimacy;	or	with	marginalized	groups,	to	improve	the	local	welfare.					 	
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Chapter	3.	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
3.1. INTRODUCTION	
The	implementation	of	CSR	in	Indonesia	is	influenced	by	the	issuance	of	CSR	legislation	and	the	
emergence	of	local	stakeholder	power	in	this	decentralization	era.		The	present	study	examines	
how	companies	comply	with	CSR	legislation	and	deal	with	local	stakeholders.		This	chapter	
presents	an	analysis	of	extant	literature	in	the	areas	of	CSR,	the	institutional	perspective,	and	
stakeholders	perspective.		The	combined	effects	model	from	Lee	(2011),	describing	the	influence	
of	institutional	and	stakeholder	pressures	on	company	CSR	strategies,	is	applied	to	relate	these	
three	areas.		The	present	study	can	then	take	its	position	with	respect	to	this	range	of	relevant	
literature.			
The	chapter	is	divided	into	five	major	sections.		Section	3.2	discusses	Corporate	Social	
Responsibility	(CSR).		Section	3.3	is	about	institutions.		Section	3.4	presents	a	discussion	of	
stakeholders.		Section	3.5	presents	a	model	of	the	configuration	of	external	influences	on	CSR	
strategies.		In	the	final	Section	3.6	the	chapter’s	conclusion	is	presented.		
3.2. CORPORATE	SOCIAL	RESPONSIBILITY	(CSR)		
This	section	explores	the	extant	literature	on	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR).		Subsection	
3.2.1	examines	definitions	of	CSR.		Subsection	3.2.2	presents	a	discussion	of	three	domains	of	
CSR,	whilst	Subsection	3.2.3	discusses	the	politics	of	CSR	in	the	context	of	developing	countries.					
3.2.1. Definitions	
There	is	no	single	universal	shared	definition	of	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR),	with	many	
scholars	pointing	to	the	lack	of	an	agreed	definition	as	a	potential	weakness	within	the	literature	
of	the	CSR	field	(Carroll	1999a;	van	Marrewijk	2003;	Windsor	2006).		Blowfield	and	Frynas	(2005)	
suggest	that	CSR	is	best	understood	as	an	‘umbrella	term’	that	can	be	employed	for	a	range	of	
uses	related	to	concerns	for	business	responsibilities	to	society,	environment	and	stakeholders,	
including	responsibility	to	meet	expectations	beyond	legal	requirements,	to	manage	supply	
chains	ethically	and	to	consider	local	community	relationships.		The	present	thesis	does	not	
attempt	to	identify	all	existing	definitions	of	CSR	in	the	extant	literature.		The	earliest	definition	of	
CSR	proposed	by	Bowen	(1953,	quoted	in	Carroll	1999,	p.25)	referred	to	‘social	responsibility’	as	
the	obligations	of	businessmen	to	pursue	those	policies,	to	make	those	decisions,	or	to	follow	
those	lines	of	action	which	are	desirable	in	terms	of	the	objectives	and	values	of	our	society.		This	
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definition	introduced	a	normative	value	through	the	acknowledgement	that	society	should	be	
considered	as	an	important	component	in	the	decision	making	process	of	businesses.				
Matten	and	Moon	(2008,	p.	405),	reviewing	subsequent	literature	presenting	definitions	of	CSR,	
assess	these	definitions	as	being	too	diverse	and	contested	to	be	easily	categorized.		They	
categorize	the	development	of	CSR	definition	into	narrow	and	broad	perspectives.		A	supporter	
of	the	narrow	view	is	Milton	Friedman	(2007)	who	claims	that	the	social	responsibility	of	business	
is	to	increase	its	profits.		This	definition	reflects	a	limitation	of	company	responsibility	to	only	
providing	economic	goods	for	profit,	with	responsibility	for	social	issues	not	being	an	interest	of	
corporations	(Friedman	2007;	Usunier,	Furrer	&	Furrer-Perrinjaquet	2011).			Within	the	category	
of	narrow	perspectives	on	CSR	are	included	definitions	that	are	related	to	attempts	to	fit	
corporate	social	responsibility	within	economic	theories	of	the	firm	(Choi	&	Wang	2009;	
Friedman	2007;	Garriga	&	Domènec	2004;	Usunier,	Furrer	&	Furrer-Perrinjaquet	2011).		These	
definitions	maintain	that	the	chief	responsibility	of	a	corporation	is	to	maximize	their	profits	and	
shareholders’	value	(Barnea	&	Rubin	2010;	Godfrey	2005;	Hillman	&	Keim	2001;	Jensen,	M	2001)	
or	to	improve	the	competitive	advantage	of	businesses	(Porter,	M.	E.	&	Kramer	2002;	Porter,	
Michael	E	&	Kramer	2006).		Therefore,	any	CSR	decision	in	business	should	be	aimed	at	
supporting	this	main	business	goal,	and	positioning	CSR	as	an	instrument	for	management	to	
achieve	this	financial	goal	(Friedman	2007;	Jensen,	M	2001).			
By	contrast,	the	broad	definition	of	CSR	incorporates	a	normative	approach,	where	the	
company’s	goals	go	beyond	simply	achieving	profit	(Langtry	1994;	Schwartz	&	Saiia	2012).		Apart	
from	their	responsibility	to	shareholders,	company	managers	have	other	responsibilities	related	
to	social	issues,	such	as	to	their	employees,	the	supply	chains,	consumers,	the	government	and	
local	communities.		Therefore,	Windsor	(2006,	p.	93)	defines	CSR	as	‘any	concept	concerning	how	
managers	should	handle	public	policy	and	social	issues’.		In	this	manner,	a	company’s	CSR	should	
integrate	social	demands,	arguing	that	business	depends	on	society	for	its	existence,	continuity	
and	growth.		Some	studies	of	CSR	included	in	this	broad	category	link	CSR	with	poverty	alleviation	
(Jenkins	2005),	human	rights	issues	(Wettstein	2009)	and/or	development	matters	(Bhagwat	
2011;	Frisko	&	Arisandi	2011;	Idemudia	2011).	
These	two	types	of	CSR	definition	are	grounded	solely	in	the	perspective	of	the	company	as	the	
main	actor	that	voluntarily	initiates	to	undertake	CSR.		The	narrow	perspective	allows	companies	
to	include	their	economic	interests	such	as	value	maximization	or	competitive	advantage	as	a	
basis	to	undertake	CSR	voluntarily.		In	the	broad	perspective	of	CSR,	the	inclusion	of	social	goals	
in	company	CSR	is	mainly	related	to	the	assumption	that	those	social	problems	will	affect	their	
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economic	goals,	such	as	the	poverty	that	may	impact	on	their	production	demand.		The	present	
study	questions	these	underlying	assumption,	both	in	broad	and	narrow	perspective,	with	
respect	to	Indonesian	CSR.		The	mandate	of	CSR	legislation	in	Indonesia,	as	a	reflection	of	the	way	
Indonesian	society	views	CSR,	may	be	different	from	CSR	as	viewed	mainly	from	the	company’s	
perspective.		Furthermore,	the	legislation	put	CSR	as	mandatory	to	the	companies	regardless	how	
the	companies	view	CSR	as	narrow	or	broad	perspective.		The	mandated	CSR	legislation	also	
could	shape	the	way	Indonesian	society	view	CSR	and	their	distinct	expectations	of	company	CSR	
practices	in	Indonesia.			
3.2.2. Three-Domains	of	CSR	
The	various	definitions	of	CSR	suggest	that	businesses’	motivation	for	CSR	is	varied.		Based	on	the	
narrow	definition,	the	rational	explanation	for	business	enacting	CSR	relies	on	an	economic	
motive;	while	within	the	broad	definition,	the	motive	can	be	a	form	of	ethical	or	legal	
compliance.		In	relation	to	these	definitions,	Schwartz	and	Carroll’s	(2003)	model	of	CSR	proposed	
three	domains	of	influence	on	companies	decision	to	implement	CSR.		These	are:	(1)	economic,	
(2)	legal,	(3)	ethical	(see	Figure	3.1).		This	model	was	developed	from	Carroll’s	(1991)	pyramid	of	
CSR;	however,	Schwartz	and	Carroll	(2003)	removed	the	philanthropic	domain	from	their	model,	
since	in	reality	business	philanthropic	activities	such	as	giving	to	charity	could	be	considered	
driven	by	either	an	ethical	or	an	economic	motive.		
Figure	3.1	shows	that	these	three	domains	of	economic,	ethical,	and	legal	responsibilities	overlap	
and	interact	in	the	investigation	of	the	drivers	of	company	CSR.		Schwartz	and	Carroll	(2003)	
contend	that	it	is	rare	for	CSR	activities	to	be	motivated	from	within	one	domain	only.		The	ideal	
overlap	resides	at	the	centre	of	the	model,	where	economic,	legal,	and	ethical	responsibilities	are	
simultaneously	fulfilled.		Other	pure	domains	and	overlapping	domains	in	the	model	may	
represent	real	situations	in	companies,	which	must	be	explored	and	analysed	to	illustrate	the	
situations	faced	by	decision	makers	in	the	business	world.		As	Graham	and	Woods	(2007)	point	
out,	voluntary	initiatives	that	derive	from	economic	and	ethical	motives	may	incorporate	a	
mandatory	aspect	from	national	regulatory	frameworks.		Relying	on	a	purely	legal	domain	may	
not	make	sense	for	developing	countries	such	as	Indonesia	due	to	the	institutional	environment.		
The	political	power	of	businesses	in	a	country	may	allow	companies	to	negotiate	the	way	they	
comply	with	legislation	or	even	to	avoid	following	legislation	orders.		In	addition,	the	weak	legal	
enforcement	characteristic	of	corruption	practices	may	enable	companies	to	escape	compliance	
with	CSR	laws,	through	for	example	the	bribing	of	officials.					
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In	relation	to	Figure	3.1,	the	economic	domain	generally	relates	the	company’s	CSR	to	company	
performance	or	profit.		This	views	CSR	exclusively	as	an	instrument	for	the	company	to	achieve	its	
financial	objective,	which	is	profit	(Berger,	Cunningham	&	Drumwright	2007).		This	domain	is	also	
described	as	the	narrow	CSR	perspective,	where	businesses	will	only	involve	themselves	in	CSR	
related	activities	when	there	is	a	clear	link	to	financial	performance	and	CSR	is	part	of	the	
instrument	to	achieve	this	economic	objective	(Friedman	2007;	Garriga	&	Domènec	2004;	Jensen,	
M	2001;	Maas	&	Liket	2011;	McWilliams	&	Siegel	2001;	Usunier,	Furrer	&	Furrer-Perrinjaquet	
2011).		Further,	Friedman	(2007)	asserts	that	if	the	CSR	activities	of	companies	produce	a	loss	or	
decline	in	profits	this	indicates	that	the	activity	represents	a	flawed	business	decision,	because	
the	responsibility	of	the	firm	is	to	achieve	profit	only,	while	responsibility	for	social	issues	is	not	
an	interest	of	corporations	except	where	it	contributes	to	their	economic	performance.		Berger	
et.al	(2007)	affirmed	this	domain	of	CSR	as	the	business-case	model,	mentioning	that	CSR	
initiatives	from	companies	are	basically	assessed	in	a	purely	economic	manner	to	pursue	a	clear	
link	to	financial	performance.		The	ethical	domain,	on	the	other	hand,	is	commonly	linked	with	
the	broad	perspective	on	CSR	or	normative	approach	to	CSR.		In	general,	the	ethical	domain	
refers	to	company	activities	that	fit	with	the	expectations	of	the	community	and	other	relevant	
stakeholders	both	domestically	and	globally.		However,	it	is	considered	impossible	to	integrate	all	
stakeholders’	expectations	as	the	types	of	norms	in	society	are	varied	and	depend	on	context.		
The	Legal	domain	explains	the	intention	of	companies	to	undertake	CSR	so	as	to	obey	or	comply	
Source:	Adopted	from	(Schwartz	&	Carroll	2003,	p.	509)	
Figure	3.1.	Three	Domain	Approach	of	CSR	
Purely	Ethical
Purely	LegalPurely	Economic
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with	the	law.		The	law	represents	a	‘codified	ethics’,	which	means	it	is	a	means	of	fairness	
established	by	the	lawmakers	through	consideration	of	various	norms	in	the	society	(Schwartz	&	
Carroll	2003).				
Utilizing	the	three	domains	of	CSR	to	describe	CSR	practices	in	Indonesia	may	assist	to	identify	
the	internal	motivation	of	each	company	in	undertaking	CSR,	given	the	CSR	legislation	in	
Indonesia.		With	the	existence	of	CSR	legislation	it	may	be	assumed	that	CSR	is	solely	motivated	
by	the	company	compliance	with	the	legislation.		However,	it	should	be	questioned	if,	whether	
and	why	then	each	company	practices	CSR	differently,	in	implementing	the	same	legislation.		
Therefore,	the	present	study	presumes	that	each	company’s	CSR	practice	is	a	form	of	integration	
between	legal	compliance	and	economic	and/or	ethical	motives,	leading	to	differences	in	CSR	
practices	found	among	companies.		For	example,	a	company	might	integrate	its	legal	compliance	
motive	with	an	economic	motive	depending	on	the	circumstances	of	their	operations,	such	as	
their	local	legitimacy.							
3.2.3. The	Politics	of	CSR	in	the	Context	of	Developing	Countries	
Aside	from	exploring	the	internal	aspects	of	CSR,	literature	on	CSR	now	has	begun	to	include	the	
political	aspects	of	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	(Scherer	&	Palazzo	2007,	2011).		The	
increasing	of	company	involvement	in	the	provision	of	public	goods	and	community	services	such	
as	health	and	education,	which	were	previously	regarded	as	a	preserve	of	a	state,	result	in	
various	political	impacts	of	CSR	(Blowfield	&	Frynas	2005).		These	contributions	allow	companies	
to	pressure	politicians	by	influencing	regulatory	changes	in	relation	to	social	and	environmental	
issues,	through	lobbying,	membership	on	advisory	committees	and	other	traditional	political	
channels	(Rodriguez	et	al.	2006).		This	perspective	goes	beyond	the	instrumental	view	of	CSR,	by	
underlining	that	not	only	does	politics	influence	business	behaviour,	but	in	turn	business	can	also	
become	actors	in	and	upon	politics	themselves	and	influence	political	judgements	(Rodriguez	et	
al.	2006).			
The	role	of	business	power	in	society	was	first	examined	by	Davis	(1960),	who	suggested	that	
businesses	are	also	social	institutions	so	they	therefore	also	have	to	utilise	their	power	within	
society.		Businesses,	Davis	suggested,	may	shift	their	role	from	the	economic	to	the	social	forum	
and	from	there	to	the	political	forum	and	vice	versa.		In	this	manner,	the	assumption	of	classical	
economic	theory	precluding	the	involvement	of	business	in	politics	was	contested.		According	to	
Davis	(1960),	social	responsibility	comes	from	the	amount	of	social	power	that	companies	
possess.		Therefore,	if	companies	do	not	fulfil	and	practice	the	social	responsibility	expected	by	
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the	society,	other	groups	eventually	will	step	in	to	take	those	responsibilities,	with	the	result	that	
business	will	lose	its	power	and	position	within	society.	
Matten	et.al	(2003)	propose	that	the	role	of	business	in	providing	public	goods	may	lead	them	to	
act	in	a	state-like	role,	with	many	companies	fulfilling	the	functions	of	protecting,	enabling,	and	
implementing	citizenship	rights,	originally	considered	to	be	the	sole	responsibility	of	the	state	
and	its	agencies.		Moon,	Crane	and	Matten	(2005)	add	that	these	corporate	social	activities	often	
occur	in	cases	where	the	state	system	fails,	such	as	when	the	state	withdraws	or	has	not	yet	
implemented	basic	citizenship	rights,	or	when	it	is	principally	unable	or	unwilling	to	do	so.		During	
recent	decades	companies	have	started	to	engage	in	activities	that	have	traditionally	been	
regarded	as	actual	governmental	activities	such	as	providing	public	health	and	education	when	a	
government	has	failed	to	do	so	(Matten,	Crane	&	Chapple	2003;	Matten	&	Moon	2005).			
The	question	arises	to	why	companies	are	willing	to	take	up	this	role	within	developing	countries.		
Shamir	(2004)	contends	that	multi-national	companies	are	in	a	position	to	effectively	escape	local	
jurisdictions	by	moving	production	sites	and	steering	financial	investments	to	places	where	local	
laws	are	most	hospitable	to	their	activities.		Thus,	in	a	country	with	strong	state	institutions	for	
formulating	regulations	and	imposing	them	through	the	country’s	legal	system,	the	country’s	
laws	may	not	be	hospitable	for	company	operations,	with	a	high-cost	affect	to	the	company	in	
following	rules	such	as	labour	rules,	sustainable	reporting	or	human	rights	regulation.		A	company	
may	thus	steer	financial	investments	towards	countries	with	relatively	weak	law	enforcement.		
Developing	countries	often	have	this	type	of	weak	law	enforcement	and	imperfections	within	the	
state	apparatus,	the	juridical	and	enforcement	systems,	which	thus	attracts	companies	to	invest	
in	these	countries	(Scherer	&	Palazzo	2011).		Providing	social	goods	to	the	communities	in	
developing	countries	may	offer	more	advantages	to	these	companies,	compared	to	investment	in	
developed	countries	with	their	complex	rules	and	regulations.		Thus,	companies	apply	economic	
criteria	to	choose	the	optimal	context	of	labour,	social,	and	environmental	regulations	for	their	
operations	(Scherer	&	Palazzo	2008).				
The	social	responsibilities	of	business	may	give	companies	a	position	of	influence	on	the	policies	
of	national	governments,	particularly	in	developing	countries.		In	order	to	take	on	a	social	role,	
business	may	attempt	to	influence	government	policy	to	facilitate	their	operations	by,	for	
example,	demanding	subsidies,	tax	holidays,	infrastructural	investments,	and	cutbacks	on	
regulations.		The	importance	of	companies	to	national	economies	and	their	important	role	in	
society	allow	companies	to	often	do	this	successfully.		This	may	also	lead	to	negative	
consequences	in	developing	countries	in	terms	of	social	and	environmental	conditions	(Detomasi	
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2008;	Scherer	&	Palazzo	2007;	Whelan	2013).			Utting	(2005)	mentions	government	economic	
incentives	to	companies	as	a	‘double	standard’,	in	reference	to	incentives	in	form	of	tax	breaks,	
low	royalty	payments,	worsening	labour	standards,	which	are	often	associated	with	outsourcing,	
and	increases	in	the	absolute	level	of	pollution.		Such	incentives	may	give	advantage	to	
businesses	to	invest	in	developing	countries,	but	such	investment	may	also	harm	the	people	of	
such	countries.		Nevertheless,	in	these	ways	companies	are	able	to	exert	influence	on	
government	regulations,	making	them	important	political	actors.				
In	relation	to	Indonesia,	the	importance	of	the	role	of	businesses	to	the	Indonesian	economy	is	
visible	through	their	significant	investment	in	managing	the	country’s	rich	natural	resources,	jobs	
creation,	and	tax	contributions	to	government.		This	important	position	in	the	national	economy	
accords	businesses	the	capacity	to	influence	certain	government	policies.		This	is	made	clear	in	
the	Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010)	study,	which	found	an	influence	of	businesses	groups	on	CSR	laws	in	
2007	through	the	use	of	their	connections	within	political	parties,	as	described	in	Chapter	2.		
Therefore,	the	present	study	presumes	that	in	the	implementation	of	CSR	legislation,	companies	
may	also	utilise	their	powers	in	influencing	the	way	each	company	implements	CSR	in	the	local	
district.	
3.3. INSTITUTIONAL	PERSPECTIVES	
This	section	is	divided	into	three	subsections.		Subsection	3.3.1	discusses	institutional	theory	in	
CSR.		Subsection	3.3.2	presents	the	institutional	environment	within	the	context	of	developing	
countries.		Subsection	3.3.3	examines	types	of	CSR	regulation.	
3.3.1. Institutional	Theory	in	CSR	
Aside	from	CSR	definitions	offered	by	literature	viewing	CSR	from	a	business	perspective,	
Brammer	et.al	(2012)	suggest	an	institutional	perspective	to	understanding	the	‘social’	aspect	of	
the	CSR	label.		Further,	Margolis	and	Walsh	(2003)	argue	that	most	CSR	definitions	have	
neglected	the	societal	aspects	of	CSR	by	treating	‘social’	only	as	external	requirements	for	
organizations,	defining	CSR	as	functionalist,	instrumental	and	giving	a	business	case	rationale	for	
their	social	engagement.		Brammer	et.al	(2012)	point	out	the	common	definitions	of	CSR	are	
based	on	the	assumption	of	company	voluntariness	by	relating	CSR	to	the	market	as	a	rationale	
for	their	CSR	practices.		Institutional	theory	suggests	that	markets	themselves	are	socially	
embedded	within	a	wider	context	of	social,	business	and	political	networks	and	rules	(Brammer,	
Jackson	&	Matten	2012).			
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Scott	(2001,	p.	48)	defines	institutions	as	”social	structures	that	have	attained	a	high	degree	of	
resilience	and	composed	of	cultural-cognitive,	normative,	and	regulative	elements	that,	together	
with	associated	activities	and	resources,	provide	stability	and	meaning	to	social	life”.		
Furthermore,	Morgan	et.al	(2010,	p.	3)	defines	institutions	as	“formal	or	informal	rules,	
regulations,	norms,	and	understandings	that	constrain	and	enable	behaviour”;	whilst	North	
(1991)	defines	institutions	as	"humanly	devised	constraints	that	structure	political,	economic	and	
social	interactions".		The	constraints,	as	North	describes,	are	devised	as	formal	rules	
(constitutions,	laws,	property	rights)	and	informal	restraints	(sanctions,	taboos,	customs,	
traditions,	codes	of	conduct),	which	usually	contribute	to	the	perpetuation	of	order	and	safety	
within	a	market	or	society	(North	1990,	1991).		Institutional	theory	thus	focuses	on	the	deeper	
and	more	resilient	aspects	of	social	structure.		It	considers	the	processes	by	which	structures,	
including	schemes,	rules,	norms,	and	routines,	become	established	as	authoritative	guidelines	for	
social	behaviour	(Scott	2001).		Therefore,	rather	than	seeing	CSR	purely	as	a	voluntary	action	of	
companies,	institutional	theory	places	CSR	explicitly	within	a	wider	field	of	economic	governance	
characterized	by	different	modes,	including	the	market,	state	regulation	and	beyond	(Scott	2001).			
In	general,	within	institutional	theory	two	forms	can	be	distinguished,	old	institutionalism	and	
new	institutionalism.		The	old	institutionalism	approach	to	the	study	of	politics	focuses	on	formal	
institutions	of	government,	while	the	new	institutionalism	tradition	relies	on	social	theory	in	
developing	a	sociological	view	of	institutions,	the	way	they	interact	and	the	effects	of	institutions	
on	society	(Selznick	1996).		In	the	present	study,	the	new	institutionalism	approach	provides	a	
framework	for	understanding	how	CSR	legislation	issued	by	the	central	state	government	has	
influenced	local	stakeholders	and	companies	in	the	implementation	of	CSR.		Brammer	et.al	
(2012)	further	suggests	the	importance	of	institutional	theory	for	understanding	the	‘diversity’	
and	‘dynamics’	of	the	CSR	concept	itself.		The	diversity	of	CSR	among	countries	cannot	easily	be	
explained	without	an	understanding	of	the	institutional	conditions,	which	pertain	not	only	to	
formal	institutions	such	as	laws,	business	associations,	civil	society	groups	or	trade	unions	but,	far	
more	importantly,	to	informal	institutions	such	as	religious	norms,	customary	practices	or	tribal	
traditions.		In	terms	of	the	dynamics	of	CSR	concepts,	institutional	theory	provides	a	lens	for	
understanding	and	explaining	how	and	why	CSR	assumes	different	forms	in	different	countries	
(Brammer,	Jackson	&	Matten	2012;	Matten	&	Moon	2008).				
In	order	to	survive,	companies	must	conform	to	the	prevailing	rules	and	belief	systems	of	formal	
and	informal	institutions	in	the	environment	as	this	will	result	in	their	social	legitimacy	
(Greenwood,	R	&	Meyer	2008).	Therefore,	unlike	the	theoretical	perspective	that	views	CSR	
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purely	as	a	form	of	company	voluntary	action,	institutional	theory	allows	us	to	place	CSR	in	a	
wider	perspective	that	includes	the	market,	state	regulations,	and	political	rules.		This	tradition	of	
CSR	theory	may	often	utilize	markets	as	a	tool	to	explain	company	CSR	behavior,	for	instance	
where	companies	use	green	technology	to	achieve	company	efficiency	or	CSR	to	build	the	
company’s	reputation	on	the	market.		However,	institutional	theories	also	provide	a	broader	
perspective	that	sees	markets	themselves	as	being	socially	embedded	within	a	wider	field	of	
social	networks,	business	associations	and	political	rules	(Brammer,	Jackson	&	Matten	2012).		In	
this	manner,	the	institutional	theory	lens	on	descriptive	CSR	enables	the	researcher	to	
understand	that	the	“S”	in	CSR	differs	in	terms	of	societal	definitions.	This	may	result,	in	terms	of	
the	present	study,	in	CSR	definitions	and	understandings	specific	to	the	Indonesian	context	and	
different	from	that	of	other	contexts.		Institutional	theory	may	thus	also	help	to	understand	the	
differences	in	CSR	among	the	three	companies	studied	for	the	present	work,	which	may	be	
shaped	by	the	differing	institutional	pressures	faced	by	these	three	companies.			
3.3.2. Institutional	Environment	in	Developing	Countries	Context	
There	are	two	rival	claims	explaining	the	influence	of	institutions	on	CSR	(Fransen	2013).		The	first	
is	illustrated	by	company	CSR	in	countries	that	have	a	Coordinated	Market	Economy	(CME),	often	
categorized	as	strong	welfare	states.		CSR	in	these	countries	is	characterized	by	more	stringent	
rules	in	policy	areas	relevant	to	CSR,	such	as	labour	standards	and	environmental	protection,	
which	have	been	predominantly	applied	in	European	countries	such	as	UK	and	Italy	(Steurer	
2010).		In	this	respect,	Matten	and	Moon	(2008)	position	CSR	as	an	implicit	element	of	a	
company’s	institutional	framework,	where	national	institutions	encourage	collectivism	and	
systemic	approaches	for	companies	in	performing	CSR.		The	second	type	of	institutional	approach	
is	presented	by	countries	with	a	Liberal	Market	Economy	(LME).		These	countries	are	
characterized	by	a	less	interventionist	state,	and	individualized	and	liberal	markets	for	corporate	
control.		Demands	for	social	responsibility	are	taken	up	through	individual	company	policies,	
rather	than	through	public	policies.		Companies	in	the	US	predominantly	perform	this	type	of	CSR	
(Bucholz	2009).		Matten	and	Moon	(2008)	categorize	CSR	in	this	institutional	environment	as	an	
explicit	element	of	companies’	policies,	in	which	national	institutions	encourage	individualism	
and	discretionary	systems	for	company	CSR.		
The	institutional	environment	settings	in	developing	countries	are	different	from	those	in	
developed	countries,	which	affects	the	way	CSR	is	performed	by	companies	in	developing	
countries.		CSR	in	these	countries	aims	to	assist	governments	to	achieve	their	development	goals	
(Desta	2010;	Dobers	&	Halme	2009;	Visser	2008).		However,	governments	in	developing	countries	
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may	have	limited	freedom	to	intervene	in	the	affairs	of	companies,	particularly	Multi-National	
Companies	(MNC),	to	involve	them	in	development	issues.		Their	need	for	foreign	direct	
investment	(FDI)	to	create	jobs	and	generate	income	puts	the	government	in	developing	
countries	in	a	weak	negotiating	position	(Blowfield	&	Frynas	2005;	Desta	2010;	Dobers	&	Halme	
2009;	Idemudia	2011;	Jamali	&	Mirshak	2007).		In	addition,	dependence	upon	loans	from	
institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	or	IMF	(International	Monetary	Fund),	which	come	attached	
with	loan	condition	requirements	for	developing	countries	to	prioritize	industrialization,	leads	
governments	of	developing	countries	to	focus	more	on	protecting	company	interests,	rather	than	
on	the	welfare	of	their	communities	(Dobers	&	Halme	2009;	Gugler	&	Shi	2009;	Prieto-Carron	et	
al.	2006).		Meanwhile,	inside	the	government,	bribery	and	corruption	practices	in	developing	
countries	mean	the	authorities	tend	to	prioritize	investor	interests	because	they	hold	the	
economic	influence	necessary	to	their	corrupt	behaviour	(Adeyeye	2011;	Duncan	2007;	Lindsey	&	
Dick	2002).			
Market	conditions	in	developing	countries	often	differ	considerably	from	developed	countries,	in	
terms	of	political,	macro-economic,	cultural	or	natural	conditions.		The	business	environment	of	
developing	countries	can	be	characterized	as	often	rather	unstable	and	less	predictable	than	in	
developed	markets,	raising	the	level	of	uncertainty	for	companies	(Heidenreich	&	Puck	2012).		
The	success	of	companies	is	not	shaped	solely	by	market	actors	such	as	managers,	shareholders,	
customers	and	suppliers,	but	also	depends	on	a	company’s	relationship	with	stakeholders	that	
have	political	power	(Hillman	&	Wan	2005).		Without	links	to	governments’	officials,	non-
governmental	organizations	and	other	relevant	groups,	companies	can	face	major	business	
problems	in	terms	of	their	local	permits	and	local	legitimacy.			
The	existence	of	non-market	forces	in	influencing	company	operations	in	developing	countries,	as	
illustrated	in	Chapter	2,	encourages	companies	to	apply	political	strategies	to	manage	these	
environmental	challenges.		Therefore,	a	political	strategy	is	necessary	for	companies	to	deal	with	
uncertain	environments	in	developing	countries.		Lord	(2000)	states	that	‘by	actively	attempting	
to	shape	public	policy,	many	companies	and	industries	are	seeking	to	reduce	uncertainty,	to	
mitigate	or	eliminate	perceived	threats,	and	to	create	opportunities	in	their	environments’	(p.	
76).		Beyond	market	strategies,	companies	thus	have	to	develop	political	strategies	to	attain	non-
market	acceptance	from,	for	example,	political	stakeholders	in	the	country	of	their	operations.		
Hillman	and	Hitt	(1999)	define	company	political	strategies	as	the	efficient	design	of	all	relations	
with	political	stakeholders,	which	may	affect	the	operations	of	a	company	in	a	positive	or	
negative	way,	in	order	to	achieve	competitive	advantage.		Further,	they	distinguish	three	
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different	political	strategies	that	can	be	utilized	by	companies	to	approach	political	stakeholders.		
First,	the	information	strategy	or	lobbying	seeks	to	affect	the	actions	of	political	stakeholders	by	
providing	them	with	specific	information	about	preferences	for	policy	or	political	positions.	
Second,	the	financial	incentives	strategy	aims	to	influence	the	actions	of	political	stakeholders	by	
providing	financial	inducements	such	as	providing	financial	support	or	committing	bribery	of	
decision-makers.		Third,	the	reputation-building	strategy	tries	to	influence	political	stakeholders	
indirectly	through	public	stakeholders	and	public	policy	support.			
In	relation	to	CSR	in	developing	countries,	the	blurred	distinction	between	market	and	state	
forces	in	this	environment	creates	the	integration	of	company	roles	in	politics	and	the	market.		
The	idea	of	business	responsibility	mainly	as	the	dominant	engine	of	economic	growth	and	
creator	of	economic	value	of	the	developing	countries’	resources	is	thus	not	sufficient	(Jamali	&	
Mirshak	2007).		The	kind	of	institutional	environment	in	most	developing	countries,	such	as	
Indonesia,	results	in	companies	being	expected	to	fulfil	social	obligations	in	such	countries	
(Idemudia	2007).		Thus,	a	more	crucial	agenda	of	CSR	programs	in	developing	countries	is	their	
contribution	to	development-related	issues	such	as	reducing	poverty	and	building	human	capital	
(Blowfield	&	Frynas	2005).		This	role	has	traditionally	been	regarded	as	a	governmental	activity	
(Matten	&	Moon	2005;	Scherer	&	Palazzo	2008),	and	thus	causes	companies	to	act	in	a	state-like	
role	(Matten,	Crane	&	Chapple	2003).			
3.3.3. Types	of	CSR	Regulation			
The	importance	of	companies’	contribution	to	development	has	raised	the	level	of	government	
intervention	in	CSR.		In	this	manner,	some	governments	have	formed	certain	CSR	regulations	to	
govern	CSR	in	their	countries.		The	type	of	CSR	regulation	made	by	a	government	reflects	their	
country’s	institutional	environment,	reflecting	the	relationship	between	businesses,	government	
and	society.		Some	governments	govern	CSR	only	in	the		form	of	informal	and	reflexive	laws	
which	basically	rely	on	normative	ethical	ideas	and	behaviour	on	the	part	of	companies	
(Buhmann	2006).		These	soft	law	interventions	typically	encourage	business	to	adopt	CSR	
standards	such	as	anti-bribery	practices	(Adeyeye	2011),	or	build	sustainable	reporting	of	CSR	
activity	as	part	of	business	requirements	(Delbard	2008).		Countries	like	UK,	Norway,	and	Italy	are	
among	countries	that	promote	soft	laws	for	CSR	public	policy	(Albareda	et	al.	2006;	Fox,	Ward	&	
Howard	2002;	Steurer	2010;	Steurer,	Martinuzzi	&	Margula	2011).		Promoting	soft	policy	is	
directed	to	building	a	good	environment	for	businesses	to	implement	CSR	and	encourages	
voluntariness	of	company	CSR	responses	(Steurer,	Martinuzzi	&	Margula	2011).	
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However,	the	idea	of	government	intervention	is	built	upon	the	reciprocal	relationship	between	
government	and	companies.		These	governments	depend	on	companies	and	markets	for	the	
efficient	provision	of	goods	and	services	that	enhance	social	well-being	and	in	return	markets	
depend	on	government	rules	and	infrastructure	to	function	efficiently	and	fairly.		Thus,	
government	intervention	in	CSR	should	achieve	an	optimal	balance	between	state	intervention	
and	market	freedom.		Consideration	of	the	government-business	relationship	has	resulted	in	two	
key	ideas	being	posited:	‘the	civic	governance’	concept	whereby	the	state	is	required	to	intervene	
to	protect	public	good;	and	the	opposite	thinking,	on	‘consumer	sovereignty’	following	laissez	
faire	market	dynamics	with	minimum	government	intervention	(Gjølberg	2011).		The	ideas	of	
these	two	schools	of	thought	lead	us	to	ask	whether	companies’	CSR	performance	is	best	
achieved	by	“hard	law”	through	legislated	regulatory	intervention	or	through	“soft	law”	by	
delegated	voluntary	approaches	that	leverage	the	power	of	the	market	to	move	companies	to	be	
socially	responsible.	
Table	3.1.	“Hard	law”	versus	“Soft	law”	regulatory	approaches	
Type	of	Intervention	 Hard	law	(prescriptive)	 Soft	law	(voluntary)	
Setting	standards	 Regulatory	prescription-	
traditional	command	and	control	
regulation	in	which	legally	
binding	standards	are	prescribed	
Information-	influence	constituents	
through	the	transfer	of	knowledge	and	
the	communication	of	reasoned	
argument	and	persuasion	
Enforcing	standards	 Economic	regulatory	instruments-	
examples	include	pollution	fees,	
emission	taxes,	and	tradable	
permits	to	encourage	firms	to	
internalize	environmental	costs	
Voluntary	approaches-	examples	
include	industry	self-regulation,	codes,	
voluntary	challenges,	eco-labels,	
charters,	co-regulation,	covenants,	and	
negotiated	environmental	agreements	
Source:	(Gjølberg	2011)	
Table	3.1	shows	the	types	of	interventions	that	can	be	applied	by	government,	consisting	of	
either	“setting	standards”	or	“enforcing	standards”.		Prescriptive	hard	law	approaches	prescribe	
regulatory	prescription	by	government	legally	binding	businesses.		Enforcing	standards	can	also	
be	created	under	hard	law	by	introducing	taxing,	fees,	and	permits	that	are	authorized	by	the	
government.		In	contrast,	soft	law	voluntary	approaches	tend	to	focus	on	the	transfer	of	
knowledge	and	communication	of	government	and	business,	so	businesses	can	voluntarily	apply	
particular	standards	in	their	CSR.		Government	intervention	with	a	soft	law	approach	encourages	
self-regulation	of	business	through	giving	rewards	such	eco	labelling,	charters,	covenants	and	
negotiated	environmental	agreements.			
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The	hard	law	approach	to	regulation	is	generally	criticized	for	being	slow	and	expensive	to	
develop	and	operate.		The	argument	against	hard	law	government	intervention	states	that	it	
inhibits	company	innovation	and	beyond-compliance	behaviour.		On	the	other	hand,	the	soft	law	
voluntary	approaches	such	as	self-regulation	by	business	are	also	criticized	for	being	difficult	to	
apply,	less	rigorous	in	their	performance	requirements	and	the	lack	of	certainty	in	public	
accountability	(Gjølberg	2011).				
Companies	generally	prefer	to	apply	a	voluntary	rather	than	a	regulatory	approach	because	this	
avoids	the	impositions	of	inefficient	regulation.		Imposing	a	regulative	approach	limits	the	
flexibility	of	companies	to	utilise	CSR	as	an	economic	instrument	to	achieve	economic	goals.		
Further,	companies	argue	that	self-regulation	generates	positive	changes	in	corporate	culture	
towards	being	socially	responsible	(Schulz	&	Held	2004),	by	giving	them	opportunities	to	develop	
their	CSR	strategies	in	particular	ways.		Firstly,	it	can	promote	the	innovation	of	CSR	practices	by	
companies.		Secondly,	it	can	be	appropriate	for	all	companies	irrespective	of	sector,	size	or	
context,	as	it	enables	companies	to	build	their	CSR	strategies	to	suit	their	own	circumstances.		
Thirdly,	the	voluntary	approach	tends	to	give	more	substantive	benefits	for	the	companies	that	
are	acting	in	socially	and	environmentally	responsible	ways	(Lynch-Wood,	Williamson	&	Jenkins	
2009;	Windsor	2006).			
However,	in	the	developing	countries’	context,	promoting	a	soft	law	approach	that	relies	on	the	
voluntariness	of	company	self-regulation	and	policy	setting	may	not	be	as	appropriate.		Porter	
and	van	der	Linde	(1995),	for	example,	disagree	with	the	proposition	that	government	
intervention	can	raise	business	costs.		They	found	that	in	the	case	of	environmental	regulations,	
these	can	trigger	innovations	that	can	offset	the	costs	involved	in	reducing	the	negative	effect	of	
operations	on	the	environment,	resulting	in	efficiencies	and	making	companies	more	competitive	
in	the	global	market.		It	is	also	evident	that	mandatory	initiatives	from	government	can	fill	the	
gap	due	to	a	lack	of	companies’	voluntary	initiatives	to	be	socially	responsible.		The	penalization	
of	companies	for	not	conducting	CSR	may	force	them	to	comply	with	mandatory	requirements	
and	encourage	higher	levels	of	compliance.			
While	the	positive	potential	of	enforcement	action	and	penalties	have	already	been	noted	for	
mandatory	CSR,	these	same	attributes	can	also	create	downsides.		For	example,	with	regard	to	
regulation,	the	costs	of	enforcement	are	placed	on	the	government;	while	limited	enforcement	
resources	may	lead	to	increased	evasive	activity.		Furthermore,	some	commentators	have	noted	
that	monetary	penalties	may	be	insufficient	to	encourage	compliance	in	all	cases	and	may	come	
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to	be	seen	as	merely	another	cost	associated	with	doing	business	(Bakan	2005).	In	such	instances,	
even	mandatory	regulation	may	be	insufficient	to	regulate	corporate	behaviour.		The	drawbacks	
of	a	mandatory	approach	are	also	associated	with	the	methods	used,	particularly	when	they	
emerge	from	legislative	efforts.	The	time-consuming	nature	of	legislative	undertakings	may	make	
regulatory	solutions	less	responsive	to	quickly	evolving	situations.	Furthermore,	it	has	also	been	
observed	that	legislation	tends	to	be	less	tailored	to	industry	needs,	an	issue	that	may	be	
important	where	the	regulation	will	apply	to	corporations	in	different	sectors	and	of	different	
sizes.	
3.4. STAKEHOLDERS	PERSPECTIVES	
Given	the	various	groups	in	communities,	a	stakeholder	approach	is	useful,	for	both	academics	
and	practitioners,	to	explain	who	the	main	beneficiaries	of	CSR	are.		Maignan	et	al.	(2004)	found	
a	stakeholder	approach	assists	senior	management	and	many	marketers	in	defining		the	word	
‘social’	in	CSR.		Even	though	businesses	in	general	are	responsible	to	society	at	large,	an	
individual	business	can	only	be	deemed	responsible	toward	specific	stakeholders	or	definable	
agents.	
This	section	is	divided	into	four	subsections.		Subsection	3.4.1	discusses	stakeholder	theory.		
Subsection	3.4.2	presents	stakeholder	power	and	networks.		Subsection	3.4.3	shows	local	
stakeholder	legitimacy.		Subsection	3.4.4	addresses	the	local	stakeholder	pressures.	
3.4.1. Stakeholder	Theory	
Similar	with	CSR	perspectives,	there	are	two	views	in	defining	stakeholders:	the	narrow	view	and	
broad	view	(Mitchell,	Agle	&	Wood	1997).		The	narrow	view	relates	the	stakeholder	concept	with	
“their	direct	relevance	to	the	firm’s	core	economic	interest”	(Mitchell,	Agle	&	Wood	1997,	p.	
857).		In	relation	to	this,	Greenwood	(2007,	p.	31)	defines	“stakeholders”	as	“groups	who	are	vital	
to	the	survival	and	success	of	the	organization”.		Some	groups	appropriate	to	this	definition	are	
stockholders,	employees,	customers,	suppliers,	and	key	government	agencies	(Klonoski	1991).		
The	broad	view,	according	to	Freeman	(2011,	p.	25),	defines	stakeholders	as	“any	groups	or	
individuals	who	can	affect	or	are	affected	by	the	achievement	of	the	firm’s	objectives”.		Some	
stakeholder	groups	categorized	in	this	definition	are	local	communities,	trade	associations,	
unions,	and	other	public	interest	groups	(Freeman	2011;	Klonoski	1991).		The	broad	view	allows	
companies	to	include	their	environment	in	their	decisions	by	identifying	stakeholders’	interests	in	
order	to	build	stakeholder	relationships.		Therefore,	the	broad	view	is	required	in	CSR	since	it	
does	not	merely	deal	with	shareholder	interests	but,	according	to	(Mitchell,	Agle	&	Wood	1997,	
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p.	857)	is	based	on	“the	empirical	reality	that	companies	can	indeed	be	vitally	affected	by,	or	they	
can	vitally	affect,	almost	anyone”	.	
In	addition	to	addressing	stakeholder	views,	the	development	of	the	stakeholder	concept	has	
also	been	categorized,	by	Donaldson	and	Preston	(1995),	into	three	aspects:	descriptive,	
instrumental,	and	normative.		The	descriptive	approach	seeks	to	describe	specific	corporate	
characteristics	and	behaviours	through	relationships	that	are	observed	in	the	external	world.		It	
analyses	the	nature	and	scope	of	various	relationships	with	stakeholders	(Branco	&	Rodrigues	
2007;	Jawahar	&	McLaughlin	2001).		The	instrumental	approach	explains	the	connections	
between	stakeholder	management	and	corporate	objectives	(e.g.,	profitability,	growth),	obtained	
from	certain	practices	of	relationship.		Here,	the	instrumental	approach	views	stakeholders	as	a	
means	to	improve	corporate	performance	(Jones	1995;	Yang,	Shen	&	Ho	2009).		The	normative	
approach	interprets	the	functions	of	the	corporation,	including	the	identification	of	moral	or	
philosophical	guidelines	for	the	operation	and	management	of	corporations	(Hendry	2001;	Yang,	
Shen	&	Ho	2009).			
Stakeholder	theory	emphasizes	relationships	with	agents	that	affect	or	may	be	affected	by	the	
business	(Boesso	&	Kumar	2009;	Freeman	2011).		Stakeholders	refers	to	those	actors	who	have	a	
two-way	interaction,	thus	relationships	are	considered	socially	constructed	(Onkila	2011).		The	
theory	further	illustrates	the	three	basic	steps	of	the	stakeholder	management	approach	as	
espoused	in	Freeman	(2011):	“identification”,	“treatment”,	and	“assessment	of	impact”.		
Stakeholder	identification	determines	which	stakeholders	matter	most	(Harrison	&	St	John	1996),	
and	this	depends	on	company	perspectives	(Frooman	1999;	Phillips	1999).		Some	characteristics	
commonly	used	to	identify	stakeholders	include	power,	legitimacy,	and	urgency	(Mitchell,	Agle	&	
Wood	1997),	and	structural	and	demographic	determinants	(Frooman	&	Murrell	2005).		Freeman	
et.al.	(2010),	in	addition,	propose	two	distinct	types	of	stakeholders	based	on	influences:	primary	
stakeholders	(those	who	engage	in	economic	transactions	with	the	business	such	as	stockholders,	
customers,	and	employees);	and	secondary	stakeholders	(those	who	do	not	engage	directly	with	
business	operations	but	are	affected	by	or	can	affect	its	actions).		In	relation	to	the	several	
attributes	of	stakeholders	offered	in	the	literature,	the	present	study	employs	Mitchell	et	al.’s	
(1997)	attributes,	consisting	of	power,	legitimacy,	and	urgency,	to	identify	the	salience	of	
stakeholders	in	the	study.			
Stakeholder	treatment	addresses	the	ways	used	to	engage	with	stakeholders,	such	as	
‘communications’	to	maintain	relationships	with	stakeholders	and	‘information’	to	improve	
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relationships	with	stakeholders	(Smudde	&	Courtright	2011).		Heugens	and	Van	Oosterhout	
(2002)	ascertain	three	conditions	related	to	this:	parties	should	be	autonomous;	alignable	in	their	
interests;	and	capable	in	their	commitments.		Timeliness	of	communication,	honesty	and	
completeness	of	information,	and	empathy	and	equity	of	treatment	have	also	been	identified	as	
important	factors	when	engaging	with	stakeholders	(Strong,	Ringer	&	Taylor	2001).		Impact	
assessment	includes	the	impact	of	stakeholder	management	on	stakeholders	and	on	the	
corporation.		Kolk	(2005)	clearly	states	that	stakeholder	management	should	simultaneously	
create	a	positive	impact	for	society	and	profit	for	the	corporation.		However,	the	literature	has	
mainly	focused	on	measuring	the	impacts	of	stakeholders	on	corporations	and	less	on	the	
impacts	to	stakeholders.		Hillman	and	Keim	(2001)	related	management	of	primary	and	
secondary	stakeholders	to	shareholder	wealth	and	value;	while	Romenti	(2010)	studied	how	
stakeholder	engagement	influenced	the	reputation	of	a	corporation.		Maignan	&	Ferrel	(2004)	
state	that	stakeholder	management	can	have	a	positive	impact	if	corporation	norms	converge	
with	community	norms,	and	will	have	a	negative	impact	if	corporation	norms	conflict	with	those	
of	community	stakeholders.					
3.4.2. Stakeholder	Power	and	Networks	
Through	the	definitions	of	stakeholders	from	various	scholars	discussed	above	lies	the	question	
of	who	and	what	really	counts.		Identification	of	stakeholders,	that	is,	is	important	to	
understanding	stakeholder	theory.		Mitchell	et	al.	(1997)	tried	to	respond	to	this	inquiry	by	
developing	a	set	of	underlying	dimensions	found	in	the	various	accounts	of	stakeholder	theory,	
which	they	list	as	power,	legitimacy	and	urgency.		They	found	that	power	and	legitimacy	are	the	
core	attributes	for	identifying	stakeholders,	and	concluded	that	stakeholder	salience	is	positively	
related	to	the	cumulative	number	of	stakeholder	attributes.		Stakeholders	who	are	perceived	to	
possess	one	attribute	are	less	salient	than	those	who	possess	two	attributes.			
Freeman	(2011)	identifies	important	stakeholders	faced	by	business	organizations	in	the	US,	
where	the	formal	institutions	are	obvious.		However,	for	the	developing	country	context	such	as	
in	Indonesia,	stakeholders	may	not	as	easily	be	identified	by	reference	to	formal	institutions,	due	
to	dynamic	powers	held	by	different	stakeholders	in	the	national	and	regional	levels.		That	is,	
critical	stakeholders	may	come	not	only	from	a	formal	position	such	as	government,	due	to	the	
lack	of	power	and	legitimacy	held	by	those	in	such	positions.		
The	power–influence	conceptualization	advanced	by	French	and	Raven	(1958)	has	been	used	by	
many	scholars	to	explain	power	relations	and	dynamics	in	the	organization.		Their	classic	study	on	
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power	developed	a	schema	of	sources	of	power	by	which	to	analyse	how	power	plays	work	or	fail	
to	work	in	a	specific	relationship.		According	to	Raven	(1992),	power	must	be	distinguished	from	
influence	in	the	following	way:			
(i) “Legitimate	power”,	also	called	positional	power,	is	the	power	of	an	individual	owing	
to	the	relative	position	and	duties	of	the	holder	of	the	position	within	an	
organization.	Legitimate	power	is	formal	authority	delegated	to	the	holder	of	the	
position.	It	is	usually	accompanied	by	various	attributes	of	power	such	as	uniforms	
and	offices.				
(ii) “Referent	power”	is	the	power	or	ability	of	individuals	to	attract	others	and	build	
loyalty.	It	is	based	on	the	charisma	and	interpersonal	skills	of	the	power	holder.	
Abuse	is	possible	when	someone	that	is	likable,	yet	lacks	integrity	and	honesty,	rises	
to	power,	placing	them	in	a	situation	to	gain	personal	advantage	at	the	cost	of	the	
group's	position.	Referent	power	alone	is	unstable,	and	is	not	enough	for	a	leader	
who	wants	longevity	and	respect.	When	combined	with	other	sources	of	power,	
however,	it	can	help	a	leader	achieve	great	success.				
(iii) “Expert	power”	is	an	individual's	power	deriving	from	the	skills	or	expertise	of	the	
person	and	the	organization's	needs	for	those	skills	and	expertise.	When	an	
individual	has	knowledge	and	skills	that	enable	that	person	to	understand	a	situation,	
suggest	solutions,	use	solid	judgment,	and	generally	outperform	others,	people	will	
have	reason	to	listen	to	that	person.	When	an	individual	demonstrates	expertise,	
people	tend	to	trust	that	person	and	respect	what	they	say.		
(iv) “Reward	power”	depends	on	the	ability	of	the	power	wielder	to	confer	valued	
material	rewards:	it	refers	to	the	degree	to	which	the	individual	can	give	others	a	
reward	of	some	kind	such	as	benefits,	time	off,	desired	gifts,	promotions	or	increases	
in	pay	or	responsibility.	
(v) “Coercive	power”	is	the	application	of	negative	influence.	It	includes	the	ability	to	
demote	or	to	withhold	other	rewards.	Coercive	power	tends	to	be	the	most	obvious	
but	least	effective	form	of	power	as	it	builds	resentment	and	resistance	from	the	
people	who	experience	it.	Threats	and	punishment	are	common	tools	of	coercion.		
All	these	types	of	power	may	be	obtained	by	stakeholders	through	networks	where	stakeholders	
interact	with	and	influence	each	other	within	the	power	balance.		To	understand	stakeholder	
networks,	three	concepts	are	of	vital	importance:	nodes,	links,	and	networks	(Rowley	1997b).		
Nodes	commonly	refer	to	actors	or	stakeholders,	both	individual	or	a	group.		Links	are	the	
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relationships,	of	any	kind,	between	the	actors,	which	have	content	such	as	information	or	
financial	transfer,	friendship,	partnership	or	even	an	enemy	relationship.		Actors	can	be	directly	
or	indirectly	linked,	joined	by	multiple	relationships,	or	be	separate.		Networks	are	the	patterns	
formed	from	the	combination	of	all	the	actors	and	links	within	the	system	(Bovaird	2005;	Rowley	
1997b;	Svendsen	&	Laberge	2005).		Networks	have	certain	characteristics.	For	example,	networks	
may	be	“dense”	(having	many	links)	or	“sparse”	(having	few	links).		“Density”	refers	to	the	
number	of	connections	between	actors	within	the	network.		It	is	argued	that	highly	dense	
networks	result	in	efficient	communication	and	enhanced	diffusion	of	norms	across	networks.		
Another	network	characteristic	is	“centrality”.	Networks	may	have	one	central	actor	with	links	
from	many	actors	directed	to	this	actor,	which	indicates	high	network	centrality;	or	a	network	
may	have	several	groups	and	no	central	actor,	indicating	low	network	centrality.	A	central	
position	within	the	network	indicates	the	amount	of	power	obtained	through	the	structure,	and	
capacity	to	access	information	and	influence	other	members	(Fassin	2008,	2009;	Rowley	1997a).		
The	goal	of	adopting	the	power	and	network	perspective	in	stakeholder	analysis,	in	the	present	
study,	stems	from	the	recognition	that	since	CSR	has	been	mandated	by	the	state,	the	
implementation	of	company	CSR	must	be	influenced	by	power	relations	between	companies,	
local	governments,	and	local	communities.		The	power	relations	and	networks	are	tools	that	can	
be	used	to	examine	the	links	and	the	potential	influence	of	ties	between	stakeholders	in	the	
implementation	of	CSR.		In	this	study,	“actors”	are	stakeholders	representing	the	company,	local	
government,	and	some	actors	in	the	local	community	or	village.		The	“link”	is	operationalized	as	
contacts	or	relationship	among	stakeholders	and	the	content	of	the	link	is	power	relations	
between	stakeholders	in	terms	of	CSR	(Freeman	2011;	Rowley	1997b).				
The	lack	of	discussion	of	power	issues	and	the	dominating	discourse	of	the	business	perspective	
on	CSR	are	particularly	salient	issues	in	relation	to	stakeholder	management.		Freeman	and	Reed	
(1983)	have	argued	that	the	democratization	of	corporations	in	terms	of	increased	direct	citizen	
participation	can	only	be	achieved	by	looking	at	power	relation	issues	in	the	stakeholder	
approach.		In	practice,	the	stakeholder	approach	is	often	portrayed	as	ideationally	neutral:	as	a	
process	that	brings	business	representatives,	NGOs	and	public	sector	agencies	together	to	
address	challenges	facing	the	corporation.		However,	in	the	process	some	stakeholders	are	often	
missing	from	lists	of	stakeholders,	or	physically	absent	from	stakeholders’	meetings	and	forums	
(Harrison	&	St	John	1996).		These	situations	usually	happen	with	communities	in	developing	
countries	that	do	not	normally	have	a	voice	in	society:	farmers,	children,	and	workers	-	especially	
home-based	workers,	women	workers,	and	poor	communities	who	toil	under	harsh	and	
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dangerous	conditions	due	to	businesses	negative	externalities.		Even	if	these	groups	do	
occasionally	have	a	voice	in	multi-stakeholder	initiatives,	“power	relations	between	stakeholders	
continue	to	shape	the	issues	that	are	raised,	the	alliances	that	are	formed	and	the	successes”	
that	are	identified	(Jensen,	T	&	Sandström	2011).	
3.4.3. Local	Stakeholders	Legitimacy	
Literature	on	the	stakeholder	approach	has	included	legitimacy	in	local	business	environments	as	
part	of	companies’	stakeholders	strategy	(Gifford	&	Kestler	2008;	Gifford,	Kestler	&	Anand	2010).		
Local	legitimacy	suggests	that	in	order	to	survive,	companies	have	to	comply	with	the	rules	and	
belief	systems	of	the	local	stakeholder	environment	in	which	they	operate	(Hillman	&	Wan	2005).		
In	this	manner,	to	gain	local	legitimacy,	companies	need	to	create	a	“generalized	perception	or	
assumption	that	the	actions	of	[their]	entity	are	desirable,	proper,	or	appropriate	within	some	
socially	constructed	system	of	norms,	values,	beliefs,	and	definitions”	(Suchman	1995,	p.	574).		
The	concept	of	legitimacy	(Suchman	1995)	is	different	from	acceptance	that	tends	to	be	related	
to	individual	decisions	to	accept	others,	and	is	draw	from	psychology	(Wentzel	1994;	Gifford-
Smith	and	Brownell	2003;	Leary	2010).		According	to	Leary	(2010),	social	acceptance	means	that	
other	people	signal	that	they	wish	to	include	you	in	their	groups	and	relationships	and	occurs	on	
a	continuum	that	ranges	from	merely	tolerating	another	person’s	presence	to	actively	pursuing	
someone	as	a	relationship	partner.		In	this	manner,	the	social	acceptance	is	dependent	on	the	
individual	decision,	whilst	the	legitimacy	is	relied	on	the	wider	community	norms	and	values.	
The	common	study	of	local	legitimacy	shows	how	companies,	particularly	the	MNCs,	often	have	
difficulty	in	gaining	local	legitimacy	in	each	country,	due	to	the	differences	between	the	MNCs’	
values	and	that	of	the	local	environment.		For	instance,	Carney	et.al	(2009)	found	that	the	
establishment	of	US	and	European	companies	in	Asia	countries	often	can	be	hindered	because	
they	were	not	accustomed	to	operating	in	a	dominant	state	control	environment.		Gifford	et	al.	
(2010)	further	argue,	for	example,	that	the	contributions	of	the	Multi-National	gold	company,	
Newmont,	to	community	development	as	demanded	by	local	communities	were	part	of	their	
efforts	to	gain	local	legitimacy	in	Peru.					
In	relation	to	the	present	study,	the	two	stakeholder	groups	that	are	the	focus	of	the	study,	local	
district	governments	and	local	communities,	are	frequently	among	the	constituencies	named	in	
connection	to	companies'	local	legitimacy	(Suchman	1995).		Local	district	government	as	
authority	provides	the	license	to	operate	and	plays	a	vital	role	in	establishing	the	infrastructure	to	
support	company	operations	in	their	territory.		Local	communities,	meanwhile,	according	to	
Marquis	and	Battilana	(2009),	provide	the	environment	for	companies,	in	that	the	way	in	which	
	 Mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia:	Institutional	and	Stakeholder	Perspective	
 
54	
 
companies	behavior	is	influenced	by	the	local	communities	in	creating	local	regulations,	and	
social	normative	and	cultural	cognitive	ways	of	conducting	business.			
To	support	local	legitimacy,	stakeholder	theory	proposes	that	company	success	depends	on	the	
company	relationships	with	various	internal	(e.g.	employees)	and	external	constituencies	(e.g.	
local	government	and	local	communities)	(Clarkson	1995;	Jones	2011).		Phillips	(2003)	suggests	
that	companies	should	consider	two	types	of	stakeholders	to	gain	local	legitimacy.		The	first	type	
is	the	normative	stakeholder.		Normative	stakeholders	are	stakeholders	to	whom	the	
organization	has	a	moral	obligation	(Phillips	2003).		These	groups	might	be	the	stakeholders	that	
Freeman	(2011)	define	as	those	"who	are	affected	by	the	the	achievement	of	the	firm’s	
objectives".		In	relation	to	the	present	study,	these	stakeholders	may	be	taken	to	refer	to	
marginalized	stakeholders.		The	second	type	describes	derivative	stakeholders.	Derivative	
stakeholders	are	those	groups	whose	actions	and	claims	must	be	considered	by	managers	due	to	
their	power	and	potential	effects	upon	the	organization	and	even	on	the	normative	stakeholders	
(Phillips	2003).		However,	the	legitimacy	of	these	derivative	stakeholders	depends	solely	upon	
obligations	owed	to	others	(the	normative	stakeholders)	and	does	not	result	from	any	obligation	
due	the	derivative	stakeholders	themselves.		Freeman	(2011)	define	this	stakeholder	as	“who	can	
affect	the	achievement	of	the	firm’s	objective”.			In	this	manner,	the	derivative	stakeholders	may	
be	taken	to	refer	to	the	‘little	kings’,	where	those	stakeholders	have	power	to	influence	company	
operations	such	as	by	providing	the	companies	with	a	license	to	operate	and	supporting	
infrastructure	for	company	operations	such	as	roads	and	bridges.		Further,	through	their	power	
little	kings’	acceptance	to	companies	can	influence	wider	community	perceptions	to	give	
legitimacy	to	the	companies	operating	in	their	area.			
3.4.4. Local	Stakeholder	Pressures	
Stakeholder	theory	embeds	companies	in	a	broader	set	of	social	relations	than	that	of	the	
dominant	shareholder-oriented	approach	promoted	by	economic	theory	from	the	firm’s	
perspective	(Freeman	2011).		The	core	idea	of	the	stakeholder	concept	is	consideration	of	the	
interests	of	different	stakeholders	and	managing	the	influences	embedded	in	the	relationships	
between	stakeholders	and	the	companies	(Freeman	et	al.	2010).				
In	relation	to	the	Indonesian	context,	local	stakeholders	identified	by	this	research	consist	of	local	
government	and	local	communities.		The	definition	of	local	government	and	local	communities	is	
complex,	considering	how	the	definition	of	these	terms	has	been	shaped	by	understanding	of	
social	and	political	processes	(McMillan	&	Chavis	1986;	Sharpe	1970).		Indeed,	companies	often	
create	and	identify	local	communities	for	their	own	purpose	and	motives	(Mayes,	McDonald	&	
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Pini	2014).		Local	government	has	been	characterized	by	(i)	operation	in	a	restricted	geographical	
area	within	a	nation	or	state;	(ii)	local	election	or	selection;	and	(iii)	the	enjoyment	of	a	measure	
of	autonomy	including	the	power	of	taxation	and	local	permits	(Sharpe	1970).		Definitions	of	
communities	have	four	essential	elements,	which	are	:	(i)	membership	as	the	feeling	of	belonging	
or	of	sharing	a	sense	of	personal	relatedness;	(ii)	influence,	a	sense	of	mattering,	of	making	a	
difference	to	a	group	and	of	the	group	mattering	to	its	members;	(iii)	reinforcement	as	the	
integration	and	fulfilment	of	needs	by	sharing	the	resources	throughout	the	group;	and	(iv)	
shared	emotional	connection,	the	commitment	and	belief	that	members	have	shared	and	will	
share	history,	common	places,	time	together,	and	similar	experiences	(McMillan	&	Chavis	1986).				
The	issuance	of	CSR	legislation,	consisting	of	laws	and	regulations,	gives	legitimacy	to	local	
government	and	local	communities	to	push	companies	to	perform	CSR.		Unlike	the	explicit	
contracts	that	companies	have	with	various	stakeholders	such	as	shareholders,	suppliers	and	
customers,	in	a	voluntary	CSR	environment,	local	stakeholders	are	not	subject	to	explicit	
contracts	with	companies.		Post	et.al.	(2002)	affirms	that	local	stakeholders	have	an	‘implicit	
contract’	and	often	expect	companies	to	provide	compensation	for	the	‘service’	that	they	believe	
they	provide	to	companies,	in	the	form	of	the	social	license	or	use	of	natural	or	community	
resources.		If		stakeholder	expectations	are	not	satisfied,	then	they	may	become	adversarial,	
and/or	litigious	towards	the	company	to	ensure	it	fulfils	its	duties,	thereby	making	the	contract	
explicit	(Vazquez-Brust	et	al.	2010).		The	issuance	of	CSR	legislation	by	central	government	in	
Indonesia	has	given	legitimacy	to	local	stakeholders	for	CSR	from	companies.		The	claim	of	CSR	
has	become	‘explicit’	for	local	stakeholders,	influencing	the	company	to	fulfil	these	local	
stakeholder’s	demands.	
In	the	present	thesis,	the	influence	of	CSR	legislation	is	recognised	as	a	reflection	of	institutional	
legitimacy	to	local	stakeholder	pressures.		Marquis	and	Battilana	(2009)	have	formulated	three	
primary	mechanisms	to	explain	the	process	of	CSR	legislation	influence	on	the	local	stakeholder	
environment,	which	are;	local	regulative,	social-normative	and	cultural-cognitive.			
Regulative	processes,	according	to	Scott	(2001,	p.	35),	“…involve	the	capacity	to	establish	rules,	
inspect	or	review	others’	conformity	to	them,	and,	as	necessary,	manipulate	sanctions—rewards	
or	punishments—	in	an	attempt	to	influence	future	behaviour”.		As	the	central	government	
issues	the	CSR	legislation,	local	political	dynamics	are	likely	to	have	an	apparent	and	dominant	
influence	on	how	such	legislation	is	interpreted	and	implemented	in	the	local	region.		There	are	
three	dimensions	for	explaining	the	regulative	process	of	mandated	CSR	to	be	applied	in	a	local	
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environment	(Marquis	&	Battilana	2009).		Firstly,	the	regulative	pressures	from	the	central	
government	may	vary	in	the	field	implementation	depending	on	the	degree	to	which	central	
government	influences	local	political	dynamics.		The	more	decentralized	the	state,	the	more	
scope	local	governments	have	in	terms	of	the	implementation	of	the	legislation.		Secondly,	with	
the	degree	of	this	state	centralization,	the	reason	why	local	government	makes	specific	types	of	
local	public	policies	can	be	understood.		There	are	many	examples	of	local	government	public	
policies	designed	to	pressure	companies.		Local	government	can	adopt	local	legal	regulations	in	
the	form	of	incentives	to	the	companies	such	as	subsidies	and	tax	breaks	or	giving	penalties	to	
companies.		Guthrie	et.al	(2008)	show,	in	their	study	set	in	the	US,	that	the	control	of	local	
governments	over	the	provision	of	tax	breaks	enabled	them	to	influence	company	contributions	
to	local	schools.		Thirdly,	local	public	authorities	may	also	mobilize	other	local	actors	to	help	them	
shape	economic	and	organizational	behaviour.		For	instance,	Ingram	and	Rao’s	(2004)	study,	set	
in	in	US,	identified	the	role	of	local	professional	associations	or	social	movement	organizations	in	
determining	legal	changes	to	the	legal	status	of	chain	stores	in	local	communities.			
Social	normative	systems	refer	to	“a	prescriptive,	evaluative	and	obligatory	dimension	(of)	social	
life”	(Scott	2001,	pp.	54-5).		Local	communities	have	developed	social	normative	systems	that	set	
standards	for	and	enforce	conformity	by	companies,	with	respect	to	what	is	regarded	as	an	
acceptable	level	and	type	of	giving	to	communities	(Guthrie	2003).		This	logic	suggests	that	social-
normative	systems	have	a	strong	effect	on	companies’	giving	behaviour.		There	is	also	evidence	
that	the	level	of	company	giving	is	closely	tied	to	their	annual	profits	(Godfrey	2005).		However,	
community	expectations	about	companies	giving	can	lead	companies	to	consciously	manage	this	
social	activity	annually	in	order	to	fulfil	this	community	standard	(Guthrie	et	al.	2008).		A	close	
proximity	between	companies	and	local	actors	suggests	more	frequent	interactions,	which	are	
important	for	resource	acquisitions	among	stakeholders	and	companies	in	the	area	(Marquis	&	
Battilana	2009).		Social	networks	in	a	community	work	on	the	basis	of	trust,	sharing	of	
information	and	communication	mechanisms	among	the	members.		In	order	to	be	accepted	in	a	
community,	a	company	should	adopt	these	values.		This	can	be	illustrated	from	the	Galaskiewicz	
and	Burt	(1991)	study	on	the	network	of	company	officers	and	non-profit	organization	officers	in	
Minneapolis,	USA,	which	shows	the	importance	of	these	relational	factors	in	guiding	companies	
in	delivering	their	philanthropic	contributions.		Aside	from	guidance,	this	social	network	enabled	
the	local	community	to	establish	normative	expectations	among	their	members	with	regard	to	
company	philanthropy,	leading	organizations	to	behave	in	ways	that	were	socially	appropriate.			
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Cultural	cognitive	systems	refers	to	the	shared	frameworks	or	mental	models	actors	draw	on	to	
create	common	definitions	of	a	situation		(Scott	2001).		Within	such	shared	frameworks,	
communities	and	companies	often	act	in	a	sensible	course	following	a	shared	set	of	logics	that	
derive	from	cognitive	templates	as	shaped	by	cultural	influences	(Marquis,	Glynn	&	Davis	2007).		
While	social	networks	of	communities	are	involved	in	spreading	information	as	well	as	
appropriate	behaviours	for	companies,	communities	also	have	a	deeper	set	of	shared	
frameworks	that	are	tied	to	longstanding	identity	and	tradition.		Marquis	and	Battilana	(2009)	
point	out	the	local	frames	of	reference	among	local	communities	vary	for	three	reasons:	
differences	in	history	and	tradition;	difference	in	demographics;	and	differences	in	geography.		
Therefore,	there	are	different	standards	of	appropriateness	in	different	localities	and	these	occur	
due	to	the	influence	of	local	cultures.		This	suggests	that	cognitive	templates	about	what	
constitutes	appropriate,	credible,	or	legitimate	organizational	social	practice	by	companies	can	
differ	across	localities,	and	the	degree	of	isomorphism	or	community	consensus	about	the	nature	
of	appropriate	corporate	social	practices	will	pressure	corporations	to	align	their	activities	in	
ways	that	are	sanctioned	by	the	community.				
3.5. A	MODEL	OF	THE	CONFIGURATION	OF	EXTERNAL	INFLUENCES	ON	
CSR	STRATEGIES		
Looking	at	the	context	of	the	present	study,	a	company’s	CSR	strategy	is	seen	as	being	influenced	
by	institutions	through	CSR	legislation	and	local	stakeholder	power	pressures,	which	rose	during	
decentralization.		The	three	literature	areas,	which	are	CSR,	institutions	and	stakeholders,	have	
been	interrelated	and	conceptualized	in	Lee’s	(2011)	model	to	explain	how	institutions	and	
stakeholders	have	influenced	an	organizations’	CSR	strategy	and	how	a	company	adapts	their	
strategies	within	the	context	of	these	external	pressures	(see	Figure	3.2).			
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Figure	3.2.	A	model	of	the	configuration	of	external	influences	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source	:	(Lee	2011,	p.	287)	
Figure	3.2	illustrates	the	relationship	between	external	pressures	and	the	organization’s	CSR	
strategy.	Local	stakeholders	can	influence	institutions	through	their	collective	actions.		In	this	
manner,	CSR	legislation,	in	the	form	of	laws,	regulations	and	ministerial	decrees,	evidently	exhibit	
this	influence,	as	state	legislation	on	CSR	are	a	result	of	local	stakeholder	actions	demanding	that	
companies	deliver	CSR.		In	return,	institutional	rules	such	as	regulating	companies	to	deliver	CSR	
to	local	stakeholders	give	legitimacy	and	power	to	local	stakeholders	in	their	demands	for	
company	CSR.		Institutions	and	their	legislation	create	the	rules	of	the	game	for	companies	
through	regulative,	normative	and	cognitive	influences	(North	1991;	Scott	2001).		Meanwhile,	
local	stakeholders	pressure	companies	through	market	and	social	activism	such	as	protest	and	
rallies.		The	institutional	pressures	may	be	amplified	or	diminished	depending	on	stakeholder	
pressures.		Institutional	rules	might	be	amplified	in	effect	if	their	implementation	has	been	
monitored	and	enforced	by	local	stakeholders.		Conversely,	the	power	of	such	rules	might	be	
diminished	when	local	stakeholders	buffer,	resist	or	divert	the	institution	rules.				
In	relation	to	these	external	influences,	Lee	(2011)	suggests	that	companies	take	four	different	
strategic	stances	depending	on	the	level	of	pressure	given	by	these	two	factors.		Table	3.2	
describes	the	possible	CSR	strategies	that	companies	can	take.	
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Table	3.2.	Different	configurations	of	institutional	and	stakeholder	pressures		
and	corresponding	CSR	strategies	
Stakeholder	
Pressures	
Institutional	Pressures	
Weak	 Intense	
Weak	 Obstructionist	–	Absence	of	external	
pressures	
Defensive	–	Institutional	
pressures	without	stakeholder	
support	
Intense	 Accommodative	–	Stakeholder	
pressure	without	institutional	
legitimacy	
Proactive	-	Synchrony	in	external	
pressures	
Source	:	(Lee	2011,	p.	288)	
Table	3.2	shows	the	options	for	company	organizations	to	deal	with	the	combination	of	
institution	and	stakeholder	pressures.		With	weak	institutional	and	stakeholder	pressures,	the	
company	organization	is	expected	to	take	an	‘obstructionist’	strategy.		An	obstructionist	strategy	
refers	to	the	complete	rejection	by	companies	of	any	form	of	social/ethical	responsibility	that	lie	
outside	their	economic	interest.		The	company	tends	to	ignore	or	fight	social	responsibility	as	part	
of	the	company’s	responsibility.				
In	the	condition	of	intense	institutional	pressures	and	the	weak	stakeholder	pressures,	the	
company	organization	can	utilise	a	‘defensive’	strategy.		A	defensive	strategy	indicates	the	
rejection	of	a	broad	ethical	responsibility	but	company	compliance	with	legal	requirements	to	
protect	their	self-interest	in	maintaining	their	operation,	by	remaining	legally	legitimate.			
For	a	company	with	weak	institutional	pressures	and	intense	stakeholder	pressures,	the	company	
organization	could	be	expected	to	take	an	‘accommodative’	strategy.			An	accommodative	
strategy	points	out	companies’	acceptance	of	ethical	responsibility,	particularly	toward	their	
stakeholders.		They	comply	with	legal	requirements	and	pay	attention	to	various	stakeholder	
voices.		However,	the	lack	of	institution	pressure	allows	the	companies	to	be	minimalist	in	
fulfilling	stakeholder	demands.		They	accept	some	stakeholder	pressures	but	rarely	take	
voluntary	initiatives	to	develop	their	CSR	activities.				
In	the	situation	of	intense	institutional	and	stakeholder	pressures,	the	model	predicts	a	company	
organization	to	take	a	‘proactive´	strategy.		The	company	fully	recognises	its	social	responsibility	
and	actively	engages	with	stakeholders	to	minimize	their	negative	impacts	and	to	improve	the	
welfare	of	their	stakeholders	(Carroll	1979;	Carroll	&	Buchholtz	2006).	
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3.6. CONCLUSION	
The	development	of	CSR	literature	predominantly	rests	on	the	assumption	of	voluntary	CSR	by	
companies	(Carroll	1991,	1999b;	Matten	&	Moon	2008).		The	narrow	definition	of	CSR	suggests	
that	the	companies	perform	CSR	if	there	is	a	clear	link	to	economic	benefit	(Friedman	2007).		The	
broad	perspective	recognises	that	social	demands	is	grounded	in	the	voluntary	behaviour	of	
companies	in	accepting	that	companies	themselves	respond	to	the	societal	expectations	
(Schwartz	&	Saiia	2012).		While	this	espousing	CSR	have	established	the	principle	of	voluntariness	
as	underlying	company	CSR,	the	issue	arises	of	what	happens	when	a	country	issues	CSR	
legislation	as	mandated	rules	of	the	game,	within	which	companies	must	perform	their	CSR.			
Institutions	provide	the	rules	of	the	game	for	companies	through	formal	and	informal	rules	that	
constrain	and	influence	companies’	behaviour	(North	1991;	Scott	2001).		With	the	development	
of	mandated	Indonesian	CSR	legislation,	the	institutional	environment	of	CSR	has	changed	from	
soft	to	hard	(Gjølberg	2011).		This	has	happened	against	the	backdrop	of	the	decentralization	era	
in	which	power	has	transferred	from	the	central	government	to	local	governments.		Further,	
resource	nationalism	is	a	big	issue	in	Indonesia,	particularly	in	the	Oil	&	Gas	industry	where	local	
communities	want	some	of	the	benefits	of	resources	mined	in	their	regions	and	want	some	
control	over	the	companies	operating	in	their	regions.		Therefore,	in	order	to	understand	the	
Indonesian	CSR	legislative	framework	asks	to	Oil	and	Gas	companies,	research	question	1	asks:		
“What	are	the	main	mandates	of	CSR	legislation	for	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia?”	
Mandated	CSR	legislation	provides	the	rule	of	the	game	that	companies	should	be	complied	with,	
so	CSR	practices	are	a	form	of	legal	compliance	of	company	with	mandated	CSR	legislation.		
However,	the	three-domain	of	CSR	(Schwartz	&	Carroll	2003)	suggests	that	the	legal	domain	of	
CSR	should	be	integrated	with	other	company	interests	such	as	economic	or	ethical	motives.		The	
context	highlights	that	local	legitimacy	from	local	stakeholders	is	important	for	companies	in	the	
territory	due	the	fact	that	local	stakeholders	gain	more	power	in	the	decentralization	era	and	
their	demands	have	been	legitimated	through	CSR	legislation	(Freeman	2011;	Phillips	2003).		This	
situation	lead	companies	to	perform	CSR	not	only	as	a	form	of	legal	compliance,	but	also	as	their	
instrument	for	maintaining	their	interests	such	as	obtaining	reputation	and	local	legitimacy	
(Friedman	2007;	Suchman	1995)	and/or	approaching	the	legitimate	local	stakeholders	(Freeman	
2011;	Mitchell,	Agle	&	Wood	1997;	Phillips	2003).			
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Therefore,	the	institutions	and	stakeholders	are	essential	factors	in	shaping	company	CSR	
strategies	in	Indonesia.		On	the	one	hand,	companies	need	to	comply	with	legislation;	on	the	
other	hand,	the	companies	also	need	to	deal	with	local	stakeholder	pressures.		
Lee’s	(2011)	conceptualization	of	the	influences	of	institutions	and	stakeholders	on	company	CSR	
strategies	propose	four	different	strategies	for	company	to	adapt	these	pressures.		However,	
companies	also	have	political	and	economic	power	to	counter	these	institutions	and	local	
stakeholders’	pressures	(Davis	1960;	Scherer	&	Palazzo	2011).			In	order	to	understand	how	
companies	undertake	CSR	in	this	mandated	environment	research	question	2	asks:	“How	do	Oil	
and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia	practice	CSR	and	treat	local	stakeholders?”		
Mandated	CSR	legislation	in	Indonesia	makes	the	demands	of	these	local	stakeholders	become	
‘explicit	claim’	(Donaldson,	T.	&	Dunfee	1999).			Therefore,	the	issuance	of	CSR	legislation	is	likely	
to	create	local	stakeholder’s	expectations	toward	the	company	CSR.		On	the	other	hand,	local	
stakeholder’	perceptions	of	how	company	implement	the	legislation	is	very	important	in	
assessing	the	impacts	of	mandated	CSR	legislation.		In	order	to	understand	the	hopes	and	
aspirations	of	host	communities	to	resource	companies	and	their	experiences	of	company	CSR	
under	mandated	CSR,	research	question	3	asks;	“what	are	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	
mandated	CSR	and	their	perceptions	of	the	CSR	practices	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia?”			
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Chapter	4.	RESEARCH	METHODOLOGY	
4.1. INTRODUCTION	
In	this	chapter,	the	research	methodology	of	the	study	is	presented.		Section	4.2	discusses	the	
nature	of	the	research	and	the	rationale	for	selecting	a	qualitative	method.		Section	4.3	presents	
the	research	design	of	the	study,	exploring	the	design	methodology	in	terms	of	the	three	
research	questions,	together	with	a	discussion	of	how	the	data	was	collected	and	analysed.		
Section	4.4	discusses	the	research	setting,	areas	and	context.		Section	4.5	describes	the	
participants	of	this	study,	which	came	from	various	groups.		Ethical	considerations	are	addressed	
in	Section	4.6.		Finally,	Section	4.7	discusses	the	limitations	of	the	methodology.	
4.2. QUALITATIVE	RESEARCH	
Indonesia	is	one	of	the	first	countries	to	pass	mandatory	CSR	legislation,	which	thus	provides	the	
present	research	with	an	important	phenomenon	to	be	examined,	particularly	in	terms	of	
experiences	of	the	implementation	of	the	legislation.		This	research	focused	on	the	experiences	
of	companies,	communities	and	local	governments	in	the	implementation	of	Indonesian	CSR	laws	
in	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry.		The	secondary	data	analysis	of	the	legislative	framework	was	a	key	
part	of	this	research	also	to	analyze	the	content	of	the	CSR	laws	to	understand	the	implications	of	
the	legislation.		A	qualitative	approach	was	taken	for	this	research,	as	this	emphasizes	an	
understanding	of	the	world	from	the	perspective	of	participants,	and	that	social	life	should	be	
viewed	as	being	the	result	of	interactions	and	interpretations	(Creswell	2012;	Yin	2009).		Further,	
the	information	from	interview	with	participants	from	companies	and	local	stakeholders	
regarding	CSR	legislation	impacts	was	anticipated	to	be	complex.		Thus,	standardized	data	
collection	methods	such	as	surveys	would	have	been	too	rigid	for	the	type	of	information	sought	
for	this	study.		In	addition,	quantitative	methods	would	not	be	allowed	for	informal	probing,	
which	was	necessary	to	capture	the	richness	of	the	required	data.			
For	the	present	purposes,	therefore,	a	qualitative	research	methodology	provided	flexibility	and	
adaptability	(Marshall	&	Rossman	2010).		The	qualitative	methods	taken	also	enabled	the	
researcher	to	develop	investigations	based	on	interesting	responses	found	during	the	data	
collection	process,	following	Yin	(2009),	who	states	that	the	collection	of	qualitative	data	
depends	considerably	on	the	research	topic	chosen	and	objectives	developed.		The	phenomena	
under	investigation	in	the	present	study	was	the	impacts	of	mandatory	CSR	legislation,	a	still	new	
area	of	research.		Therefore,	this	study	involved	exploratory	research	which	aims	to	‘understand	
phenomena	that	are	poorly	understood’	(Leedy	&	Ormrod	2012).		Mason	(2002)	also	explains	
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that	exploratory	qualitative	research	is	concerned	with	how	the	social	world	is	interpreted,	
understood,	experienced,	or	produced.		The	impacts	of	mandatory	CSR	thus	would	require	
assessment	through	participants’	meanings	and	interpretations:	as	Holloway	(1997)	also	asserts,	
individuals	are	best	placed	to	describe	situations	and	feelings	in	their	own	words.		The	qualitative	
exploratory	research	approach	used	to	examine	the	way	people	interpret	and	make	sense	of	
their	experiences	and	the	world	in	which	they	live,	in	order	to	explore	their	behaviour,	
perspectives	and	experiences	(Holloway	&	Biley	2011;	Patton	1987).	
Qualitative	research	is	also	context	bound,	in	that	such	study	involves	in-depth	comprehension	of	
complexity,	detail,	and	the	contexts	of	social	life	so	as	to	give	holistic	form	to	analysis	and	
explanation	(Miles	&	Huberman	1994).		Thus,	a	qualitative	study	can	be	done	in	natural	settings,	
allowing	the	researcher	to	make	sense	of	or	interpret	phenomena	in	terms	of	the	meanings	that	
people	bring	to	them	(Denzin	&	Lincoln	2005).		In	examining	the	implementation	of	CSR	
legislation	in	Indonesia,	qualitative	methods	offered	the	researcher	an	opportunity	to	understand	
this	implementation	through	participants’	meanings	based	on	their	experiences	of	
implementation	of	the	legislation.								
4.2.1.		Positioning	the	Research	
The	research	is	taking	qualitative	study	as	part	of	the	subjectivist	approach.		The	subjectivist	
approach	benefit	this	study	to	allow	the	researcher	to	seek	informants’	opinion	closely	and	
researcher	experiences	and	reflections	in	order	to	uncover	valuable	meaning	and	to	find	a	
different	type	of	objectivity.  This	section	elaborates	Burrell	and	Morgan	(1979)	literature	on	
subjective	and	objective	dimension	to	positioning	this	research.	
Figure	4.1.	The	Subjective	–	Objective	Dimension	
The	Subjectivist	Approach	to	
Social	Science	
	 The	Objectivist	Approach	to	
Social	Science	
	
Nominalism	
	
Ontology	
	
Realism	
	
Anti-Positivism	
	
Epistemology	
	
Positivism	
	
Voluntarism	
	
Human	Nature	
	
Determinism	
	
Ideographic	
	
Methodology	
	
Nomothetic	
Source	:	Burrell	and	Morgan	1979,	p.3	
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Figure	4.1	shows	the	different	dimension	between	subjectivist	and	objectivist	approach.		The	
ontology	dimension	discusses	how	the	reality	being	research	derives;	it	can	be	from	an	external	
conscious	or	a	product	of	individual	researcher	consciousness.		In	this	ontology	level,	the	
subjectivist	approach	suggests	nominalism	that	assumes	society	is	relative	so	the	researcher	can	
describe	the	social	world	with	names,	concepts	and	labels.		While	the	objectivist	sees	realism	
with	the	assumption	the	real	world	is	separate	from	the	individual’s	perception	of	it.		The	
epistemology	level	discusses	how	the	knowledge	can	be	acquired	and	found.		The	subjectivist	
believes	in	anti-positivism,	as	social	science	cannot	create	true	objective	knowledge	of	any	kind.		
Whilst	the	objectivist	approach	take	positivism	to	seeks	explanation	and	prediction	on	what	
happens	in	the	social	world	by	searching	for	patterns	and	relationships	in	which	hypotheses	are	
developed	and	tested.		In	the	human	nature	dimension,	the	subjectivist	approach	assumes	
voluntarism	that	sees	man	is	completely	autonomous	and	possessing	free	will,	while	the	
objectivist	suggests	determinism	that	sees	man	being	determined	by	the	situation	and	
environment	he	is	in.		In	term	of	methodology,	the	subjective	approach	agrees	on	ideographic	
that	focuses	on	detailed	observation	of	society	and	the	objectivist	approach	believes	on	
nomothetic	that	involves	hypotheses	testing	and	employs	methods	such	as	surveys	and	other	
standardized	tools	(Heinemann	1979;	Burrell	and	Morgan	1979).		This	research	takes	subjectivist	
as	an	approach.		It	means	this	study	is	taking	nominalism	as	its	ontology	where	researcher	give	
labels,	names	or	concepts	on	certain	social	phenomenon.		Anti-positivism	as	an	epistemology	in	
which	the	social	phenomenon	is	viewed	only	from	the	perspective	of	people	involved	in	this	
research.			Voluntarism	as	its	human	nature	relationship	and	nature	interaction	between	
researcher	and	participants	whereas	is	initiated	by	themselves.		Ideographic	as	its	methodology	
that	suggest	researcher	to	conduct	detail	observation	of	society.				
Further,	in	the	operationalization	of	this	approach,	a	study	should	acknowledge	the	paradigms	to	
understand	the	nature	of	society	being	research.		There	are	two	assumptions	used	to	understand	
the	society;	order	or	integrationist	view	sees	society	as	relatively	stable	and	based	on	consensus	
and	conflict	or	coercion	view	sees	society	as	constantly	changing	and	disintegrating	(Dahrendorf	
1959).		Further,	Burrell	and	Morgan	(1979)	introduce	the	term	of	'sociology	of	regulation'	to	refer	
to	the	theorist	that	concern	with	the	unity	and	cohesiveness	in	explaining	the	society,	and	the	
term	‘sociology	of	radical	change’	that	focus	on	the	radical	change,	deep-seated	structural	
conflict,	modes	of	domination	and	structural	contradiction	to	find	the	explanations	of	society.				
These	two	assumptions	relate	with	the	assumptions	of	subjectivist	and	objectivist	approach	
creating	four	paradigms	in	the	research;	the	radical	humanist,	interpretive,	radical	structuralist,	
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and	functionalist	(Burrell	and	Morgan	1979).					
Figure	4.2.	Four	Paradigms	for	Analysis	of	Social	Theory	
	 	
The	Sociology	of	Radical	Change	
	
	
	
	
Subjective	
	
Radical	Humanist	
	
	
Radical	Structuralist	
	
	
	
Objective		
Interpretive	
	
	
Functionalist	
	 The	Sociology	of	Regulation	 	
Source	:		Burrell	and	Morgan	1959,	p.22.	
The	radical	humanist	paradigm	are	mainly	concerned	with	releasing	social	constraints	that	limit	
human	potential.	They	see	the	current	dominant	ideologies	as	separating	people	from	their	"true	
selves".		They	use	this	paradigm	to	justify	desire	for	revolutionary	change.		The	radical	
structuralist		paradigm	see	inherent	structural	conflicts	within	society	that	generate	constant	
change	through	political	and	economic	crises.		The	functionalist	paradigm	has	been	the	primary	
paradigm	for	organizational	study.		It	assumes	rational	human	action	and	believes	one	can	
understand	organizational	behavior	through	hypothesis	testing.		This	research	is	identified	as	the	
subjectivist	approach	by	using	interpretive	paradigm.		The	research	is	informed	by	a	concern	to	
understand	the	world	as	it	is,	to	understand	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	social	world	at	the	
level	of	subjective	experience.	It	seeks	explanation	within	the	realm	of	individual	consciousness	
and	subjectivity,	and	seeks	to	explain	the	stability	of	behavior	from	the	individual’s	viewpoint.		
Further,	the	researcher	attempt	to	observe	on-going	process	to	better	understand	individual	
behavior	and	the	spiritual	nature	of	the	world.		
4.3. RESEARCH	DESIGN	
To	support	the	analysis,	a	multi-method	research	design	was	adopted,	which	comprised	of	
content	analysis,	interpretative	analysis	and	network	analysis.		Table	4.1	describes	the	
relationships	between	the	research	questions,	the	sources	of	data,	method	of	analysis	and	key	
outcomes.		Various	data	collection	and	data	analysis	used	in	this	research	in	which	the	position	of	
secondary	data	and	primary	data	are	depending	on	the	research	question.		For	RQ1	(what	are	the	
main	mandates	of	CSR	legislation	for	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia?),	the	
research	relies	on	secondary	data	in	the	form	of	document	analysis	of	CSR	laws	to	reveal	the	
main	mandate	of	CSR	laws.		While	for	RQ	2	(How	do	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	
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Indonesia	practice	CSR	and	treat	local	stakeholders?)	and	RQ	3	(What	are	local	stakeholder	
expectations	of	mandated	CSR	and	their	perceptions	of	the	CSR	practices	of	Oil	and	Gas	
companies	operating	in	Indonesia?),	primary	data	in	the	from	interview	and	observation	of	
companies	staff,	community	members	and	local	government	officials	are	the	primary	sources	of	
data.		The	use	of	qualitative	methods	to	address	the	three	key	research	questions	drives	the	
research	to	utilize	three	types	of	data:	interviews,	observation	and	secondary	data	in	the	form	of	
documents	from	legislation,	companies	and	local	government.	Consequently,	the	methods	of	
analysis	employed	are	document	analysis,	interpretive	analysis	and	network	analysis.		Section	4.3	
is	divided	into	two	subsections	to	explicate	these.		Subsection	4.3.1	discusses	the	data	collection	
techniques;	while	Subsection	4.3.2	discusses	the	methods	of	analysis.	
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Table	4.1	
Research	Questions,	Source	of	Data,	Method	of	Analysis	and	Key	Outcomes	
Research	Questions	 Source	of	Data	 Method	of	Analysis	 Key	Outcomes	
(i) What	are	the	main	
mandates	of	CSR	
legislation	for	Oil	and	
Gas	companies	operating	
in	Indonesia?		
Document	Review:	
• 6	laws	related	to	CSR	
• The	accompanying	2	government	
regulations	and	4	ministerial	
decrees	
• Document	Analysis	
• Interpretive	Approach		
	
• Identification	of	the	main	mandate	of	
CSR	legislation	and	how	the	Indonesian	
legislation	views	CSR	
(ii) How	do	Oil	and	Gas	
companies	operating	in	
Indonesia	practice	CSR	
and	treat	local	
stakeholders?	
	
• Document	review	of	CSR	reports,	
company	web	sites,	and	
newspapers	
• Interview	with	managers	and	
staff	
• Observation	of	CSR	projects	and	
company’	interaction	with	local	
stakeholders	
• Stakeholder	Network	
Analysis		
• Interpretive	Approach	
	
• Knowing	each	company’s	perceptions	of	
mandated	CSR	legislation	
• Identifying	CSR	priority	projects	of	each	
company	
• Identifying	local	stakeholders	of	each	
company	
• Understanding	the	outcome	of	what	
impacts/	benefits	to	local	stakeholders	
(iii) What	are	local	
stakeholder	expectations	
of	mandated	CSR	and	
their	perceptions	of	the	
CSR	practices	of	Oil	and	
Gas	companies	operating	
in	Indonesia?						
• Document	review	of	local	
government	documents	
• Interview	and	Group	Discussion	
with	local	stakeholders	
• Observation	on	local	
stakeholders	and	company	
interaction	
	
• Interpretive	Approach	 • Recognition	of	local	stakeholder	
expectations	of	CSR	legislation		and		
their	perceptions	of	company	CSR	
practices	
	
68	
 
4.3.1. Data	Collection	Techniques	
In	relation	to	the	research	questions,	three	types	of	data	were	used	in	this	study:	existing	
documents,	interviews/	Focus	Group	Discussion	(FGD)	and	observation.		Interview	is	used	to	
describe	one-on-one	discussion	between	researcher	and	participant,	whilst	focus	group	discussion	
to	describe	discussions	between	research	with	multiple	participants.		Focus	group	discussion	is	
applied	to	interview	the	local	community	group	as	this	group	is	consisted	by	many	stakeholders.		
The	interview	is	used	to	companies	staff	and	local	government	officials.		So	the	use	of	interview	
and	focus	group	discussion	is	not	mixed,	but	it	is	applied	to	different	group	of	participants	in	this	
study.		The	existing	documents	used	in	this	study	included	printed	and/or	electronic	documents	
(Corbin	&	Strauss	2008);	available	from	newspaper,	the	official	documents,	and	the		official	
websites.		These	documents	contain	text	(words)	and	images	that	have	been	recorded	without	the	
researcher’s	intervention.	Atkinson	and	Coffey	(2004)	refer	to	documents	as	‘social	facts’,	which	
are	produced,	shared,	and	used	in	socially	organized	ways.		Documents	that	are	used	for	answering	
the	research	inquiries	in	this	study	can	be	in	variety	of	forms,	including:	books;	articles;	maps	and	
charts;	newspapers	(clippings/	articles);	press	releases;	program	proposals	from	communities;	
organizational	or	institutional	reports	such	as	company	annual	reports;	statistical	data	from	official	
institutions;	and	various	public	records.		Photos	can	also	furnish	documentary	material	for	research	
purposes.		These	types	of	documents	are	found	in	libraries,	newspaper	archives,	government	and	
company	files.		Regarding	the	research	question	2	and	3,	the	exploration	of	participants’	meanings	
in	natural	settings	employs	interview	methods	(Robson	2002).		However,	for	better	understanding	
of	the	participants’	perspective,	the	researcher	also	complemented	the	interviews	with	some	
observations	and	existing	secondary	data	(Denzin	2001;	Silverman	2004).		Through	these	combined	
methods,	in	an	interpretive	approach,	the	researcher	is	enabled	to	identify	any	contradictions	
between	what	people	do	and	what	they	say	(Robson	2002;	Silverman	2004).			
It	should	be	noted	that	all	participants	were	Indonesian.		Therefore,	interviews	and	discussions	
were	conducted	in	(Bahasa)	Indonesian,	and	local	languages	for	local	community	interviews,	to	
facilitate	clear	understanding	between	the	researcher	and	participants.		Most	participants,	
particularly	from	the	local	communities,	and	some	staff	of	oil	and	gas	companies	did	not	agree	to	
be	audio	recorded	by	the	researcher,	so	the	researcher	had	to	rely	on	note-taking	during	the	
interviews	and	discussions.		The	use	of	a	recording	machine	was	often	deemed	not	to	be	suitable,	
since	it	would	disturb	the	nuances	arising	out	of	a	relaxed,	less	formal	conversation.		The	
researcher	was	thus	able	to	write	down	key	points	and	terms	occurring	during	interviews	and	
discussions.		When	the	interviews	and	discussions	were	completed,	the	researcher	checked	the	key	
terms	and	points,	and	further	elaborated	in	writing	the	information	that	had	been	provided	and	
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expressed	by	participants	during	the	sessions.		This	condition	brought	the	issue	of	rigor	and	
trustworthiness	in	this	research.		Tracy	(2010)	noted	the	issue	of	rigor	and	trustworthiness	in	
qualitative	research	by	offering	five	basic	requirements	for	qualitative	research	to	achieve	rigor	
and	four	factors	to	achieve	the	credibility.	Rigor	in	qualitative	research	can	be	achieved	if	the	study	
uses	sufficient,	abundant,	appropriate,	and	complex	theoretical	constructs,	data	and	time	in	the	
field,	samples,	contexts,	and	data	collection	and	analysis	processes.		While	the	credibility	of	
research	is	achieved	when	the	research	is	marked	by	thick	description,	concrete	detail,	explication	
of	tacit	(nontextual)	knowledge,	and	showing	rather	than	telling,	triangulation	or	crystallization,	
multivocality,	and	member	reflections.		In	term	of	rigor,	the	researcher	should	relate	the	data	
collected	in	the	field	with	the	theory	used	in	this	study,	have	significant	time	to	build	relationship	
and	discuss	with	participants	in	the	field,	and	If	the	researcher	needed	some	clarity	on	their	
statement,	the	researcher	will	consult	with	participant	during	the	writing	process.		On	the	issue	of	
credibility,	since	the	participants	rejected	the	use	of	audio	recorder,	the	researcher	should	be	able	
to	note	opinion	and	terminology	from	various	participants	and	find	the	triangulation	and	
crystallization	of	those	findings.		Further	researcher	also	allowed	participants	to	reflect	their	
statements	and	these	findings	afterwards.	
Meetings	with	the	company	managers	and	staff	were	usually	conducted	outside	the	participant’s	
offices	and	other	places	of	work,	taking	place	in	locations	such	as	restaurants	and	coffee	shops	that	
were	comfortable	for	conversations.		The	researcher	attempted	to	build	a	relaxed	and	informal	
conversation	with	these	participants.	Some	of	the	participants	had	only	just	met	the	researcher	for	
the	first	time	and	did	not	know	much	about	the	background	of	the	researcher;	thus,	understanding	
cultural	backgrounds	was	an	important	first	task	of	the	researcher	in	order	to	get	closer	with	these	
particular	participants.		For	instance,	participants	originating	from	South	Sumatera,	the	home	
province	of	the	researcher,	may	accept	a	more	relaxed	conversation	with	some	kelakar	(jokes)	so	
that	the	distance	between	researcher	and	participant	was	close;	while	the	participants	from	
Javanese	cultures	were	more	considered	in	their	manners	during	the	conversation.		By	respecting	
these	particularities	in	cultural	background,	the	researcher	encouraged	participants	to	become	
more	open	and	relaxed	in	answering	questions	during	the	interviews	and	FGDs.		It	was	also	
emphasized	to	participants	that	they	were	able	to	request	any	of	their	responses	to	be	excluded	
from	the	research,	again	creating	a	more	relaxed	and	open	environment	for	discussion.	
The	interviews	with	local	district	government	participants	were	conducted	by	making	
appointments	with	these	officials,	who	welcomed	the	researcher	to	meet	for	interviews	in	their	
offices.		The	first	interview	was	more	formal,	being	conducted	in	their	offices,	and	often	used	an	
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audio	recorder.		Then	for	the	next	meeting,	the	researcher	initiated	an	invitation	to	government	
officials	for	lunch.		Much	useful	and	important	information	was	revealed	during	these	informal	
conversations;	but	during	these	more	informal	discussions	the	researcher	was	unable	to	record,	
having	to	rely	on	note-taking	during	and	post	the	interview	process.		The	participants	gave	
permission	for	some	of	their	statements	to	be	noted,	but	they	also	understood	that	they	were	able	
to	demand	that	the	researcher	exclude	some	of	their	statements	from	the	data	if	they	requested	
this.	
Interviews	and	FGDs	with	local	communities	group	were	also	conducted.		The	researcher	had	to	
combine	interviews	and	group	discussions	because	the	members	of	community	groups	were	
enthusiastic	about	participating	in	discussions.		The	researcher	was	familiar	with	the	village	
communities	around	company	A	and	company	B,	so	the	researcher	was	easily	able	to	be	involved	
with	the	communities	and	thus	to	conduct	such	discussions.		However,	for	the	communities	
around	company	C,	the	researcher	had	to	make	more	effort	to	become	involved	with	the	local	
communities.		The	researcher	used	a	local	NGO	in	South	Sumatra	working	in	villages	around	
company	C	to	introduce	the	researcher	to	these	communities.		Through	this	recommendation,	the	
researcher	was	able	to	be	involved	with	the	communities	and	thus	have	discussions	with	them.		
The	discussions	in	all	villages	then	flowed	naturally	and	covered	some	sensitive	issues	regarding	
company	CSR	and	participants	feeling;	but	they	declined	to	be	recorded	as	they	were	afraid	that	
they	could	be	identified	through	their	voices	on	such	recordings.							
The	other	groups	interviewed	consisted	of	a	Corporate	Forum	for	Community	Development	
(CFCD),	a	business	and	managers’	forum	focused	on	the	CSR	issue,	NGOs	working	on	the	CSR	issue,	
and	the	upstream	regulatory	body	for	Oil	and	Gas	in	South	Sumatra.		The	researcher	had	existing	
contacts	with	the	first	two	of	these	groups	mentioned.		For	the	Oil	and	Gas	Regulatory	Body,	the	
researcher	used	a	colleague	to	introduce	the	researcher	to	some	important	people	in	the	Oil	and	
Gas	industry.		At	first,	the	colleague	was	reluctant	to	introduce	the	researcher	to	the	regulatory	
body	head	in	South	Sumatra	office;	but	then	agreed	to	introduce	the	researcher	to	the	officials,	
with	an	explanation	to	the	officials	that	the	research	does	not	have	any	relation	to	his	duties	and	
company.		The	other	participants	from	NGO	groups	were	easier	to	contact	and	access	by	the	
researcher	because	of	close	pre-existing	working	relationships	with	them.			
4.3.2. Data	Analysis	Method	
Multiple	types	of	data,	including	documents,	photo,	audio	recordings	and	field	notes	from	
interviews	and	observation,	were	analysed.		This	collected	data	required	the	researcher	to	choose	
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appropriate	analytic	strategies	and	techniques	to	“treat	evidence	fairly,	produce	compelling	
analytic	conclusions,	and	rule	out	alternative	interpretations”	(Yin	2009,	p.	131).		The	first	method	
used	was	document	analysis.		The	secondary	data	analysis	of	the	legislative	framework	was	a	key	
part	of	this	research	also	to	analyse	the	content	of	the	CSR	laws	to	understand	the	implications	of	
the	legislation.		As	a	research	method,	document	analysis	is	particularly	applicable	to	qualitative	
case	studies	and	intensive	studies	producing	rich	descriptions	of	a	single	phenomenon,	event,	
organization,	or	program	(Stake	2010).		Non-technical	literature,	such	as	company	annual	reports	
and	newspaper	articles,	is	a	potential	source	of	empirical	data	for	case	studies;	for	example,	data	
on	the	context	within	which	the	participant	operates	(Bowen	2009).		Document	analysis	involves	
skimming	(superficial	examination),	reading	(thorough	examination),	and	interpretation.	This	
process	combines	elements	of	content	analysis	and	thematic	analysis.		Content	analysis	is	the	
process	of	organizing	information	into	categories	related	to	the	questions	of	the	research	
(Krippendorff	2012;	Weber	1990).		Thematic	analysis	is	a	tool	to	find	a	pattern	recognized	within	
the	data.		The	themes	emerge	from	this	process	and	become	the	categories	for	analysis	(Fereday	&	
Muir-Cochrane	2008).			
The	second	approach	used	in	this	study	is	the	interpretive	approach	towards	qualitative	research.		
Denzin	(2001)	suggests	that	an	interpretive	approach	can	deal	with	multiple	perceptions	and	
meanings	where	these	come	from	thinking	and	behaviour	in	the	‘natural	setting’	context.		This	
context	can	be	obtained	from	an	effective	relationship	between	the	researcher	and	participants,	so	
that	people	identify	what	they	see	as	significant	and	tell	their	stories	in	the	ways	they	want	(Denzin	
2001).		The	researcher	identified	different	perceptions	and	assumptions	that	are	held	by	
participants	by	comparing	different	responses	given	by	participants.		This	differentiation	is	then	
interpreted	through	an	‘interpretive	evaluation’	with	pragmatic,	action-oriented	recommendations	
for	alleviating	problems	of	differentiation	(Denzin	2001;	Walsham	2006).		The	interpretive	
approach	therefore	supports	understanding	of	the	nuances,	influences	and	perceptions	of	those	
involved	in	the	evaluation,	and	the	way	they	are	in	turn	influenced	by	the	context	of	the	
organization	(Walsham	2006).		This	is	a	justification	for	the	present	research	to	use	an	interpretive	
approach,	as	it	allows	the	researcher	to	have	sense-making	in	a	complex	situation,	consider	
multiple	interpretations	and	draw	lessons	from	the	evaluation	process	that	can	be	used	to	improve	
future	processes	(Denzin	2001).		This	approach	suggests	the	researcher	critically	examine	conflicts	
and	contradictions	within	the	complexity	of	social,	cultural	and	political	systems	from	many	
perspectives	(Denzin	2001;	Klein	&	Myers	1999).		Thus,	interpretive	approach	supports	the	richness	
and	complexity	of	the	analysis	and	the	identification	of	social	and	political	issues,	surrounding	CSR	
implementation	by	Oil	and	Gas	companies.		
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The	strategy	in	this	research	was	to	use	a	‘case	descriptive’	method	for	organizing	case	studies	
according	to	the	complexity	of	cases.		This	strategy	allowed	the	researcher	to	describe	and	relate	
the	context	of	each	case.		In	line	with	this	strategy,	an	explanation-building	technique	was	
employed	to	explain	a	phenomenon,	by	answering	‘how’	and	‘why’	questions	to	the	findings	
(Gummesson	1999;	Patton	1987).		Finally,	a	cross-case	synthesis	technique	was	also	employed	to	
identify	similarity	and	difference	patterns	among	the	three	company	cases.	
The	use	of	stakeholder	analysis	reflects	a	recognition	of	how	the	various	external	stakeholders,	
both	local	governments	and	local	communities,	influence	the	decision	making	processes	of	
company	organizations	in	implementing	CSR.		Varvasovzky	and	Brugha	(2000)	define	stakeholder	
analysis	as	an	approach,	a	tool	or	set	of	tools	for	generating	knowledge	about	actors	-	individuals	
and	organizations	-	so	as	to	understand	their	behaviour,	intentions,	and	interrelations;	and	for	
assessing	the	influence	and	resources	they	bring	to	bear	on	decision-making	processes.		In	
identifying	the	stakeholders,	firstly	the	researcher	selected	stakeholders	in	the	companies,	local	
governments,	and	within	local	communities,	members	who	had	interest	in	the	CSR	legislation	
implementation	issue.		The	stakeholders	could	include	individuals,	organizations,	or	networks	or	
groups	of	individuals	and	organizations.		It	was	found	that	actors	related	to	CSR	were	easily	
identified	in	companies	and	government	due	to	the	clear	formalities	of	institutions	and	specific	job	
description	within	organizations.		However,	for	local	communities,	various	available	actors	would	
assume	themselves	to	be	community	representatives,	due	the	fact	that	the	dynamic	power	
relationship	existing	in	the	village.		Consideration	of	power	relations	within	communities	and	the	
dynamics	of	village	power	relations	assisted	the	researcher	to	select	the	right	actors	to	be	
participants.		As	data	was	gathered,	interim	outputs	such	as	matrix	tables	or	maps	were	
constructed	to	draw	stakeholder	interest	in	company	CSR,	the	resources	and/or	influence	they	can	
bring,	their	support	or	opposition	to	company	CSR	projects	and	what	level	of	importance	attached	
to	each	stakeholder	by	the	company.		This	analysis	was	based	on	the	primary	sources	of	data	
collected	through	interviews	and	discussion,	with	the	addition	of	observation	data	on	company	
and	local	actor	relationships.				
In	addition,	according	to	Tracy	(2012),	visual	data	display	is	one	approach	for	analysing	qualitative	
data	research.		A	visual	data	display	approach	was	proposed	by	Miles	and	Huberman	(1994,	p.	91),	
who	stated	that	“you	know	what	you	can	display”.		The	examples	of	visualizing	data	findings	
include	matrices,	charts,	position	maps,	network	maps	and	other	figures	for	presenting	data	(Miles	
&	Huberman	1994;	Thomas	2006).		The	use	of	data	displays	will	reduce	the	enormous	volumes	of	
qualitative	text,	which	make	it	almost	impossible	for	the	researcher	to	work	from	such	data.		Most	
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researchers	find	that	creating	a	display	is	another	useful	way	for	analysing	and	thinking	creatively	
about	data	(Tracy	2012).		Tables	or	matrices	provide	a	visual	display	of	important	categories	in	CSR	
legislation,	assisting	readers	to	understand	the	various	CSR	legislations	discussed	in	this	study,	
consisting	of	six	laws,	two	government	regulations	and	four	ministerial	decrees.		This	tool	is	also	
helpful	to	show	the	differences	between	the	three	companies’	perceptions	in	responding	to	CSR	
legislation.		The	use	of	a	stakeholders	network	map	aided	this	study	in	exploring	stakeholder	
engagement	by	the	companies	and	the	power	relations	related	to	CSR	implementation	issue	in	the	
field.				
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Figure	4.3	
Map	of	Musi	Banyuasin	District	and	it	position	in	Sumatera	Island	
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4.4. RESEARCH	SETTINGS,	AREA	AND	CONTEXT	
Figure	4.1	shows	the	location	of	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	in	Sumatera	Island,	where	the	research	
data	collection	was	conducted.		This	region	is	well-known	for	its	oil	and	gas	resources	(Ministry	of	
Energy	and	Mineral	Resources	2011),	and	its	palm	oil	and	rubber	plantations.		The	population	of	
this	district	is	561,458	people,	consisting	of	288,450	males	and	273,008	females.		The	district	has	
an	area	of	14,265.29	KM2	(BPS	2012).		The	district	has	11	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	the	
area	under	several	concession	contracts	with	central	government,	such	as	the	Production	Sharing	
Contract	(PSC),	Joint	Operating	Body	(JOB)	contract,	or	Technical	Assistances	Contract	(TAC)	(BPS	
2013).		This	study	selected	the	three	companies	that	hold	PSC	contracts,	so	that	the	company	
decisions	involving	CSR	are	made	within	that	one	company	only.			The	present	research	focusses	on	
the	Oil	and	Gas	industry	in	this	district,	as	this	industry	is	subject	to	the	mandated	CSR	legislation.			
The	district	distributes	its	Oil	and	Gas	resources	to	generate	electricity	for	Java	Island	and	
Singapore.	Aside	from	providing	essential	power	resources,	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry	also	provides	
an	interesting	set	of	circumstances	in	terms	of	CSR	implementation.		The	industry	is	still	under	
central	government	control;	however,	the	beneficiaries	of	CSR	are	mainly	within	the	local	districts,	
allowing	local	stakeholders	to	demand	CSR	from	this	industry.		In	addition,	the	local	government	of	
this	district	has	also	established	a	CSR	forum	to	improve	consultation	between	stakeholders	in	CSR	
projects.		This	forum,	membered	by	all	companies	operating	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	District,	is	
managed	by	several	district	government	officials.		The	main	aim	of	the	forum	is	to	synchronize	CSR	
projects	by	companies	with	development	projects	by	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	government.		The	
forum	has	meetings	twice	a	year	to	consult	about	and	discuss	the	CSR	project	planning	by	all	the	
companies	and	evaluate	previous	CSR	projects.		Although	the	local	district	government	has	
established	this	forum,	this	does	not	guarantee	harmonious	relationships	between	Oil	and	Gas	
companies	and	their	stakeholders.		The	company	relationships	with	stakeholders	have	been	tense	
in	this	district,	with	several	demonstrations	and	protests	from	local	communities	regarding	Oil	and	
Gas	company	activities	(Zainal	2007).		As	a	result	of	this	situation,	the	local	district	government	has	
responded	by	warning	companies	to	make	more	contributions	towards	the	development	of	local	
district	communities.	
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4.5. THE	PARTICIPANTS	
The	researcher	is	an	outsider	in	this	study	because	he	is	not	employed	by	any	of	the	organizations.		
However,	the	researcher	has	had	previous	working	relationships	as	a	consultant	with	a	number	of	
participants	in	the	research,	including	Oil	and	Gas	company	managers	and	staff,	local	district	
government	officials,	and	local	community	members.		This	put	the	researcher	in	the	position	of	a	
“friendly	outsider”	within	this	research	setting	(Greenwood,	DJ	&	Levin	2007).		Based	on	
Gummesson	(1999),	prior	relationships	are	seen	as	being	a	potential	benefit	to	the	research,	by	
having:	(i)	first	hand	pre-understanding	to	enter	the	research	process;	and	(ii)	initial	access	to	the	
research	phenomena	and	continuing	access	based	on	the	researcher’s	prior	good	relationships	
with	participants.		Prior	relationships	give	pre-understanding	to	researchers	to	reflect	the	
phenomena	and	further	give	initial	access	to	the	research	site	(Stenbacka	2001).		
The	initial	access	allows	the	researcher	to	access	the	organization,	the	team,	the	informant	and	
later	the	more	personal	access.		The	present	study	utilized	this	initial	access	to	get	
recommendations	from	contacts,	allowing	the	researcher	to	enter	the	organization,	communities	
and	government	offices,	and	further	interact	with	informants	in	those	groups.		Further	
recommendations	from	the	researcher’s	contacts	provided	access	to	informants,	allowing	them	to	
voice	their	experiences	of	CSR.		In	this	manner,	access	for	the	research	cannot	be	limited	to	
‘physical	access’	to	the	participants	by	formally	interviewing	them	with	questions	and	answers,	but	
should	also	consider	‘mental	access’	to	be	deeply	involved	in	and	explore	participant	feelings	
(Gummesson	1999;	Walsham	2006).		Figure	4.2	below	explains	the	advantage	of	researcher	prior	
relationships.	
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Figure	4.4.	Interrelated	concepts	in	a	qualitative	study	within	an	organisational	setting	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	(Stenbacka	2001,	p.	554)	
For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	participants	from	three	Oil	and	Gas	companies	were	selected,	
consisting	of	managers,	supervisors,	and	staff.		Their	participation	in	this	research	involved	them	
identifying	their	local	stakeholders,	namely	local	government	and	local	community.		Those	
company	participants	were	asked	to	list	several	names	or	actors	in	the	government	and	
community	groups	that	they	felt	related	most	to	their	CSR	performance.		In	addition	to	those	
identified	by	company	members,	this	research	also	identified	any	additional	legitimate	
stakeholders	that	might	not	be	identified	by	Oil	and	Gas	companies	participants.		It	was	expected	
that	the	selection	of	legitimate	stakeholders	by	companies	might	be	different	from	that	of	local	
communities.		Therefore,	through	a	referral	system,	the	researcher	asked	communities	who	they	
consider	legitimate	stakeholders	to	be.		Purposive	sampling	(Sarantakos	2005)	was	used,	where	
participants	were	selected	based	on	the	research	objectives	and	conceptual	framework.		The	three	
companies	were	selected	based	on	PSC	and	had	different	ownerships	status:	one	Indonesian	
Owned	Private	Company	(IOC),	one	Foreign	Owned	Private	Company	(FOC),	and	one	State-Owned	
Company	(SOC).				
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Table	4.2	presents	the	list	of	stakeholder	participants	involved	in	this	study.		Interviews	were	
conducted	with	four	groups	participating	in	this	study,	consisting	of:	managers	and	staff	from	Oil	
and	Gas	companies	(13	participants);	local	government	officers	(3	participants);	local	community	
members	from	three	villages	where	the	three	companies	were	operating	(37	participants	involved	
in	FGD);	and	other	groups	from	business	associations,	NGOs	and	the	national	regulatory	unit	of	Oil	
and	Gas	(6	participants).			
Table	4.2.	List	of	Stakeholder	Participants	
No	 Group	 Organization	 Participant	
1	 Oil	and	gas	
companies	
Company	A	-	IOC	
(4	participants)	
- one	Manager	of	Community	
Development	in	Jakarta		
- two	Supervisors	of	Public	and	External	
Relation	Office	in	the	field		
- one	staff	of		Public	and	External	Relation	
office	
Company	B	-	FOC	
(4	participants)	
- one	CSR	specialist	(supervisor)	in	Jakarta	
office	
- one	staff	External	Affairs	Department	in	
Jakarta	office	
- two	staff	of	public	relation	department	in	
the	field	
Company	C	-	SOC	
(5	participants)	
- two	staff	of	public	relation	office	who	
handle	CSR	projects		
- one	head	of	PPEB	office	in	Palembang	
(capital	of	south	Sumatra	province)	
- two	staff	of	PPEB	office	in	Palembang	
2	 Local	
Government	
District	Developmental	
Planning	Body	
(2	participants)	
- The	head	of	district	development	body	
- One	staff	handling	CSR	forum		
District	Mining	Office	
(1	participant)	
- One	staff	of	district	office	
3	 Local	
community	
Three	villages	
(37	participants)	
- The	heads	of	three	villages	
- Discussions	with	community	members	
consisting	of	8-15	members	
4	 Other	group	 Corporate	forum	for	
community	development	
(2	participants)	
- one	head	
- one	member	
NGO	
(2	participants)	
- two	members	of	NGO	
Oil	and	Gas	upstream	
regulatory	working	unit	
(2	participants)	
- one	head	of	SKKMIGAS	
- one	head	of	Public	Relation	in	SKKMIGAS	
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The	three	companies	selected	in	this	study	will	be	elaborated	in	Chapter	6.		Apart	from	focussing	
on	three	oil	and	gas	company	organizations,	this	study	also	looked	at	local	stakeholders,	consisting	
of	local	district	government	officials	and	local	communities.		These	groups	are	described	as	follows:	
Local	District	Government	
Representatives	of	the	district	government	of	Musi	Banyuasin	were	interviewed	in	this	study.		
There	are	several	offices	that	relate	to	the	operation	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies,	such	as	a	Mining	
District	Governmental	Office,	and	a	Developmental	District	Planning	Body.		As	mandated	by	the	
Bupati	(head	of	district),	CSR	programs	in	Musi	Banyuasin	should	be	reported	to	the	
Developmental	District	Planning	Body.		The	researcher	focussed	on	approaching	this	body	as	the	
head	of	Developmental	District	Planning	Body	is	also	appointed	as	the	head	of	the	CSR	forum	in	
the	Musi	Banyuasin	district.		Further	information	on	issues	related	to	Oil	and	Gas	company	
activities	outside	CSR	was	gathered	from	other	district	government	offices	such	as	the	District	
Mining	Office.			
Local	Communities	
The	members	of	local	communities	who	participated	were	drawn	from	the	villages	where	the	
companies	operate.		The	companies	name	the	villages	surrounding	their	areas	as	ring	one.		
Historically,	this	term	was	used	during	the	Soeharto	era	to	indicate	where	the	companies	got	
protection	from	military	forces.	The	military	force	used	this	term	to	designate	the	closest	areas	
that	needed	to	be	secured,	so	it	would	not	disturb	the	companies’	operations.		Today,	companies	
still	use	this	term	to	identify	the	villages	that	they	need	to	be	aware	of	in	prioritizing	their	CSR	
programs.					
It	is	very	difficult	to	find	legitimate	members	of	local	communities	since	there	are	a	lot	of	actors	
existing	in	the	villages	claiming	that	they	are	affected	by	the	operation	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	or	
can	represent	the	village	community	voice.		Thus,	selecting	participants	in	this	group	started	from	
asking	the	companies	about	the	members	with	whom	they	had	regular	contact	within	the	
community	groups.		Most	of	them	nominated	the	heads	of	villages;	however,	finding	legitimate	
stakeholders	can	be	furthered	by	involvement	with	the	communities	themselves	in	their	daily	
activities.		By	observing	community	interactions	in	their	daily	life,	the	power	relations	within	
communities	can	be	revealed,	which	was	essential	to	selecting	the	legitimate	stakeholders	in	the	
villages.																			
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Other	Group	
In	addition,	the	researcher	approached	other	groups,	consisting	of	NGOs	activists,	and	the	head	
and	members	of	a	business	association	involved	in	CSR	in	the	South	Sumatra	province.		Although	
these	groups	are	not	related	directly	to	CSR	activities	in	terms	of	the	company-stakeholder	
relationships,	they	provided	useful	insights	for	the	researcher	to	understand	the	CSR	practices	
within	the	South	Sumatra	province.		The	researcher	also	approached	the	Regulatory	Body	for	
Upstream	Oil	and	Gas	(SKKMIGAS),	which	controls	the	areas	of	South	Sumatera,	Lampung,	Jambi,	
and	Bangka	Belitung	provinces.		This	body	was	very	important	for	obtaining	access	and	
recommendations	to	contacts	within	certain	Oil	and	Gas	companies.			
4.5.1. Doing	Research	in	Indonesia	
As	mentioned	earlier,	prior	relationships	of	the	researcher	in	this	research	setting	was	employed	to	
contact	different	groups	of	participants.		Researchers	should	be	aware	of	‘contextual	sensitivity’	as	
suggested	by	Silverman	(2010),	in	which	the	researcher	should	understand	the	institutions	and	
social	phenomena	of	research	settings.		Researchers	should	also	be	aware	of	the	‘cultural	
sensitivity’	referred	to	by	Seidman	(2012),	wherein	researchers	need	to	be	aware	of	cultural	
differences	and	similarities	which	affect	values,	learning,	and	behaviour.		Understanding	contextual	
and	cultural	sensitivities	was	important	for	the	present	study	in	order	to	gain	mental	access	to	the	
participants’	telling	of	their	experiences.		Access	can	be	defined	as	the	appropriate	ethical	and	
academic	practices	used	to	gain	entry	to	a	given	community	and/or	organization	for	the	purpose	of	
conducting	formal	research	(Corbin	&	Strauss	2008).		Gummesson	(1999)	differentiates	three	steps	
of	access:	physical	access	means	the	ability	to	get	close	to	the	object	of	the	study;	continued	access	
refers	to	maintaining	an	ongoing	physical	access	to	the	research	setting;	and	mental	refers	to	being	
able	to	understand	what	is	happening	and	why	in	the	investigated	setting.			
The	first	group	of	research	participants	consisted	of	the	managers	and	staff	from	Oil	and	Gas	
companies.		The	Oil	and	Gas	industry	is	well	known	as	a	closed	industry	in	Indonesia,	so	that	even	
local	district	government	officials	have	found	difficulties	in	obtaining	information	and	data	related	
to	companies.		This	affected	the	researcher’s	access	to	certain	people	in	the	companies	studied	in	
the	present	research.		In	solving	this	problem,	firstly	an	attempt	was	made	to	use	formal	means,	by	
sending	an	email	and	formal	letter	requesting	the	prospective	participants’	acceptance	to	be	
interviewed.		However,	the	request	was	replied	to	by	managers	and	staff	with	a	variety	of	
responses.		Some	responses	required	the	researcher	to	obtain	initial	permission	from	the	Oil	and	
Gas	regulatory	unit	(SKKMIGAS).		Others	directed	the	researcher	to	interview	public	relations	
officers,	who	handle	external	affairs	and	do	not	directly	manage	CSR	in	the	community.		
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Meanwhile,	others	never	replied	to	the	letter	or	email.		All	of	these	responses	indicate	that	CSR	in	
this	industry	is	a	sensitive	issue,	so	that	the	three	selected	companies	are	reluctant	to	discuss	CSR	
practices	in	their	companies.			
This	condition	required	that	the	researcher	employ	personal	relationships	with	certain	people	
working	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	companies	in	CSR.		According	to	Jensen	(2013),	such	people	can	be	
referred	to		as	‘gatekeepers’.		‘Gatekeepers’	are	individuals	who	can	be	used	as	an	entry	point	to	
organizations	through	their	recommendation.		In	addition,	gatekeepers	will	have	“inside”	
information	that	can	help	the	researcher	in	determining	who	are	the	best	participants	to	access	in	
the	organization	(Gummesson	1999).		The	application	of	the	gatekeeper	concept	is	suited	to	
Indonesian	culture,	in	which	a	common	saying	is	‘temanmu	adalah	temanku‘	(your	friend	is	my	
friend).		Gatekeepers	were	useful	for	the	present	research	for	gaining	access	to	certain	key	
informants.		Gatekeeper	introductions	to	colleagues	in	other	companies	(with	which	the	
researcher	had	no	prior	connection)	moved	the	position	of	researcher	in	relation	to	key	informants	
from	that	of	‘stranger’	to	‘friend’.		To	improve	this	initial	entry	to	mental	access,	the	researcher	
employed	an	awareness	of	Indonesian	culture	in	building	close	relationships	by	conducting	
occasions	such	as	makan	siang	(lunch),	giving	gifts	and	developing	verbal	and	non-verbal	
communication	connections	with	informants.			
However,	imposing	the	relationship	with	a	gatekeeper	into	the	research	may	also	result	in	a	
disadvantage.		Aside	from	giving	access	to	some	organizations,	the	role	of	gatekeepers	may	limit	
the	researcher	in	that	the	gatekeepers	would	monitor	the	activities	of	the	researcher	throughout	
the	data	collection	process	to	ensure	that	the	latter	do	not	touch	upon	sensitive	issues	in	
organizations	(Coghlan	&	Brannick	2005).		These	activities	can	be	seen	as	a	threat	to	the	autonomy	
of	the	researchers	and	might	arguably	influence	the	data	collection	process.		Thus	the	researcher’s	
judgement	is	needed	to	balance	maintenance	of	access	and	potential	bias.		The	activities	of	
gatekeepers	as	“controllers”	should	not	overshadow	their	importance	as	facilitators.		It	was	
understood	that	the	gatekeepers	might	take	some	personal	risk	in	letting	the	researcher,	as	a	
stranger,	ask	sensitive	or	perhaps	irrelevant	questions	to	informants	who	hold	important	positions	
in	the	organizations.	They	thus	risked	their	own	reputation	and	status	in	the	organization	by	
“sponsoring”	such	a	project.	With	these	risks	in	mind,	the	researcher	should	manage	the	balance	
between	maintaining	the	required	relationships	on	the	one	hand,	and	potential	bias	in	the	
findings;	thus	leading	to	considerations	of	‘what	should	be	said	and	not	to	be	said’	in	the	present	
thesis.			
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The	second	group	of	participants	is	drawn	from	local	stakeholders,	consisting	of	local	government	
officials	and	local	community	members.			The	approach	to	these	groups	was	quite	different	from	
that	to	informants	from	the	companies	group.		Prior	relationships	with	certain	local	district	
government	officers	and	local	community	members	were	already	established	due	to	the	working	
relationships	developed	during	the	establishment	of	a	CSR	forum	in	2007.		Limitations	of	internet	
access	in	the	area	forced	the	researcher	to	rely	on	telephone	and	SMS	to	invite	the	willingness	of	
informants	to	participate	in	this	research.		After	obtaining	the	permissions	to	interview	and	
conduct	group	discussions,	instead	of	offering	a	schedule	for	these,	the	researcher	preferred	to	
stay	in	the	districts	and	villages	in	order	to	observe	and	be	involved	with	informal	discussions	with	
informants	from	community	groups.		Indeed,	informal	discussions	with	local	stakeholders,	such	as	
lunch	together	with	government	officers,	drinking	afternoon	coffee	in	a	warung	(small	shop	in	the	
village)	with	community,	and	informal	discussions	after	maghrib	(Islamic	prayer	time	in	the	
afternoon)	in	the	mosque	were	essential	in	revealing	participants’	feelings	on	related	issues.		The	
researcher	always	explained	clearly	that	their	statement	can	be	used	in	the	research	and	asked	
community	members	to	sign	a	consent	form	during	the	researcher’s	stay	in	the	village.			
However,	during	interviews	the	researcher	was	also	aware	of	the	intention	of	members	of	these	
groups	to	ask	advice	from	the	researcher	about	developing	a	CSR	forum	and	CSR	projects.		In	this	
sense,	the	researcher	should	distinguish	his	previous	role	as	consultant	of	a	CSR	forum	and	the	
recent	role	as	researcher.		It	was	thus	necessary	to	explain	to	the	groups	that	my	role	in	these	
conversations	was	as	researcher,	where	the	focus	of	this	meeting	was	to	interview	and	collect	data	
from	the	participants,	not	as	a	consultant	to	provide	advice.		By	explaining	to	the	participants	that	
the	outcome	of	this	research	might	offer	some	solutions	to	their	problems	in	relation	to	CSR,	
participants	from	local	government	and	local	communities	were	enabled	to	understand	and	hope	
that	what	they	told	the	researcher	during	interviews	and	group	discussions	could	be	useful	in	
solving	their	problems	in	the	future.			
4.6. ETHICAL	CONSIDERATIONS	
As	the	research	deals	with	human	participants,	the	research	was	conducted	with	the	approval	of	
the	RMIT	University	Business	College	Human	Ethics	Advisory	Network	(BCHEAN),	with	a	low	risk	
classification	(see	Appendix	1:	notice	of	approval	from	BCHEAN).		All	research	participants	received	
a	plain	language	statement	explaining	the	project‘s	aim	and	gave	written	consent.		They	could	
choose	to	end	an	interview	at	any	time,	and	were	able	to	withdraw	their	data	up	to	the	point	of	
collated	data	analysis.		A	confidentiality	agreement	was	also	signed	with	all	participants	as	a	
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necessary	requirement	to	secure	the	participants’	permission	and	give	them	a	clear	understanding	
of	the	nature	of	their	participation	and	their	rights	during	the	course	of	the	research.		
The	ethics	and	confidentiality	agreement	required	that	all	individual	and	corporate	data	be	
identified	through	the	use	of	pseudonyms.		Given	the	small	number	of	companies	in	the	district	
and	the	villages	where	the	companies	were	operating,	and	the	resulting	potential	for	identifying	
particular	companies	and	participants,	details	of	company	information	are	not	discussed	in	the	
thesis,	with	pseudonyms	applied	to	companies	and	individual	participants	to	protect	participant	
identity.		The	use	of	pseudonyms	to	protect	identity	was	also	intended	to	assist	participants	to	be	
more	open	in	their	responses,	supporting	them	to	speak	more	freely	and	critically.	In	the	district,	
however,	it	is	possible	that	who	may	be	agreed	to	be	participants	may	be	able	to	be	guessed	by	
others	known	to	them,	even	though	efforts	were	made	to	de-identify	any	individual		comments,	
and	this	possibility	was	explained	to	participants	prior	to	their	undertaking	the	interviews.	
4.7. CONCLUSIONS	AND	LIMITATIONS	
This	chapter	presents	the	rationale	behind	and	perceived	strengths	of	the	chosen	research	
methodology.		However,	the	research	project	cannot	avoid	some	practical	and	theoretical	
limitations.		The	main	research	limitations	of	this	research,	as	laid	out	below,	are	related	to:	the	
timeframe	of	this	research;	pragmatic	and	financial	limitations;	and	limited	generalizability	of	
results.	
4.7.1. Research	Timeframe	
This	PhD	research	project	was	conducted	over	a	four-year	timeframe,	with	the	data	collection,	
including	the	secondary	data	and	primary	data	gathering	in	form	of	interviews	and	observation,	
taking	place	about	one	year,	between	January	2013	–	January	2014.		The	research	focussed	the	
project	on	CSR	implementation	in	Indonesia	at	this	particular	point	in	time	only.		The	dynamics	of	
Indonesia	politics	and	economy	during	other	times	are	not	be	covered	in	this	research’s	timeframe.		
In	addition,	the	present	research	questions	demanded	a	focus	on	the	current	on-ground	
happenings	in	CSR	implementation	within	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	only.	
4.7.2. Financial	and	Distance	Considerations	
The	research	site	is	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district;	however	the	participants’	locations	spread	
across	other	areas	within	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district.		At	the	rural	area,	with	its	lack	of	available	
infrastructure	such	road	access,	accommodation,	public	transportation	and	electricity,	the	
researcher	had	to	stay	at	the	village	residence	house,	which	was	also	of	benefit	in	getting	close	
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with	the	community	participants.		The	supervisor	and	staff	were	mostly	available	at	this	research	
site;	however,	the	managers	could	only	be	contacted	at	the	Palembang,	the	capital	city	of	the	
province,	or	Jakarta	in	their	headquarters	office.		Moreover,	the	local	government	offices	are	
located	in	Sekayu,	as	the	capital	of	this	district,	which	is	quite	far	from	the	rural	site	area.		This	
distance	forced	the	researcher	to	carefully	manage	limited	available	financial	resources	for	
contacting	possible	participants.				
4.7.3. Research	Findings	and	Generalizability	
The	qualitative	approach	used	in	this	study	is	not	intended	to	provide	findings	that	can	universally	
be	generalizable.		However,	this	does	not	mean	this	study	cannot	offer	important	lessons	for	
similar	cases,	particularly	those	on	the	implementation	of	CSR	legislation.		As	Yin	(2009)	argues,	the	
case	study	does	have	the	ability	to	support	theoretical	(if	not	practical)	generalisations,	with	
empirical	insights	which	can	extend	beyond	the	cases	at	hand,	especially	where	these	studies	
employ	rich	qualitative	analysis,	as	is	the	case	in	the	present	work.	
4.7.4. The	Limitations	of	Data	Collection	
Due	to	the	resistance	of	participants	to	be	recorded	during	interview,	the	researcher	relied	
primarily	on	field	notes.		Once	the	interviews	were	completed	the	researcher	spent	an	hour	
reflecting	on	the	interview	and	typing	as	much	of	the	conversations	as	could	be	remembered.		
Follow	up	discussions	were	had	with	all	participants.	In	this	situation,	I	took	some	notes	during	the	
interview	-	and	then	allow	time	immediately	afterwards	to	write	these	up	in	some	detail	while	it	is	
still	fresh	in	my	mind.		So	I	scheduled	time	in	between	interviews	to	do	this,	rather	than	having	
them	too	close	together.		These	notes	were	revisited	the	same	evening,	and	then	the	next	day	to	
draw	further	insights	into	the	conversations	out	of	the	research.		Further,	the	findings	of	this	thesis	
were	summarized	and	distributed	to	participants	involved	in	this	research,	and	no	participant	
expressed	a	significantly	different	view	to	the	findings	presented	in	the	thesis.		As	Tracy	(2010)	
suggested	that	members	check	is	one	of	requirement	to	achieve	rigor	and	trustworthiness	in	
qualitative	research.		Therefore,	it	encourages	the	researcher	to	always	recheck	the	correctness	of	
data	collection	and	sometimes	consult	with	the	participants	about	their	statement	during	the	
writing	of	this	thesis.		
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Chapter	5.	THE	MANDATE	OF	CSR	LEGISLATION	AND	LOCAL	
STAKEHOLDER	EXPECTATIONS	
5.1. INTRODUCTION	
This	chapter	analyses	Indonesian	CSR	legislation,	comprising	specific	laws,	and	their	associated	
implementation	regulations	and	decrees.	The	choice	of	scope	for	this	analysis	follows	the	
suggestions	of	managers	and	staff	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies,	the	local	government	officials,	the	
local	community	members,	the	SKKMIGAS	officials,	the	NGO	activists,	and	the	business	association	
members,	who	responded	as	participants	in	the	research,	as	to	what	relevant	laws	their	companies	
must	comply	with.		Furthermore,	this	chapter	also	examines	how	this	legislation	relates	to	Oil	and	
Gas	companies.		Section	5.2	presents	a	brief	description	of	Indonesia’s	regulatory	framework	for	
CSR.		Section	5.3	examines	the	CSR	mandate,	through	an	analysis	of	CSR	legislation.		Section	5.5	
discusses	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	the	CSR	legislation.		Finally,	Section	5.6	presents	the	
conclusion	of	this	chapter.						
5.2. A	DESCRIPTION	OF	INDONESIA	REGULATORY	FRAMEWORK	OF	CSR	
This	section	describes	the	complete	laws,	government	regulations	and	ministerial	decrees	that	
apply	to	this	study.		Subsection	5.2.1	identifies	the	Indonesia	hierarchical	legislation	system,	in	
order	to	understand	the	hierarchical	order	of	Indonesian	legislation	and	under	whose	authority	
those	rules	are	made.		Subsection	5.2.2	presents	the	Indonesian	legislation	framework	for	CSR.		
Subsection	5.2.2	presents	a	reflection	on	CSR	legislation	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry.					
5.2.1. Indonesia	Hierarchical	Legislation	System	
Before	commencing	an	examination	of	Indonesian	CSR	legislation,	it	is	important	to	understand	
first	the	Indonesian	legislation	system,	particularly	after	decentralization,	which	gave	authority	to	
local	provincial	and	district	government	to	make	local	regulations.		The	proposals	of	local	
government	regulations	cannot,	however,	contradict	with	central	state	laws	and	regulations,	
because	Indonesia’s	regulatory	system	adopts	a	hierarchical	approach	wherein	the	lower	order	
(i.e.	local	government)	regulations	are	not	allowed	to	contradict	those	from	the	higher	level	of	
(central	government)	regulation.		Therefore,	the	central	government,	through	the	Domestic	Affairs	
Ministry,	has	the	right	and	authorization	to	revoke	a	local	regulation,	once	the	regulation	is	
considered	to	be	not	in	line	with	that	of	the	central	state	government.		The	clear	hierarchical	order	
of	Indonesia’s	regulatory	system	is	illustrated	in	Figure	5.1.	
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Figure	5.1.	Indonesia	Legislation	Hierarchical	Order	
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source:	(Rahardjo	2006)	
Figure	5.1	presents	the	Indonesian	legislation	hierarchical	order.		It	begins	from	the	Constitution	of	
UUD	1945	as	the	basis	of	all	laws	and	regulations.		All	laws,	regulations,	and	ministerial	decrees	
should	be	in	line	with	this	fundamental	constitutional	basis.		The	Constitution	has	been	amended	
four	times	since	the	Indonesian	reformation	era.		These	amendments	were	intended	to	limit	the	
President’s	power,	due	to	the	experiences	of	the	President	Soeharto	regime,	and	capture	the	
demands	of	local	government,	in	the	decentralization	process3.	
																																								 																				
3	Under	the	“new	order	regime”,	between	1965-1999,	the	content	of	the	Constitution	(UUD	1945)	was	never	modified,	in	
order	to	maintain	President	Soeharto’s	power.		The	old	constitution	did	not	mention	any	limitation	of	time	period	for	the	
elected	President,	meaning	as	a	result	that	Soeharto	could	be	continually	re-elected	as	President	for	32	years.		In	the	
reformation	era,	four	amendments	to	the	constitution	were	made.		The	first	amendment	in	1999	was	focused	on	the	
length	of	the	presidential	term	upon	election,	which	is	now	limited	to	two	terms	only	or	a	maximum	of	10	years.		The	
second	amendment,	made	in	2000,	was	to	regulate	the	distribution	of	authority	between	the	central	government	and	
local	governments	at	the	provincial	and	district	levels.		Then	in	2001,	the	constitution	was	amended	for	the	third	time	to	
confirm	the	authority	of	President	and	Vice	President	in	their	relations	with	other	state	institutions,	particularly	the	
1945	Constitution	
(Undang-Undang	Dasar	(UUD)	
1945)	
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Government	Regulation	
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At	the	central	government	level,	Undang-Undang	(law)	is	the	highest	law	in	the	hierarchical	system	
that	the	central	government	can	issue.		The	laws	issued	by	the	central	government	are	signed	by	
the	President	with	the	approval	of	the	DPR	(Dewan	Perwakilan	Rakyat	–	The	House	of	People’s	
Representatives)	in	the	Parliament.		Draft	law	may	be	proposed	by	central	government	and	then	
submitted	to	Parliament	in	order	to	be	discussed	and	approved	by	the	legislative.		However,	the	
legislative	members	themselves	can	initiate	a	proposal	to	issue	laws.		Furthermore,	government	
regulations	issued	by	Presidential	and	Ministerial	decrees	are	two	types	of	public	policy	or	
regulation	that	can	be	used	by	central	government	to	give	guidance	or	direction	on	how	to	
implement	laws.		At	the	local	government	level,	local	regulation	applies	to	give	local	governments	
in	provinces	and	districts	the	authority	to	regulate	their	own	territory	by	issuing	Perda	(local	
regulation).		Local	regulation	must	gain	approval	from	the	DPRD	(local	legislatives),	and	most	
importantly,	must	be	in	line	with	Presidential	and	Ministerial	decrees,	government	regulations	and	
laws	issued	by	the	central	government.	
5.2.2. Indonesia’s	CSR	Legislation	
Article	33	of	the	Constitution,	which	was	amended	in	2002,	provides	a	brief	justification	that	all	
economic	sectors	aim	to	create	prosperity	for	the	people	of	Indonesia.		However,	a	study	by	one	
national	NGO	critiqued	the	implementation	of	Article	33,	claiming	that	most	communities	in	the	
resource	abundant	districts	living	near	mining	areas	are	still	living	with	high	levels	of	poverty	
(Mumbunan	2013).		Furthermore,	the	study	revealed	that	mining	company	operations	in	the	
village	areas	are	not	providing	benefits	to	communities	as	a	result	of	their	‘rent-seeking’	behaviour.		
In	relation	to	CSR	legislation,	all	CSR	legislation	passed	by	central	government	and	their	
implementation	regulations	rest	on	the	power	of	Article	33	to	confirm	the	central	government	
authority	over	natural	resources	in	the	natural	resource	areas.		By	stating	that	the	benefit	of	
natural	resources	is	for	the	prosperity	of	the	Indonesian	people,	this	article	provides	a	justification	
for	central	government	to	enact	CSR	legislation	aiming	its	benefit	towards	local	communities	living	
nearby	the	mining	companies’	operations.		Figure	5.2	presents	a	comprehensive	description	of	all	
laws,	government	regulations	and	ministerial	decrees.	 	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																									
legislative	powers,	constitutional	court,	and	justice	court.		Finally,	further	amendments	undertaken	in	2002	change	
certain	articles	on	public	health	and	education,	which	services	are	now	provided	under	the	authority	of	local	district	
governments.		Aside	from	giving	authority	to	local	districts	to	manage	health	and	elementary	and	middle	levels	of	the	
education	sector,	this	final	amendment	also	detailed	the	authority	of	local	districts	to	administer	natural	resources.		In	
relation	to	Article	33	of	UUD	1945,	the	amendment	authorized	local	districts	to	control	mining	resources	such	as	coal,	
sand	and	rocks.		However,	as	described	in	Chapter	2,	oil	and	gas	resources	remain	under	central	government	control,	
justified	according	to	the	need	to	maintain	control	of	essential	national	energy	supply.				
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Figure	5.2.	Indonesia	CSR	Legislation	Framework	
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The	Indonesian	CSR	legislation	begins	with	Article	33	of	Undang-Undang	Dasar	1945	(UUD	1945	–	
Indonesian	Constitution)	with	its	statement	that	the	natural	resources	should	provide	prosperity	to	
the	Indonesian	people,	which	include	local	communities.		From	this	position,	CSR	legislation	was	
established.		There	are	four	specific	CSR	laws,	mentioned	by	managers	and	staff	from	the	three	Oil	
and	Gas	companies	in	the	present	study,	that	have	direct	relevance	to	their	companies’	operations,	
which	are:	(i)	Law	No	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	
2007a),	obliging	companies	related	to	natural	resources	to	undertake	CSR;	(ii)	Law	no	25/2007	on	
Investment	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2007b),	detailing	CSR	compliance	for	all	
investors;	(iii)	Law	No	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2001),	stating	
that	Community	Development	(CD)	is	the	obligation	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	to	local	
communities;	and	(iv)	Law	No.	19/2003	on	State	Owned	Companies,	which	was	suggested	by	
participants	from	the	SOC	(company	C)	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2003),	stating	the	
obligation	to	deliver	Partnership	Program	and	Environmental	Building	(PPEB)	(or	in	Indonesian,	
PKBL-	Program	Kemitraan	and	Bina	Lingkungan)	programs	for	State	Owned	Companies	(SOC).		
Aside	from	those	laws,	other	participants	from	local	government	and	the	Corporate	Forum	for	
Community	Development	pointed	out	two	other	relevant	laws,	which	are:	(v)	Law	No.	11/2009	on	
Social	Welfare;	and	(vi)	Law	No.	13/2011	on	Poverty	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2009,	
2011).			
The	present	research	distinguishes	these	six	laws	into	two	categories.		The	category	of	direct	laws	
refers	to	the	laws	that	have	direct	influence	on	companies	operations,	such	as	the	Oil	and	Gas	Law	
No.	22/2001,	which	should	be	followed	by	all	Oil	and	Gas	companies	during	their	operations,	or	the	
Limited	Liability	Company	Law	No.	40/2007,	which	sets	rules	and	requirements	for	companies	
registered	in	Indonesia.		The	indirect	laws,	which	are	Law	No.	11/2009	on	Social	Welfare	and	Law	
No.	13/2011	on	Poverty,	have	no	direct	influence	on	company	operation.		Instead,	these	two	laws	
encourage	local	governments	at	district	and	provincial	levels	to	involve	businesses	through	their	
CSR	efforts	to	provide	social	welfare	and	eradicate	poverty.		Furthermore,	the	company	
participants	in	this	study	admitted	that	they	did	not	concern	themselves	with	these	two	laws	as	
they	are	not	related	to	their	operations.		This	suggests	that	these	two	indirect	laws	are	symbolic	to	
local	government	to	involve	in	company	CSR,	but	not	to	business.			
Only	five	of	the	six	laws	have	implementation	regulations.		The	Law	on	Oil	and	Gas	No.	22/2001	
does	not	have	relevant	regulations	for	how	to	implement	Community	Development	in	the	field;	
instead,	the	direction	is	only	provided	in	Government	Regulation	No.	79/	2010	on	Cost	Recovery,	
confirming	CD	projects	as	part	of	cost	recovery	if	the	cost	is	expended	during	the	exploration	stage	
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(before	exploitation	or	production).		Further	CD	guidelines	are	included	in	SOP	No.	17/PTK/III/2005	
(BPMIGAS	2005),	issued	by	BPMIGAS		(Badan	Pelaksana	Kegiatan	Usaha	Hulu	Minyak	dan	Gas	-	
The	Regulatory	Body	for	Oil	and	Gas	Upstream	Activities)	which	has	changed	to	now	be	SKKMIGAS	
(Satuan	Kerja	Khusus	Pelaksana	Kegiatan	Usaha	Hulu	Minya	dan	Gas	–		a	special	Task	Force	for	
Upstream	Oil	and	Gas	Business	Activities),	directing	CD	programs	into	five	areas:	health,	education,	
infrastructure,	environment	and	economic	empowerment.		Law	No	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company	has	an	implementation	regulation	via	Government	Regulation	No.	47/	2012	on	CSR	
(President	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	2012).		This	implementation	regulation	directs	the	board	of	
directors	in	companies	as	the	main	bearer	of	responsibility	with	respect	to	this	law;	and	points	out	
that	the	funding	should	be	derived	from	company	operational	costs	instead	of	company	profits.		
For	specific	State	Owned	Companies	(SOC)	the	ministry	has	set	Ministerial	Decree	No.	
08/MBU/2013	on	Partnership	Program	and	Environmental	Building	(or	PKBL-Program	Kemitraan	
dan	Bina	Lingkungan),	declaring	that	PPEB	funds	are	taken	from	2	percent	of	company	profits.		
Under	indirect	Law	No.	11/	2009	on	Social	Welfare	and	Law	No.	13/	2011,	the	Social	Minister	
passed	Regulation	No.	13/	2012	encouraging	local	governments	to	establish	CSR	forums.		In	
addition,	participant	managers	and	staff	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	also	pointed	out	PROPER	
(Program	Penilaian	Peringkat	Kinerja	Perusahaan	dalam	Pengelolaan	Lingkungan	Hidup	-	
Environmental	Performance	Assessment	Ranking	Program)	regulation	to	the	present	researcher,	a	
program	of	the	National	Environment	Minister	to	rank	companies’	performance	in	maintaining	the	
environment.		Through	the	Environmental	Minister’s	Regulation	No.	5/	2011,	CSR	projects	
conducted	by	companies	are	categorized	as	beyond	compliance,	giving	consideration	for	the	
companies	to	be	included	in	the	green	or	gold	categorizations	of	ranking.			
There	are	four	pertinent	observations	generated	from	Figure	5.2.		Firstly,	all	laws	and	their	
implementation	regulations	have	been	issued	after	2000,	or	after	the	decentralization	process	was	
begun.		This	indicates	that	the	issuance	of	CSR	legislation	is	a	form	of	response	to	the	local	
stakeholder	pressures	and	demands	on	companies	for	contributions	to	local	development	during	
the	decentralization	era.		Secondly,	the	legislation	applies	to	companies’	operations	in	natural	
resources.		This	statement	on	CSR	legislation	suggests	that	CSR	is	a	consequence	of	the	increasing	
claims	from	locals	who	have	natural	resources	located	in	their	area.		CSR	has	been	seen	by	central	
government	as	a	tool	to	satisfy	this	claim;	however,	they	still	retain	control	of	some	natural	
resources,	particularly	oil	and	gas.		Thirdly,	CSR	legislation	positions	local	communities	as	the	main	
beneficiaries	of	CSR	projects.		This	means	that	the	objective	of	CSR	is	to	help	local	communities	
where	the	companies	are	operating.		However,	the	term	‘local	communities’	can	be	interpreted	in	
various	ways	across	different	borders:	it	can	refer	to	local	communities	in	the	villages,	districts	or	
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provinces	where	company	operations	are	located.		In	this	manner,	local	district	governments	may	
direct	companies	to	deliver	their	CSR	to	other	villages	outside	of	the	companies’	areas	of	operation	
given	it	is	beneficial	to	local	communities	of	the	district;	or	the	local	provincial	government	may	
direct	company	CSR	to	be	delivered	to	a	district	outside	the	company’s	district	area,	considering	
the	welfare	of	the	local	community’s	province	area.		Fourthly,	Figure	5.2	also	highlights	that	no	
regulations	issued	by	local	government	have	actually	been	approved.		According	to	a	local	district	
government	participant,	the	local	district	government	of	Musi	Banyuasin,	where	the	present	
research	took	place,	had	attempted	to	issue	local	regulations,	Perda	(Peraturan	Daerah),	for	CSR	in	
the	area.		However,	the	Ministry	of	Domestic	Affairs	eventually	dismissed	the	regulation	drafts,	
although	the	district	legislative	authority	had	approved	the	regulation.	
“…	My	team	and	I	have	drafted	perda	of	CSR.		This	was	supported	by	DPRD	(the	local	
legislative	members).		But	the	Ministry	of	Domestic	Affairs	rejected	the	perda.		They	
worried	this	perda	would	make	difficulties	to	investors”		(Go.1)		
This	case	is	similar	to	that	of	other	CSR	regulations	issued	by	other	local	district	governments.		The	
reason	for	these	cancellations	is	in	the	main	because	the	central	government	is	afraid	such	
regulation	may	harm	the	business	climate	in	the	district,	and	this	may	impact	the	national	business	
situation	(Karina	2011).		According	to	a	study	conducted	by	SMERU,	an	Indonesian	NGO,	these	
local	CSR	regulations	began	to	treat	companies’	CSR	as	a	source	of	donations,	corrupting	district	
chiefs	and	burdening	the	businesses	involved.		This	provoked	the	central	government	to	dissolve	
Perdas,	which	was	thus	seen	to	have	become	detrimental	to	Indonesia’s	business	climate	(Bachtiar	
2009).		Thus,	while	on	one	hand,	the	exercise	of	central	government	power	is	generally	
discouraged	in	this	decentralization	era,	this	case	highlights	how	central	government	can	overrule	
local	authorities	by	justifying	how	one	local	regulation	is	not	in	line	with	the	central	government	
rules.					
5.2.3. CSR	Legislation	in	Oil	and	Gas	Industry	
There	are	three	terms	introduced	by	the	CSR	legislation	presented	in	Figure	5.2	above,	for	
explaining	CSR:	(i)	CSR	(Corporate	Social	Responsibility),	which	is	mentioned	in	Law	No	40/	2007	on	
Limited	Liability	Company,	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment,	Law	No.	11/2009	on	Social	Welfare,	
and	Law	No.	13/2001	on	Poverty;	(ii)	Community	Development	(CD),	which	is	stated	in	Law	No.	
22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas;	and	(iii)	PPEB	(Partnership	Program	and	Environmental	Building,	or	PKBL	–	
Program	Kemitraan	dan	Bina	Lingkungan),	which	is	directed	by	Law	No.19/2003	on	State	Owned	
Enterprises.					
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In	relation	to	these	various	terms	of	social	responsibility,	each	participant	from	three	different	
companies	related	their	specific	social	responsibilities	regarding	certain	laws	and	regulations	that	
relate	to	their	companies.		Participants	from	Company	A,	a	private	Indonesian	Owned	Company	
(IOC),	stated	that	the	company	must	carry	out	CD	and	CSR	activities	in	accordance	with	the	
country’s	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No.	22/2001,	the	Limited	Liability	Company	Law	No.	40/2007	and	the	
Investment	Law	No	40/2007.		Participants	from	Company	B,	a	foreign	owned	company	(FOC),	are	
undertaking	CD	as	stated	in	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No	22/2001	and	CSR	as	in	Investment	Law	No	
25/2007.		They	do	not	undertake	CSR	as	espoused	in	Limited	Liability	Company	Law	No	40/2007,	
arguing	that	the	company	registration	is	not	in	Indonesia,	making	the	Limited	Liability	Company	
Law	not	applicable	to	their	company.		Participants	from	Company	C,	a	State	Owned	Company	
(SOC),	acknowledged	that	they	are	bonded	by	all	laws	and	regulations	and	must	implement	three	
forms	of	social	responsibility	mentioned	in	the	laws,	which	are	CD,	PPEB,	and	CSR.			
This	differing	terminology	also	affects	how	companies	fund	the	various	CSR	projects	referred	to	by	
these	terms.		CSR	projects	suggest	the	cost	should	be	taken	from	the	operational	cost	of	the	
company,	not	from	the	profit.		This	gives	the	implication	that	companies	should	budget	CSR	
annually,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	they	are	getting	profits.		CD	projects,	as	stated	in	the	Oil	and	
Gas	Law,	can	be	funded	by	companies’	operational	cost	and	government	expenditure	through	a	
cost	recovery	scheme,	if	the	CD	was	delivered	during	the	exploration	stage	(before	production).		
The	cost	for	PPEB	projects	by	a	State	Owned	Oil	and	Gas	company	are	derived	from	2	percent	of	
the	company’s	profits.		This	arrangement	results	in	the	company	CSR	strategy	in	the	diversifying	
the	CSR	cost,	which	can	be	taken	from	operational	cost,	government	expenditure	trough	cost	
recovery	scheme,	or	their	profit	(particularly	for	State	Owned	Companies).					
Table	5.1	below	describes	the	forms	of	CSR	and	their	sources	of	funding	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry.	
Community	Development	(CD)	projects,	as	outlined	by	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	can	be	
distinguished	into	two	types:	those	at	the	exploration	stage,	where	the	company	is	still	looking	for	
the	resources;	and	those	at	the	exploitation	stage,	where	the	company	has	begun	production.		At	
the	exploration	stage,	CD	aims	to	assist	the	company	to	settle	their	operation	in	the	midst	of	local	
communities	in	Indonesia.		In	this	stage,	the	government	allows	CD	as	a	Social	Program	for	
Supporting	Operation	(SPSO)	within	a	cost	recovery	scheme,	meaning	that	the	cost	of	the	project	
can	be	shared	with	the	government.		This	is	part	of	the	agreement	in	the	production	sharing	
contract	(PSC)	between	company	and	government,	which	states	that	"the	contractors	(the	Oil	and	
Gas	Company)	will	receive	back	their	operational	cost	to	produce	oil	and	gas”.		The	phrase	"will	
receive	back"	is	defined	as	cost	recovery	(Partowidagdo	2008).		At	the	exploration	stage	(before	
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production)	for	oil	mining,	the	proportion	of	government	expenditure	in	a	CD	project	is	85	percent,	
while	the	remaining	15	percent	of	cost	comes	from	the	company.		In	gas	mining	exploration,	the	
proportion	of	government	expenditure	is	70	percent,	while	companies	spend	30	percent	of	CD	
project	costs.		At	the	exploitation	stage	(production),	all	CD	cost	is	imposed	on	the	company.		
Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR),	as	stated	by	the	Limited	Liability	Company	Law	No	40/2007	
and	the	Investment	Law	No	25/2007,	directs	all	spending	on	CSR	projects	to	be	covered	by	the	
company.		Furthermore,	the	Partnership	Program	and	Environmental	(PPEB)	program	is	a	specific	
obligation	for	a	State	Owned	Oil	and	Gas	company.		It	is	stated	in	the	State	Owned	Enterprises	laws	
that	all	costs	of	PPEB	are	to	be	taken	from	2	percent	of	company	profits.	
Table	5.1.	The	Forms	of	CSR	and	their	Sources	of	Funding	in	Oil	and	Gas	Industry	
	 Community	Development	
(CD)	
Corporate	Social	
Responsibility	(CSR)	
Partnership	Program	
and	Environmental	
Building	(PPEB)	
Law	 • Law	 No	 22/2001	 on	 Oil	
and	Gas	
• Law	No	40/	2007	on	
Limited	Liability	
Company	
• Law	No	25/2007	on	
Investment	
• Law	No	19/2003	on	
State	Owned	
Companies	
Source	of	
Funding	
Exploration	Stage	(cost	
recovery	scheme):	
Oil	Mining:	
• 85	percent	government	
• 15	percent	companies	
Gas	Mining:	
• 70	percent	government	
• 30	percent	companies	
	
Exploitation	Stage	
(Production):	
All	spending	is	covered	by	
companies	operational	cost	
	
• All	spending	is	taken	
from	Companies	
Operational	Cost,	
budgeted	annually	
	
• The	spending	is	
taken	from	2	
percent	of	total	SOC	
previous	year	profit		
	
The	main	problem	with	these	categorizations	of	CSR	for	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry	is	regarding	the	
inclusion	of	CD	as	cost	recovery	in	the	exploration	stage.		Before	2008,	the	government	had	
included	all	CDs,	regardless	of	whether	the	project	was	at	exploration	or	exploitation	stage,	under	
the	cost	recovery	scheme.		The	cost	recovery	scheme	was	designed	to	recover	the	Oil	and	Gas	
companies’	exploration,	development,	production	costs	and	expenses,	from	the	share	of	
production	(Ashong	2014).		In	the	current	Production	Sharing	Contract	(PSC)	agreement,	the	
Indonesian	government	sets	the	ceiling	of	cost	recovery	to	be	allocated	for	Community	
	 Mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia:	Institutional	and	Stakeholder	Perspective	
 
94	
 
Development	(CD)	at	85	percent	for	oil	mining	and	70	percent	for	gas	mining,	when	the	mining	
operation	is	still	under	exploration	stage	(before	production).		A	grievance	regarding	this	cost	
recovery	scheme	is	related	to	how	companies	calculate	the	operating	cost,	development	cost	and	
exploration	cost.	This	has	been	much	debated,	as	the	cost	recovery	amounts	demanded	by	
companies	reached	around	USD	18	billion	per	year	(Yudhistira	2014).		This	huge	amount	
significantly	decreases	the	government	revenue	in	Oil	and	Gas,	which	instead	goes	to	companies	to	
disburse	their	operational	cost.		The	decision	to	include	CD	as	part	of	cost	recovery	is	argued	
against	by	practitioners	in	the	field	of	Indonesian	CSR,	as	they	feel	CD	should	not	be	part	of	cost	
recovery	(Christina	2012;	Partowidagdo	2008;	Prasetijo	2012).		The	company	could	use	cost	
recovery	to	CD	to	increase	their	own	reputation;	whilst	they	were	likely	to	try	to	minimize	the	cost	
of	CSR	by	putting	CD	in	a	cost	recovery	scheme	in	order	to	share	the	cost	with	government.			
Although	the	legislation	distinguishes	various	terms	of	social	responsibility	of	the	companies,	the	
local	stakeholders	from	local	communities	and	local	governments	tend	to	use	the	term	CSR	as	a	
common	term	across	all	such	laws.		The	distinction	in	terms	is	only	applicable	to	companies	to	
show	from	which	funds	the	CSR	activities	are	to	be	financed.		A	report	by	the	Corporate	Forum	for	
Community	Development	(CFCD),	a	leading	company	forum	concerning	CSR,	confirmed	that	the	
differences	between	CD,	PPEB,	and	CSR	are	only	in	the	technical	aspects	of	the	programs,	
particularly	their	respective	sources	of	funding	(Firdian	2012).		In	addition,	according	to	
Environmental	Ministerial	Law	No.	05/	2011	on	PROPER	regulations,	the	assessment	of	CSR	
activities	of	companies	does	not	depend	on	the	categorizations	of	CD,	PPEB,	or	CSR.		Moreover,	
those	three	social	responsibilities	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	are	assessed	by	the	ministry	under	the	
single	umbrella	of	CSR	activity,	which	assessment	may	benefit	the	company	to	gain	a	green	or	gold	
label	as	the	highest	rank	of	PROPER.		In	this	set	of	regulations,	CSR	is	viewed	as	a	“beyond	
compliance	activity”	(Ministry	of	Environment	2011).							
5.3. ANALYSIS	OF	CSR	LEGISLATION	
The	complex	CSR	legislative	landscape	raises	the	question	of	what	is	the	intended	mandate	of	this	
legislation	for	companies.		Aside	from	the	differentiation	in	terms	used	to	describe	their	social	
responsibilities	in	the	various	laws,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	principle	mandate	that	should	
be	complied	with	by	the	companies.		Table	5.1	below	is	used	to	examine	the	various	CSR	laws	and	
implementation	regulations	and	decrees	in	order	to	identify	similarities	and/or	the	differences	in	
the	messages	of	the	legislation,	and	thus	enable	us	to	identify	the	central	intention	of	the	mandate	
of	CSR	legislation.				
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Table	5.2.	Laws,	Mandate,	Mechanism	of	Implementation	and	Sanctions	
Law	 Mandate	to	Businesses		
	
Mechanism	of	Implementation	 Sanctions	
Law	No	22/	
2001	–	Oil	
and	Gas	
• Oil	and	Gas	Companies	
have	a	responsibility	to	
develop	environment	
and	local	community	
(Article	40)	
	
Government	Regulation	No.	79/	
2010	
• CD	Program	obtain	approval	
from	BPMIGAS	(now	
SKKMIGAS)			
• The	CD	program	is	part	of	cost	
recovery,	if	the	program	is	
conducted	during	exploration.		
• Not	specified	
Law	No.	
19/	2003	–	
State	
Owned	
Enterprises	
(SOE)	
	
	
• Beneficiaries	are	the	
small	entrepreneur,	
cooperative,	and	
community	(Article	2)		
• Program	is	developed	
under	PPEB	(Per-
05/MBU/2007)	
State	Owned	Enterprises	
Ministerial	Decree	no.	05/	MBU/	
2007	
• Programs	are	managed	by	unit	
under	board	of	directors		
• Funding	for	PPEB	is	taken	from	
2	percent	of	SOC	net	profit.		
• Program	should	be	approved	
by	shareholders	(central	
government)	
• Not	Specified	
Law	No.	
25/	2007	–
Investment	
• Every	investor	must	
perform	CSR	and	respect	
the	community	cultural	
tradition	around	the	
operation	(Article	15)		
• Not	specified	 • Administrative	
sanctions	
(article	16).		
Law	No.	
40/	2007-		
Limited	
Liability	
Company	
	
	
	
	
• CSR	is	the	obligation	of	
company	conducting	its	
business	related	to	
natural	resources	(Article	
74)			
• CSR	must	be	budgeted	in	
the	company’s	cost	
(Article	74)	
Government	Regulation	No	
47/2012	
• The	obligation	is	on	board	of	
directors	to	make	CSR	annual	
plan	
• Annual	work	plan	should	
contain	activities	and	budget	of	
CSR	(Government	Regulation	
No	47/2012).	
• Sanctions	will	
be	given	
according	to	
the	related	
laws	(Article	
74)			
• Not	specified	
which	are	the	
related	laws	
Law	No.	
11/2009	–	
Social	
Welfare	
• Role	of	business	in	social	
welfare	is	in	their	CSR	
(Article	40)	
• CSR	funds	for	social	
welfare	are	a	form	of	
business	obligation	to	
their	social	and	
environment	(Article	36)	
Social	Ministerial	Regulation	No.	
13/	2012	
• CSR	forum	should	be	
established	at	national	and	
provincial	levels	to	integrate	all	
businesses	in	CSR	
• Not	specified	
Law	No.	
13/	2011	–	
Poverty	
• Business	role	in	
alleviating	poverty	is	to	
provide	funds	in	form	of	
CSR	to	the	poor	(article	
41)	
• Not	specified	 • Not	specified	
	
	 Mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia:	Institutional	and	Stakeholder	Perspective	
 
96	
 
Table	5.1	shows	important	aspects	of	the	six	laws	and	their	relevant	regulations	and	decrees	
identified	in	this	study,	which	are	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	Law	No.	19/2003	on	State	
Owned	Companies,	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment,	Law	No.	40/	2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company,	Law	No.	11/2009	on	Social	Welfare,	and	Law	No.	13/2011	on	Poverty.		In	order	to	find	
the	main	mandate	of	all	these	various	laws,	this	section	categorizes	three	aspects	of	the	laws	that	
can	describe	succinctly	the	content	of	the	laws:	the	mandate	to	business;	mechanism	of	
implementation;	and	sanctions.		Using	document	analysis,	the	six	laws	and	their	implementation	
regulations	have	been	analysed	to	categorise	them	within	these	three	aspects.		The	three	aspects	
are	discussed	in	three	subsections:	Subsection	5.3.1	discusses	the	mandate	to	business;	
Subsection	5.3.2	discusses	the	mechanism	of	implementation;	and	Subsection	5.3.3	reveals	the	
sanctions.		In	addition,	Subsection	5.3.4	presents	a	discussion	of	the	power	and	interest	behind	
CSR	legislation	drafting	process,	particularly	Law	No.	40/2007,	which	have	influenced	the	
definition	of	CSR	in	Indonesia.			
5.3.1. Mandate	to	Business			
Table	5.2,	in	the	mandate	to	business	column,	shows	the	form	of	CSR	activities	and	their	targets	
stated	in	the	six	laws.		Law	No.22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	mandates	Oil	and	Gas	companies	to	
develop	the	local	communities	and	environment,	whilst	Law	No.	19/2003	on	SOC	also	aims	for	
local	community	development	by	specifically	targeting	small	community	businesses	as	
beneficiaries.		Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	stipulates	the	obligation	of	investors	to	implement	
CSR	and	respect	the	local	traditions.		Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	states	that	
the	related	natural	resource	companies	budget	CSR	for	local	communities	annually.		Law	No	
11/2009	on	Social	Welfare	and	Law	No.	13/2011	on	Poverty	similarly	mandate	businesses	to	take	
on	a	role	in	social	welfare	and	poverty	eradication	through	CSR.					
It	is	evident	from	the	six	laws	that	the	intended	beneficiaries	of	CSR	are	local	communities	and	
their	environment.		However,	the	definition	of	‘local	communities’	is	not	specified	in	those	laws,	
whether	it	is	directed	to	the	community	in	the	village,	sub	district,	district,	or	provincial	level.		For	
instance,	the	provincial	government	in	the	present	study	demanded	CSR	projects	from	an	Oil	and	
Gas	company	during	a	big	sports	event	(the	Asian	Games),	to	build	sport	infrastructure	in	South	
Sumatera,	by	claiming	it	is	for	the	people	in	the	province.		However,	although	the	sport	
infrastructure	projects	developed	are	located	in	the	city	urban	area,	far	from	the	company’s	
location	of	operations	in	the	rural	area,	the	company	claimed	this	demand	had	been	fulfilled.		The	
specific	mandate	of	social	duty	to	local	communities	and	their	environment	is	presented	only	in	
Law	No.	19/2003	on	SOC	and	their	implementation	regulations	aimed	at	small	and	medium	sized	
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enterprises	(SMEs),	koperasi	(cooperative)	organizations	and	local	community	businesses.		
Furthermore,	the	social	duty	of	businesses	is	made	very	broad	in	Social	Welfare	Law	No.	11/	2009	
and	Poverty	Law	No.	3/	2011,	by	positioning	businesses	in	their	CSR	to	contribute	to	improving	
social	welfare	and	poverty	eradication.		The	other	laws	and	their	implementation	regulations	are	
not	clear	in	defining	what	kind	of	CSR	should	be	conducted	by	companies.		This	means	that	the	
CSR	activities	that	are	undertaken	by	companies	may	vary,	so	that	contributing	to	a	charity	in	the	
local	communities	by	giving	a	cow	for	celebrating	‘sedekah	kampung’	(a	village	celebration)	is	
considered	as	CSR,	although	this	donation	is	not	strictly	in	line	with	the	goal	of	CSR	laws	to	
develop	local	communities.			
Another	issue	arising	with	this	theme	is	the	clear	obligation	for	companies	to	spend	their	money	
or	resources	for	CSR	activities.		CSR	projects	in	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	and	
Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	are	derived	from	the	annual	budget	of	companies’	operational	
cost.		PPEB	projects	in	Law	No	19/2003	on	State	Owned	Companies	are	financed	by	two	percent	
of	a	company’s	net	profit.		CD	projects	in	Law	No	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	are	funded	by	
companies	or	by	cost	sharing	with	the	government	if	the	projects	are	under	the	exploration	
stage.		The	focus	of	CSR	laws	on	the	distribution	of	funds	in	CSR	explicitly	shows	that	the	role	of	
businesses	in	CSR	is	actually	to	provide	funds	or	wealth	to	local	communities.		Apart	from	the	
businesses’	contribution	in	their	investment	to	the	country,	job	creation	and	tax	revenue	to	the	
government,	the	businesses’	CSR	is	assumed	as	part	of	companies’	contributions	to	local	
communities.		This	implies	that	the	main	mandate	of	CSR	in	the	six	laws	and	their	
implementation	regulations	is	essentially	to	distribute	a	share	of	companies’	wealth	to	local	
communities.	
5.3.2. Mechanisms	of	Implementation	
Table	5.2,	in	the	mechanism	of	implementation	column,	shows	to	whom	companies	should	
report	in	conducting	CSR,	CD	or	PPEB	projects	to	local	communities.		Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	
Gas	states	that	the	CD	program	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	should	be	reported	regularly	to	central	
government	through	SKKMIGAS	(Satuan	Kerja	Khusus	Pelaksana	Kegiatan	Usaha	Hulu	Minyak	
Dan	Gas	Bumi	-	Special	Task	Force	for	Upstream	Oil	and	Gas	Business	Activities;	before	2012	it	
was	BPMIGAS).		Two	types	of	CD	project	-	government	shared	through	cost	recovery	or	fully	
funded	by	company	-	are	required	to	gain	approval	from	SKKMIGAS.		Law	No.	19/2003	on	SOC	
has	a	detailed	mechanism	for	implementation,	establishing	a	unit	under	a	director	to	handle	
PPEB	matters.		The	director	of	SOC	is	the	person	appointed	by	the	commissioners	or	the	central	
government	representative.		The	director	must	report	on	all	companies’	activities,	including	PPEB	
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funds	and	projects,	to	these	commissioners.		Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment,	however,	does	not	
have	implementation	regulations,	making	the	law	unclear	in	terms	of	how	to	implement	the	law.		
Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company,	through	its	implementation	regulation	No.	
47/2012,	points	out	that	the	responsibility	for	a	company’s	CSR	duties	is	borne	by	the	directors	of	
the	company.		Instead	of	obligating	companies	to	report	to	government,	the	law	suggests	that	
the	directors	of	private	companies,	as	the	duty	bearers,	must	give	an	annual	plan	and	report	all	
their	CSR	activities	to	the	companies’	commissioners	in	a	shareholders	meeting.		Law	No.	
11/2009,	through	Social	Minister	Regulation	No.	13/2012,	states	that	the	local	government,	
through	provincial	government,	should	establish	a	CSR	forum	to	build	coordination	with	CSR	
projects.			
	As	stated	earlier,	the	main	aim	of	mandatory	CSR	legislation	is	to	distribute	companies’	wealth	to	
local	communities,	meaning	locals	are	the	main	beneficiaries	of	CSR	projects.		However,	none	of	
the	CSR	legislation	obliges	companies	to	report	to	local	government	officials	such	as	kades	(the	
head	of	village),	camat	(head	of	subdistrict),	bupati	(head	of	district)	and/or	governor	as	the	head	
of	province.		The	one	piece	of	regulation	mentioning	the	local	government	role	in	CSR	is	Social	
Ministerial	Regulation	No.	13/	2012,	by	encouraging	local	provincial	government	to	establish	a	
CSR	forum	to	coordinate,	facilitate	and	synergize	the	efforts	of	businesses	and	local	actors	such	
as	universities	and	social	organizations	to	implement	CSR	programs.		Despite	obliging	companies	
to	get	approval	from	local	government	who	hold	authority	over	local	developments,	companies	
are	encouraged	in	various	laws	to	report	to	central	government.		For	instance,	in	CD	projects,	it	is	
obvious	that	with	SKKMIGAS	as	the	regulatory	unit	for	upstream	Oil	and	Gas	under	the	Ministry	
of	Energy	and	Mineral	Resources,	its	authority	of	approval	is	the	main	instrument	for	central	
government	to	control	CD	projects	in	local	areas.		PPEB	projects	by	a	state	owned	company	is	a	
similar	case,	where	approval	from	shareholders,	who	are	mainly	from	the	Ministry	of	State	
Owned	Companies,	is	essential	for	companies	in	conducting	certain	PPEB	projects.		CSR	projects	
in	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company,	which	applies	for	private	natural	resource	
companies,	mandate	that	companies	must	report	to	their	shareholders.		This	law	is	more	well-
known	than	any	other	CSR	laws,	and	the	local	governments	usually	point	to	this	law	to	push	
companies	operating	in	the	districts	to	report	their	CSR.		However,	the	law	does	not	require	the	
private	natural	resource	companies	to	report	to	government	at	national	and	local	levels.			
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In	the	case	of	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry,	the	private	Oil	and	Gas	companies	may	combine	CSR	in	
the	Law	No.	40/2007	with	CD	projects	in	the	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas.		This	particularly	
applies	to	CD	projects	in	the	exploration	stage,	which	are	funded	out	of	companies’	operational	
cost,	similar	to	CSR	projects	in	their	sources	of	funding.		In	this	manner,	the	obligation	of	CSR	in	
Law	No.	40/2007	may	be	replaced	by	CD	projects.		The	obligation	of	these	private	Oil	and	Gas	
companies	to	consult	with	and	report	their	CD	projects	to	SKKMIGAS	makes	it	difficult	for	local	
government	to	direct	Oil	and	Gas	companies	in	the	area	to	report	to	them	on	their	CD	projects.			
One	participant	from	the	local	district	government	of	Musi	Banyuasin	highlighted	the	difficulties	
in	getting	companies’	CSR	reports,	possibly	leading	to	a	‘double	budget’	on	a	project:	
“Every	year	through	the	CSR	forum,	we	always	ask	companies,	including	Oil	and	Gas	
companies,	to	give	reports	on	what	they	did	this	year	and	their	plans	next	year	for	CSR.	
But	it	is	always	hard	for	Oil	and	Gas	companies	to	do	that.		We	only	need	to	know	what	
kind	of	projects	they	want	to	do	next	year,	so	we	don’t	create	a	‘double	budget4’	on	one	
project...	we	do	not	ask	how	much	money	they	want	to	give	to	our	district,	we	only	need	
to	know	what	project…		But	they	always	avoid	giving	it	by	justifying	that	they	already	
gave	the	plans	to	SKKMIGAS	in	Jakarta;	while	we	need	to	make	annual	development	
planning	every	December…	So	one	time	I	told	them…	just	give	those	CSR	projects	to	
Jakarta,	we	can	still	afford	to	develop	our	area…”	(Go.1)	
The	CSR	forum	has	been	established	by	local	district	government	to	build	coordination	between	
local	development	agendas	and	companies’	CSR	projects.		They	hold	regular	meetings	once	a	year	
between	October	and	November,	considering	the	development	planning	for	the	next	year	must	
be	finished	and	submitted	to	central	government	in	December.		The	main	objective	of	local	
government	in	the	forum	is	to	get	information	from	companies	on	‘what	they	did	this	year’	and	
‘what	they	want	to	do	next	year’.		However,	the	Oil	and	Gas	companies	need	to	get	prior	
approval	from	SKKMIGAS	in	December	before	they	can	tell	the	local	government	‘what	they	want	
to	do	next	year’.		This	creates	a	complicated	situation	for	local	district	governments	in	making	
local	development	planning.		The	participant	quoted	above	expressed	the	need	to	avoid	a	
‘double	budget’	project,	where	district	government	could	not	expend	their	allocated	budget	for	
one	project	because	the	company	also	had	a	similar	project.		The	expression	of	the	local	
government	officer	in	the	statement	‘just	give	those	projects	to	Jakarta’	reflects	his	frustration	at	
the	prioritization	of	companies	to	report	to	central	government	exclusively.														
																																								 																				
4	Double	budget	refers	to	a	condition	where	one	project	has	been	budgeted	by	both	government’s	and	company’s	CSR.		
This	condition	causes	either	government	or	company	to	cancel	the	implementation	of	projects	to	avoid	the	corruption	
risks.		
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Decentralization	gave	local	district	government	autonomy	to	manage	and	administer	local	
development	in	the	area,	and	CSR	is	the	main	contribution	by	businesses	to	local	development.		
However,	the	mechanisms	set	by	CSR	legislation	emphasises	central	government	authority,	
rather	than	that	of	the	local	governments	who	have	authorization	over	local	development	
planning.		As	a	result,	although	CSR	is	intended	to	be	directed	to	the	benefit	of	local	communities,	
by	emphasising	reporting	to	central	government	the	agendas	and	priorities	of	local	government	
are	in	fact	frustrated.		For	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry,	the	dominant	role	of	central	government	is	
obvious	through	the	approval	requirement	from	SKKMIGAS,	which	needs	to	be	obtained	by	Oil	
and	Gas	companies	before	delivering	their	projects.		
5.3.3. The	Sanctions	
The	legal	sanctions	that	apply	to	companies	who	fail	to	implement	CSR	programs	are	rather	
ambiguous	in	the	CSR	legislation.		Table	5.2	above	indicates	only	two	laws	stating	legal	sanctions.		
Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	sets	out	administrative	sanctions	in	the	form	of	written	warning	
from	central	government,	limitation	of	business	activities,	freezing	of	investment	activities	or	the	
revocation	of	investment	permits.		However,	these	sanctions	apply	to	investors	who	fail	to	
comply	with	all	requirements	stated	in	the	Law	of	Investment,	including	CSR	activities.		This	
means	that	the	sanctions	are	not	specifically	set	to	punish	businesses	that	are	not	conducting	
CSR.		The	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	also	provides	sanctions	for	companies	
that	are	not	conducting	CSR.		However,	the	sanctions	are	not	detailed,	but	only	state	that	
‘sanctions	will	be	given	in	accordance	with	related	laws’.		This	statement	is	ambiguous,	as	the	law	
provides	no	further	explanation	and	no	other	CSR	legislation	refers	to	sanctions	for	non-
compliance.			
Furthermore,	a	participant	in	the	present	study	from	an	NGO	stated	that	the	country	has	a	lack	of	
experience	in	punishing	companies.		Moreover,	in	terms	of	CSR,	he	further	argued	that	the	
legislation	is	not	able	to	punish	businesses:	
“There	is	no	experience	of	the	application	of	such	sanction	to	the	company	not	
conducting	CSR.	In	fact,	in	this	country,	it	is	very	rare	to	see	the	company	being	penalized	
for	their	bad	attitudes.		And	one	more	thing,	if	the	company	has	been	charged,	I	think	
they	can	avoid	it	using	their	money	and	power”.	(NG.1)				
This	weak	enforcement	of	CSR	legislation	has	made	local	NGOs	pessimistic	about	businesses	
being	sanctioned	if	they	are	not	compliant	with	the	laws.		The	country’s	environment,	where	the	
corruption	of	law	enforcers	such	as	police,	judges	and	prosecutors	is	present,	leads	to	the	lack	of	
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implementation	of	these	laws	because	money	can	buy	off	the	law	enforcers,	and	businesses	have	
financial	and	political	power	in	this	respect	(Husni	2009).		In	addition,	difficulties	in	applying	
sanctions	for	CSR	non-compliance	may	also	derive	from	the	lack	of	indicators	measuring	CSR	
performance.		CSR	legislation	focuses	only	on	budgeting	and	planning,	with	a	lack	of	emphasis	on	
assessing	the	benefits	of	programs	to	local	communities.		This	means	that	as	long	as	the	company	
provides	a	budget	and	plans	for	CSR,	it	is	in	compliance	with	the	laws.				
Given	this	finding,	whilst	symbolically	the	CSR	legislation	seems	to	apply	a	hard	approach,	in	
practice	the	Indonesian	CSR	legislation	is	not	as	severe	as	it	looks.		The	hard	CSR	rules	discussed	
in	Chapter	3	apply	to	the	government	approach	to	CSR	in	forcing	companies	to	conduct	CSR	
through	giving	penalties	or	punishments	to	the	companies	if	they	do	not	perform	CSR.		In	the	
case	of	Indonesia’s	CSR	laws,	it	is	evident	that	the	government	issued	the	laws	to	rule	companies	
regarding	CSR.		However,	the	lack	of	sanctions	through	clear	penalties	in	the	legislation	weakens	
the	enforcement	of	these	laws.		In	addition,	the	weak	law	enforcement	culture	in	Indonesia	may	
contribute	to	the	lack	of	implementation	of	these	CSR	laws,	impeding	the	goal	of	the	laws	to	
improve	the	lives	of	local	people,	and	bringing	into	question	how	serious	the	central	government	
is	about	this	goal.					
5.3.4. Power	and	Interest	behind	CSR	Legislation	Drafting	Process	
The	issuance	of	CSR	legislation,	particularly	two	controversial	CSR	laws,	which	are	Law	No.	40/	
2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	and	Law	No.	25/	2007	on	Investment,	cannot	be	separated	
from	political	power	intervention	and	the	vested	interests	behind	the	legislation.		Other	CSR	
legislation,	for	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No.	22/2001	and	SOC	Law	No.	19/2003,	were	issued	before	2007,	
when	CSR	issues	did	not	attract	political	power.		The	enactment	of	Law	No	40/2007	on	Limited	
Liability	Company	and	Law	No	25/2007	on	Investment,	which	apply	to	all	natural	resource	
companies,	subsequently	attracted	many	interested	groups	to	become	involved	in	the	policy	
making	process	and	influence	the	content	of	these	laws.		Certain	interested	political	parties	may	
have	shaped	the	CSR	policies	by	exploiting	the	respective	abilities	of	various	figures	and	
organizations	involved	in	the	policy	making	process	(Lesmana	2007;	Mulkhan	&	Pratama	2013;	
Rosser	&	Edwin	2010).		It	is	noted	in	this	respect	that	the	discussion	to	define	CSR	in	the	
legislation	took	two	years	to	be	approved.		It	began	in	2005	with	the	submission	of	a	new	draft	
from	Government	to	Parliament,	to	update	Law	No.	1/1995	on	Limited	Liability	Company.		The	
early	2005	draft	did	not	include	CSR	issues	as	part	of	the	requirement	for	a	Limited	Liability	
Company.		The	process	of	public	hearings	with	communities	and	NGOs	then	drew	political	
attention	to	the	absence	of	CSR	in	the	draft.		Subsequent	to	that,	the	discussion	of	mandatory	or	
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voluntary	CSR	escalated	between	various	actors	in	business	organizations,	local	communities	with	
their	NGO	allies,	and	legislative	assembly	and	government.	
Business	organizations	proposed	the	voluntary	approach	to	CSR	during	the	drafting	process,	
particularly	for	Limited	Liability	Company	Law	No.	40/	2007.		Representatives,	which	included	
members	of	IBL	(Indonesia	Business	Link),	APINDO	(the	Indonesian	Employers	Association)	and	
KADIN	(Indonesian	Chambers	of	Commerce),	offered	three	arguments	for	why	mandatory	
requirements	for	CSR	may	be	problematic:	(i)	in	addition	to	forcing	companies	to	allocate	a	
portion	of	their	revenue	for	CSR	that	would	otherwise	be	distributed	to	shareholders	or	be	
reinvested	in	the	business,	this	requirement	would	effectively	amount	to	additional	taxes	on	the	
companies’	profits;	(ii)	this	mandatory	stipulation	would	create	opportunities	for	government	
officials	and	politicians	to	demand	bribes	from	companies,	in	that	they	could	demand	companies	
fund	projects	to	their	constituents	in	order	to	maintain	their	power;	and	(iii)	such	requirements	
might	burden	companies	financially	and	thereby	trigger	the	flight	of	capital	from	Indonesia	
(Indonesia	Business	Link	2007;	Kiroyan	2007).				
The	business	group	plays	an	important	role	in	providing	investment	in	the	national	economy	and	
provides	structural	power	to	the	business	lobby.		Business	tried	to	use	this	position	to	alarm	the	
public	that	mandatory	CSR	could	prompt	capital	flight	from	Indonesia.		Furthermore,	this	group	
was	able	to	exploit	their	connections	with	senior	political	figures.		Indonesia’s	business	leaders	
have	enjoyed	a	long,	close	relationship	with	government	officials	in	order	to	secure	access	to	
subsidized	credit,	import	licenses	and	other	forms	of	state	largesse	(Leuz	&	Oberholzer-Gee	
2006).		Hence,	Indonesia’s	prominent	business	figures	have	played	an	important	role	in	the	
government	and	political	parties	after	the	collapse	of	the	new	order	regime,	including	former	
Vice	President	Jusuf	Kalla	and	President	Yuhoyono’s	Coordinating	Minister	of	People’s	Welfare,	
Aburizal	Bakrie,	which	together	formed	the	head	of	the	Golkar	Party.		Jusuf	Kalla	and	Aburizal	
Bakrie	were	influential	figures	from	politics	that	assisted	the	business	group	in	influencing	the	
drafting	of	the	two	controversial	CSR	laws.		The	power	these	representatives	yielded	was	crucial	
in	making	the	CSR	provisions	in	Law	No.	40/	2007	more	amenable	to	their	collective	interests	in	
the	lead-up	to	the	regulation’s	acceptance	by	Parliament,	and	in	shaping	both	the	content	and	
timing	of	the	laws	on	implementation,	as	related	to	Article	74	(Rosser	&	Edwin	2010).	
Local	communities	were	primarily	represented	by	the	NGO	Business	Watch	Indonesian	(BWI)	that	
is	actively	involved	in	monitoring	business	practices.		This	group	argued	that	a	mandatory	
approach	to	CSR	was	required	for	Indonesia	to	make	the	companies	more	accountable	for	their	
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negative	social	and	environmental	impacts.		They	believed	that	many	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia	had	a	lack	of	concern	over	issues	such	as	environmental	impact,	occupational	health	
and	safety	for	workers	and	community	development,	and	rarely	took	actions	to	ensure	that	their	
operations	do	not	harm	their	employees	and	the	local	community.		In	this	regard,	businesses	
often	fail	to	compensate	affected	individuals	for	their	harmful	activities	(Mumbunan	2013).	
According	to	Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010),	this	NGO	proposed	the	identification	of	those	who	should	
be	held	liable	for	any	negative	externalities	produced	by	corporate	activities.		Their	support	for	
the	mandatory	approach	became	evident	as	such	externalities	involved	the	local	community	and	
workers,	while	the	companies	involved	attempted	to	maximize	their	profits.				
In	terms	of	power,	the	NGO	group	is	the	weakest,	with	limited	resources	and	powers	to	influence	
the	policy	making	process.		This	group	also	lacks	connections	to	the	central	government	and	
legislative	assembly,	reflecting	the	poor	relationship	the	group	has	with	Indonesia’s	major	
political	parties	and	its	leaders.		The	group	is	heavily	involved	in	public	debates,	lobbying	
activities,	public	demonstrations	and	efforts	to	improve	policies.		Most	protests	come	from	
members	of	local	communities	who	have	felt	victimized	by	companies’	damaging	environmental	
and	social	impacts.		These	cases	have	inspired	this	group	(NGOs)	to	demand	a	mandatory	CSR	
approach	in	Indonesia’s	laws.	
The	legislative	members	in	Parliament	and	Government	at	national	and	local	levels	are	the	group	
that	directly	drafted	the	law.		Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010)	indicate	that	inside	this	group	there	are	
“predatory	elements”,	referring	to	political	and	bureaucratic	figures	both	national	and	local	who	
wish	to	exploit	CSR	for	their	own	interests.		This	group	generally	supported	the	mandatory	
approach	to	CSR,	but	for	different	reasons	to	those	held	by	NGOs	and	the	local	communities.		In	
the	public	debates,	this	group	often	supported	the	NGO	argument	that	a	mandatory	approach	is	
necessary	to	ensure	that	the	big	foreign	and	domestic	companies	act	responsibly.		But	in	reality,	
the	real	interest	of	this	group	is	in	how	to	use	the	companies’	wealth	in	CSR	for	the	needs	of	
political	parties	and	bureaucratic	officials,	the	predominantly	pribumi	(indigenous	Indonesian)	
businesses	that	have	links	with	the	political	powers,	and	the	individuals	and	organizations	that	
support	their	networks.		Channelling	CSR	project	contributions	to	those	specific	groups	could	
assist	them	to	maintain	their	political	power	in	the	region	and	their	chances	of	re-election	(Rosser	
&	Edwin	2010).		The	rising	support	for	mandatory	CSR	inclusion	in	legislation	is	also	related	to	the	
gas	mining	activities	of	Aburizal	Bakrie’s	(a	head	of	the	Golkar	political	party)	company,	which	
caused	a	massive	mud	flow	disaster	in	Sidoarjo,	East	Java.		The	mud	flow	damaged	buildings,	
schools	and	farmland	in	a	number	of	neighbouring	villages	and	displaced	thousands	of	people	
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from	their	homes,	the	effects	of	which	are	still	being	felt	(Muhtada	2008;	Schiller,	Lucas	&	
Sulistiyanto	2008).		The	widespread	parliamentary	support	for	mandatory	CSR	may	reflect	the	
parliament’s	desire	to	embarrass	Bakrie	and	the	Golkar	party	in	the	leadup	to	the	2009	
Parliamentary	and	Presidential	elections,	by	underlining	this	case	as	an	example	of	the	lack	of	
social	responsibility	of	Bakrie’s	company.		In	fact,	As	Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010)	noted,	before	the	
Sidoarjo	mud	flow	occurred	in	2006,	only	one	Islamic	party	faction,	PKB	(Partai	Kebangkitan	
Bangsa-National	Awakening	Party),	supported	mandatory	CSR,	due	to	their	interests	in	
generating	CSR	funds	to	support	pesantren	(Islamic	schools)	as	their	political	basis.		These	short-
term	electoral	considerations	then	had	been	one	factor	attracting	other	parties	to	support	the	
mandatory	approach	to	drafting	CSR	law.			
The	predatory	behaviour	in	the	legislative	house	and	government	in	supporting	mandatory	CSR	
can	be	seen	from	their	primarily	focus	on	the	amount	or	the	proportion	of	company	revenues	
that	should	be	set	aside	for	CSR.		The	issue	of	how	much	the	company	should	be	required	to	
spend	on	CSR	was	the	main	agenda	of	parliamentary	discussion	of	this	law.		However,	predatory	
elements	in	the	parliament	did	not	completely	get	their	way,	with	their	ambition	being	
constrained	by	the	Indonesian	business	group’s	influence	(Rosser	&	Edwin	2010).		The	first	
proposal	submitted	by	PKB	(Partai	Kebangkitan	Bangsa	-	the	National	Awakening	Party)	directed	
that	the	companies	set	aside	five	per	cent	of	their	profits	for	CSR	activities.		However,	a	Golkar	
party	member	expressed	concern	that	five	percent	was	too	high,	that	it	would	discourage	
investment	if	it	was	introduced.		Finally,	the	committee	agreed	to	issue	the	new	law	with	a	simple	
requirement	for	CSR	to	set	aside	‘a	proportion	of	their	profits’	(sebagian	laba).		They	hoped	the	
implementation	regulation,	in	the	form	of	Peraturan	Pemerintah	(or	Government	Regulation),	
would	specify	how	much	the	portion	should	be,	although	the	issued	regulation,	as	explained	
earlier,	does	not	mention	a	definitive	portion.		
Within	the	national	government,	their	interest	to	control	CSR	funds	began	right	after	the	law	was	
issued.		In	late	May	2007,	the	Minister	of	Social	Affairs,	Bachtiar	Chamsyah,	gave	his	response	to	
this	law	by	stating	to	the	press	that	CSR	funds	should	not	be	under	control	of	regional	
governments	because	they	would	misuse	the	money,	implying	that	they	should	flow	instead	to	
the	central	government	(Fadillah	2007).		In	addition,	the	minister	argued	that	3	to	4	percent	of	
company	profits	set	aside	for	CSR	activities	was	‘ideal’	(KOMPAS	2007).		Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010)	
even	noted	the	tension	between	the	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	and	the	Coordinating	Ministry	for	
Social	Welfare	to	control	the	CSR	funds,	with	the	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	arguing	that	CSR	best	
fitted	under	its	area	of	responsibility.	
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The	economic	and	political	power	held	by	the	dominant	business	group	had	a	victory	in	
influencing	the	Limited	Liability	Company	Law.		The	fact	that	a	‘voluntary	element	of	CSR’	
prevailed	in	this	‘mandatory	law’	can	be	seen	from	the	absence	of	sanctions	for	companies	not	
conducting	CSR,	making	the	law	unenforceable.		Hence,	the	lack	of	specific	proportion	that	
companies	be	required	to	set	aside	suggests	that	businesses	tried	to	limit	government	
involvement	in	managing	their	CSR	funds.		Amending	the	laws	to	add	sanctions	is	difficult	to	
achieve,	given	the	country's	fractured	political	party	structure;	that	is,	the	presence	of	many	
different	parties	in	Parliament	and	the	fact	that	none	of	them	controls	a	majority	of	votes.		This	
means	that	legislation	can	only	be	amended	after	lengthy	processes	of	coalition-building	and	
‘horse-trading’	among	the	legislative	members.		The	business	group	tried	to	eliminate	Article	74	
of	CSR	legislation	through	an	appeal	to	the	Constitutional	Court	in	December	2008.		Their	
representative	in	the	Chambers	of	Commerce	and	Industry	(KADIN),	the	Indonesian	Young	
Entrepreneurs	Association	(HIPMI),	and	the	Indonesian	Women’s	Business	Association	(IWAPI)	
argued	that	the	article	caused	legal	uncertainty	and	was	discriminatory	to	natural	resource	
companies	(Rosser	&	Edwin	2010).		The	appeal	from	this	group	to	the	Constitutional	Court	
proved	unsuccessful,	in	April	2009,	with	the	Court	ruling	that	Article	74	was	constitutional.	
5.4. LOCAL	STAKEHOLDER	EXPECTATIONS	OF	CSR	LEGISLATION	
According	to	Duncan	(2007),	decentralization	acknowledged	local	government	authority	and	local	
community	aspirations,	which	were	ignored	during	the	35	years	of	the	Soeharto	regime.		The	
issuance	of	CSR	legislation	by	central	government	is	a	response	to	local	requests	for	companies’	
contribution	to	local	life.		As	discussed	earlier,	although	it	is	evident	in	the	legislation	that	CSR	
should	be	directed	to	and	benefit	local	communities,	none	of	those	laws	advises	companies	to	
report	to	local	authorities.		Indeed,	each	law	states	which	state	ministry	or	body	in	central	
government	is	authorized	to	control	this	company	social	activity.		The	control	by	central	
government	of	the	CSR	of	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry	is	apparent	because	of	its	position	supporting	
central	state	government	fuel	subsidy	policy.		Yet	the	responses	of	local	community	and	local	
government	toward	CSR	legislation	is	important,	as	they	are	the	main	beneficiaries	of	the	
legislation.		What	they	perceive	in	the	legislation	constructs	the	local	environment	for	companies	
in	complying	with	the	legislation.		Subsection	5.4.1	below	outlines	local	district	government	
responses;	whilst	Subsection	5.4.2	discusses	local	community	and	NGO	perspectives.			
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5.4.1. Local	District	Government	
CSR	resources	distributed	to	local	communities	may	assist	and	support	local	government	to	
implement	their	development	agendas.		Despite	supporting	the	legislation,	a	local	district	
government	official	criticised	the	CSR	legislation	for	not	being	enforced	for	companies	in	his	
district:	
“These	are	the	‘banci	(sissy)	legislation’.		The	companies	operating	in	this	district	are	still	
not	helping	our	people,	and	we	cannot	do	anything	to	punish	them	because	the	laws	are	
lacking	sanctions…	We	have	even	tried	to	draft	perda	(District	Regulation)	on	CSR	and	
include	the	sanctions,	but	it	was	rejected	by	the	home	affairs	ministry	in	Jakarta.	They	
thought	we	were	trying	to	scare	business,	but	they	didn’t	think	what	the	company	had	
done	to	our	people”	(Go.2)	
Another	local	government	official	also	expressed	a	critical	perception	of	CSR	legislation	because	
the	legislation	does	not	give	power	to	them	to	control	companies’	CSR:	
“…The	laws	have	not	given	us	power	to	control	companies’	CSR	projects”	(Go.3)	
There	are	two	important	points	to	be	made	from	these	responses	to	CSR	legislation.		Firstly,	the	
statement	of	‘banci	legislation’,	referring	to	CSR	legislation,	indicates	that	the	legislation	cannot	
be	utilized	by	local	government	to	push	companies	in	the	area	to	perform	CSR.		Banci	is	a	
common	term	to	identify	a	man	acting	like	woman	(ie	without	male	power).		It	has	negative	
connotations,	as	banci	is	still	not	accepted	by	the	culture	of	these	male-dominant	communities.		
Referring	to	CSR	legislation	as	banci	regulation	means	the	legislation	lack	clarity	in	their	power	to	
force	companies,	similar	to	the	meaning	of	banci	of	‘indeterminate	gender’	in	the	culture.		The	
lack	of	sanctions	and	the	reduction	of	local	government’s	role	in	CSR	legislation	result	in	this	
notion,	representing	the	local	government’s	disappointment	with	CSR	legislation.		Secondly,	the	
statement	also	obviously	shows	the	resentment	of	a	local	government	official	towards	the	central	
government	constraint	on	their	power	to	control	company	CSR.		Their	initiative	to	build	local	
regulations	in	order	to	add	power	to	CSR	laws	had	been	cancelled	by	central	government,	with	
the	reason	that	it	may	harm	the	business	environment.		The	central	government	decision	to	
revoke	local	regulation	of	CSR	is	viewed	negatively	by	district	governments	by	reference	to	
prevailing	company	attitudes	that	result	in	negative	consequences	for	their	local	communities.					
Perda	(local	regulations)	designed	to	sanction	companies	not	conducting	CSR	failed	due	to	central	
government	restrictions.		Therefore,	the	establishment	of	a	CSR	forum	is	another	way	for	local	
government	to	become	involved	in	company	CSR.		The	CSR	forum	encourages	all	companies	in	
the	area	to	be	a	member	of	the	forum.		There	are	no	sanctions	if	companies	do	not	want	to	be	
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involved	in	the	forum,	however	local	government	offers	CSR	awards	annually	and	consultation	
staff	to	discuss	local	development	programs	with	company	members.		One	local	government	
participant	explained	the	function	of	the	CSR	forum:	
“We	established	the	CSR	forum	in	order	to	assist	the	companies	to	synchronize	their	
programs	with	our	development	agendas...	We	provide	staff	in	the	CSR	forum	to	discuss	
local	development	programs	with	company	CSR.		We	also	evaluate	their	CSR	
performance	with	CSR	awards	from	our	bupati	(head	of	district)”	(Go.1)	
Another	local	district	government	officer	added	this	statement:	
“This	forum	helps	us	to	know	what	they	want	to	do	and	how	much	money	they	will	spend	
for	CSR…”			(Go.3)	
The	CSR	forum	in	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	was	established	in	2007	through	a	project	funded	
by	the	EU	and	UNDP,	in	which	the	present	researcher	was	involved.		The	project	aimed	to	place	
CSR	as	part	of	development	agendas,	and	to	build	consultation	between	district	government	and	
companies.		The	failure	to	have	power	to	issue	perda	(local	regulation)	on	CSR	led	local	
government	to	establish	the	CSR	forum	as	a	tool	to	involve	companies	in	local	development.		
Rather	than	forcing	companies	to	do	certain	projects,	as	drafted	in	local	regulations,	the	forum	
took	an	encouraging	approach.		Companies	were	initially	reluctant	to	join	this	CSR	forum;	
however,	as	stated	in	the	legislation,	they	are	required	to	consult	with	local	government	in	
delivering	their	CSR	projects.		The	CSR	forum	has	been	established	with	an	agreement	in	the	
Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU)	signed	by	bupati	and	all	companies	in	the	area.		Then,	the	
agreement	is	operationalized	by	SK	(Surat	Keputusan	–	Decree)	from	the	Bupati	(head	of	district)	
to	appoint	the	government	staff	and	each	company	representative	to	be	membered	in	the	forum.		
The	agreement	in	the	MoU	reflects	more	on	‘what	the	local	government	want’	rather	than	‘what	
the	companies	want’.		For	instance,	there	is	an	obligation	of	company	representatives	to	report	
the	projects	to	government	staff	in	the	CSR	forum,	rather	than	explaining	what	benefits	the	CSR	
forum	can	give	to	the	companies.			
The	attraction	of	CSR	to	be	included	in	development	agendas	as	an	alternative	source	of	funding	
for	development	in	the	area	derived	from	the	flexibility	of	CSR	funds.		Local	government	can	
categorize	CSR	funds	as	a	third-party	contribution	which	does	not	need	to	be	stated	in	the	APBD	
(Anggaran	Pendapatan	Belanja	Daerah	–	District	Revenue	and	Expenditure	Statement).		
However,	this	flexibility	of	funds	also	attracts	the	‘little	kings’	interests.		This	term,	‘little	kings’,	
refers	to	local	government	officials,	local	legislative	groups	and	kades	(the	head	of	village),	who	
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company	contributions	in	the	form	of	CSR	may	be	directed	by	‘little	kings’	to	attain	their	self-
benefit.		A	local	government	officer	highlighted	the	attraction	of	these	‘little	kings’	to	CSR	
resources,	by	pointing	out	the	risks	of	his	position	in	the	CSR	forum:	
“So	many	people	think	I	got	a	lot	of	money	from	this	forum…		They	want	to	replace	me	
from	this	position...”	(Go.2)		
The	position	as	administrator	of	the	forum	allows	the	officer	to	have	contact	with	the	companies’	
members.		This	attracts	some	officials	in	government	office	to	be	in	this	position	so	as	to	impose	
their	self-interest	on	companies.		This	behaviour	is	similar	to	the	‘predatory	elements’	of	CSR	
mentioned	by	Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010).		They	discovered	these	elements	in	national	legislative	
assemblies	and	government	during	the	drafting	process	of	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company.		In	the	implementation	of	this	legislation,	these	predatory	elements	may	occur,	as	the	
participant	above	noted,	in	the	attraction	of	the	CSR	forum	administrator	to	some	government	
officials	in	order	to	gain	access	to	companies.		This	access	could	lead	to	resources	for	their	self-
benefit,	such	as	access	to	get	facilities	from	companies,	information	on	CSR	projects	and	
consultation	fees	that	may	occur	during	evaluation	of	the	CSR	forum.								
5.4.2. Local	Communities	and	NGO	Allies	
Interviews	with	three	heads	of	villages	and	three	Focus	Group	Discussions	(FGD),	the	latter	
consisting	of	10-15	people	in	each	village	where	the	three	companies	were	located,	were	
conducted	to	obtain	local	stakeholders’	perceptions	on	CSR	legislation	and	practices.		The	
information	about	CSR	legislation	for	local	communities	was	very	limited,	depending	on	the	kades	
(the	head	of	village)	:	
“I	often	heard	about	the	legislation.		Our	kades	(the	head	of	village)	in	our	village	always	
mentioned	about	CSR	legislation.		He	said	we	can	protest	and	demand	CSR,	if	companies	
do	harm	to	us.		But	I	don’t	know	how	to	do	that.		I	usually	ask	kades	if	I	got	problem	with	
companies…”		(FGD.2)					
The	limited	access	of	most	community	members	to	local	district	government,	due	to	the	distance	
of	the	government	office	from	the	village,	has	resulted	in	the	reliance	of	communities	on	the	
kades	(the	head	of	village),	including	for	information	about	CSR	legislation.		However,	the	lack	of	
information	of	communities	does	not	mean	they	do	not	support	the	CSR	mandatory	legislation.		
All	community	participants	in	the	present	research	were	found	to	support	this	legislation,	by	
relating	the	essentials	of	CSR	legislation	to	their	recent	conditions:	
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“Now	we	can	push	the	company	to	help	us...		I	don’t	know	details	of	CSR	legislation	
exactly,	but	the	legislation	will	force	the	company	to	do	that.		I	think	the	legislation	are	
important	for	us,	as	a	disadvantaged	group.		Many	years,	they	have	stolen	our	resources.		
They	are	getting	rich	and	we	are	being	suffered.	They	always	drive	their	fancy	air	
conditioned	car	passing	through	our	village	and	leave	dryness	and	dust	for	us	to	live	and	
breathe	in”	(D.2)	
That	CSR	should	be	directed	to	local	communities	has	been	emphasised	by	local	communities,	
assuming	that	they	now	have	rights	to	force	companies	to	give	CSR	projects	to	them.		However,	
no	one	in	the	community	could	explain	the	exact	content	of	the	laws.		This	is	because	the	
information	about	CSR	legislation	received	by	the	local	communities	is	very	limited,	depending	on	
the	kades’	(the	head	of	village)	information	about	CSR.		However,	the	communities	in	these	
discussions	felt	that	the	laws	have	already	accommodated	their	demands	to	push	the	companies	
to	give	contributions	and	compensation	to	their	villages	for	exploiting	their	resources	in	their	
land.		The	strong	statement,	‘stolen	our	resources’,	indicates	the	local	communities’	claim	over	
natural	resources	in	their	land,	although	the	basic	constitution	and	laws	clearly	state	these	as	
central	government-owned	natural	resources.		According	to	Agrarian	Law	No.	5/1960,	the	
people’s	ownership	of	land	only	applies	to	the	land	and	everything	on	it,	while	all	the	
underground,	including	natural	resources	for	mining,	belongs	to	the	central	government.			
Furthermore,	the	companies’	attitude	to	the	villages	also	led	to	the	communities’	
disappointment.		Company	operations	that	mostly	gave	negative	consequences	rather	than	
benefits	were	illustrated	by	their	story,	in	the	statement	that	‘they	always	drive	their	fancy	air	
conditioned	car	passing	through	our	village	and	leave	dryness	and	dust	for	us	to	live	and	breathe	
in’.		The	example	of	luxurious	air-conditioned	company	cars	represents	the	companies’	
operational	resources,	being	equipped	with	infrastructure	such	as	clean	water,	electricity,	
modern	transport	and	communication,	while	the	‘dryness	and	dust’	of	the	dirt	road	symbolizes	
their	village	conditions,	with	their	lack	of	modern	infrastructure.		The	dryness	and	dust	of	the	dirt	
road	after	company	cars	pass	by	the	road	means	their	conditions	will	become	worse	after	the	
companies	have	finished	their	operations,	which	continues	to	impact	their	life	as	they	are	the	
ones	who	still	stay	in	the	village,	while	the	companies’	staff	have	left	the	mining	site.			
The	issuance	of	CSR	legislation	has	legitimated	the	local	communities	to	demand	companies’	CSR	
as	form	of	compensation	and	contribution	to	their	territories.		However,	who	most	often	utilises	
this	legislation	in	communities	depends	on	the	power	of	stakeholders	inside	the	local	
communities.		Not	all	community	members	in	the	village	have	power	to	voice	their	demands	to	
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companies.		One	participant	from	a	local	NGO	in	South	Sumatera,	who	was	aware	of	the	
implementation	of	CSR	laws	in	this	district,	highlighted	this	condition	by	stating:	
“CSR	is	like	‘pemadam	kebakaran’	(fire	extinguisher).		The	companies	only	give	CSR	
whenever	there	are	protests	to	them.		Actually	those	protests	and	rallies	are	driven	by	
some	elite	groups	such	as	government	officials,	the	head	of	village,	and	some	important	
figures	in	the	village.		Because	these	people’s	behaviour	might	influence	the	company’s	
security,	they	have	been	approached	and	prioritized	by	the	companies.	In	result,	the	
companies	are	only	concerned	with	this	group…”		(NG.1)	
This	NGO	activist	noticed	that	the	number	of	rallies	and	protests	from	the	local	community	
increased	after	the	CSR	laws	were	issued	in	2007.		Their	NGO	often	assists	kades	(the	head	of	
village)	in	formulating	the	issues	to	be	protested	to	companies,	such	as	an	oil	spill	that	damaged	
the	village	river	or	lack	of	local	labour	in	companies.		Despite	the	changes	in	company	policies	to	
clean	up	the	river	or	absorb	more	local	labour,	the	protests	tended	to	demand	more	CSR	
projects.		Those	kades	and	his	group	often	discontinued	their	protests	after	companies	gave	them	
CSR	projects	to	manage.		The	stopping	of	local	protest	after	companies	give	CSR	projects	is	
caused	by	the	local	cultural	value	on	mutual	relationship:	when	someone	gives	something,	the	
other	person	should	return	something	to	him/her.		In	this	manner,	the	companies’	gifts	to	this	
little	kings	group	may	benefit	themselves.		In	return,	these	little	kings	group,	as	legitimate	
stakeholders	in	the	village,	try	to	give	something	back	to	companies,	such	as	stopping	the	
protests	against	companies.		This	might	not	resolve	the	issues	occurring	in	the	village	due	to	
companies	operations,	but	villagers	assume	that	the	company	was	willingly	showing	its	
responsibility	through	donation	and	charity.		In	this	manner,	CSR	has	been	used	as	a	’tool’	for	the	
company	to	control	community	protests.		This	is	not	in	line	with	the	laws’	objective,	which	is	to	
improve	the	life	of	the	local	community.		Aside	from	the	cultural	value,	the	stopping	of	protests	
from	local	stakeholders	after	receiving	CSR	projects	is	also	a	form	of	power	play	in	negotiations	
between	kades	and	companies.		Kades	use	their	legitimate	position	of	influence	to	demand	
companies	CSR	projects	for	their	own	interests,	while	the	companies	use	kades	legitimate	
position	to	influence	other	local	stakeholders	to	stop	their	protests.	The	dynamics	of	this	power	
play	in	negotiation	means	that	CSR	projects	can	be	used	as	a	tool	or	instrument	of	companies	to	
lessen	community	protests.	
5.5. CONCLUSION	
There	are	six	CSR	related	laws	and	related	regulations	identified	by	this	study	in	relation	to	CSR	in	
the	Oil	and	Gas	industry.		Different	terms	for	social	responsibilities	are	used	in	various	laws	and	
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regulations,	such	as	Partnership	Program	and	Environmental	Building	(PPEB)	in	Law	No	19/2003	
on	State	Owned	Companies,	Community	Development	(CD)	in	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	
and	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR)	in	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	and	Law	No.	
40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company.		Besides	providing	guidance	for	companies	on	how	to	
conduct	those	social	responsibilities,	the	legislation	focuses	heavily	on	how	to	allocate	and	
distribute	the	companies’	resources	for	CSR	to	local	communities.		The	context	behind	the	
issuance	of	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	highlights	the	vested	interests	in	the	
CSR	drafting	process.		Many	interest	groups	shaped	the	content	of	the	laws	and	further	
influenced	the	definition	of	CSR	in	the	country.		This	process	also	resulted	in	the	mandate	of	CSR	
laws	having	a	lack	of	sanctions,	making	the	laws	unenforceable.	
Local	government	officials	have	been	disappointed	with	the	legislation,	one	naming	the	laws	as	
banci	(weak,	or	‘sissy’)	regulation.		Meanwhile,	CSR	becomes	essential	for	local	government	as	an	
alternative	source	of	funds	for	local	development.		The	failure	to	issue	perda	(the	local	
regulations)	has	led	local	government	to	emphasize	their	efforts	in	establishing	a	CSR	forum	to	
involve	business	in	local	development.		The	forum	accommodates	the	dominant	interests	of	local	
government	in	CSR	by	encouraging	all	companies’	members	to	report	their	projects	to	the	forum.		
The	forum	does	not	force	companies	to	commit	to	do	certain	projects	that	their	perda	draft	
aimed	to	do,	but	the	companies	are	required	to	consult	with	local	government	as	stated	in	
legislation.		Local	communities	also	acknowledge	the	main	beneficiaries	of	CSR	to	be	themselves,	
where	they	presume	that	the	legislation	has	accommodated	their	aspiration	to	pressure	
companies	to	give	them	more	power	and	voice.		However,	not	all	stakeholders	can	utilise	the	
legislation	to	demand	their	rights,	due	to	the	difference	of	power	and	access	among	
stakeholders.		The	‘marginalized	stakeholders’	who	lack	power	and	limited	access	to	government	
and	business	may	rely	only	on	‘little	king’	power	to	assist	them	in	solving	their	problems	with	
companies,	including	with	CSR.		The	dominance	of	‘little	kings’	in	the	village	and	local	district	
government,	resulting	in	their	demands	that	CSR	satisfy	their	vested	interests,	may	in	fact	mean	
that	CSR	implementation	cannot	achieve	its	intended	goal,	which	is	the	benefit	of	the	
community.	
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Chapter	6.	THE	IMPLEMENTATION	OF	CSR	LEGISLATION	
6.1.	INTRODUCTION	
This	chapter	presents	findings	of	three	companies’	perceptions	of	CSR	legislation,	their	
implementation	of	CSR,	and	the	outcomes	of	their	CSR	practices	from	external	stakeholder	
viewpoints.		It	provides	the	evidence	based	upon	which	to	answer	research	questions	2	and	3.		
The	chapter	structure	is	based	on	the	three	cases	of	selected	companies	and	the	cross	case	
analysis.		Section	6.2	presents	the	findings	for	company	A	(the	IOC	-	the	Indonesian	Private	
Owned	Oil	and	Gas	company).		Section	6.3	presents	the	findings	for	company	B	(the	FOC	-	the	
Foreign	Owned	Oil	and	Gas	Company).		Section	6.4	presents	the	findings	for	company	C	(the	SOC	
-	the	State	Owned	Oil	and	Gas	Company).		Then,	in	Section	6.5,	a	cross	case	analysis	of	the	three	
companies	is	presented.								
6.2.	COMPANY	A	–	THE	INDONESIAN	OWNED	COMPANY	(IOC)	
The	Indonesian	Owned	Oil	and	Gas	Company	(IOC)	selected	for	the	present	study	is	owned	by	an	
Indonesian	businessman	who	is	also	involved	in	and	has	influential	power	within	one	political	
party	in	Indonesia.		Starting	as	drilling	contractors,	the	company	has	transformed	into	an	
integrated	energy	company	with	its	main	business	involvement	being	in	oil	and	gas	exploration	
and	production,	downstream	operations	and	power	generation.		This	company	has	recently	been	
awarded	the	right	to	explore	for	and	produce	oil	and	gas	under	15	different	production	sharing	
arrangements	with	the	Indonesian	government	through	SKKMIGAS,	and	also	has	a	joint	operation	
with	Indonesia's	state-owned	national	Oil	and	Gas	company.		The	company	has	produced	crude	
oil	and	natural	gas	from	their	contract	areas	located	in	Sumatra,	Java,	Sulawesi,	Kalimantan	and	
Natuna	in	Indonesia.		Aside	from	operations	domestically,	the	company	also	has	stakes	in	other	
countries	such	as	the	US,	Libya,	Oman	and	Tunisia.		The	operating	company	in	Musi	Banyuasin	
has	gained	a	production	sharing	contract	from	SKKMIGAS	to	exploit	oil	and	gas	until	2023.		The	
main	production	of	this	operating	company	is	oil:	according	to	its	annual	report,	the	total	average	
of	oil	production	is	recorded	at	around	12	MBOEPD5.						
In	their	sustainability	report	published	in	2013,	the	company	argued	that	their	CSR	is	in	the	form	
of	voluntary	efforts	to	actively	contribute	towards	progress	and	welfare	in	the	community	and	
environment,	beyond	merely	complying	with	prevailing	laws	and	regulations.		They	added	in	this	
report	that	their	CSR	focus	is	on	three	areas:	(i)	to	reduce	poverty	and	unemployment	by	
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empowering	small	scale	businesses;	(ii)	to	provide	access	to	higher	quality	education	and	spiritual	
life;	and	(ii)	to	help	improve	the	existing	infrastructure	that	supports	higher	quality	education	and	
spiritual	life.			
As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	there	are	three	laws	that	a	company	is	required	to	comply	with	in	
conducting	its	CSR:	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	Law	No	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company,	and	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment.		The	manager,	supervisors	and	staff	of	the	
company	studied	here	suggested	that	their	CSR	practices	align	with	these	three	laws.		However,	
within	these	various	laws	and	their	implementing	regulations,	the	company	prioritized	the	law	on	
Oil	and	Gas	as	their	main	guidance	for	implementing	CSR.		As	the	company’s	operation	depends	
on	the	PSC	(Production	Sharing	Contract)	with	Indonesian	government,	it	is	important	for	
company	A	to	ensure	all	the	requirements	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	Law	is	implemented	in	its	
operations.		The	community	development	manager	underlined	the	importance	of	Law	No.	
22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	for	their	CSR,	by	mentioning:	
“…	among	those	laws,	we	prioritize	Oil	and	Gas	Law.		I	think	it	is	more	appropriate	to	us:	
if	we	want	to	maintain	or	even	extend	our	contracts	with	the	government,	we	have	to	
comply	with	the	Oil	and	Gas	law,	including	conducting	Community	Development	
activities.		Other	(CSR)	laws	such	as	Limited	Liability	Company	Law	are	also	included	in	
the	CD	projects”	(A.M.1)	
The	guiding	principle	of	the	Community	Development	(CD)	mandate	as	advocated	in	Law	No.	
22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	Law	is	obvious	from	the	establishment	of	a	Community	Development	
department	in	this	company,	rather	than	naming	the	department	as	the	CSR	department.		By	
conducting	CD	projects,	the	manager	assumes	that	the	company	has	met	the	CSR	obligations	
stated	in	Law	No	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	and	Law	No	25/2007	on	Investment.		In	
fact,	prioritizing	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	may	allow	the	company	to	utilise	the	cost	
recovery	facilities	to	fund	their	CSR.		The	Law	No.	22/2001	categorizes	the	CSR	sources	of	funding	
into	cost	recovery	for	projects	under	exploration	stage	(before	production)	and	non-cost	recovery	
for	projects	under	exploitation	stage	(production)	(see	Table	5.1).		This	distinction	might	be	
unclear	in	the	implementation	in	the	field,	as	in	many	cases	one	village	area	may	have	both	
exploration	and	exploitation	being	conducted.		Furthermore,	it	is	also	unclear	how	SKKMIGAS,	as	
the	authority	to	control	the	use	of	cost	recovery,	monitors	the	application	of	cost	recovery	in	the	
field.						
The	report	and	the	prioritization	of	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No	22/2001	showed	such	a	normative	claim	
and	in	addition	a	rhetoric	company	CSR.		Instead	of	stating	their	compliance	with	the	legislation,	
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the	company	claimed	their	CSR	is	a	result	of	company	voluntariness,	and	that	the	three	areas	are	
aligned	with	the	government	development	agenda.		Their	CSR	effort	is	aligned	with	the	legislation	
since	it	only	mandates	the	company	to	allocate	and	distribute	its	wealth	to	local	stakeholders.		
However,	the	intention	of	their	voluntary	effort	has	nuances	that	limit	the	local	government	
intervention	in	their	CSR.		By	claiming	their	CSR	drivers	as	voluntary	efforts	rather	than	via	
mandatory	compliance,	it	is	suggested	that	while	the	company	complies	with	the	legislation	to	
allocate	CSR	wealth,	the	decision	to	whom	the	wealth	is	distributed	is	dependent	on	the	
company,	not	on	other	stakeholders’	interventions.		Furthermore,	the	prioritization	of	Oil	and	
Gas	Law	No.	22/	2001	underlines	that	the	company	is	obligated	to	report	to	the	central	
government	through	SKKMIGAS,	rather	than	reporting	to	the	local	government.					
In	terms	of	CSR	activities	in	the	district,	the	operation	company	receives	advice	from	the	
Community	Development	(CD)	Department	in	their	headquarters	office	in	Jakarta.		This	CD	
department	is	headed	by	one	manager	and	employs	15	Community	Development	staff	focused	
on	assisting	the	implementation	of	CD	projects	in	all	operating	companies	under	the	parent	
company	in	Indonesia.		In	the	district	field,	two	staff,	at	supervisor	level	of	the	Public	Relations	
(PR)	Office,	which	is	itself	under	the	direction	of	an	Operational	Manager,	have	responsibility	to	
implement	the	CD	projects,	as	the	funding	for	CD	projects	is	taken	from	the	operating	company	
rather	than	from	the	parent	company	headquarters	office.		These	two	staff	in	the	PR	office	are	
structurally	responsible	to	the	Operational	Manager	of	the	operating	company	in	terms	of	the	
use	of	funds;	however,	in	relation	to	their	CD	activities	they	must	consult	to	the	manager	of	
Community	Development	Department	in	Jakarta.		The	PR	office	in	the	operating	company	also	
contracted	three	local	staff,	who	were	residents	from	the	surrounding	area,	for	the	Public	
Relations	Office	in	order	to	assist	the	office	to	communicate	with	the	surrounding	communities.		
This	research	was	able	to	interview	four	participants	from	this	company,	which	are:	one	manager	
of	the	Community	Development	Department	who	is	based	in	the	Jakarta	office;	and	two	
supervisors	and	one	staff	from	the	Musi	Banyuasin	Public	Relations	Office.		It	is	the	company’s	
policy	to	hire	Indonesians	only,	so	all	participants	are	Indonesian.				
The	department	distinguishes	CD	projects	into	cost	recovery	projects	and	non-cost	recovery	
projects.		Cost	recovery	projects	are	those	where	their	expenditures	are	shared	with	the	state	
government	through	SKKMIGAS,	for	their	exploration	fields	(not	producing);	while	non-cost	
recovery	is	for	projects	that	are	fully	funded	by	the	company	budget	for	their	production	fields.		
The	CD	manager	further	explained	that	the	non-cost	recovery	projects	can	be	categorized	as	CSR	
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in	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company,	since	they	are	funded	from	the	company’s	
operational	costs:	
“We	have	cost	recovery	and	non-cost	recovery	projects.		The	non-cost	recovery	projects	
come	from	our	money,	so	this	is	aligned	with	what	Law	No.	40/2007	mandates	on	CSR…”	
(A.Sp.1)	
The	CD	manager	and	staff	assumed	that	the	non-recovery	CD	that	is	funded	from	the	company’s	
own	budget	is	similar	to	CSR	proposed	by	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	and	Law	
No.	25/2007	on	Investment	(see	table	5.1	pg.	86).		As	highlighted	in	Chapter	5,	CSR	in	Law	No.	
40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	and	its	Implementing	Regulation	No.	47/2012	suggests	the	
source	of	funds	for	CSR	activities	be	derived	from	companies’	operational	cost.		In	this	manner,	
company	A	adopts	the	idea	of	non-cost	recovery	CD	similar	to	CSR	in	the	Law	No.	40/2007	
Limited	Liability	Company,	as	the	cost	of	non-cost	recovery	CD	is	taken	from	companies’	
operational	cost.		The	way	company	A	has	implemented	various	CSR	laws	shows	that	the	
complexity	of	various	CSR	laws	has	been	simplified	by	the	company	by	putting	all	requirements	of	
various	CSR	laws	into	cost	recovery	CD	and	non-cost	recovery	CD.		These	two	categories	are	not	
violating	the	laws	as	the	sources	of	funds	to	cover	those	two	activities	fit	with	CSR	legislation.		
The	cost	recovery	CD	is	relevant	to	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	while	the	non-cost	recovery	
CD	is	related	to	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	and	Law	No.	25/	2007	on	
Investment	suggesting	CSR	should	be	derived	from	a	company’s	operational	cost.	
Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	suggests	that	the	categorization	of	cost	recovery	and	non-cost	
recovery	is	based	on	the	area,	whether	it	is	an	exploration	area	or	exploitation	(production)	area.		
However,	as	mentioned	earlier,	differentiating	mining	operation	areas	in	the	field	is	not	easy	in	
relation	to	a	village’s	territory.		In	one	village	area,	the	company	may	have	exploration	and	
exploitation	areas.	Furthermore,	the	lack	of	monitoring	from	SKKMIGAS	on	one	project	might	
also	lead	the	company	to	categorize	more	projects	as	cost-recovery	in	order	to	reduce	the	CSR	
cost.		In	responding	to	this	issue,	the	supervisor	participant	stated	only	that	the	calculation	of	
cost	recovery	and	non-cost	recovery	is	an	issue	for	their	finance	department:	
“...	It	is	very	complicated	calculation.		I	don’t	really	understand	the	issue.		This	is	a	duty	of	
financial	department.”	(A.Sp.1)			
The	possibility	to	categorize	projects	into	cost-recovery	may	be	used	by	the	company	to	reduce	
the	CSR	cost.		A	project	in	one	village	might	be	categorized	as	cost	recovery	rather	than	non-cost	
recovery	as	this	would	reduce	company	costs	for	CSR.		However,	the	financial	data	about	CSR	
funds	delivered	to	the	village	is	not	made	available	by	companies	and	so	lacks	of	transparency.					
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	The	following	subsections	discuss	how	the	company	perceives	and	implements	CSR	in	the	field.		
Subsection	6.2.1	presents	the	company	perceptions	of	CSR.		Subsection	6.2.2	presents	a	
discussion	of	the	implementation.		Subsection	6.2.3	provides	a	discussion	of	the	outcomes.		
Subsection	6.2.4	presents	the	conclusion	for	case	A.				
6.2.1.	The	Perception	of	Legislation	
The	sustainability	report	of	company	A	promotes	the	idea	of	the	voluntariness	of	the	company	in	
performing	CSR,	in	contrast	to	the	idea	of	mandated	CSR	legislation.		The	interview	with	the	
manager	of	this	company	clearly	supported	this	as	the	company’s	perspective.		Having	an	
overseas	educational	background,	the	manager	is	often	invited	to	give	presentations	in	seminars	
to	represent	the	business	perspective	on	CSR.		In	the	interview	he	stated:			
“I	was	involved	in	one	seminar	conducted	by	one	university	in	2007	discussing	the	
possibility	to	mandate	CSR	in	the	law	(during	the	drafting	process	of	Law	No	40/2007).		I	
was	representing	the	business	perspective	in	this	seminar.		I	am	still	standing	with	my	
opinion	that	a	Company	should	do	CSR	voluntarily	by	embedding	their	social	
responsibility	in	their	activities.		You	see	now	the	government	only	want	to	know	our	
budget	for	CSR	projects...not	to	encourage	business	to	be	more	responsible	in	their	
operations.		That	is	the	falseness	of	this	law.”	(A.M.1)					
His	perception	seems	influenced	by	the	voluntariness	approach	of	CSR,	more	developed	in	
western	countries,	which	is	part	of	his	background.		In	this	manner,	he	is	critical	of	the	idea	of	
mandating	CSR,	which	approach	tends	to	focus	on	the	company’s	budget	allocation	for	CSR	
rather	than	on	encouraging	businesses	to	be	more	socially	responsible	in	their	operations.		This	
focus	on	budget	allocation	has	led	local	stakeholders	to	only	recognize	companies’	CSR	
contributions	in	terms	of	how	much	money	they	distribute	to	CSR	projects.		This,	according	to	the	
interviewee’s	view,	is	limiting	companies’	efforts	to	be	more	socially	responsible	in	their	
operations,	as	companies’	other	efforts	such	as	making	green	technology	for	their	operations	or	
improving	their	labour	rights	are	not	considered	as	CSR	for	local	government.		He	added	to	his	
opinion	by	saying:	
	“…the	laws	actually	suggest	to	us	that	as	long	as	we	always	keep	giving	to	the	
communities	in	CSR	projects,	we	can	call	ourselves	as	socially	responsible	although	
maybe	we	did	bad	things	to	the	environment	and	communities”	(A.M.1)	
The	CD	manager	suggested	that	the	mandated	CSR	laws’	attention	on	the	companies’	budget	
allocation	steers	the	companies	to	allocate	their	budget	to	community	CSR	projects,	rather	than	
allocating	the	budget	to	improve	their	operations	to	be	more	socially	responsible	in	general.		For	
instance,	many	companies	have	issues	with	oil	spillage	to	the	villages,	which	is	caused	by	the	
	 Mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia:	Institutional	and	Stakeholder	Perspective	
 
117	
 
poor	pipelines	located	nearby	village	residences.		Instead	of	replacing	the	pipelines	outside	the	
villages’	residences,	companies	tend	to	distribute	more	CSR	money	to	the	affected	villages	in	the	
form	of	charities	or	donations.		These	practices	thus	appear	only	as	symbolic	actions	of	
companies,	emphasizing	their	CSR	contribution	rather	than	conducting	responsible	business	
practices.		
Given	this	case,	the	company	manager	censures	the	mandated	CSR	laws	because	the	laws	have	a	
negative	impact	on	community	behaviours:									
“…CSR	should	be	defined	on	the	company	behaviour	in	a	local	community,	not	in	the	
form	of	the	donation	or	charity.		The	major	drawback	of	these	laws	is	that	they	create	a	
‘Masyarakat	Manja	(spoiled	community)’.	They	always	ask	companies	to	help	them...	You	
can	see	now	there	are	no	more	gotong	royong	(community	mutual	cooperation)	activities	
in	the	village.		Before	there	was	always	gotong	royong	every	month	in	the	village	to	
renovate	their	mosque,	repair	their	road	etc...”	(A.M.1)	
The	focus	of	CSR	laws	on	company	wealth	distribution	to	communities	has	increased	CSR	projects	
to	the	villages,	such	as	projects	renovating	a	mosque,	head	of	village	offices,	repairing	village	
roads,	or	even	building	electricity	infrastructure.		The	CSR	projects,	instead	of	giving	positive	
impacts	to	the	communities,	created	masyarakat	manja	(spoiled	communities)	as	one	of	the	
drawbacks	of	CSR	legislation.		While	many	village	issues	such	as	the	need	to	repair	a	road	or	
renovate	a	mosque	or	a	school	were	previously	managed	by	the	community	through	gotong	
royong	(community	mutual	cooperation),	now	instead	they	ask	for	and	indeed	expect	company	
sponsorship	to	fund	these	activities.		In	this	way,	in	the	manager’s	view,	the	mandated	CSR	laws	
have	degraded	community	self-initiatives	such	as	the	value	of	gotong	royong,	which	promoted	
community	reciprocity	or	mutual	aid	to	solve	the	village’s	problems	and	which	was	commonly	
practiced	by	communities	before	the	legislation	was	passed.						
The	supervisors	and	staff	at	the	local	site	level	offer	another	perception	related	to	this	
legislation’s	implementation.		The	manager’s	office	is	in	the	Jakarta	headquarters,	while	the	
supervisor	and	staff	in	the	local	Public	Relations	Office	are	the	ones	who	handle	the	
implementation	of	CSR	activities	in	the	villages.		The	supervisor,	whose	academic	background	is	in	
engineering	rather	than	social	science,	admitted	there	were	an	increasing	number	of	proposals	
received	by	their	office	since	the	CSR	laws	had	been	passed.		The	change	of	community	values	to	
that	of	reliance	on	company	sponsorship	has	resulted	in	companies	receiving	a	substantial	
increase	in	proposals	from	local	stakeholders,	as	he	described:	
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	“Every	day	we	receive	at	least	five	proposals	from	the	community	asking	to	fund	some	
projects	in	their	villages.	They	mostly	came	from	certain	people	whom	always	complain	
about	our	existence.	They	can	be	kades	or	other	important	figures	in	the	villages.		We	call	
them	raja	kecil	(little	kings)	because	they	always	want	to	be	served	like	kings…		We	
receive	around	100	proposals	in	a	month	from	these	types	of	people.	Can	you	imagine	
how	we	handle	them?”	(A.Sp.1)	
This	confession	of	an	operating	company	staff	supervisor	in	this	district	reveals	the	increasing	
number	of	local	stakeholder	proposals	demanding	company	funding	for	their	activities.		He	added	
that	most	of	the	proposals	actually	come	from	the	same	type	of	people,	whom	they	referred	to	
as	raja	kecil	(little	kings),	heads	of	villages	and	other	important	stakeholders	in	the	village	such	as	
legislative	members	originating	from	the	village	and	their	preman	(‘hoodlum’,	refers	to	men	that	
have	a	bad	reputation	in	the	community	group)	allies.		These	people	appeared	after	the	country	
adopted	decentralization,	allowing	local	districts	and	villages	to	conduct	direct	elections	to	
appoint	their	own	head	and	manage	their	own	territory.		However,	these	people	have	made	
proposals	based	on	their	self-interest	in	demanding	CSR	projects,	in	behaviour	that	is	similar	to	
the	‘predatory	elements’	discussed	in	Chapter	5.			
The	statement	above	shows	what	type	of	local	stakeholders	tended	to	demand	projects	from	
company	A.		This	situation	was	brought	to	the	attention	of	the	company,	that	the	CSR	would	only	
benefit	this	certain	type	of	stakeholder.		Participants	from	this	company	described	this	little	king	
behaviour,	that	every	year	the	number	of	proposals	from	these	stakeholders	increased	although	
they	had	already	distributed	the	projects	to	them.		Moreover,	prioritizing	these	stakeholders	
would	not	give	any	real	benefit	to	general	communities,	since	the	projects	they	demand	were	
mostly	centred	on	their	own	interests,	such	as	conducting	a	village	ceremony	for	their	own	
campaign	during	political	election	or	giving	cows	to	their	constituents.				
This	condition	led	to	company	concerns	as	to	how	to	distribute	their	CSR	to	marginalized	
stakeholders.			Through	the	assistance	of	one	local	NGO	in	building	intensive	consultation	
between	the	company	employees	and	local	marginalized	stakeholders,	the	company	realized	that	
most	of	their	previous	projects	had	not	benefitted	these	local	marginalized	communities.		The	
local	village	consultation	conducted	by	this	local	NGO	has	resulted	in	the	company	shifting	some	
of	their	resources	towards	marginalized	stakeholders	since	2012.		This	consultation	with	local	
marginalized	groups,	mostly	membered	by	farmers	and	women,	has	brought	them	an	idea	of	
what	is	really	needed	by	the	local	community.		Therefore,	since	then,	the	promotion	of	organic	
farming	projects	to	the	local	community	has	been	the	focus	of	this	company	in	their	CSR	efforts,	
to	improve	local	household	incomes.								
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6.2.2.	The	Implementation		
The	manager	of	the	CD	department	decided	to	change	strategy	in	CSR	implementation	by	
introducing	an	organic	farming	system	to	the	communities.		He	was	assured	that	this	program	
came	from	assessments	conducted	by	their	staff	and	NGOs,	where	they	found	the	villages	had	a	
rice	shortage.		They	shifted	their	approach	from	local	elites	to	the	community	farming	group,	
hoping	to	thereby	give	benefits	to	this	marginalized	group	and	long-term	impact	from	the	
program.					
The	shifting	of	company	CSR	project	distribution	target	from	‘little	kings’	to	farmer	groups	has	
changed	the	stakeholder	identification	of	company	A,	based	on	stronger	consultation.		Certain	
elites,	those	the	company	called	‘preman´	and	sometime	allies	with	kades	(the	head	of	village),	
were	previously	the	main	stakeholders	of	company	A	for	delivering	CSR	projects	due	to	their	
influence	in	securing	the	company’s	operations,	as	one	of	the	company	A	participants	said:	
“We	approached	some	‘preman’	(hoodlums)	in	the	community	as	our	target	to	deliver	
the	Community	Development	Projects,	hoping	that	they	could	help	us	to	secure	our	
pipelines	and	influence	the	local	community	to	not	disturb	our	company.		We	admit	that	
what	we	did	was	only	wasting	money.		All	Community	Development	Projects	delivered	to	
the	preman	failed.		For	instance,	we	provided	them	with	cattle	to	improve	their	living.		
Instead	of	breeding	them	for	their	future	income,	they	sold	them	and	used	the	money	for	
their	own	pleasure”	(A.Sp.1)	
In	this	manner,	the	company	enjoyed	protection	from	these	people,	and	in	return,	these	premans	
also	received	benefits	from	the	company	in	the	form	of	most	of	the	CSR	projects.		This	earlier	
approach	showed	the	company’s	instrumental	approach	to	CSR,	emphasizing	the	economic	
benefit	of	CSR	projects	from	these	stakeholders	to	the	company,	where	the	benefit	is	the	
company	security.		However,	the	earlier	projects	often	failed	in	their	implementation,	since	the	
projects	were	not	well	directed,	as	illustrated	by	the	company	A	participant.		CSR	resource	
distribution	was	only	of	benefit	to	the	powerful	stakeholders	or	the	little	kings,	which	
stakeholders	in	Philips	(2003)	were	referred	to	as	receiving	only	derivative	legitimation,	whilst	the	
local	marginalized	communities	holding	the	normative	legitimation	were	not	included	in	these	
projects.		This	relationship	with	the	little	kings	gave	pressure	to	the		company	in	terms	of	the	
increasing	demands	coming	from	this	group.		
The	managers	and	supervisors	admitted	that	the	budget	for	CSR	increased	before	2010	when	
they	relied	on	these	little	king	stakeholders,	but	the	benefit	to	the	larger	communities	was	
lacking.		However,	stopping	CSR	resource	distribution	to	this	group	may	also	negatively	affect	the	
company’s	security	in	the	area.		For	instance,	when	the	company	tried	not	to	pass	a	preman	
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Figure	6.1.	Picture	of	the	Blocking	Road	Access	to	Company	Facility		
Source	:	Author	
group	CSR	proposal,	which	was	also	supported	by	the	‘little	king’	kades,	the	group	protested	by	
blockading	road	access	to	the	company,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	6.1.		
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Whilst	this	road	blockade	seems	very	easy	to	breach	by	the	company,	as	the	blockade	is	built	only	
from	small	pieces	of	wood,	Figure	6.1	expresses	how	premans	can	display	their	power	to	the	
company.		The	text	written	in	this	wooden	blockade		“stop	(the	name	company	A)”	aimed	to	stop	
the	company	operations.		Breaking	this	wooden	blockade	means	challenging	the	group’s	power,	
potentially	affecting	company	security	within	the	community.		Moreover,	the	support	of	little	
kings	(kades	and	legislative	members	originated	from	the	village)	to	this	action	gave	legitimacy	to	
this	group,	again	threatening	company	legitimacy	to	operate	in	this	area.		The	picture	presented	
in	Figure	6.1	thus	represents	the	issue	of	security	and	legitimacy	faced	by	the	company	in	the	
area.		Instead	of	demolishing	the	block,	the	company	decided	to	advise	their	employees	not	to	
pass	the	road,	although	this	affected	its	operations	for	two	days,	where	the	company	employees	
had	to	find	another	way	to	reach	the	operations.		The	issues	of	local	security	and	local	legitimacy	
in	this	area	were	considered	more	essential	for	the	company	to	continue	its	operations	and	
maintain	its	reputation.									
The	effort	to	be	released	from	this	preman	and	kades	group	pressure	began	in	2012	after	the	
blockade,	through	the	introduction	of	the	organic	farming	program,	with	the	assistance	of	a	
reputable	local	NGO.		These	projects	required	the	company	to	allocate	most	of	their	resources	to	
farmer	groups	in	the	village,	while	the	consultation	with	the	kades	and	his	allied	preman	group	
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was	limited.		The	prominence	of	the	local	farmer	group	in	the	project	results	in	a	change	in	the	
company	stakeholder	network,	which	is	presented	in	Figure	6.2.				
Figure	6.2.	Company	A	and	its	Local	Stakeholders	Relationship		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	6.2	shows	the	company	A	local	stakeholder	network	relationships.		The	solid	line	
represents	good	relationships	between	company	and	stakeholders,	while	the	dashed	line	
represents	inharmonious	relationships.		The	network	distinguishes	the	local	stakeholders	at	
village	level	and	district	level.		At	village	level,	the	organic	farming	project	focused	on	the	
community	farming	group	has	built	company	closeness	with	this	group.		The	local	farmer	group	
had	been	categorized	as	a	marginalized	group	who	lack	power	in	economic	terms	due	to	their	
lack	of	ownership,	and	political	power	because	of	their	lack	of	influence	in	village	decisions.		
However,	the	company	recognized	the	closeness	of	this	group	to	one	religious	leader	in	the	
village	who	had	these	powers.		This	meant	that	supporting	this	group	allowed	the	company	to	
attain	local	legitimacy	from	this	religious	leader	in	the	village,	to	contest	the	power	of	the	kades	
and	his	allies.		On	the	other	hand,	the	shifting	of	company	attention	to	the	farmers	caused	its	
relationship	with	the	kades	and	his	allies	preman	group	to	become	quite	unpleasant.		Although	
the	company	still	allocated	resources	to	them	in	terms	of	security	salary,	the	reduction	of	
company	dependency	on	them	limited	their	power	with	the	company,	and	had	effect	in	a	
decrease	of	CSR	resource	distribution	to	them.		At	the	district	level,	the	inharmonious	
relationship	which	developed	between	the	company	and	local	district	government	and	legislative	
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members	may	stem	from	information	from	this	kades.		The	distance	of	the	village	to	the	district	
and	limited	access	of	other	villagers	to	district	government	officials	prompts	the	reliance	of	
district	government	and	legislative	members	on	information	from	the	kades.		In	particular,	with	
local	legislative	members	originating	from	the	village,	their	interests	in	maintaining	their	
relationships	with	their	constituents	in	the	village	forces	them	to	push	the	company	to	deliver	
projects	to	their	constituents,	which	commonly	include	the	premans	(hoodlums)	group	under	the	
leadership	of	the	kades	(the	head	of	village).		However,	the	dashed	line	indicates	that	the	district	
government	and	legislative	members	might	not	have	as	solid	a	relationship	as	that	between	
company	and	kades,	since	the	company	had	political	connections	at	the	district	level	by	
consideration	of	its	ownership	position	in	relation	to	one	big	national	political	party.									
Two	types	of	important	stakeholders	existing	in	company	stakeholder	networks	are	represented	
in	Figure	6.2:	the	elite	group,	membered	by	the	kades	and	his	allies	preman;	and	the	marginalized	
group	of	community	farmers.		The	local	staff	of	the	company	explained	how	they	treat	both	
groups	in	this	statement:	
“Previously,	meetings	with	the	local	community	were	always	organized	by	the	preman	
group.		The	meetings	were	usually	attended	by	their	members,	and	during	the	meetings	
they	always	trumped	up	some	issues	and	demanded	more	projects.		However,	recently	
the	meetings	with	the	farmer	group	are	very	conducive.		Their	demands	are	very	simple	
and	even	not	needing	a	lot	of	money.		They	even	help	us	in	other	projects.		Honestly,	the	
group	is	now	‘our	bridge’	to	be	in	contact	with	the	village	people”	(A.St.1)	
At	the	previous	meetings,	the	company	reliance	on	preman	group	and	kades	was	utilized	by	this	
group	to	demand	company	projects	by	exposing	important	issues	related	to	company	impacts	on	
the	village,	such	as	road	damage	caused	by	company	cars,	lack	of	local	labour	and	oil	spillage.		
The	previous	consultation	meetings	between	company	and	local	communities	were	organized	by	
this	group.		However,	the	company	local	staff	realized	that	the	meetings	were	only	attended	by	
these	little	king	stakeholder	members.		Therefore,	prior	to	2012,	the	results	of	community	
consultations	were	shaped	only	by	the	interests	of	these	little	king	stakeholders.		The	launching	
of	an	organic	farming	program	in	2012	allowed	the	company	to	have	access	to	the	marginalized	
farmer	group.		This	access	has	been	utilized	by	the	company	to	broaden	their	contacts	in	the	
village	in	order	to	gain	local	acceptance.		The	meetings	with	the	farming	group	have	evidently	
benefitted	the	company	in	understanding	the	village	better.		Indeed,	some	other	programs	of	
Community	Development,	such	as	the	kind	of	renovation	that	communities	need	on	their	school	
and	Puskesmas	(health	service	centre),	finding	appropriate	children	for	their	scholarships,	and	
identifying	the	potential	receivers	of	its	micro	finance	program,	are	the	results	of	company	
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consultations	with	this	group.		The	term	‘our	bridge’	indicates	the	importance	of	this	group	for	
the	company	to	engage	with	local	village	communities.		
In	relation	to	the	power	of	the	little	kings	in	the	village	and	district,	the	company	managed	this	
through	its	national	political	connections.		Ownership	by	a	national	political	figure	in	one	big	
political	party	in	the	country	provided	the	company	with	these	political	connections,	which	
benefit	them	in	managing	their	relationship	with	the	little	kings.		These	political	connections	
allow	the	company	to	gain	assistance	from	district	political	figures	from	the	same	party	as	the	
owner	to	secure	their	legitimation	in	the	area.		In	addition,	the	company	have	still	distributed	
their	resources	to	the	little	kings	in	the	form	of	uang	keamanan	(security	fees)	and	more	limited	
CD	projects.		The	security	fee	is	related	to	the	monthly	fee	or	payment	to	the	powerful	
stakeholders	(mainly	kades)	to	secure	the	company	pipelines	and	other	company	assets	in	the	
village.	The	company	has	also	provided	limited	CD	projects,	such	as	giving	donations	or	
conducting	ceremonies	as	requested	by	the	little	kings	in	the	village	and	district.			
6.2.3.	The	Outcomes	
The	organic	farming	program	has	given	concrete	benefits	to	local	communities,	as	a	local	
community	participant	highlighted	in	one	discussion:	
“…	Now	we	don’t	need	to	buy	rice.		It	is	all	here	in	our	village…”	(FGD.1)	
The	dominant	employment	of	local	villagers	is	working	as	rubber	farmers;	and	this	has	made	the	
village	dependent	on	rice	from	outside,	which	previously	was	very	expensive	due	to	the	distance	
and	lack	of	transportation	to	the	villages.		Planting	rice	fields	is	not	an	option	for	the	farmers	in	
this	area	due	to	the	high	cost	of	rice	farming.		They	prefer	to	focus	on	rubber	plantations	that	
give	them	more	benefits	due	to	the	high	prices	and	easy	cultivation	of	rubber	trees.				
However,	the	importance	of	rice	as	the	main	dish	of	the	local	people	contributed	to	the	
importance	of	this	project	in	terms	of	benefit	to	people	in	the	village,	as	assessed	by	the	
company	and	local	NGO	before	any	projects	were	undertaken.		One	farmer	in	the	FGD	admitted	
that	the	use	of	an	organic	system	in	his	farm	gave	him	benefits	due	to	the	low	cost	of	this	farming	
system	and	the	high	production	yield	of	rice.				
	“…	before	we	had	to	buy	expensive	fertilizers	and	pesticide,	but	the	rice	production	
often	is	not	sufficient	compared	to	the	cost.		We	only	produced	around	2	tons	per	1	
hectare	rice	field.		But	this	organic	system	showed	us	that	we	can	make	our	own	
fertilizers	from	banana	stems	and	other	plants	in	our	environment.		And	we	also	make	
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our	own	pesticide	from	our	cigarette	ashes.		And	the	production	is	beyond	our	
expectation.		We	can	produce	5-10	tons	of	rice	from	1	hectare	rice	field...”	(FGD.2)			
Previously,	the	locals	complained	about	the	expensive	fertilizers	and	pesticides	for	rice	farming,	
the	costs	of	which	are	not	equalled	by	the	rice	production.		The	organic	system	allowed	the	
farmers	to	lower	their	cost	on	rice	farming	by	utilising	available,	low-cost	resources	that	are	
available	in	their	areas	such	as	banana	stems	and	other	plants.		On	the	other	hand,	the	
production	of	this	system	has	increased	to	5-10	tons	per	hectare	of	rice	field,	making	this	type	of	
production	able	to	satisfy	the	village	need	for	rice.	
Furthermore,	these	benefits	have	also	led	to	local	acceptance	of	the	company,	as	noticed	in	some	
community	stories	in	the	FGDs,	where	the	local	appreciation	of	the	company	was	evident:			
“…	We	can	meet	the	staff	directly,	even	they	allow	us	to	call	them	anytime	if	we	need	
something	to	ask.		We	are	very	glad	they	like	to	come	and	eat	in	our	house.		They	are	our	
‘friend’...”	(FGD.1)				
Another	local	community	member	also	appreciates	the	company	manager	and	staff,	by	telling	
this	story:	
“…	two	months	ago,	my	daughter	got	married.		I	wanted	to	invite	Pak	(sir)	A	(the	
manager).		I	knew	he	was	busy	and	I	was	also	shy	to	invite	him	to	this	little	ceremony.		So,	
I	just	told	the	staff	to	invite	him	if	he	was	not	busy.		But	I	was	so	surprised	that	he	came	
to	our	celebration.	Even	he	sang	a	song	and	danced	in	the	celebration…”	(FGD.1)				
These	stories	reflect	only	part	of	communities’	appreciation	of	the	company	managers	and	staff.		
The	availability	of	company	staff	to	meet	and	have	contact	with	local	farmers	group	resulted	in	
local	acceptance,	shown	by	them	referring	to	the	company	staff	as	their	‘friend’.		Furthermore,	
the	company	manager	and	staff	tried	to	maintain	this	‘friend’	relationship	by,	for	example,	
respecting	a	local	farmer’s	invitation,	as	symbolic	that	they	consider	themselves	part	of	the	
community.		
Aside	from	the	appreciation	from	the	local	farmers	group,	the	company	has	also	obtained	a	good	
reputation	from	central	government	through	a	visit	of	the	National	Agricultural	Minister	to	the	
village	to	view	how	the	company	has	developed	organic	farming	in	the	village.		A	CD	manager	
affirmed	that	the	visit	of	minister	is	an	important	recognition	for	the	company:	
“We	are	being	acknowledged	for	what	we’ve	done	in	CSR	through	this	project.		My	
colleagues	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	Industry	congratulate	me	for	this	program.		The	visit	of	the	
Minister	is	such	a	recognition	of	our	efforts.”	(A.M.1)	
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Reputation	is	an	important	matter	in	a	company’s	brand.		Companies	in	Indonesia	often	publicise	
their	CSR	projects	in	the	advertisement	sections	of	newspapers,	where	the	company	might	buy	
such	a	section.		The	visit	of	the	Agricultural	Minister	to	the	village	was	an	equivalent	recognition	
of	the	company’s	contribution	without	requiring	them	to	invite	media	(or	pay)	to	publicise	their	
project.		
In	contrast,	this	recognition	has	not	encouraged	the	district	government	to	give	a	CSR	award	to	
the	company.		Complaints	by	local	district	government	to	the	company	are	expressed	by	stating	
that	the	company	often	rejected	their	proposals:		
“The	company	has	never	respected	us	as	the	local	government.	They	often	reject	our	
advice	to	fund	some	projects….	compared	to	other	companies,	the	company	is	
considered	worse	and	stingy	in	delivering	CSR	projects	in	the	district”	(Go.2)	
Another	local	government	official	added	this	statement:	
“I	know	the	CD	of	this	company	in	organic	farming.		It	is	only	small	contribution	and	they	
try	to	boast	of	this	little	help…”	(Go.3)			
The	intention	of	local	government	to	include	CSR	projects	to	fund	their	development	agendas	is	
thus	evidently	the	main	reason	for	this	complaint.		The	company	often	rejected	to	fund	projects	
of	the	district	government	agenda.		The	reason	for	rejection	may	be	because	those	district	
government	projects	require	a	lot	of	money	to	fund	projects	such	as	building	a	head	of	village	
office,	community	health	centre,	school,	and	repairing	roads.		This	may	impact	on	the	company’s	
reputation	at	district	government	level,	as	is	suggested	in	the	use	of	terms	such	as	‘worse’	and	
‘stingy’.		The	term	‘worse’	can	be	interpreted	as	a	lack	of	resources	distributed	to	support	local	
government	development	agendas;	while	the	term	‘stingy’	is	also	related	to	the	funding	that	they	
would	obtain	if	the	company	had	distributed	the	resources	to	their	project.		Furthermore,	the	
local	government	official	also	mentioned	that	the	organic	farming	project	only	required	a	small	of	
funds	from	the	company.		Indeed,	according	to	this	official,	the	company	tried	to	boast	of	this	
small	amount	of	funding	to	projects	in	order	to	gain	reputation	from	the	local	community.			
6.2.4.	Conclusion	
CSR	in	this	company	is	managed	by	the	CD	department	in	the	Jakarta	office	headed	by	the	
manager,	with	its	implementation	being	assisted	by	two	staff	at	the	public	relations	office	in	the	
site	operating	company.		The	company	argued	that	the	nature	of	CSR	should	derive	from	
company	voluntariness,	not	by	mandated	CSR	legislation.		The	company	assumes	that	the	focus	
of	CSR	legislation	on	the	budget	allocation	to	local	communities	can	cause	masyarakat	manja	
(spoiled	community)	and	views	of	CSR	only	in	terms	of	determining	how	the	projects	are	funded.		
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The	present	research	argues	that	these	perceptions	are	part	of	the	company’s	rhetoric	as	
argument	to	limit	local	stakeholder	interventions,	particularly	those	of	the	‘little	kings’,	on	their	
CSR	efforts.		In	this	way,	while	the	company	complied	with	the	legislation	by	allocating	the	
necessary	budget	for	CSR,	their	claim	that	this	is	a	form	of	voluntary	activity	allowed	them	to	
nuance	their	decision	as	to	whom	the	funding	should	be	allocated	as	being	a	company	decision.			
The	company	built	their	own	local	stakeholder	network	by	linking,	consulting,	engaging		and	
dialogue	with	marginalized	groups,	ignoring	the	local	power	of	little	kings.		Furthermore,	the	
company	also	decided	on	their	own	CSR	projects	in	organic	farming,	involving	less	local	
government	intervention	in	how	to	set	their	CSR	program.		Rather	than	engaging	with	‘little	king’	
stakeholders	such	as	the	kades	and	his	allies	the	preman	and	following	district	government	
advice	on	certain	projects,	the	company	preferred	to	be	more	engaged	with	the	farmer	group	in	
the	village.		This	decision	caused	the	reduction	of	CSR	wealth	distribution	to	the	little	kings	group.		
The	decentralization	system	has	given	this	group	power	to	administer	their	territory.		Therefore,	
a	small	portion	of	CSR	funds	is	still	distributed	to	this	group	in	the	form	of	security	fees.		
However,	reducing	wealth	distribution	to	this	group,	consequently,	may	affect	company	
legitimacy	to	operate	in	the	area.		Instead,	the	company	recognized	the	existence	of	an	informal	
leader	in	the	village	such	as	the	religious	leader,	who	is	close	to	the	farmer	group.		Instead	of	
depending	on	the	local	elites	group,	the	company	contested	the	kades	power	by	approaching	the	
farmer	group	and	a	religious	leader	to	obtain	local	acceptance	and	legitimacy.		Furthermore,	this	
research	also	indicates	that	the	company’s	political	connection	at	the	national	level	might	deliver	
them	the	power	to	counter	the	little	kings’	power	in	the	district	and	still	gain	their	local	
legitimacy.				
The	shifting	of	CSR	resource	distribution	evidently	benefitted	local	communities	in	increasing	
their	rice	production	in	the	village.		In	return,	this	decision	also	evidently	gave	an	advantage	to	
the	company	in	obtaining	local	community	acceptance	and	local	farmer	group	involvement	in	
other	company	CSR	projects.		The	research	also	noted	that	the	company	may	get	benefit	from	
the	small	amount	of	funding	required	to	conduct	CD	projects.		The	frequent	consultation	with	
local	community	members	allowed	them	to	fund	the	basic	needs	of	local	communities	
economically,	without	involving	the	little	kings’	interests.		Indeed,	the	company	strategy	to	
distinguish	the	CD	projects	into	cost	recovery	and	non-cost	recovery	may	also	give	them	an	
opportunity	to	put	their	CD	projects	into	the	cost	recovery	program	category	given	the	lack	of	
clear	distinction	of	these	categorizations	in	the	field.		Apart	from	local	community	acceptance,	
the	company	also	pointed	out	the	importance	of	central	government	support	through	the	visit	of	
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the	Agricultural	Minister	that	legitimated	their	CSR	approach,	as	contrasted	with	the	lack	of	
appreciation	of	the	local	district	government	recognition	through	a	district	CSR	award.		The	
company’s	decision	to	be	more	engaged	with	the	farmer	group	and	to	deliver	their	own	projects	
resulted	in	a	lack	of	contribution	to	district	government	development	agendas	and	involvement	
of	the	little	kings	in	their	CSR	projects.						
6.3.		COMPANY	B	–	THE	FOREIGN	OWNED	COMPANY	(FOC)	
The	company	discussed	in	this	section	is	a	multinational	energy	corporation	with	its	headquarters	
located	in	the	United	States.	It	is	the	world's	largest	independent	pure-play	exploration	and	
production	company.		From	only	three	oil	and	gas	blocks	in	the	beginning	of	their	operations	in	
Indonesia	during	Dutch	colonization,	this	company	expanded	by	acquisitioning	other	companies’	
blocks.		The	companies’	blocks	are	mostly	located	in	Sumatera,	for	example	in	Aceh,	South	
Sumatera,	East	and	Central	Java,	and	Papua.		Its	corridor	block	PSC	in	Musi	Banyuasin	
commenced	in	around	1980,	and	recently	covers	a	contract	area	of	around	900	square	miles.		The	
block	consists	of	five	oil	fields	and	seven	natural	gas	fields.		The	production	of	crude	oil	in	this	
area	is	around	2	MBOEPD6,	while	gas	production	is	the	main	production	of	this	block	with	335	
MMFCD7.		The	natural	gas	is	sold	through	long-term	contracts	to	the	domestic	Java	and	Singapore	
markets,	wherein	the	dominant	gas	production	of	this	company	is	used	to	generate	electricity	in	
Singapore	and	Java.			
This	Foreign	Owned	Oil	and	gas	Company	(FO),	in	its	sustainability	report	published	in	2014	by	its	
headquarters	office	in	the	US,	has	a	vision	to	be	the	exploration	and	production	company	of	
choice	for	all	stakeholders.		The	operating	policies	are	set	rigidly	by	the	company	codes	of	
conduct,	which	are	published	on	its	website,	to	achieve	this	vision,	ruling	how	company	staff	
should	build	relationships	with	the	external	stakeholders.		In	this	respect,	the	company	
acknowledges	the	importance	of	political	stakeholders	to	the	company.		Therefore,	the	company	
in	its	report	decided	to	support	the	political	decisions	in	the	country	as	these	align	with	the	
company	interests.		However,	in	supporting	political	stakeholders,	the	company	also	sets	
prohibitions	such	as	giving	gifts	to	elected	officials,	regulators	and/or	government	employees,	
forbidding	the	giving	or	use	of	company	money	for	political	campaigns,	and/or	giving	
contributions	to	the	political	party.		This	code	of	conduct	has	been	set	by	the	headquarters	and	
implemented	by	all	companies	within	this	international	corporation,	including	the	one	in	the	
																																								 																				
6	Million	Barrels	Oil	Equivalent	per	Day	
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Musi	Banyuasin	district,	although	they	admit	that	this	policy	may	not	be	intended	to	cover	all	
global	countries’	rules.			
In	relation	to	CSR	legislation,	company	B	nominated	only	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas	and	
Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	as	related	to	their	CSR.		The	company	did	not	mention	the	
obligation	of	CSR	in	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company,	and	when	asked	they	stated	
that	the	law	did	not	apply	to	them	because	the	company’s	registration	is	not	in	Indonesia.		They	
claimed	that	as	the	company	is	registered	in	the	US,	so	Law	No.	40/2007	cannot	be	imposed	on	
the	company,	as	the	head	of	the	CSR	unit	stated:			
“I	tell	you,	our	company	is	not	registered	in	this	country	so	with	this	fact	we	don’t	need	
to	follow	this	law	(Law	No.	40/2007)”	(B.Sp.1)	
The	Law	No	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	is	actually	to	rule	all	registered	limited	liability	
companies	in	Indonesia.		However,	participants	acknowledged	that	the	company	has	to	obey	CSR	
obligations	in	Investment	Law	No.	25/2007	and	Law	No	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas.		The	relevance	of	
Law	No	22/2001	to	this	company	is	related	to	their	operation	as	a	production	sharing	contractor	
of	Oil	and	Gas	mining;	while	the	Investment	law	No.	25/2007	is	related	to	their	investment	as	
PMA	(Penanaman	Modal	Asing	–	Foreign	Investment)	in	the	country.			
The	participant’s	argument	to	not	consider	Law	No.	40/2007	as	part	of	company	obligations	may	
be	acceptable	considering	the	company’s	registration	is	outside	Indonesia.		But	the	basis	for	
avoiding	CSR	obligation	in	the	law	while	accepting	the	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	is	unclear,	
as	CSR	in	these	two	laws	are	similar	in	terminology	(see	Figure	5.2).		However,	CSR	in	Law	No.	
25/2007	on	Investment	does	not	have	any	implementing	regulations,	since	Government	
Regulation	No.	47/2012	on	CSR	refers	to	the	CSR	of	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company	(see	Table	5.1).		This	may	be	a	reason	why	the	company	prefers	to	relate	its	activities	to	
the	law	with	weaker	implementation	regulations.		Furthermore,	this	may	also	be	part	of	the	
company’s	strategy	to	limit	the	local	stakeholder	claims	on	this	popular	CSR	Law	No.	40/2007.		In	
the	course	of	the	present	research	it	was	found	that	Law	No	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company	is	a	popular	law	on	CSR	for	local	stakeholders.		The	law	is	often	used	to	refer	to	and	
demand	company	obligation	for	CSR,	as	this	company’s	CSR	specialist	described:	
“…	I	always	meet	many	people	asking	about	our	CSR	and	they	always	talk	about	Law	No.	
40/2007	to	show	our	obligation.		Well,	we	obey	all	legislations,	we	deliver	our	CSR,	
except	this	law	is	not	relevant	to	our	company…”	(B.St.1)		
The	argument	of	this	supervisor	to	not	relate	his	company	CSR	to	the	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	
Liability	Company	may	also	reflect	the	company’s	avoidance	on	the	local	stakeholders	utilisation	
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of	this	popular	Law.		For	external	stakeholders,	CSR	in	Law	No.40/2007	became	popular	amongst	
CSR	laws	since	the	debate	on	the	inclusion	of	CSR	during	the	drafting	process	of	this	law	in	2007	
raised	local	stakeholders’	awareness	of	CSR	issues.		The	argument	that	the	company	is	not	
subject	to	Limited	Liability	Company	Law	No	40/	2007	thus	might	be	utilised	by	the	company	to	
confront	the	rising	local	stakeholder	demands	as	a	result	of	the	exposure	of	this	popular	law.					
The	CSR	affairs	of	this	company	is	managed	by	their	CSR	unit	under	the	external	affairs	
department	in	their	Jakarta	office.	This	department	has	four	other	units,	which	are	the	public	
relations	unit,	field	external	affairs	unit,	government	relations	unit,	and	business	relations	unit.		
The	CSR	unit	aims	to	deliver	CSR	projects	to	local	communities	as	obligated	under	CSR	legislation.		
The	head	of	the	unit	is	at	supervisor	level	below	the	manager	level,	reporting	directly	to	the	
manager	of	the	external	affairs	department.		There	are	nine	CSR	specialists	working	in	this	CSR	
unit	to	assist	all	CSR	projects	in	all	operating	companies	of	the	parent	company	in	Indonesia.		The	
unit	has	the	main	duty	to	plan,	assist	in	the	implementation	of	and	monitor	all	CSR	projects	in	all	
companies’	geographic	areas.		Two	staff	in	the	PR	office	in	the	district	of	the	operating	company	
have	responsibility	to	implement	CSR	projects,	since	the	funds	are	taken	from	the	company’s	
operational	budget.		All	staff	in	the	CSR	Unit	in	Jakarta	are	Indonesian,	originating	mostly	from	
Java;	while	nearly	all	the	staff	at	the	operating	company	site	come	from	the	South	Sumatera	
province.		In	contrast	to	other	departments	within	the	company	that	employ	expatriate	workers,	
the	external	affairs	department	and	CSR	unit	hire	only	Indonesian	staff.		Four	participants	from	
this	company	were	interviewed	for	the	present	research:	the	head	of	the	CSR	unit	and	one	CSR	
specialist	from	the	Jakarta	head	office;	and	two	staff	from	the	Musi	Banyuasin	public	relations	
office.										
The	following	subsections	describe	company	B’s	perceptions	of	CSR,	its	implementation	and	the	
outcomes.		Subsection	6.3.1	discusses	the	company’s	perceptions	of	CSR.		Subsection	6.3.2	
presents	a	discussion	of	its	implementation.		Subsection	6.3.3	presents	the	outcomes	of	CSR.		
Subsection	6.3.4	presents	a	conclusion	to	Section	6.3.		
6.3.1.	The	Perception	of	Legislation	
The	company’s	sustainability	report	broadly	supported	the	Indonesian	government	policies	on	
local	development.		This	is	in	line	with	the	company’s	policy	in	allocating	their	budget	for	local	
communities.		The	head	of	the	CSR	unit	from	this	company	declared	that	the	legislation	only	
serves	to	clarify	their	CSR	activities,	and	that	the	company	has	an	existing	commitment	to	budget	
a	substantial	amount	of	funds	for	CSR:	
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“The	laws	are	only	to	clarify	what	we	have	done	is	lawful.	With	or	without	the	laws,	our	
company	has	always	allocated	a	large	amount	of	money	for	CSR	programs	which	we	get	
from	our	headquarter	office.		This	is	already	our	company	policy,	to	give	to	local	
communities.		The	amount	of	funds	may	be	beyond	what	the	laws	require.		So,	what	we	
have	done,	I	think,	is	‘beyond	the	compliance’	of	the	law…	even	SKKMIGAS	always	
advised	me	to	use	cost	recovery	for	our	CSR.		But	our	money	from	headquarters	is	more	
than	enough	to	fund	our	projects…”	(B.Sp.1)	
There	are	three	impressions	one	can	gain	from	this	statement.		Firstly,	the	company	support	to	
the	CSR	laws’	mandate	is	in	accordance	with	the	company	policy	on	the	annual	budget	allocation	
to	local	communities.		Secondly,	this	view	hence	influences	his	next	statement	on	the	amount	of	
company	budget	allocation	for	CSR,	in	which	he	claimed	it	is	‘beyond	the	compliance’	required	by	
law.			In	distinction	to	McWilliams	and	Sigel’s	(2001)	reference	to	‘beyond	the	compliance’	as	a	
form	of	ethical	driver	for	company	CSR,	the	meaning	of	beyond	compliance	in	this	statement	is	
related	to	the	amount	of	budget	that	company	provides	for	CSR:	the	exact	amount	or	percentage	
of	company	budget	allocation	is	not	as	ruled	in	the	legislation	related	to	this	company.		However,	
most	practitioners	refer	to	Law	No.	19/2003	on	State	Owned	Enterprises	as	a	minimum	standard	
of	CSR	budget	allocation,	that	is,	2	percent	of	company	profit.		The	claim	of	‘beyond	the	
compliance’	appears	to	justify	the	comparison	of	the	required	amount	with	the	amount	allocated	
by	the	company	for	CSR,	the	latter	which	is	significantly	more	than	2	percent	of	company	profits.		
Thirdly,	underlining	his	statement	on	‘we	get	from	out	of	the	headquarter	office’	is	a	reflection	on	
the	ownership	of	this	company.		Being	foreign	owned	gives	different	pressures	to	the	company.		
The	issue	of	‘resource	nationalism’,	in	which	the	locals	expect	to	manage	their	own	natural	
resources,	was	further	aroused	during	the	political	campaigns	for	the	Presidential	election	in	
2014,	which	occurred	during	the	period	when	this	research	was	conducted.		The	presidential	
candidates’	campaigns	at	this	time	focused	on	natural	resources	management	as	not	being	able	
to	benefit	the	locals’	population.		This	campaign	influenced	the	locals	to	feel	that	the	foreign	
owned	companies	would	not	give	any	benefit	to	the	nation	and	local	communities.		In	order	to	
face	this	issue,	the	head	of	the	CSR	unit	wanted	to	give	the	strong	impression	that	the	company	
has	given	a	lot	of	contributions	to	the	local	community	through	the	allocation	and	distribution	of	
enormous	funding	for	CSR	to	local	communities.			
The	company’s	CSR	project	alignment	with	the	government	development	plan	urged	the	
company	to	direct	their	CSR	funds	to	support	the	government	development	agenda,	as	strongly	
stated	by	the	head	of	the	CSR	unit:		
“Our	CSR	is	to	support	the	district	government	development	plans...”	(B.St.3)	
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As	mentioned	earlier,	the	support	to	government	policy	is	articulated	in	the	company’s	
sustainability	report.		Furthermore,	the	reliance	of	the	company	on	the	district	government	
development	plan	is	in	keeping	with	the	intention	of	government	legislation.		Based	on	Law	No	
24/	2004	on	the	National	Development	Planning	System	(Government	of	Republic	of	Indonesia	
2004),	the	company	plan	should	involve	local	community	participation	through	musbangdes	
(Musyawarah	Pembangunan	Desa	–	Village	Development	Discussion),	musbangda	(Musyawarah	
Pembangunan	Daerah	–	Regional	Development	Discussion	at	district	and	provincial	level),	and	
musbangnas	(Musyawarah	Pembangunan	Nasional	–	National	Development	Planning).		The	steps	
in	this	discussion	planning	system	are	to	ensure	the	local	villagers’	aspirations	are	to	be	listened	
to	by	the	district,	provincial	and	national	governments.		This	planning	system	requires	companies	
to	adopt	the	district	government	development	plan	in	a	RPJMD	(Rencana	Pembangunan	Jangka	
Menengah	Daerah		–	Middle	Term	District	Development	Planning)	document,	assuming	the	
document	is	already	representing	the	local	community’s	needs.					
In	practice,	Gibson	and	Woolcock	(2008)	found	non-transformative	cases	in	the	making	of	the	
development	plan,	as	most	musbangdes	conducted	in	the	village	don’t	involve	the	more	
marginalized	and	powerless	groups	such	as	women,	farmer	groups	and	poor	people	in	the	
discussions.		They	suggested	the	development	system	planning	should	transform	power	relations	
in	the	village	to	be	successful	in	involving	marginalized	groups	in	the	discussion.		The	present	
researcher	found	that	most	of	the	musbangdes	were	controlled	by	the	kades	(the	head	of	village)	
and	his	preman	(hoodlum)	cronies.		In	the	interview	with	the	kades	(the	head	of	village)	he	
exhibited	strong	notions	of	his	influence	to	control	the	meeting	consultations,	as	he	illustrated	
with	this	statement	about	those	attending	the	meetings:	
“We	are	born	and	grow	in	this	village.		I	know	very	well	the	condition	of	people	in	this	
village.		So,	for	the	easiness	of	discussion	I	just	invited	some	community	leaders	in	the	
village.		I	am	sure	all	people	in	this	village	will	agree	with	what	those	figures	advise	for	
this	village	development”	(D.2)	
This	statement	reflects	the	dominant	power	of	the	kades	and	his	allies	in	determining	the	village	
development	discussions.		It	begins	with	only	inviting	certain	stakeholders	in	the	village,	then	
assuming	these	stakeholders	attending	the	discussion	represent	all	villagers.	The	result	of	
discussion	may	in	fact	only	reflect	and	perpetuate	the	elite	stakeholders’	interests,	rather	than	
those	of	the	marginalized	groups’	interests.		In	this	manner,	the	company’s	adoption	of	
government	development	planning	may	only	benefit	the	elite	stakeholders	in	the	village.			
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The	support	of	company	B	for	the	local	government	development	agenda	is	important	to	gain	
local	legitimacy	in	this	area.		The	local	development	agenda	represents	the	promises	of	the	
bupati	(head	of	district	government)	during	his	campaign	and	the	local	communities’	needs	as	
voiced	during	village	and	district	development	consultations.		Supporting	this	development	plan	
means	supporting	the	political	power	of	‘little	kings’,	which	is	essential	for	the	company	to	gain	
local	political	legitimacy.		Being	foreign	owned	positions	this	company	without	having	much	
political	influence	in	national	and	local	levels.		The	available	means	to	influence	political	
legitimacy	is	by	utilising	their	economic	wealth	or	resources.		Therefore,	allocating	their	CSR	
resources	mainly	to	support	the	local	government	development	plan	is	a	way	for	the	company	to	
gain	this	legitimacy.			
6.3.2.	The	Implementation	
The	distribution	of	company	CSR	resources	primarily	focused	on	supporting	the	district	
government	development	agendas.		This	support	to	the	local	district	government’s	development	
agendas	can	be	seen	in	its	CSR	activities,	which	prioritise	public	infrastructure	projects	in	
accordance	with	the	government	development	plan,	such	as	repairing	roads	and	bridges,	
providing	water	sanitation,	and	renovating	schools	and	Puskesmas	(Community	Health	Service	
Centres).		Based	on	the	present	research	observations,	the	company	had	contributed	a	lot	of	
projects	to	the	villages	nearby	the	company	operations	in	the	form	of	building	the	office	of	the	
kades,	renovating	the	community’s	market,	building	a	library	and	even	building	a	water	
treatment	facility	for	the	community.		These	were	obviously	in	evidence	at	the	research	sites	as	
those	projects	were	marked	with	the	company	brand	to	let	the	community	know	that	these	items	
of	infrastructure	were	the	company’s	contribution.		These	infrastructures	projects	could	be	quite	
expensive	and	this	encouraged	other	companies	to	allocate	more	budget	for	CSR.		However,	the	
projects	also	allowed	the	company	to	market	their	brand	through	the	projects,	due	to	the	long-
term	use	of	the	infrastructure	built	and	the	company	brand	that	attached	to	these	infrastructure	
items,	compared	to	intangible	projects	such	as	organic	farming	or	giving	soft	loans	to	
communities.		
The	commitment	to	support	district	government	agendas	by	collaborating	with	district	
government	was	confirmed	by	the	head	of	CSR	unit:	
“We	have	collaborated	with	the	local	government	in	delivering	our	CSR	projects.		We	
realize	that	the	development	agendas	of	local	government	are	results	of	a	series	of	public	
consultations	with	the	communities.		Rather	than	conducting	our	own	local	community	
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consultation	that	might	not	be	efficient,	we	chose	to	work	with	local	government.”		
(B.Sp.1)	
This	statement	implies	the	company’s	reliance	on	the	district	government,	particularly	in	
delivering	CSR	projects.		As	regulated	in	Law	No.	24/2004	on	National	Development	Planning	
System,	the	government	development	plan	has	been	through	discussion	and	consultation	in	the	
villages.		However,	the	next	statement	of	this	participant	mentioning	‘conducting	our	own	
community	consultation	might	not	be	efficient’	reflects	company	awareness	of	the	various	
interests	from	various	stakeholders	in	the	village.		Relying	on	district	government	development	
agendas	allowed	the	company	to	save	time	and	effort	in	managing	these	various	stakeholders,	
and	enables	the	company	to	avoid	the	complexity	of	stakeholders’	demands	in	the	discussions.		
However,	this	led	the	company	to	focus	only	on	the	interests	of	the	little	kings’	group,	while	the	
aspirations	from	marginalized	groups	might	be	ignored.	
Building	relationships	with	the	kades	and	the	local	district	government	is	necessary	for	company	
B	to	implement	this	motive.		Figure	6.3	below	shows	the	company	B	local	stakeholder	network.		
As	before,	the	solid	line	represents	a	good	relationship,	while	the	dashed	line	represents	an	
inharmonious	relationship.		The	solid	line	between	company,	the	kades,	and	local	district	
government	and	legislative	members	reveals	the	reliance	of	company	B	on	these	stakeholders	in	
planning	its	CSR	agenda.		The	frequent	discussion	with	district	government	officers	and	legislative	
members	in	designing	CSR	projects	and	the	involvement	of	kades	in	implementing	the	projects	in	
the	village	makes	solid	this	relationship	between	the	company	and	these	stakeholders.		In	
contrast,	the	research	also	recognizes	the	inharmonious	relationship	between	the	company	and	
local	marginalized	groups	such	as	the	poor,	women	and	other	people	in	the	village	who	do	not	
have	links	with	the	kades’	power.				
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Figure	6.3.	Company	B	and	Its	Local	Stakeholders	Relationships	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	focus	of	company	staff	on	doing	consultations	with	little	kings	and	resulting	lack	of	
involvement	from	marginalized	groups	has	affected	how	a	local	marginalized	group	member	
expressed	her	feeling	in	a	FGD	about	the	company	staff:	
“The	company	is	only	close	to	those	‘kings’	group.		They	never	want	to	talk	to	us.		And	
they	are	very	sombong	(cocky).	Every	time	they	come	to	our	village,	they	drive	their	car	
directly	to	the	kades	house,	without	opening	the	window	to	say	‘permisi’	(excuse	me)…”	
(FGD.2)						
This	statement	reflects	how	the	company’s	reliance	on	‘little	kings’	stakeholders	impacts	the	
perception	of	local	marginalized	groups	toward	the	company.		The	decision	of	the	company	to	
support	the	local	government	development	agenda	urged	them	to	be	close	with	the	elite	
stakeholders.		In	this	manner,	the	kades	and	his	group	are	the	authorised	village	stakeholders	to	
implement	the	district	government’s	development	plan	in	his	village.		The	consultation	relied	on	
kades’	information	for	projects,	such	as	the	location	of	the	project,	the	process,	and	mechanism	
to	implement	the	project	in	the	village.		Therefore,	the	consultation	with	other	stakeholders	such	
as	the	marginalized	groups	is	very	limited.		This	kind	of	behaviour	is	deemed	inappropriate	by	a	
marginalized	group	member	by	stating	this	behaviour	is	‘sombong	(cocky)’.		This	community	
participant	also	gave	an	example	of	company	behaviour	by	illustrating	how	the	company	staff	
pass	through	their	residential	area	without	saying	‘permisi’	(‘excuse	me’),	which	in	the	village	
culture	is	inappropriate	behaviour.			
As	explained	previously,	the	government	development	plan	may	only	reflect	local	elite	
stakeholder	interests	due	to	this	absence	of	local	marginalized	groups	in	its	development;	hence,	
Foreign	Owned	
Oil	and	Gas	
Company	
Local	
Marginalized	
Groups	
Kades	and	
preman	allies	 Local	District	
Government	
Officials	and	
Legislative	
Members	
Village	level	 District	level	
	 Mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia:	Institutional	and	Stakeholder	Perspective	
 
135	
 
company	B	CSR	projects	may	also	only	reflect	local	elite	stakeholders’	interests.		The	village	elite	
stakeholders	such	as	sekdes	(sekretaris	desa	-	village	secretary),	kadus	(kepala	dusun	-	the	sub	
village	heads)	and	kaur	(kepala	urusan	-	head	of	affairs	in	village	office)	are	the	formal	positions	
in	the	village	appointed	by	the	kades.		This	stakeholder	group	has	authorization	to	conduct	
musbangdes	in	the	village.		Rather	than	inviting	marginalized	groups	in	the	village,	the	discussion	
is	usually	attended	by	the	kades	and	their	allies.		The	results	of	this	elite	group	discussion	are	
then	proposed	to	district	government	officials	and	legislative	members,	who	assume	the	results	
represent	the	villagers’	aspirations.		The	discussion	results	are	selected	by	district	government	
and	local	legislative	to	be	implemented	in	the	annual	district	government	development	budget.			
The	projects	can	benefit	all	communities	in	the	village	because	all	communities	can	enjoy	
infrastructure	built	by	companies.		However,	in	terms	of	wealth	distribution,	one	participant	from	
a	marginalized	group	gave	an	example	of	how	the	projects	are	conducted	by	this	‘little	kings’	
group:	
“I	know	the	company	has	a	lot	of	projects	in	this	village,	but	the	projects	are	only	for	the	
head	of	the	village	and	his	‘geng´	(allies)	benefits.		They	renovated	the	head	of	village	
office,	and	I	saw	the	head	of	village	received	a	lot	of	building	materials	to	use	to	renovate	
his	house.		The	rubber	seeds	for	the	farmers	in	this	village	were	distributed	only	to	their	
allies	through	the	cooperative	under	the	head	of	village…	(FGD.2)	
This	statement	illustrates	the	perception	of	‘little	kings’	being	self-interested	on	the	conduct	of	
CSR	projects	of	company	B.		The	participant	from	the	community	accepts	that	the	company	CSR	
benefits	them	in	ways	such	as	the	renovation	of	the	kades	office	to	improve	community	services,	
and	the	distribution	of	rubber	seeds	to	replant	the	community’s	plantation.		However,	the	lack	of	
consultation	with	other	stakeholders	and	lack	of	transparency	from	the	company	on	CSR	projects	
have	led	the	communities	to	perceive	that	the	projects	were	also	benefitting	the	kades’	self-
interests.		The	use	of	materials	from	CSR	projects	to	renovate	the	kades’	house	and	the	
distribution	of	rubber	seeds	being	limited	via	the	kades’	allies	are	examples	of	local	community	
perceptions	of	the	lack	of	participation	and	transparency	in	the	company’s	CSR	projects,	
particularly	on	the	part	of	those	who	are	not	linked	to	the	little	kings’	power.			
The	company	might	not,	however,	be	concerned	about	this	distribution	issue.		The	company	
emphasis	on	their	budget	allocation	for	CSR	and	supporting	government	agendas	has	evidently	
caused	the	company	to	not	apprehend	the	dynamics	of	the	village	situation,	with	the	effect	that	
their	CSR	distribution	mostly	goes	to	local	elite	stakeholders.		Indeed,	company	might	enjoy	this	
type	of	stakeholder	network	that	can	thus	provide	them	protection.		Kades	is	presumed	as	
holding	the	major	constituency	support	in	the	village	since	he	won	the	direct	election.		Thus,	
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distributing	most	CSR	projects	to	the	kades	and	his	allies,	and	on	the	other	hand	abandoning	local	
marginalized	groups,	might	be	a	function	of	foreign	ownership	and	the	thinking	that	this	would	
assist	the	company	to	attain	local	legitimacy	from	the	major	players	in	the	village	constituency.			
6.3.3.	The	Outcomes		
The	company	received	a	CSR	award	from	the	bupati	(the	head	of	district)	for	supporting	local	
government	development	agendas.		The	assessment	from	the	CSR	forum	gave	the	company	an	
excellent	rating	in	delivering	its	CSR	projects;	however,	how	this	performance	was	measured	is	
not	clear.		In	relation	to	the	instrument	assessing	the	company’s	CSR	performance	in	the	district,	
one	participant	from	the	government	officials	involved	in	the	CSR	forum	only	gave	some	hints,	
such	as	the	amount	of	money	that	the	company	distributes	to	the	local	communities	and	the	
adoption	of	government	agendas	in	company	CSR	projects.		Furthermore,	the	administrator	for	
the	CSR	forum	gave	some	examples	of	company	B	projects	to	clarify	why	the	local	district	
government	gave	them	the	CSR	award:	
“I	think	the	company	deserved	the	award.		You	see	the	school	on	the	side	of	the	road	to	
the	village,	it	was	renovated	by	the	company.		The	water	sanitation	for	supplying	clean	
water	around	the	area	was	also	donated	by	this	company”	(Go.2)	
The	CSR	program	to	renovate	the	elementary	school	building	is	part	of	the	district	government	
development	agenda.		The	company	B	supported	this	program	with	their	commitment	to	build	
some	schools	near	their	company	operations.		This	kind	of	support	for	the	government	
development	plan	attracted	bupati	to	come	and	launch	the	school	at	its	inauguration	(see	Figure	
6.4).	
Figure	6.4	below	shows	the	ceremony	for	the	launch	of	the	school	built	by	company	B,	with	the	
bupati	(the	head	of	district)	and	his	wife	pictured	accompanied	by	the	operational	manager	from	
company	B	(not	pictured	here).		The	picture	was	published	by	the	district	government	in	a	
publication	as	a	form	of	appreciation	for	the	company’s	support.		The	picture	reveals	the	
importance	of	the	mutual	relationship	between	company	and	district	government.		The	project	
building	the	elementary	school	is	a	way	for	the	company	to	demonstrate	their	commitment	to	
supporting	the	district	government.		In	return,	the	coming	of	the	bupati	representing	district	
government	gave	the	impression	of	local	government	support	to	the	company	to	remain	
operating	in	the	area.		This	legitimacy	is	essential	for	the	company	as	a	foreign	owned	company,	
to	continue	its	PSC	(Production	Sharing	Contract)	in	the	area.		The	PSC	is	given	by	the	central	
government	though	SKKMIGAS	for	a	period	of	time;	however,	the	local	district	government	
recommendation	is	essential	for	the	company	to	extend	its	PSC	contract.						
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The	project	benefitted	the	local	community	in	the	village,	as	previously	children	had	to	go	to	
other	villages	for	school.		However,	the	lack	of	consultation	with	local	parents	in	the	village	on	
the	school’s	location	made	the	local	people	confused	about	the	decision	to	build	the	school	far	
from	their	residences.		The	children	have	to	walk	a	long	way	to	the	school	(around	4-5	KMs),	
which	made	the	parents	afraid	about	the	safety	of	their	children.		The	FGD	discussion	with	local	
community	groups	reveals	that	the	building	of	this	SD	(Sekolah	Dasar	–	elementary	school)	was	
influenced	by	the	kades,	who	directed	the	location	of	SD	to	be	on	his	own	land:	
“The	school	is	very	far	from	our	settlement…	Well,	they	built	the	school	at	kades	(the	
head	of	village)	land	so	he	could	get	compensation	from	the	project”	(FGD.2).		
This	is	an	illustration	of	how	the	local	community	perception	on	the	elite	stakeholder	interests	
shape	the	way	CSR	projects	are	delivered	within	a	local	community.		The	lack	of	community	
consultations	have	resulted	in	local	stakeholders	perceved	that	kades	has	directed	the	company	
project	as	to	the	location	of	the	elementary	school	building.		Stakeholder	power	thus	influenced	
the	company	to	conduct	the	project	in	a	way	that	fitted	the	stakeholder’s	self-interest.		One	may	
argue	that	this	type	of	company	CSR	projects	gives	benefit	to	the	local	communities.		However,	
with	a	lack	of	company	and	local	community	consultation	in	the	implementation	of	such	CSR	
projects,	the	company	can	only	rely	on	‘little	kings’	power.		As	a	result,	this	reliance	in	this	case	
allowed	the	little	kings	to	satisfy	their	own	vested	interests	in	their	proposals	for	company	CSR	
Figure	6.4.	Picture	of	ceremony	of	the	Launching	of	New	School	Building	by	Bupati	(District	
Government	Publication)	
Source	:	Musi	Banyuasin	District	Government	Publication	
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project	implementation.		The	way	a	company	implements	CSR	projects	might,	however,	assist	
them	to	obtain	local	legitimacy	from	little	kings	stakeholders	in	the	village	and	at	district	level.		
Nevertheless,	the	lack	of	marginalized	group	involvement	in	CSR	projects	and	dominance	of	the	
little	kings’	self-interest	implies	the	company	might	have	difficulty	in	achieving	the	goal	of	CSR	
legislation,	which	is	to	improve	local	life.			
6.3.4.	Conclusion	
CSR	activities	by	this	company	are	managed	by	the	CSR	unit	in	Jakarta	under	the	external	affairs	
department,	while	the	public	relations	office	staff	in	the	operating	company	in	the	district	assist	
in	the	project’s	implementation.		Due	to	its	company	registration	being	outside	Indonesia,	the	
company	view	it	as	necessary	to	not	align	themselves	with	the	popular	CSR	Law	No.	40/2007	on	
Limited	Liability	Company,	preferring	to	focus	on	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No.	22/2001	and	Investment	
Law	No.	25/2007.		This	may	be	a	strategy	for	the	company	to	relate	only	to	the	laws	with	weaker	
implementation	regulations	and	limit	various	stakeholder	claims	by	utilising	this	popular	law.		
However,	the	company	justified	that	they	have	provided	an	enormous	budget	for	local	
communities	which	aligns	with	the	mandate	of	CSR	legislation.			
Rather	than	conducting	their	own	consultation,	the	company	preferred	to	rely	on	the	district	
government	development	plan	for	their	CSR	agenda.		This	decision	directed	the	company	to	build	
a	strong	relationship	with	local	elite	stakeholders,	or	little	kings,	at	village	and	district	levels.		The	
relationship	with	little	kings	assists	the	company	to	thereby	gain	local	legitimacy,	since	the	
company	does	not	have	political	connections	to	assist	them	in	dealing	with	local	power	relations.		
This	was	important	for	this	company	at	this	particular	time,	as	it	faced	more	pressure	from	locals	
due	to	the	‘resource	nationalism’	issue	that	spread	during	the	political	campaigns	for	the	
Presidential	election	during	which	the	research	conducted.			
However,	the	reliance	of	companies	on	these	stakeholders	has	meant	that	they	company	has	
ignored	the	existence	of	local	marginalized	groups	in	the	village.		The	research	found	that	the	
discussion	of	government	development	agendas	seldom	involved	marginalized	groups	such	as	
poor	people,	women	and	those	who	are	not	linked	to	kades	power.		Therefore	the	government	
plan	actually	only	reflected	the	kades’	interests	as	little	kings	in	the	village.		Furthermore,	this	
network	relationship	with	little	kings	influences	the	distribution	of	company	CSR.		The	
phenomenon	of	little	kings	in	villages	and	district	cannot	be	separated	from	the	villagers	
perceptions	on	the	little	kings’	self-interest.		The	use	of	CSR	resource	to	benefit	little	kings	
personally,	such	as	the	perceived	of	the	use	of	school	building	materials	for	one	kades’	house	and	
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to	maintain	power	by	distributing	the	rubber	seeds	to	his	group	of	allies,	allegedly	occurring	in	
the	company’s	CSR	project	distribution,	might	be	examples	of	this	perceived	self-interest.		Even	if	
these	incidents	did	not	in	fact	happen,	this	shows	how	this	company’s	CSR	efforts	are	perceived	
by	local	communities	where	the	company’s	CSR	projects	were	lacking	their	participation	and	
transparency	for	local	communities.		In	this	manner,	achieving	the	CSR	mandate’s	goal	of	
improving	local	communities’	life	seems	unattainable,	as	long	as	the	company’s	CSR	projects	are	
shaped	by	such	little	kings	interests	and	their	processes	hidden	from	the	wider	groups	of	
stakeholders.							
6.4.		COMPANY	C	–	THE	STATE	OWNED	COMPANY	(SOC)	
This	state	owned	Oil	and	Gas	Company	(SOC)	is	controlled	fully	under	the	central	government	
through	the	Minister	of	State	Owned	Companies.			It	was	created	by	the	merger	of	two	state	Oil	
and	Gas	companies.		The	firm	is	currently	the	second-largest	crude	oil	producer	in	Indonesia.		This	
company	is	responsible	to	report	to	the	central	government	in	terms	of	their	operation	and	
activities.		The	proposal	to	open	the	company	publicly	on	the	stock	market	has	been	unsuccessful	
in	gaining	support	from	Parliament,	with	the	premise	that	the	company	has	a	strategic	role	in	
maintaining	Indonesia’s	energy	security.		This	company	has	previously	been	in	receipt	of	a	
privileged	monopoly	of	oil	and	gas	resources	during	the	centralized	Soeharto	era.		As	the	result	of	
Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	this	monopoly	in	the	upstream	sector	has	been	removed,	so	
that	the	company	has	a	similar	position	to	that	of	other	private	companies,	needing	to	obtain	a	
Production	Sharing	Contract	(PSC)	for	one	mining	area	from	the	government	through	SKKMIGAS.		
This	circumstance	has	urged	this	company	to	be	more	efficient	in	exploration	and	exploitation	of	
oil	and	gas	resources.						
In	CSR,	according	to	the	company	sustainability	report	in	2013,	the	company	has	a	vision	to	be	a	
company	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	sector	which	preserves	the	environment	and	provides	added	value	to	
surrounding	stakeholders.		The	mission	of	the	company’s	CSR	as	stated	in	this	report	is	to	
implement	community	development	and	environmental	preservation,	as	well	as	create	
harmonious	relationships,	and	a	social	and	conducive	business	climate	to	support	the	company’s	
operations.			
As	a	State	Owned	Oil	and	Gas	Company,	the	company	recognises	all	CSR	laws	as	applying	to	
them,	which	are:	(i)	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas;	(ii)	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment;	(iii)	Law	
No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company;	and	specifically,		(iv)	Law	No.	19/2003	on	State	Owned	
Companies.		The	social	responsibility	obligation	stated	in	these	laws	consequently	posits	the	
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company	to	have	two	forms	of	CSR	(see	Table	5.1).		The	first	form	is	Corporate	Social	
Responsibility	and	Community	Development	activities,	where	the	fund	is	administered	by	the	
Public	Relations	Department	in	the	operating	company	in	the	district.		The	CSR	activities	in	this	
department	are	categorized	as	a	form	of	compliance	to	the	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company,	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment,	and	Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	where	all	these	
laws	mandate	the	company	to	allocate	its	operational	cost	for	conducting	CSR	and	CD,	as	one	
staff	of	Public	Relations	Department	stated:	
“…	our	department	manages	the	fund	from	the	company’s	operational	cost	for	local	
communities,	including	Community	Development	as	mandated	by	Oil	and	Gas	Law,	and	
Corporate	Social	Responsibility	following	the	Law	on	Limited	Liability	Company”	(C.St.1)	
Secondly,	Partnership	Program	and	Environmental	Building	(PPEB)	is	organized	by	a	unit	under	
the	board	of	directors	of	the	company,	and	the	funds	for	this	unit	are	taken	from	two	percent	of	
company	profits,	as	explained	by	the	PPEB	unit	manager:			
“…	As	you	know	we	have	to	allocate	our	profit	for	PPEB.		Our	office	has	been	appointed	
to	manage	these	activities”	(C.M.1)	
The	unit	is	reports	directly	to	the	company’s	board	of	directors.		The	company	participants	
explained	that	the	funding	for	PKBL	is	derived	from	company	profit	allocation,	so	it	is	no	longer	
part	of	company	operational	budget:	
“Well,	we	work	for	the	company,	but	in	terms	of	the	funding,	it	is	from	the	allocation	of	
company	profit.		This	means	they	have	already	donated	the	fund.		So,	it	is	actually	no	
longer	company	business	how	the	fund	is	distributed.		But	we	report	all	of	our	activities	
directly	to	the	company’s	directors.”	(C.St.4)	
This	statement	underlines	the	separation	of	PKBL	activities	from	the	company	operations.		Since	
the	PKBL	is	funded	by	the	company	allocation	profits,	this	staff	presumed	that	his	office	is	
separated	from	the	company	operational	activities.		This	is	in	line	with	the	SOC	Ministerial	Decree	
No.	05/MBU/2007	on	PPEB,	which	states	that	the	report	of	PPEB	activities	should	be	made	to	the	
Ministry	of	State	Owned	Companies	by	the	board	of	directors.		Therefore,	unlike	the	CSR	
activities,	which	are	fully	under	the	control	of	the	PR	department	in	the	operating	company,	PPEB	
is	controlled	by	this	separate	unit.		The	unit	is	located	in	Palembang,	the	capital	city	of	the	South	
Sumatera	province,	where	this	unit	manages	PPEB	from	all	operating	companies	under	the	
parent	company	in	the	province.		The	redistribution	of	this	funding	to	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	
is	managed	by	four	staff	under	the	Public	Relations	Department,	who	select	the	recipients	of	soft	
loans	and	monitor	these	loans.			
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PPEB	projects	have	a	high	profile	in	the	community	in	the	form	of	the	company’s	micro	finance	
projects	to	small	and	medium	businesses	and	cooperatives	in	the	community.		These	projects	
commenced	during	the	President	Soeharto	era,	in	1983,	which	were	called	Pembinaan	Usaha	
Kecil	(PUK	–	Small	Business	Development)	and	Pembinaan	Pengusaha	Ekonomi	Lemah	dan	
Koperasi	(PEGELKOP	–	The	Development	of	Weak	Economic	Entrepreneurs	and	Cooperatives)	in	
1989,	and	Pembinaan	Usaha	Kecil	dan	Koperasi	(PUKK	–	The	Development	of	Small	Business	and	
Cooperatives)	in	1994;	and	from	2003	it	was	titled	PPEB.		The	long	history	of	PPEB	has	made	the	
program	gain	popularity	in	the	local	communities,	so	that	the	local	community	refers	to	PPEB	
projects	to	describe	company	CSR,	as	one	company	participant	mentioned:	
“…	I	know	very	much	about	the	company	PPEB.		My	family,	even	my	parents	before,	
often	applied	this	PPEB	for	our	family	small	business…	I	think	this	is	a	form	of	the	
company	efforts	to	pay	attention	to	us”	(FGD.3)			
After	these	32	years,	the	program	has	benefitted	many	communities’	small	businesses	in	the	
country.		As	regulated	in	the	ministerial	decree,	the	program	has	been	allocated	to	assist	many	
small	and	medium	community	businesses	and	cooperatives	with	some	required	characteristics:	
(i)	having	assets	of	not	more	than	IDR	200	million	(USD	20,000);	(ii)	having	gross	production	of	
not	more	than	IDR	1	billion	(USD	100,000);	(iii)	not	having	a	branch	or	subsidiary	company;	(iv)	in	
the	form	of	an	individual	business	entity,	or	not	having	business	entity	or	cooperatives;	and	(v)	
have	been	established	for	a	minimum	of	1	year	(Firdian	2012;	Ministry	of	State	Owned	
Enterprises	2007).		This	requirement	enables	the	community	businesses	that	have	lack	of	access	
to	the	banking	sector,	due	to	the	lack	of	administrative	requirements	such	as	not	having	a	
business	registration,	to	utilise	this	program’s	financial	assistances.		
The	researcher	was	able	to	interview	five	staff	of	the	company	related	to	company	CSR	and	PPEB	
matters.		The	interviews	were	conducted	with	two	staff	of	the	Public	Relations	Office	in	the	Musi	
Banyuasin	district,	and	one	head	of	PPEB	and	two	staff	of	the	PPEB	office	in	the	Palembang	office.		
Instead	of	there	being	a	difference	between	the	units	in	administering	the	funds,	the	
responsibility	for	implementation	in	the	field	is	focused	within	the	Public	Relations	Department	in	
the	Musi	Banyuasin	office.		The	staff	in	the	field	distinguish	the	projects	into	two	types:	CSR	is	to	
build	community	infrastructure,	particularly	focused	on	education	and	health	projects	such	as	
building	or	renovating	schools	or	puskesmas	(community	health	centres);	while	the	PPEB	focus	is	
on	giving	financial	assistance	for	community	small-sized	businesses.			Given	the	well-known	status	
of	PPEB	programs	in	the	community,	this	study	focussed	on	the	soft-loans	program	of	this	
company	in	order	to	examine	the	implementation	of	CSR	of	this	company	in	the	field.	
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This	findings	from	company	C	are	presented	in	four	subsections.		Subsection	6.4.1	discusses	the	
company	perceptions	of	CSR.		Subsection	6.4.2	discusses	its	implementation.		Subsection	6.4.3	
presents	the	outcomes.		Subsection	6.4.4	presents	the	conclusion	for	this	section	on	company	C.	
6.4.1.	The	Perception	of	Legislation	
A	strong	commitment	to	implementing	CSR	legislation	is	noted	in	the	2014	company	annual	
report	on	the	section	for	company	CSR,	that	predominantly	mentions	the	complete	laws,	
regulations	and	ministerial	decrees	as	a	legal	basis	for	the	company	to	perform	CSR	for	local	
communities,	rather	than	characterizing	their	CSR	as	part	of	company	voluntary	initiatives.		In	
further	explanation,	the	company	affirms	in	the	report	that	“all	company	CSR	projects	are	
implemented	on	the	basis	of	CSR	legislation”.		This	company	commitment	to	comply	with	CSR	
legislation	had	been	affirmed	by	the	company	Public	Relations	staff	at	the	site	level:	
	“Well,	we	have	to	follow	all	CSR	law…	We	are	the	‘kepanjangan	tangan’	(the	long	hand	
of	government).		So	we	have	to	implement	all	those	laws	and	regulations.		And	we	hope	
these	can	benefit	the	community”	(C.St.1)		
This	participant	statement	reflects	the	role	of	the	company	as	state	owned	company.		As	a	
business	entity	owned	by	central	government,	the	company	has	to	adopt	their	shareholder	
interest,	which	is	that	of	the	central	government.		In	this	manner,	profit	is	not	the	sole	or	even	
main	objective	of	the	company.		Wong	(2004)	argues	that	the	position	of	a	SOC	is	influenced	by	
two	dominant	interests:	managers	who	are	concerned	about	the	company’s	economic	interests;	
and	politicians/bureaucrats	in	the	government	that	are	concerned	with	the	company’s	role	in	the	
country.		This	participant’s	strong	statement	describing	the	company	as	‘kepanjangan	tangan’	
(the	long	hand	of	government),	referring	to	the	company	position	as	a	government	instrument,	
illustrates	the	objectives	of	the	company	to	implement	government	policies.	
This	additional	role	of	a	SOC	also	gives	privileges	to	the	company	to	receive	resources	from	
central	government.		For	instance,	the	fuel	subsidy	fund	used	to	maintain	the	country	fuel	price	
has	been	distributed	to	the	company	to	import	oil	to	fulfil	the	domestic	demand	(see	Table	2.3).		
Furthermore,	their	position	as	a	company	owned	by	the	government	has	assisted	them	in	being	
accepted	by	locals,	who	presume	the	company	represents	the	national	interests,	as	one	
community	participant	stated:	
“…	The	company	belongs	to	our	nation.		We	have	to	support	the	company	so	our	nation	
is	no	longer	dependent	on	foreign	countries...”	(FGD.3)	
As	noted	earlier,	the	present	research	was	influenced	by	the	political	campaign	for	the	election	of	
President	and	Legislative	members	in	2014.		One	Presidential	candidate	proposed	the	idea	of	
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economic	independence	to	the	community	by	promoting	that	the	Indonesian	companies,	such	as	
this	SOC,	should	manage	all	natural	resources	in	the	country.		Therefore,	this	community	
perception	was	potentially	significantly	influenced	by	this	campaign	to	support	the	SOC	operation	
in	his	territory.			
However,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	the	position	of	SOCs	owned	by	the	central	government	also	
receive	certain	disadvantages.		Being	owned	by	the	central	government	makes	such	companies	
have	to	deal	with	various	self	and	political	interests	of	politicians	and	bureaucrats	at	the	national	
level,	resulting	in	the	company	subject	to	allegations	of	being	inefficient,	mismanaged,	and	cash	
cows	for	this	group	(de	Vries	2013;	Wicaksono	2008).	As	a	consequence,	the	company	has	a	low	
level	of	disclosure	in	terms	of	their	transparency	compared	to	their	private	owned	company	
counterparts	(Wicaksono	2008).			
The	objective	of	the	company	to	securely	follow	government	policies	encourages	them	to	
implement	CSR	in	accordance	with	the	central	government	rules.		Central	government	has	set	
clear	regulations	on	how	companies	should	deliver	their	CSR	projects.		One	relevant	CSR	mandate	
is	on	PPEB,	in	which	the	company	is	required	to	gives	soft-loans	to	local	communities.		This	may	
assist	the	company	to	be	precise	in	how	they	deliver	the	projects.		However,	the	low	local	
stakeholder	pressures	and	the	company	focus	on	central	government	interests	has	led	them	to	
lack	initiatives	for	involvement	with	local	stakeholders.		This	lack	of	involvement	with	local	
stakeholders	has	resulted	in	the	company	failing	to	develop	CSR	projects	based	on	local	issues.		In	
this	respect,	company	CSR	strategy	is	not	associated	with	the	company’s	economic	domain,	such	
as	utilising	CSR	to	control	community	protests	or	build	company	local	reputations,	in	their	CSR	
projects.													
6.4.2.	The	Implementation		
The	focus	of	PPEB	projects	in	giving	financial	assistance	to	community	small	businesses	began	in	
1983	under	the	Soeharto	new	order	regime,	which	instructed	all	State	Owned	Companies	to	
allocate	a	portion	of	their	profits	to	assist	small	businesses	(Wicaksono	2008).		This	program	has	
continued	until	now,	while	the	regulation	of	this	program	was	updated	through	State	Owned	
Companies	Ministerial	Decree	No.	08/MBO/2013,	mentioning	that	the	PPEB	funds	derive	from	
SOC	profits.		In	2012,	it	was	reported	that	the	total	PPEB	funds	collected	from	all	Indonesian	SOCs	
was	IDR	6.15	trillion	(USD	6.15	million)	(Marta	2015).		However,	the	dominance	of	political	
interests	at	the	national	level	has	aroused	suspicion	that	the	PPEB	funds	have	also	been	used	for	
political	interests,	which	is	not	allowed	in	this	ministerial	decree.		According	to	Marta	(2015),	
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many	legislative	members	in	national	Parliament	demanded	PPEB	funds	during	the	election	
campaign	in	2014	for	the	SOCs	to	build	projects	for	their	constituents,	in	the	form	of	building	
bridges,	roads,	or	donating	for	some	community	basic	needs	like	rice,	eggs,	and	cooking	oil,	in	
order	to	lift	these	candidates’	popularity.		In	the	2014	Indonesian	Corruption	Watch	(ICW)	report	
it	was	also	noted	that	PPEB	funds	have	a	high	risk	of	being	used	corruptly:	as	they	highlighted,	34	
suspects	from	a	total	of	659	corruption	suspects	in	Semester	I	2014	were	Indonesian	SOC	
employees	and	managers	(ICW	2014).		One	of	the	participants	from	a	business	association	group	
also	explained	his	experience	in	managing	PPEB	funds	in	one	SOC:	
“…	why	do	you	think	government	separated	the	management	of	PPEB	funds	directly	
under	the	board	of	directors?		Well,	there	is	a	lot	of	interest	behind	that...”	(CF.1)	
Unlike	CSR	or	CD	programs,	which	are	managed	by	Public	Relations	Departments,	PPEB	programs,	
as	described	earlier,	are	managed	by	one	unit	under	the	company	director	with	direct	reporting	
to	the	Minister	of	State	Owned	Companies.		The	principle	for	separating	this	program	from	the	
company	organization	is	because	PPEB	is	generated	from	the	allocation	of	company	profits,	so	it	
is	no	longer	part	of	company	decision	making	to	use	it.		This,	however,	makes	the	funds	at	risk	to	
be	potentially	used	for	central	government	interests.		The	above	participant	gave	some	examples	
of	how	the	PPEB	funds	have	been	allocated	for	central	government	interests,	but	he	asked	that	
this	information	be	not	stated	in	the	present	thesis.		For	illustration	purposes,	one	of	the	
ministers	under	President	Jokowi	claimed	that	the	printing	of	KIP	(Kartu	Indonesia	Pintar	–	
Indonesian	Smart	Card)	and	KIS	(Kartu	Indonesia	Sehat	–	Indonesian	Health	Card)	used	PKBL	
funds	from	SOCs	(Asril	2014).		This	statement	aroused	the	issue	of	the	allocation	of	PPEB	funding	
for	central	government	purposes.		One	scholar	argued	that	the	central	government,	as	the	major	
shareholder	of	SOCs,	has	the	right	to	utilise	the	funds	for	their	own	purposes;	while	another	
scholar	criticises	the	utilisation	of	this	PPEB	funding	for	government	programs,	as	the	fund	is	
supposedly	purposed	for	community	development	(Simanjuntak	2014).							
At	the	village	level,	this	funding	was	used	mainly	for	financial	assistance	for	communities.		The	
company	under	study	here	admitted	that	the	distribution	of	this	financial	assistance	relies	on	the	
kades	as	the	government	representatives	at	the	village	level.		Kades	have	been	trusted	as	having	
information	on	community	members	and	thus	for	helping	decide	who	gets	loans.		Therefore,	
consultation	with	kades	influences	the	company	in	selecting	community	proposals,	as	explained	
by	a	company	participant:		
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“We	maintained	a	close	contact	with	the	kades.		He	tells	us	the	background	of	all	the	
stakeholders	in	the	village	when	we	try	to	assess	the	proposals	from	the	community.		He	
gives	us	valuable	information	to	assess	the	applicants.”	(C.St.2)	
This	statement	shows	a	limitation	of	the	company	-	community	involvement	in	the	discussion	of	
company	CSR	projects.		Their	frequent	consultation	with	kades	about	applicants’	backgrounds	
has	forced	the	company	to	maintain	their	relationship	with	the	kades	so	that	the	latter	can	
maintain	their	status	quo.		The	reliance	on	kades	information	in	assessing	the	community	
applicants	might	therefore	allow	the	kades	to	prioritize	his	supporters	to	get	the	company’s	soft	
loans.		In	responding	to	this	issue,	the	company	claims	that	they	have	set	mandatory	
requirements	for	the	applicants,	as	stated	by	a	company	C	staff	participant:	
“...	based	on	the	regulation	the	receiver	of	soft-loans	should	have	some	requirements	
such	as	that	his	business	has	been	established	at	least	1	year,	has	never	received	banking	
loans,	and	he	should	also	have	a	permanent	address	in	the	village”	(C.St.2)	
These	requirements	stated	in	the	ministerial	decree	and	government	regulation	has	been	
implemented	by	the	staff	in	delivering	soft	loans.		These	requirements	are	seen	as	helping	the	
SOC	to	control	the	kades’	behaviour	and	eliminate	non-credible	applicants	that	might	otherwise	
be	prioritized	by	the	kades.		In	addition,	the	company	also	applies	a	social	sanctions	mechanism	
to	the	community	in	the	village.		The	company	reduces	the	amount	of	financial	assistance	to	one	
village	if	the	individual	or	group	receiver	is	not	repaying	the	loans.		By	this	policy,	local	
communities	will	push	the	receivers	to	repay	the	loans,	so	that	other	community	members	can	
receive	the	loans	in	the	following	year.		This	mechanism	received	the	following	complaint	by	one	
participant	in	the	discussion:	
“It	is	unfair	because	of	kredit	macet	(bad	credit)	of	one	person,	we	have	to	bear	his	
responsibility.		But	what	can	I	say,	we	are	in	one	group	village,	we	already	have	
commitment	with	the	company…and	I	don’t	like	if	one	of	my	family	were	to	do	that”	
(FGD.3)									
This	statement	describes	the	community	feelings	on	the	company	policy	to	reduce	the	amount	of	
loans	if	one	village	member	has	had	kredit	macet	(bad	credit).		The	social	sanction	thus	makes	all	
members	of	the	community	bear	the	consequence	if	there	is	one	member	who	cannot	pay	back	
the	loans.		But	rather	than	blaming	the	company	for	building	such	a	system,	the	participant	
tended	to	assign	blame	to	the	individual	who	behaved	in	this	way.		This	social	sanction	seems	to	
have	been	effective	in	that	most	village	people	have	family	kinship	relationships,	strengthening	
this	social	sanction	mechanism.		One	individual	may	be	abandoned	by	his	family	kinship	
relationships,	if	he	has	shown	a	poor	attitude	in	utilising	a	soft	loan.				
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The	reliance	of	this	company	on	the	head	of	village	is	illustrated	in	Figure	6.5	below,	where	the	
company	relationship	is	focused	on	the	head	of	village	by	appointing	him	as	a	representative	of	
all	stakeholders	in	the	village.		Figure	6.5	presents	the	network	for	company	C	and	its	local	
stakeholders.		The	solid	line	represents	a	good	relationship.		Thus,	the	solid	line	between	
company	C	and	the	kades	illustrates	the	good	relationship	between	the	two.		However,	company	
C	has	a	lack	of	relationship	with	other	local	stakeholders	in	the	village	such	as	the	Karang	Taruna	
(the	young	organization),	PKK	(women	group),	the	farmers	and	the	poor	people.		This	is	a	result	
of	the	lack	of	consultation	conducted	by	the	company	with	community	stakeholders	in	selecting	
community	proposals.		This	figure	also	reveals	the	absence	of	dashed	line.			
Figure	6.5.	Company	C	and	its	Local	Stakeholder	Relationship	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
In	previous	company	cases,	maintaining	a	relationship	and	prioritising	one	group	over	another	
would	affect	the	company	relationship	with	the	others.		In	this	case,	all	stakeholders	appear	to	
approach	the	kades	to	obtain	access	to	the	company,	as	one	participant	explained	this	
relationship:	
“...	well	I	don’t	know	any	company	staff,	so	I	just	give	my	proposal	to	the	kades”	(FGD.3)		
The	lack	of	company-community	involvement	meant	the	local	communities	did	not	have	access	
to	company	staff	and	relied	on	kades	access.		Furthermore,	this	reflects	two	conditions	in	the	CSR	
implementation	of	this	company.		Firstly,	as	mentioned	previously,	the	lack	of	local	pressure	on	
the	company	due	to	its	status	as	state	owned,	representing	national	interests,	made	the	
company	fail	to	have	initiatives	for	involvement	with	local	communities.		Secondly,	the	
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importance	of	the	kades’	power	in	distributing	company	CSR	wealth,	with	overall	control	of	the	
social	sanctions	mechanism,	enabled	the	company	to	develop	their	projects	with	minimum	effort	
in	managing	the	projects.		The	lack	of	community	pressure	in	the	form	of	local	protests	and	rallies	
allows	the	company	to	apply	social	sanctions.		Other	private	companies	might	not	be	able	to	
follow	this	strategy	because	of	local	pressures	that	force	other	companies,	particularly	FOCs,	to	
use	their	CSR	as	an	instrument	to	control	local	protests	and	attain	local	legitimacy.			
Moreover,	as	Figure	6.5	also	notes,	there	is	the	presence	of	stakeholders	at	the	district	level,	such	
as	government	officials	and	local	legislative	members.		The	company	participates	in	a	CSR	forum	
in	the	district,	and	contributes	some	small	projects	suggested	by	district	government	through	
their	CSR	and/or	Community	Development	projects.		During	interviews,	rather	than	discussing	
the	company	contributions	to	the	district,	the	researcher	realized	that	those	stakeholders	were	
more	aware	of	the	company’s	status	as	belonging	to	the	government.		One	government	
participant	criticised	the	lack	of	success	with	this	SOC	in	gaining	PSC	for	other	district	areas:	
“…we	cannot	get	any	benefit,	if	this	foreign	company	manages	the	mining...”	(Go.3)				
This	statement	indicates	the	importance	of	the	support	of	the	local	government	in	company	C	
obtaining	the	contract.		This	participant	ensures	that	company	C	is	able	to	give	more	benefit	to	
Indonesia,	including	local	people,	by	assuming	the	profits	received	by	company	must	go	to	the	
government,	not	flowing	to	other	countries.		In	this	manner,	participants	did	not	appear	overly	
concerned	with	company	C’s	contribution	to	the	CSR	forum,	though	the	company	contributions	
were	in	the	form	of	small	projects	only,	such	as	donating	rubbish	bins	to	communities	or	
conducting	sunatan	masal	(mass	circumcision)	in	the	villages.			
Furthermore,	the	soft	loans	program	as	the	company’s	special	project	were	appreciated	by	local	
communities,	as	a	participant	from	a	village	near	the	company	operation	stated:	
“…the	company	soft	loan	is	the	one	that	we	really	need	for	our	household.		I	only	have	a	
small	warung	(small	shop)	so	it	is	difficult	for	me	to	get	a	loan	from	the	bank	due	to	the	
lack	of	official	documents”	(FGD.3)			
This	statement	indicates	the	communities’	value	on	the	types	of	cash	money	distribution	in	CSR	
projects.		The	SKKMIGAS	policy	in	SOP	No.	17/PTK/III/2005	has	limited	the	CSR	or	CD	projects	
delivered	to	communities	in	terms	of	cash	money	transfer	to	the	beneficiaries,	such	that	the	
project	should	be	in	goods,	materials	and/or	tools	instead.		The	SOC	was	able	to	maintain	their	
projects	giving	soft	loans	to	communities	because	it	is	regulated	in	Law	No.	19/2003	on	SOC.		In	
this	manner,	company	soft	loans	do	allow	local	communities	to	receive	cash	money	to	develop	
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their	businesses,	while	company	CSR	projects	directed	to	infrastructure	for	health,	education	or	
public	places	might	not	allow	the	community	to	receive	any	cash	money	directly.			
6.4.3.	The	Outcomes	
Community	acceptance	in	this	case	is	not	as	strongly	related	to	what	companies	contribute	to	
them	as	with	the	other	cases.		The	acceptance	of	local	communities	of	this	company	can	be	seen	
in	the	statement	of	one	woman	participant	in	the	local	community	discussion.		The	long	history	of	
company	previously	in	monopolizing	the	management	of	oil	and	gas	resources	in	Indonesia,	
which	resulted	in	cheap	prices	for	kerosene,	consequently	gained	a	positive	reputation	for	the	
company’s	operations:			
“I	like	when	this	company	managed	our	oil…		The	price	of	minyak	tanah	(kerosene)	was	
very	cheap…	not	like	today,	Minyak	tanah	(kerosene)	is	very	expensive….Although	the	
government	gives	us	LPG	it	is	still	expensive,	we	have	to	use	firewood	for	cooking	now…		
Imagine	that,	using	firewood	while	we	are	living	near	oil	mining”	(FGD.3)	
This	quotation	presents	a	number	of	viewpoints.		Firstly,	the	cheap	kerosene	formerly	
experienced	by	communities	is	associated	with	the	monopoly	of	company	C	on	such	resources	
during	the	Soeharto	era.		Although	the	monopoly	evidently	caused	inefficiencies	in	the	
government	budget,	this	statement	connects	to	what	people	see	as	important	issues	in	their	life,	
which	is	the	energy	supply	for	their	daily	needs.		Secondly,	due	to	the	reduction	in	fuel	subsidy	
policy,	particularly	on	kerosene,	the	government	distributed	free	3	kg	LPG	cylinders	for	
communities.		However,	the	government	failed	to	ensure	the	availability	of	gas	energy:	as	a	
report	showed,	the	shortage	of	subsidized	LPG	in	some	areas	in	Indonesia	has	resulted	in	the	
increasing	price	of	3	kg	LPG	cylinders	in	communities,	while	kerosene	is	no	longer	available	
(Cahyaningrum	&	M.	Simatupang	2013).		Thirdly,	energy	supplies	for	cooking	were	essential	for	
this	community,	so	that	now	people	in	this	village	used	firewood	as	an	alternative	energy	source	
that	is	available	in	the	village.		The	statement	“using	firewood	while	we	are	living	near	oil	mining”	
represents	the	community	feeling	on	the	lack	of	benefit	received	by	communities	from	resource	
exploitation	in	the	local	area	by	private	companies.					
Support	to	this	company	also	derived	from	the	company’s	status	as	owned	by	the	central	
government.		The	exploitation	of	company	status	as	state	owned	generates	local	acceptance	to	
operate	in	the	territory.		As	a	participant	from	local	district	government	stated:	
“This	is	our	national	company,	we	have	to	support	them…		I	believed	their	profit	money	
will	not	go	to	other	countries,	not	like	other	private	foreign	companies”	(Go.2)	
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Being	owned	by	the	government	has	thus	resulted	in	support	for	company	operations.		This	
participant	believed	that	company	profits	from	exploiting	their	oil	and	gas	would	not	go	to	
foreign	countries	as	the	company	is	owned	by	the	Indonesian	government,	thus	comparing	this	
company	with	other	foreign	owned	companies	that	may	distribute	their	profits	to	their	
shareholders	in	foreign	countries	and	not	give	this	benefit	to	local	communities.					
However,	the	present	research	also	reveals	that	the	company	had	some	negative	impacts	from	
their	operations	to	local	communities,	such	as	an	oil	spill	in	a	local	community’s	river	that	
happened	in	2010.		In	responding	to	this	issue,	a	participant	admitted	that	the	company	was	
similar	with	other	mining	companies	in	the	area	in	this	respect:	
“Well,	all	companies	did	that	to	our	territory.		I	do	not	justify	that	this	company’s	spilling	
[into]	the	community’s	river	in	2010	is	right.		But	compared	to	what	private	companies	
did,	they	just	want	to	get	profit	and	do	not	care	about	our	life…”	(C.Go.1)				
This	quotation	reflects	the	minimum	pressure	received	by	the	SOC	in	dealing	with	the	same	issue	
of	pipeline	leaks	experienced	in	common	with	other	companies.		The	participant	admitted	that	
what	the	company	did	is	similar	to	that	of	other	companies	in	the	area.		However,	he	compared	
this	company’s	behaviour	with	other	private	companies,	in	that	their	irresponsible	practices	are	
associated	with	their	tendency	to	prioritise	profit	gain,	while	for	this	SOC	such	behaviour	is	not	
affiliated	with	this	reason.		As	described	earlier,	the	company	status	as	owned	by	the	central	
government	urges	the	company	to	not	only	think	about	profit	but	also	to	concern	themselves	
with	the	government’s	wider	interests.			
However,	one	local	NGO	focused	on	environmental	preservation	noted	this	case,	highlighting	the	
slow	response	of	this	company	to	solving	this	issue:	
“This	company	is	the	worst.		They	are	not	responsive	quickly	to	solving	the	issue…this	
was	also	maybe	because	the	district	government	did	not	give	attention	to	this	issue;	even	
they	did	not	come	to	the	village	to	check	it”	(NG.1)	
The	NGO	activist	notes	the	slow	response	of	this	company	to	solving	this	issue.		The	slow	
response	might	be	caused	by	the	lack	of	attention	from	local	district	government	and	demand	
that	the	company	solve	the	issue.		Unlike	for	other	companies,	where	this	kind	of	issue	might	
raise	significant	attention	from	the	‘little	kings’,	such	as	certain	local	government	officials	and	
legislative	members,	sometimes	resulting	in	protests	and	rallies	against	the	offending	companies,	
in	this	case,	most	‘little	kings’	appeared	not	to	be	concerned	with	the	issue,	as	the	activist	
underlined	by	stating	that	the	local	officials	did	not	even	come	to	check	the	issue.					
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These	statements	reveal	that	the	support	by	local	stakeholders	to	the	company	is	associated	
with:	(i)	the	company	history	in	managing	oil	and	gas	resources	and	ensuring	energy	supplies	
during	the	President	Soeharto	era,	which	gave	cheap	prices	for	kerosene	to	local	communities	in	
the	village;	and	(ii)	the	company	status	as	owned	by	the	government,	which	may	result	in	locals	
not	associating	this	company’s	behaviour	with	such	profit	goals.		This	acceptance	gives	benefits	
to	the	company,	as	it	received	little	pressure	in	its	operations.		However,	the	lack	of	local	
pressure	might	influence	the	SOC’s	ability	to	achieve	efficiency	in	its	operations	and	to	adapt	to	
changes	in	the	local	environment	(Arens	&	Brouthers	2001).		Furthermore,	the	dominance	of	
central	government	control	on	the	company	and	the	lack	of	pressure	from	local	stakeholders	
drive	the	company	to	only	concern	themselves	with	central	government	interests.		Whilst	other	
companies	use	CSR	as	means	to	control	local	stakeholder	protests	or	positively	brand	their	image,	
SOCs	conduct	CSR	only	so	as	to	obey	relevant	laws	and	regulations.					
6.4.4.	Conclusion	
Company	C	has	to	deal	with	four	directly	related	CSR	laws	and	regulations.		The	company	accepts	
this	legislation	as	they	are	kepanjangan	tangan	(the	long	hand	of	government).		Being	owned	by	
government	forces	the	company	to	not	only	follow	a	profit	interest	but	also	the	central	
government	interest	in	securing	the	implementation	of	their	policies.		This	rationale	steers	the	
company	towards	compliance	with	all	relevant	CSR	legislation	as	part	of	government	policy.		The	
company	also	received	a	lack	of	local	pressure	from	local	communities.		As	a	state	owned	
company,	local	stakeholders	assume	that	the	company	brings	benefit	to	the	national	interest,	
rather	than	securing	their	own	self-interest	in	attaining	profits.		
In	terms	of	CSR	implementation,	the	company	relied	on	a	soft	loans	project	as	their	CSR	priority,	
which	project	has	been	in	place	since	1983.		The	stakeholder	network	of	the	company	in	
implementing	this	project	indicates	the	lack	of	wide	consultation	conducted	by	the	company.		All	
stakeholders	directed	their	relationship	towards	the	kades	in	order	to	get	company	soft	loans.		
This	lack	of	wider	community	involvement	led	the	company	to	a	reliance	on	the		kades’	role	in	
giving	information	for	each	stakeholder’s	identification	and	assessment.		The	company	also	has	
succeeded	in	applying	a	social	mechanism	system	for	the	project,	something	that	has	been	
difficult	to	apply	for	other	private	companies	due	to	the	local	pressures.		The	support	of	district	
stakeholders	from	the	local	government	and	local	legislative	also	suggests	a	lack	of	pressure	by	
these	stakeholders	to	the	company’s	operations.		This	lack	of	local	pressure,	however,	may	cause	
the	company	to	lessen	their	efforts	in	responding	to	local	changes.		Company	C	has	long	been	
identified	for	its	inefficiency	in	conducting	its	operations.		One	NGO	noted	some	negligence	of	
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the	company	in	preserving	the	local	environment	during	its	operations,	in	a	case	of	oil	spillage	in	
which	the	company	was	very	slow	responding	to	this	challenge.		The	low	level	of	pressure	from	
local	stakeholders	on	the	company’s	CSR	has	thus	led	to	the	company	lacking	the	initiative	to	be	
socially	responsible	with	respect	to	the	local	community,	unless	obligated	by	government	
mandate.						
6.5.	CROSS	CASE		
This	section	provides	a	conclusion	to	the	findings	chapter	in	the	form	of	cross	case	analysis	of	the	
three	companies’	perceptions	and	implementations	of	the	CSR	legislation.		Table	6.1	presents	the	
comparison	of	the	three	selected	companies	in	implementing	CSR	legislation,	by	describing:	the	
list	of	laws	that	they	focus	on;	the	perceptions	of	each	company	on	mandated	CSR	legislation;	the	
implementation	of	CSR	legislation;	and	the	outcome	of	CSR	implementation.			
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Table	6.1	Comparison	of	Three	Selected	Companies	in	Implementing	CSR	Legislation	
	 Company	A		
(Indonesian	Owned	Company)	
Company	B	
(Foreign	Owned	Company)	
Company	C	
(State	Owned	Company)	
Company	
Characteristics	
• Owned	by	Influential	Businessman	
and	Political	Figures	in	Indonesia	
• CSR	project	is	designed	by	CD	
department	in	Jakarta	and	
implemented	by	PR	office	in	the	
district.	
• Receives	medium	stakeholder	
pressure	
• Big	MNC	from	US	
• CSR	project	is	designed	by	CSR	
unit	in	Jakarta	and	implemented	
by	PR	office	in	the	district	
• Receives	high	stakeholder	
pressure	due	to	resource	
nationalism	issue	
• State	Owned	Company	
• PPEB	is	handled	by	unit	under	
Company’s	Board	of	Directors,	and	
CSR	is	managed	by	PR	Office	in	the	
district	
• Receive	low	level	of	stakeholder	
pressure	as	the	company	owned	by	
the	nation	
CSR	Laws	that	each	
company	focused	
on	
1. Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas		
2. Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company		
3. Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	law	
1. Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas		
2. Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	
Law 
1. Law	No.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas		
2. Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company	
3. Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	Law		
4. Law	No.	19/2003	on	State	Owned	
Companies		
Perceptions	on	CSR	
legislation	
• Argues	CSR	should	be	voluntary	 • Accepts	CSR	legislation	because	‘we	
already	do	this’	and	‘provide	
enormous	funding’	
• Accepts	mandatory	nature	of	CSR	
laws	because	company	acts	as	‘the	
long	hand	of	government’	
Implementation	of	
CSR	legislation	
• Approaches	marginalized	groups	
(farmers	and	women)	and	utilises	its	
national	political	connections	to	
counter	‘little	kings’	power	
• Engages	with	‘little	kings’	stakeholders	
e.g.	in	district	government	to	design	
CSR	projects	and	with	kades	to	
implement	projects	
• Relies	on	kades	information	with	lack	
of	involvement	with	community	
	
Outcomes	 • Marginalized	group	acceptance	and	
national	recognition,	but	resistance	
from	little	kings	in	the	district	
• Little	kings	support,	but	complaints	
from	local	marginalized	groups	
	
• Local	acceptance	but	lack	of	company	
involvement	with	local	stakeholders	
153	
 
According	to	Table	6.1,	each	company	has	different	characteristics	and	ways	in	which	they	manage	
their	CSR.		Company	A	is	owned	by	an	Indonesian	businessman	and	political	figure.		In	terms	of	
their	CD,	the	company	relies	on	a	CD	department	headed	by	a	manager	in	the	Jakarta	office,	while	
the	staff	in	the	district	are	the	implementers	of	the	projects.		Company	B	is	a	big	MNC	from	the	US.		
The	CSR	unit	is	under	the	external	affairs	department,	which	handles	the	company	CSR.		Company	
C	as	a	state	owned	company,	on	the	other	hand,	has	two	types	of	CSR:	PPEB	is	under	a	unit	under	
the	company’s	director;	and	CSR	is	managed	by	the	PR	office.		In	relation	to	the	differences	in	the	
characteristics	of	each	company,	the	position	of	the	CSR	office	in	each	company	reflects	the	efforts	
of	each	company	to	deliver	their	CSR.		In	this	respect,	company	A,	which	appoints	a	manager	to	
handle	their	CSR,	showed	more	initiative	and	an	innovative	approach	to	designing	their	CSR,	
compared	to	the	other	companies.		The	CSR	organization	in	the	company	also	shows	that	company	
B	has	lower	internal	status	than	company	A,	reflecting	the	importance	of	CSR	in	their	companies.		
Although	both	companies	have	different	CSR	positions	in	terms	of	the	company	organization	-	
manager	in	company	A,	and	supervisor	in	company	B	-	both	positions	have	a	similar	function	in	the	
company,	to	design	and	approve	CSR	projects	in	the	district.		This	is	related	to	the	position	of	
SKKMIGAS	as	the	central	government	body	with	authority	to	approve	Oil	and	Gas	CSR	projects	in	
the	field,	meaning	that	these	companies	could	not	give	their	operating	companies	in	the	districts	
power	to	implement	their	own	projects.		In	addition,	it	can	also	be	a	company’s	strategy	to	utilise	
cost	recovery	for	their	CSR,	where	the	departments	and	units	in	those	companies	have	a	role	to	
design	projects	that	fit	with	CD,	involving	cost	recovery.		Moreover,	although	company	A	and	B	
have	a	specific	CSR	department	or	unit	in	their	Jakarta	office,	all	companies	indicated	a	similar	
approach	by	appointing	a	Public	Relations	Department	for	implementation	of	CSR	projects.		This	
means	that	CSR	activities	were	viewed	as	part	of	the	communication	strategy	for	all	companies	
with	their	local	stakeholders.							
Moreover,	Table	6.1	shows	the	CSR	legislation	that	are	complied	with	by	each	company,	company	
A	as	an	Indonesian	Owned	Company	(IOC)	admitted	that	the	company	links	CSR	to	Law	No.	
22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	and	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	
Company;	company	B	as	a	Foreign	owned	Company	(FOC)	is	connected	with	Law	No.	22/2001	on	
Oil	and	Gas,	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment	and	Law	no.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company;	
and		company	C	as	a	State	Owned	Company	(SOC)	confirmed	their	affiliation	with	all	laws,	which	
are	Law	no.	22/2001	on	Oil	and	Gas,	Law	No.	25/2007	on	Investment,	Law	No.40/2007	on	Limited	
liability	Company	and	Law	no.	19/2003	on	State	Owned	Company.		The	reason	for	prioritizing	one	
law	over	another	is	part	of	the	companies’	rhetorical	strategy	and	implementation,	as	this	is	
related	to	confronting	the	local	stakeholder	demands.		For	instance,	company	A	selected	to	
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prioritize	Oil	and	Gas	Law	No.	22/2001,	reflecting	their	preference	to	report	to	the	central	
government	through	SKKMIGAS	as	mandated	by	this	law,	rather	than	to	local	government.		
Company	B	claimed	that	they	are	not	related	to	Limited	Liability	Company	Law	No.	40/2007	as	its	
registration	is	not	in	Indonesia,	also	reflecting	their	strategy	to	confront	the	utilisation	of	this	
popular	law	by	local	stakeholders	to	claim	company	CSR.		For	company	C,	stating	all	relevant	laws	
and	regulations	as	their	obligation	is	essential	for	their	role	as	‘the	long	hand	of	government’,	in	
which	they	are	obliged	mostly	to	the	Minister	of	State	Owned	Companies.		This	preferencing	of	
laws	thus	actually	helps	form	the	rhetoric	of	this	company	in	limiting	the	local	government	
intervention	in	their	CSR,	by	appointing	a	law	as	relevant	that	has	weaker	implementation	
regulations	and	obligates	them	to	report	to	central	government.		
The	comparison	of	company	perceptions,	implementation	and	outcomes	of	their	CSR	are	the	major	
themes	that	are	presented	in	the	following	four	subsections.		Subsection	6.5.1	discusses	the	
company	perceptions,	as	a	reflection	of	the	companies’	positions	in	their	local	environments.		
Subsection	6.5.2	shows	their	CSR	implementation,	in	terms	of	competition	for	CSR	distribution	
between	elites	and	marginalized	groups	in	the	three	companies.		Subsection	6.5.3	presents	the	
outcomes:	the	local	legitimacy	of	elites	or	marginalized	groups.		Subsections	6.5.4	presents	the	
cross	case	analysis	conclusion.				
6.5.1.	The	Perception	of	Legislation	
Table	6.1	shows	us	that	the	mandatory	nature	of	CSR	legislation	was	responded	to	by	each	
company	differently,	describing	the	different	perceptions	of	the	three	companies	in	viewing	the	
mandatory	nature	of	CSR	legislation.		Company	A	argued	that	CSR	should	be	voluntary	and	they	do	
good	things.		Company	B	accepts	mandated	CSR	legislation	by	arguing	that	the	legislation	only	
makes	lawful	what	they	already	do,	as	they	claimed	to	have	allocated	enormous	funding	for	CSR.		
Company	C	accepts	the	mandated	CSR	legislation,	considering	the	position	of	this	company	as	‘the	
long	hand	of	government’	or	government	instrument.		The	selection	of	laws	that	apply	to	them	by	
the	three	companies	is	based	on	their	respective	ownership	profiles,	but	also	seems	to	represent	
some	strategy.		These	differences	are	shaped	by	each	company’s	position	in	conforming	with	the	
institutional	and	local	stakeholder	pressures.		The	decentralization	process	that	delegated	some	
authority	to	local	government	forced	the	companies	to	deal	with	local	power	in	order	to	attain	
local	legitimacy,	where	previously	under	the	Soeharto	new	order	regime	this	legitimacy	was	
provided	by	central	government.		The	findings	reveals	that	these	three	companies’	perceptions	
reflect	each	company’s	strategies	for	this	issue.			
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The	argument	of	company	A	that	CSR	should	be	voluntary,	in	their	annual	report	and	company	
participant	perceptions,	appears	to	be	bases	as	an	attribute	to	the	company	connections	with	
political	power	at	the	national	level,	allowing	them	to	move	away	from	the	little	kings	power	at	the	
district	and	village	levels.		This	company	is	owned	by	an	influential	businessman	who	also	has	an	
influential	role	in	a	major	political	party	in	Indonesia.		The	link	of	Indonesian	private	businesses	
with	political	power	is	common	in	the	country	and	such	a	link	provides	a	valuable	resource	for	a	
company.		A	study	by	Leuz	and	Oberholzer-Gee	(2006)	reveals	that	most	Indonesian	private	
companies	with	links	to	political	power	are	given	access	to	cheap	loans	from	the	state-owned	
bank.		For	the	present	study,	the	political	connection	grants	companies	local	legitimacy	in	dealing	
with	local	powers.		This	leads	the	company	to	confront	the	idea	of	mandatory	CSR,	which	may	
result	in	the	intervention	of	local	stakeholders	in	company’s	CSR	decisions.		Company	A	thus	
preferred	to	promote	CSR	as	voluntary	as	their	normative	claims,	since	their	CSR	would	not	have	
any	consequences	for	the	company’s	legitimacy	as	that	has	been	granted	by	its	political	
connections.		This	view	might	shape	the	company	in	their	strategies	for	limiting	local	government	
intervention	in	their	CSR	decisions.		The	present	study	discovered	that	this	company	preferred	to	
report	the	progress	of	its	organic	farming	project	to	central	government	in	Jakarta	through	the	
Agricultural	Minister,	rather	than	to	local	government.		Thus,	the	company	even	invited	the	
Minister	to	their	site	to	see	the	project,	rather	than	inviting	the	bupati	(the	head	of	district)	as	the	
bupati	come	from	different	political	party	of	its	owner.						
In	contrast,	company	B	as	a	foreign	owned	company	has	limited	political	power	connections	and	
they	may	not	be	able	to	show	them.		This	urges	them	to	rely	only	on	economic	power	in	order	to	
gain	local	legitimacy.		The	company’s	tax	contributions	to	the	government	budget	form	the	
company’s	power	to	leverage	favourable	deals	for	their	operations	in	Indonesia.		Moreover,	
company	experiences	in	utilizing	this	economic	power	during	the	new	order	regime,	through	their	
contributions	to	Soeharto	and	his	military	allies	(Kemp	2001),	might	have	influenced	company	
behaviour	in	conforming	to	the	local	institutional	environment.			Legitimacy	is	necessary	for	a	
foreign	owned	company	as	the	company	is	owned	and	registered	overseas.		During	
decentralization,	the	company	had	to	deal	with	an	increase	in	local	authority	to	attain	their	
legitimacy.		The	company’s	reliance	on	economic	power	in	recent	times	has	also	been	utilized	to	
engage	with	local	authorities.		Their	claim	of	their	enormous	funding	allocation	for	CSR	illustrates	
the	company’s	adaptation	to	distribute	this	funding	for	the	growth	of	local	district	government	
authority,	in	order	to	gain	local	acceptance.		This	cost	allocated	by	the	company	might	still	be	
acceptable	to	them,	rather	than	the	company	investing	in	countries	with	strong	state	institutions,	
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with	complicated	labour	rules,	environmental	policies	and/or	human	rights	issues,	resulting	in	high	
operational	costs	to	the	company	(Scherer	&	Palazzo	2011).					
Furthermore,	company	C	perceptions	of	mandated	CSR	legislation	reflects	their	position	as	the	
government	instrument	in	securing	their	policy.		Therefore,	accepting	the	legislation	is	reflective	of	
their	position.		Positioning	as	central	government	instrument,	however,	limits	this	company	in	
being	innovative	in	their	CSR	program	designs.		Their	position	also	limits	local	government	and	
community	involvement.		For	this	company,	being	owned	by	central	government	forces	them	to	be	
primarily	concerned	with	central	government,	by	relying	on	the	state	owned	ministerial	regulation	
on	soft-loan	programs	rather	than	designing	a	program	based	on	local	stakeholder	consultations	
and	aspirations.		
6.5.2.	The	Implementation	
Table	6.1	on	implementation	of	CSR	legislation	shows	the	distinctions	between	the	three	
companies	in	engagement	with	certain	types	of	local	stakeholder:	the	little	kings	group;	or	the	
marginalized	groups.		Company	A	tends	to	approach	the	marginalized	group,	consisting	of	the	
farmers	and	women,	in	its	CSR	projects.		Company	B	prefers	to	engage	with	the	little	kings	group,	
such	as	the	district	government	officials	and	kades,	in	implementing	the	legislation.		Company	C	
relies	on	kades’	information	for	decisions	on	distributing	their	loans.		The	stakeholder	identification	
of	each	company’s	local	network	is	an	important	tool	for	recognising	the	distribution	of	CSR	
resources.		Moreover,	the	relationships	of	each	company	with	its	local	stakeholders	shown	in	the	
figure	6.2,	6.3	and	6.5	are	similar	with	the	presence	of	bureaucrats	and	societal	actors	
collaborating	in	influencing	the	companies	CSR.		At	the	village	level,	figures	6.2,	6.3	and	6.5	
highlight	the	companies’	links	with	various	local	community	groups	and	the	head	of	village.		Whilst	
at	the	district	level	figures	6.2,	6.3	and	6.5	illustrate	companies’	relationship	with	local	government	
and	legislative	actors.		The	relationship	of	companies	with	bureaucrats	and	societal	actors	is	
reflective	of	whom	the	companies	primarily	consult	with	about	their	CSR	initiatives.	
The	findings	from	the	CSR	legislation	document	analysis	provides	a	picture	of company	wealth	
distribution	to	local	communities.		However,	Duncan	(2007)	realized	that	Indonesia’s	
decentralization	process	split	local	communities	into	two	groups.		The	‘little	kings’	and	his	allies	are	
stakeholders	that	receive	power	delegation	to	control	their	territory,	with	which	the	little	kings	
commonly	propose	their	self-interest	in	managing	their	local	territory.		The	marginalized	
stakeholders	group	are	the	stakeholders	who	do	not	have	power	and	access	to	resources	and	
commonly	do	not	have	an	affiliation	with	the	little	kings	power.		Decentralization	forced	
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companies	to	deal	with	this	local	environment	in	order	to	attain	their	local	legitimacy,	with	a	lack	
of	central	government	assistance.		In	relation	to	this	environment,	each	company	has	to	decide	
with	which	group	they	are	required	to	engage	in	implementing	CSR	legislation,	as	this	company	
decision	affects	their	legitimacy	in	the	area.	
Company	A’s	decision	to	engage	with	a	marginalized	group	membered	by	local	poor	farmers	
reflects	the	limited	little	kings	intervention	in	their	CSR	projects	and	seen	as	a	shift	away	from	a	
reliance	on	little	kings.		Legitimacy	from	district	government	and	kades	appears	not	to	be	
necessary	for	this	company.		The	political	power	connection	of	the	company	can	provide	it	with	
local	political	power	derived	from	the	one	big	political	party	in	the	district.		This	political	
connection	grants	them	district	government	support,	such	as	securing	local	licenses.		The	kades,	as	
the	little	king	of	the	village,	gained	no	support	from	district	authorization	due	to	this	political	
influence.		The	district	government	might	complain	of	how	company	A	conducts	CSR	projects,	but	
there	is	no	evidence	that	they	can	force	the	company’s	direction	since	the	company	clearly	had	
links	with	the	political	party	with	the	majority	of	seats	in	the	local	Parliament.		At	the	village	level,	
protests	by	blocking	the	company’s	road	access	(see	Figure	6.1)	is	a	form	of	despair	on	the	part	of	
the	kades	and	his	allies	for	not	gaining	support	for	these	little	kings	at	the	district	level.		Within	this	
environment,	the	company	is	able	to	involve	themselves	with	a	marginalized	group,	and	thus	its	
CSR	resource	distribution	was	able	to	give	benefit	to	this	marginalized	group,	which	is	in	line	with	
the	goal	of	CSR	legislation.		As	a	result,	this	company	acquired	local	community	acceptance.				
Company	B	approached	the	little	kings,	consisting	of	district	government	officials	and	the	kades,	
rather	than	having	a	direct	relationship	with	local	marginalized	groups.		The	rationale	of	this	
company’s	decision	is	derived	from	their	lack	of	political	connection	at	the	national	and	district	
levels.		Supporting	district	development	agendas	and	engaging	with	kades	as	government	
representatives	in	the	villages	is	a	company	strategy	to	attain	local	legitimacy,	as	these	little	kings	
supposedly	have	the	majority	constituency	in	the	village.		The	reliance	on	‘little	kings’	at	village	and	
district	levels	in	delivering	CSR	reflects	the	company	need	to	be	acknowledged	in	its	contributions	
by	these	stakeholders,	in	order	to	obtain	their	legitimacy.		The	absence	of	political	connection	thus	
forces	them	to	depend	on	mobilizing	CSR	resources	to	support	‘little	kings’	development	agendas	
and	their	self-interests.		This	company	tends	not	to	show	interest	in	community	consultation,	as	
approaching	the	‘little	kings’	group	is	considered	more	necessary	to	attain	‘little	kings’	assistance.		
This	approach	might	benefit	marginalized	groups	in	the	form	of	building	of	basic	infrastructure,	as	
advised	by	local	government.		However,	the	company’s	CSR	strategy	cannot	escape	the	little	kings’	
interests,	meaning	that	their	CSR	resources	can	leak	to	this	elite	group	for	their	personal	interests.			
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For	company	C,	the	rationale	for	engagement	with	the	‘little	kings’	group	is	not	related	to	company	
efforts	to	attain	local	legitimacy.		Their	engagement	with	this	group	can	be	ascribed	to	the	
positioning	of	company	C	as	an	instrument	of	central	government	policy.		Being	owned	by	the	state	
results	in	the	company	enjoying	local	acceptance,	as	it	is	presumed	that	their	operation	brings	
benefit	for	the	national	interest	in	supplying	energy	to	the	people.		However,	the	lack	of	company	
involvement	both	with	the	‘little	kings’	group	and	marginalized	groups	illustrates	the	company’s	
disposition		to	only	concern	themselves	with	central	government	power.		Consequently,	this	drives	
this	company	to	rely	on	central	government	rules	in	delivering	CSR	projects,	with	a	resultant	lack	of	
innovation	in	their	design	of	CSR	projects	through	local	stakeholder	consultation.			
6.5.3.	The	Outcomes	
The	row	labelled	‘Outcomes’	in	Table	6.1	shows	the	different	outcomes	for	each	company	in	
implementing	CSR.		Company	A	attained	the	marginalized	group’s	acceptance	and	national	
recognition,	while	facing	resistance	from	little	kings	in	the	village.		Company	B	gained	support	from	
little	kings	at	district	and	village	levels,	but	received	complaints	from	marginalized	groups.		
Company	C	obtained	local	acceptance	but	with	a	lack	of	involvement	with	local	stakeholders.			
Indonesian	CSR	legislation	has	positioned	CSR	as	a	development	tool	directing	company	CSR	to	
improve	local	community	life.		On	the	other	hand,	companies	use	CSR	as	an	economic	tool	to	
attain	local	legitimacy.		These	two	conditions	mean	that	the	assessment	of	CSR	outcomes	cannot	
rely	only	on	the	benefit	to	local	communities,	but	the	local	legitimacy	to	companies	should	also	be	
considered	as	part	of	the	expected	outcomes.			
The	main	mandate	of	the	legislation	to	redistribute	company	wealth	in	the	form	of	CSR	attracts	
‘little	kings’	both	at	district	and	village	levels,	exploiting	their	local	power	to	influence	companies’	
decisions	in	distributing	CSR	resources.		Company	CSR	resource	distribution	has	to	overcome	this	
‘little	kings’	power	and	interests	in	order	to	reach	marginalized	groups.		Company	A	stood	with	its	
decision	to	limit	the	allocation	to	little	kings.		Shifting	the	resource	allocation	provided	the	
company	with	the	opportunity	to	engage	more	with	local	marginalized	groups,	although	this	
created	resistance	from	elite	stakeholders.		Company	A,	with	its	political	connections	at	national	
level,	however,	is	able	to	overcome	this	‘little	kings’	power.		The	resistance	of	kades	as	the	little	
kings	in	villages	is	a	form	of	despair	at	their	not	gaining	support	in	the	district.		Company	B	
supports	government	development	programs,	enabling	them	to	engage	with	little	kings	at	district	
and	village	levels.		This	engagement	gives	the	company	benefits	in	terms	of	local	legitimacy	to	
assist	their	operations	in	the	territory.		Complaints	from	marginalized	groups	might	indicate,	
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however,	that	their	program	cannot	achieve	the	legislation	goal	to	improve	local	community	life.		
However,	engaging	with	little	kings	is	more	necessary	for	this	company	to	obtain	legitimacy,	since	
the	company	does	not	have	political	connections	to	assist	them.		For	company	C,	local	legitimacy	is	
not	an	issue.		Their	direct	link	to	central	government	and	local	support	for	company	operations	to	
supply	national	energy	drives	the	company	to	deliver	innovative	programs	that	can	enhance	the	
life	of	local	communities.		However,	this	company	tended	to	limit	their	involvement	with	local	
stakeholders,	resulting	in	a	limitation	on	the	company	contributions	to	local	development.		
In	conclusion,	all	the	companies’	CSR	projects	are	of	benefit	to	the	local	people.		However,	how	the	
projects	are	planned,	with	whom	their	consultations	are	conducted,	and	who	are	the	main	
beneficiaries	differs	between	the	companies	depending	on	each	company’s	strategy	for	
conforming	with	their	local	environment.		For	company	A,	embracing	local	marginalized	
community	groups	through	regular	consultation	is	more	important	to	obtain	their	acceptance,	
rather	than	focusing	on	local	government	interests.		For	company	B,	adopting	local	government	
development	agendas	into	their	CSR	programs	is	a	suitable	choice	for	them	to	be	accepted,	as	a	
foreign	company	but	has	less	benefit	to	locals.		A	different	case	was	found	in	the	state	owned	
company	C,	where	CSR	is	not	a	focus	of	this	company	due	to	the	lack	of	local	pressure.		Their	main	
concern	for	central	government	interests,	as	their	dominant	shareholder,	made	the	company	
unconcerned	about	the	emergence	of	local	power	in	the	area.		Furthermore,	the	low	pressure	from	
local	stakeholders,	who	assume	this	company	to	be	representing	the	national	interest,	leads	the	
company	to	not	actively	be	involved	with	local	stakeholders.		This	situation	drives	the	company	to	
only	implement	CSR	on	a	legal	basis	in	alignment	with	central	government	policy,	thus	with	less	of	
a	self-motivation	driver	and	innovation	in	their	CSR	implementation.										
6.5.4.	Cross	Case	Conclusion	
There	are	key	findings	revealed	in	this	cross	case	analysis.		Firstly,	the	difference	in	companies’	
perceptions	in	viewing	CSR	legislation	reflects	their	strategies	for	adapting	to	institutional	and	local	
stakeholder	pressures.		The	findings	revealed	that	company	perceptions	as	to	which	laws	applied	
to	them,	their	rhetoric	perceptions	on	mandated	CSR	legislation,	and	the	CSR	practices	are	shaped	
by	these	companies’	positions	in	dealing	with	the	institutional	and	local	stakeholders	pressures.		A	
company	with	political	power	connections	might	be	able	to	counter	local	power	by	utilizing	such	
political	connections.		However,	for	a	company	lacking	such	political	connections,	utilizing	
economic	resources	is	the	instrument	for	dealing	with	local	power.		Secondly,	the	choice	of	which	
local	stakeholders	should	be	approached	depends	on	the	companies’	strategy	within	this	local	
environment.		Companies	can	select	to	engage	with	little	kings	or	marginalized	groups,	as	this	
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decision	is	associated	with	company	strategy	to	adapt	to	local	powers.		Building	relationships	with	
the	little	kings	group	as	the	powerful	stakeholders	may	be	necessary	for	a	company	to	attain	their	
protection	and	assistance.	However,	this	choice	might	involve	high	costs	in	CSR	as	the	demands	of	
little	kings	can	be	shaped	by	political	intervention	and	self-interest.		For	a	company	that	has	
political	connections	and	direct	links	to	central	government,	building	a	network	with	little	kings	
may	not	be	as	important	and	they	can	branch	out	their	own	CSR	projects.		Involvement	with	
marginalized	groups	incurs	a	low	cost	in	CSR	as	the	program	assessment	derives	from	grass-root	
consultations,	resulting	in	efficiencies	not	possible	without	such	consultations.		Thirdly,	therefore,	
assessing	CSR	implementation	cannot	be	confined	only	to	the	CSR	legislation	goal	of	improving	
local	people’s	lives.		The	occurrence	of	little	kingdoms	at	the	district	and	village	levels	that	
companies	encounter	encourages	them	to	use	their	resources,	including	CSR,	to	attain	local	
legitimacy.			
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Chapter	7.	DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSION	
7.1.	INTRODUCTION	
Mandated	CSR	legislation	in	Indonesia	and	the	emergence	of	local	stakeholder	power	associated	
with	decentralization	provide	a	unique	context	for	this	study	to	examine	the	companies	and	their	
local	stakeholder	experience	in	the	implementation	of	CSR	legislation.		This	study	focused	on	three	
central	research	questions:	(i)	What	are	the	main	mandates	of	CSR	legislation	for	Oil	and	Gas	
companies	operating	in	Indonesia?;	(ii)	How	do	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia	
practice	CSR	and	treat	local	stakeholders?;	and	(iii)	What	are	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	
mandated	CSR	and	their	perceptions	of	the	CSR	practices	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	
Indonesia?		The	research	investigated	three	companies	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	Industry	in	Musi	
Banyuasin	district	in	South	Sumatera	province;	Indonesian	Private	Owned	Company	(IOC),	a	
Foreign	Owned	Company	(FOC)	and	a	State	Owned	Company	(SOC),	including	the	local	
stakeholders	surrounding	these	three	companies’	operation.		Examining	CSR	practices	of	the	three	
different	types	of	company	enabled	the	research	to	explore	the	differences	in	their	CSR	strategies	
in	complying	with	CSR	legislation	and	dealing	with	local	stakeholders.		While	assessing	the	local	
stakeholder	expectation	of	CSR	legislation	and	their	perceptions	of	CSR	practices	from	these	three	
companies	resulted	in	the	understanding	of	the	impacts	of	the	CSR	legislation	implementation.				
This	chapter	provides	answers	to	the	research	questions,	a	discussion	of	the	core	findings	and	
implications	for	practices,	as	well	as	outlining	the	contribution	this	research	makes	in	
understanding	mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia.	The	next	two	sections	will	present	the	discussion	
(Section	7.2)	and	conclusions	(Section	7.3)	that	have	been	generated	from	this	study.				
7.2.	DISCUSSION		
This	discussion	section	is	organised	into	three	subsections	relating	to	the	research	questions.		In	
relation	to	research	question	1,	the	key	findings	are	presented	in	Subsection	7.2.1,	on	CSR	as	a	
government	policy	tool	for	wealth	distribution.		The	discussion	of	research	question	2	is	presented	
in	Subsection	7.2.2,	on	the	companies’	CSR	strategies	in	complying	with	the	legislation	and	
treatment	of	local	stakeholders.		The	discussion	of	research	question	3	is	presented	in	Subsection	
7.2.2,	on	the	local	stakeholder	expectations	and	perceptions.			
7.2.1.	The	Mandate	of	Company’s	Wealth	Distribution	in	CSR	Legislation	
In	relation	to	this	research	question	1	(What	are	the	main	mandates	of	CSR	legislation	for	Oil	and	
Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia?),	the	participants	from	the	companies	and	local	
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stakeholders	identified	six	CSR	related	laws.		In	addition,	those	six	laws	have	associated	regulations	
in	the	form	of	government	regulations,	ministerial	decrees,	or	standard	operational	procedures	for	
Community	Development	projects	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	industry	as	described	in	Figure	5.2.		The	
research	addressed	research	question	1	based	on	three	categories	in	order	to	analyse	the	content	
of	legislation	presented	in	Table	5.2,	which	are:	mandate	to	businesses;	mechanism	of	
implementation;	and	sanctions.		These	key	categories	create	the	institutional	rules	for	CSR	in	the	
Oil	and	Gas	industry	in	Indonesia.		This	categorization	assisted	the	study	to	identify	the	essential	
mandate	of	the	CSR	legislation,	which	is	to	direct	companies’	CSR	resources	to	local	communities	
living	nearby	the	companies’	operations.		Furthermore,	how	the	mandate	is	delivered	is	explained	
through	the	analysis	of	the	mechanism	of	implementation	set	by	the	legislation,	which	is	focused	
on	regulating	the	sources	used	to	fund	this	mandate,	rather	than	on	how	companies	should	be	
more	responsible	to	their	surrounding	communities.		In	other	words,	the	mechanism	of	
implementation	as	outlined	in	the	legislation	focuses	primarily	on	how	company	CSR	is	to	be	
funded	(whether	from	profit	or	from	operational	costs).		The	analysis	also	highlights	a	major	
weakness	in	the	current	CSR	legislation	that	it	lacks	provisions	for	sanctions	and	punishments	of	
businesses	not	conducting	adequate	CSR.			
CSR	and	the	Wealth	Distribution	Issue	in	Indonesia				
The	literature	on	CSR	in	developing	countries	has	suggested	that	businesses	should	be	involved	in	
developmental	issues	in	these	countries,	such	as	providing	health	and	education	infrastructure,	
addressing	poverty	and	even	human	rights	issues	(Blowfield	&	Frynas	2005;	Dobers	&	Halme	2009;	
Idemudia	2011;	Jamali	&	Mirshak	2007).		However,	the	literature	largely	views	that	the	
involvement	of	CSR	in	those	issues	through	the	lens	of	voluntary	CSR,	depending	on	companies	
self-initiative	(Desta	2010;	Dobers	&	Halme	2009;	Jamali	&	Mirshak	2007).		The	adoption	of	
mandated	CSR	legislation	by	the	Indonesian	central	government	provides	an	alternative	way	for	
developing	countries	to	engage	businesses	in	social	provision.		This	is	important	in	a	country	whose	
development	challenges	are	great	and	whose	government	capacity	to	deliver	is	limited.		It	also	
provides	an	opportunity	to	leverage	and	learn	from	the	expertise	of	MNCs.			
Moreover,	the	question	arises	as	to	what	exactly	should	be	mandated	for	CSR,	as	an	important	
area	for	discussion.		In	the	context	of	Indonesia,	the	phenomenon	of	mandating	CSR	as	wealth	
distribution	cannot	be	detached	from	the	context	of	the	decentralization	process	occurring	in	
Indonesia	since	1999.		Since	decentralization,	the	central	government	in	Jakarta	has	issued	new	tax	
and	fiscal	balance	policies	as	instruments	to	distribute	funds	to	local	government	(Agustina	et	al.	
2012;	Agustina,	Fengler	&	Schulze	2012).			A	proportion	of	tax	revenue	collected	by	the	central	
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government	is	now	shared	with	local	government	annually	through	the	Dana	Alokasi	Umum	
(General	Allocation	Fund)	and	Dana	Alokasi	Khusus	(Special	Allocation	Fund).		Local	governments	
have	also	received	the	authority	to	collect	small	taxes	in	the	form	of	restaurant	and	hotel	taxes	and	
parking	retributions,	and	include	these	in	their	local	budget	as	Pendapatan	Asli	Daerah	(Local	
Revenues)	(Riduansyah	2010).		Dana	Bagi	Hasil,	or	the	revenue	sharing	policy	from	the	mining	
sector,	is	also	one	instrument	of	central	government	to	fulfil	local	district	requests	for	more	
contributions	from	the	mining	operations	in	their	regions.		These	contributions	have	been	partly	
transferred	from	the	central	government	to	local	government	through	Dana	Bagi	Hasil	(Revenue	
Sharing	Fund)	(see	Figure	2.4).						
With	this	mechanism,	the	Musi	Banyuasin	district	received	IDR	3.4	trillion	(or	around	USD	34	
million)	in	2013,	and	this	increased	in	2014	to	IDR	3.9	trillion	(or	around	USD	39	million)	(BPS	
2015).		These	numbers	put	this	district	among	the	top	ten	districts	for	APBD	(Anggaran	
Pendapatan	dan	Belanja	Daerah	–	Local	Budget)	in	Indonesia	(Seknas	Fitra	2014).		However,	the	
local	district	government	felt	that	this	fund	was	still	not	sufficient	for	their	local	development	
(Agustina	et	al.	2012;	Budiartie	2012).		As	described	in	Chapter	2,	the	disparity	in	infrastructure	
conditions	between	Jakarta	and	less	developed	local	districts	requires	enormous	funding	to	
redress.		The	local	governments	perceive	that	the	present	fiscal	balance	policy	is	‘unfair’	due	to	the	
insufficient	funding	received	by	local	district	government.		Meanwhile,	it	must	also	be	noted	that	
the	funding	received	by	local	governments	has	been	mostly	used	for	little	kings’	self-interest,	such	
as	for	buying	cars,	instead	of	renovating	schools.		Therefore,	for	local	district	government,	the	6	
percent	rate	of	sharing	of	Oil	and	Gas	revenue,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	seems	insufficient.		In	
addition,	the	local	district	stakeholders	believe	that	this	portion	is	not	equal	to	the	environmental	
and	social	impacts	that	the	district	receives	from	the	mining	industry.			
Furthermore,	a	lack	of	transparency	from	central	government	in	Jakarta	in	calculating	Oil	and	Gas	
production,	as	widely	reported	in	Indonesian	news,	leads	to	obscurity	in	the	revenue	sharing	
calculations	used	by	the	central	government	and	thus	suspicion	of	corruption	in	the	Oil	and	Gas	
Sector	(Budiartie	2012;	Wardhana	2012).		For	instance,	the	biggest	case	revealed	by	KPK	(Komisi	
Pemberantasan	Korupsi	-	Corruption	Eradication	Commission),	involving	tax	officials,	shocked	the	
country,	as	those	officials	were	found	to	have	erased	large	tax	amounts	of	some	big	corporations	
in	Indonesia	in	return	for	bribes	received	from	those	companies	(Kimura	2012).		Another	
corruption	case	involving	SKKMIGAS,	the	regulatory	unit	of	Oil	and	Gas	production	in	Indonesia,	
found	its	former	chief,	Rudi	Rubiandini	in	2013,	had	taken	a	bribe	from	one	foreign	Oil	and	Gas	
Company	in	return	for	the	company	being	granted	the	concession	contract	from	government	(VOA	
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Indonesia	2013).		Such	cases	lead	to	suspicions	from	local	district	governments	over	central	
government	wealth	distribution	to	them	in	this	decentralization	era	(Butt	2011;	Partowidagdo	
2008).						
The	voluntary	CSR	applied	in	developed	western	countries	prefers	taxation	as	a	tool	of	wealth	
distribution;	however,	this	approach	makes	the	assumption	that	the	taxation	system	is	free	of	
corruption	and	about	the	capacity	to	enforce,	both	of	which	may	not	be	the	case	in	Indonesia.		This	
might	be	a	reason	why	CSR	has	been	to	utilised	by	Indonesian	central	government	as	a	policy	
instrument	for	wealth	distribution	to	local	regions.		Simultaneously,	the	desire	to	maintain	their	
control	of	Oil	and	Gas	resources	might	have	influenced	how	central	government	formed	CSR	
legislation.		The	central	government	requires	to	retain	resource	control	to	support	their	national	
policies,	such	as	giving	a	fuel	subsidy,	which	took	16.9	percent	of	the	central	government	budget	in	
2010,	government	personnel	salaries	(30.4	percent)	and	national	infrastructure	development	
(15.7%);	which	has	thus	led	the	central	government	to	limit	the	budget	distributed	to	local	
governments	(see	Table	2.3).		In	fact,	rather	than	increasing	the	proportion	of	revenue	sharing	
from	Oil	and	Gas	production	to	local	districts,	the	central	government	has	preferred	to	utilise	
companies’	CSR	resources	to	fulfil	local	demands.		Therefore,	mandating	CSR	in	the	form	of	
company	funding	allocations	for	local	development	has	been	an	alternative	source	of	funding	for	
central	government	to	address	local	complaints	about	inadequate	funding	distribution	to	them.		
Moreover,	the	increase	of	local	protests	over	the	impacts	of	mining	operations	has	led	the	view	
that	this	company	wealth	distribution	is	necessary	as	compensation	for	what	they	have	done	to	
the	local	communities.			
The	Debate	of	Mandatory	or	Voluntary	CSR	Legislation			
Steurer	(2010)	discusses	the	two	different	approaches	of	CSR	legislation	as	hard	law	and	soft	law	
approaches.		The	hard	law	approach	is	categorized	as	sanctions	enforcing	businesses	to	undertake	
CSR;	while	the	soft	law	approach	takes	the	position	of	encouraging	companies	to	voluntarily	
perform	CSR.		Furthermore,	Gjolberg	(2009)	combines	this	categorization	with	the	type	of	
government	intervention,	thus	framing	four	types	of	regulatory	approach	to	CSR,	which	are	
regulative	prescription,	economic	regulatory	instruments,	information	and	voluntary	approaches,		
as	illustrated	in	Table	3.1.			
The	issuing	of	mandated	CSR	legislation	can	be	seen	as	a	hard	approach,	enforcing	companies	to	
undertake	CSR.		However,	this	study	reveals	that	the	mandated	CSR	legislation	in	Indonesia	is	not	
simply	‘hard	’	when	one	considers	the	application	of	this	legislation	within	the	Indonesian	
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institutional	environment.		Firstly,	the	famous	slogan	about	law	implementation	in	Indonesia,	
which	is	“runcing	kebawah,	tumpul	keatas”	(sharp	down	but	blunt	up),	reflects	that	the	laws’	
implementation	tends	to	be	operationalized	only	to	groups	with	lower	economic	power,	while	
wealthier	groups	can	negotiate	implementation	of	the	laws	(Husni	2009).		Bribes	by	firms	in	
Indonesia	arise	principally	from	regulations,	licenses	and	levies	imposed	by	local	government	
officials	(Henderson	&	Kuncoro	2004,	p.	1).		Secondly,	another	concern	is	based	on	the	integration	
of	political	and	economic	forces	in	the	business	world.		For	instance,	it	is	common	that	many	large	
Indonesian	companies	are	owned	by	Indonesian	politicians	and/or	have	a	politicians	as	members	
of	their	board	of	directors,	which	can	thus	give	assistance	and	protection	to	the	companies.		Big	
business	in	Indonesia	is	characterised	by	the	presence	of	what	has	been	labelled	‘conglomerates’,	
that	is,	well-connected	groups	of	businesses	linked	to	Indonesia’s	political	elites,	and	large	State	
Owned	Enterprises	(SOEs),	which	are	bureaucratic	corporations	protected	by	the	power	of	
government	and	patronage	(Bunte	&	Ufen	2008).					
Enforcement	of	CSR	legislation	to	powerful	businesses	in	the	midst	of	this	weak	institutional	
environment	is	difficult	to	implement.		Some	business	leaders	that	also	had	political	power	were	
able	to	intervene	in	the	drafting	process	of	legislation,	which	resulted	in	the	absence	of	sanctions	
related	to	CSR	laws	(Rosser	&	Edwin	2010).		Indeed,	their	intervention	was	able	to	remove	the	
monitoring	and	punishment	components	for	companies	in	the	CSR	legislation,	which	makes	the	
legislation	‘softer’	than	it	initially	appears	due	to	the	lack	of	enforcement	powers	applicable	to	
businesses.		Indeed,	findings	reveal	that	despite	the	increasing	complaints	from	local	government	
about	companies	not	conducting	CSR,	there	has	been	no	single	case	of	punishment	or	sanction	to	
any	company	since	the	legislation	has	been	passed.		The	incapability	of	law	enforcers	to	punish	
companies	derives	at	least	partly	from	the	power	of	business	in	the	country,	from	their	economic	
and	social	contributions	to	Indonesia	and	also	their	political	connections,	which	enable	them	to	
avoid	such	sanctions.				
Therefore,	a	debate	on	the	form	of	Indonesian	CSR	legislation	as	either	mandatory	or	voluntary	is	
not	sufficient	in	this	context.		If	we	only	look	at	the	legislation,	Indonesia	CSR	is	categorized	as	
‘hard’;	however,	the	weak	institutional	environment	puts	the	legislation	in	the	‘soft’	category	in	
actuality,	when	one	considers	the	possibilities	for	negotiation	between	companies	and	government	
in	the	development	and	implementation	of	CSR	legislation.		On	the	other	hand,	it	is	not	suggested	
therefore	that	Indonesia	should	take	a	voluntary	approach	and	eliminate	the	current	mandatory	
CSR	legislation.		The	mandated	CSR	legislation	is	a	symbolic	resource	for	local	communities	to	
engage	companies	to	undertake	CSR	as	a	compensation	for	their	operational	impacts.		Such	
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irresponsible	practices	of	companies	still	occur	in	this	era:	for	example,	in	a	case	where	the	
Indonesian	Oil	and	Gas	Company	named	Lapindo	has	caused	mud	volcanoes,	since	before	2007	
until	now	in	the	East	Java	province.		Mud	volcanoes	are	a	geological	term,	for	when	argillaceous	
material	is	altered	and	transported	from	the	Earth’s	interior	and	expelled	onto	its	surface	(Davies	
et	al.	2008).		The	mud	drowned	around	640	hectares	of	three	nearby	subdistricts	and	their	village	
residences.		Until	now,	the	case	remains	unresolved	and	the	company	has	received	no	penalties	for	
this	failure.		The	owner	of	this	company	is	an	important	political	figure	who	has	influence	on	
central	government	policy,	wherein	he	managed	to	use	government	funds	to	pay	compensation	for	
the	victims.		Therefore,	maintaining	mandated	CSR	legislation	is	a	symbolic	tool	to	maintain	local	
community	rights	to	make	demands	of	companies	operating	in	their	area.		Therefore,	in	this	
manner	CSR	is	in	fact	the	only	practicable	way	for	locals	to	demand	companies	make	a	contribution	
to	their	areas,	and	allows	stakeholders	to	have	a	voice.	
In	relation	to	CSR	legislation,	the	present	research	found	certain	shortcomings	that	might	influence	
company	practices	in	complying	with	the	legislation.		Firstly,	the	intention	of	the	CSR	legislation	to	
mandate	the	allocation	of	companies’	funding	to	local	communities	might	indicate	the	social	
responsibility	of	companies	is	therefore	limited	to	the	funding	allocation	and	distribution	itself,	
regardless	of	to	whom	they	distribute	the	funds.		Secondly,	companies	in	this	study	received	
limited	times	in	their	concession	contracts	from	the	central	government	to	operate.		Conflicts	with	
local	communities	in	the	form	of	protests	and	rallies	can	thus	halt	their	operations,	causing	a	
significant	loss	to	companies.		The	high	investment	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	in	their	daily	
operations	requires	quick	solutions	to	such	problems,	which	may	take	the	form	of	giving	to	some	
charities	to	thereby	control	or	limit	community	protests.		In	this	manner,	companies’	CSR	resource	
distribution	might	benefit	the	community	in	the	short	term,	but	not	lead	to	the	benefits	that	are	
intended	by	the	legislation.	
CSR	Legislation	and	the	Local	Institutional	Environment		
By	legislating	the	main	beneficiary	of	CSR	as	local	communities,	the	central	government	hoped	that	
the	company	wealth	would	be	distributed	directly	to	local	communities.		The	issuance	of	CSR	
legislation	thus	gives	legitimacy	to	stakeholders	for	company	CSR.		However,	instead	of	giving	
requisite	authority	to	local	government	to	control	company	CSR,	the	present	study	found	that	the	
four	direct	laws	and	their	implementing	regulations	do	not	give	such	power	to	local	government.		
From	Table	5.2,	the	limited	power	of	intervention	by	local	government	is	clear	from	the	
mechanisms	of	reporting,	which	obligate	companies	to	report	to	central	government,	such	as	to	
SKKMIGAS	in	Law	No.	22/2001	or	to	the	Ministry	of	State	Owned	Companies	in	Law	No.	19/2003.		
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The	other	laws,	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company	and	Law	No.	25/2007	on	
Investment,	do	not	specify	to	whom	companies	should	report	their	CSR	activities,	and	in	this	way	
they	lack	accountability.		Furthermore,	the	absence	of	sanctions	in	the	legislation	for	a	company	
not	conducting	CSR	reflects	the	lack	of	enforcement	power	in	this	legislation.		Since	the	legislation	
does	not	thus	offer	much	scope	for	local	government	to	intervene	in	company	CSR,	the	district	
government	and	local	communities	utilise	their	power	relations	with	each	company,	which	are	
best	explained	through	these	three	processes:	the	local	regulative	process;	the	social	normative	
system;	and	cultural	cognitive	influence	(Marquis	&	Battilana	2009;	Marquis,	Glynn	&	Davis	2007).			
Local	Regulative	Process,	according	to	Scott	(2001,	p.	35)	“…involves	the	capacity	to	establish	rules,	
inspect	or	review	other’s	conformity	to	them,	and,	as	necessary,	manipulate	sanctions	–	rewards	
or	punishments	–	in	an	attempt	to	influence	future	behaviour”.		Lack	of	stated	sanctions	in	the	
legislation	encourages	local	district	governments	to	establish	local	regulations	if	companies	do	not	
distribute	their	wealth	or	projects	to	communities	in	the	region.		Such	attempts,	however,	appear	
to	have	failed,	as	local	regulation	drafts	were	rejected	by	central	government	in	Jakarta	through	
the	Ministry	of	Domestic	Affairs,	as	stated	by	a	local	government	participant	in	the	present	study.		
The	rejection	of	draft	local	regulation	of	CSR	by	the	central	government	may	be	a	result	of	the	
political	influence	of	companies	and	their	elite	owners.	
The	pessimism	and	scepticism	over	mandated	CSR	legislation	is	evident	from	a	local	authority’s	
impression	of	CSR	legislation	as	“banci	(sissy)	legislation”,	pointing	to	the	lack	of	enforceability	of	
the	legislation	to	punish	companies	for	not	doing	CSR.		Due	to	this	failure	to	pass	hard	local	
regulations	with	sanctions	and	punishment,	the	local	district	government	in	the	present	study	has	
sought	to	engage	companies	in	a	CSR	forum.		As	enforcing	company	CSR	was	not	successful,	the	
local	government	then	changed	their	efforts	towards	building	a	consultative	forum	and	involving	
the	forum	in	the	Musrenbang	(Regional	Development	Planning	Discussion),	in	order	to	direct	
companies	to	adopt	the	local	government’s	agendas	for	their	CSR.						
This	effort	depends	on	the	power	relationships	of	local	government	with	each	company	(Freeman	
2011).		The	IOC	rejected	being	involved	actively	in	the	forum	so	as	to	avoid	the	intervention	of	little	
kings,	from	inside	the	local	government,	in	their	CSR.		Local	government	may,	however,	find	
opportunities	to	intervene	in	the	CSR	of	private	companies	that	do	not	have	political	connections,	
such	as	the	FOC.		Being	foreign	owned,	local	legitimacy	from	local	government	is	essential	for	this	
company.		The	company	thus	decided	to	be	involved	in	the	forum	and	adopt	local	government	
development	agendas	for	their	CSR	projects	in	order	to	gain	local	legitimacy	from	this	local	power.		
This	has	provided	local	government	with	the	power	to	negotiate	this	company’s	involvement	in	
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their	development	agendas,	through	contributing	their	resources	to	support	local	government	
projects.							
Social-Normative	System	refers	to	rules	of	behaviour	that	are	considered	acceptable	in	a	group	or	
society,	wherein	people	or	groups	who	do	not	follow	these	norms	may	be	shunned	or	otherwise	
suffer	some	kind	of	negative	social	consequence	(Marquis,	Glynn	&	Davis	2007;	Scott	2001).  The	
abandonment	of	local	community	voices	and	rights	during	the	thirty-two	years	of	the	highly	
centralized	Soeharto	regime	has	positioned	the	mandated	CSR	legislation	as	an	opportunity	for	
local	communities	to	demand	contributions	from	companies	and	lead	the	social	norms	of	CSR,	as	
related	to	the	companies’	projects	for	local	communities.		With	respect	to	these	norms,	the	
relationships	of	companies	and	local	communities	are	characterized	by	what	companies	can	
contribute	to	their	local	communities.			
Company	participants	revealed	that	they	received	many	proposals	from	community	stakeholders	
requesting	them	to	fund	their	projects	and	activities	such	as	village	ceremonies,	renovating	village	
head	offices	or	building	road	infrastructure.		These	proposals	are	evidence	of	how	communities	
perceive	CSR	and	their	view	that	their	relationship	with	companies	is	always	related	to	companies’	
contributions	to	the	community.		With	this	view,	the	more	a	company	delivered	projects	or	money	
to	the	community	the	more	responsible	the	company	appeared	to	them.			
Furthermore,	the	present	study	also	found	that	most	proposals	received	by	companies	actually	
came	from	‘little	kings’	stakeholders,	consisting	of	the	kades	(head	of	village)	and	cronies	at	village	
level,	and	local	legislative	members	and	local	government	officials	at	district	level.		The	social	
normative	system	has	created	a	rule	of	behaviour	for	companies	in	CSR	to	distribute	their	wealth	
distribution	through	company	projects	and	charities	to	local	stakeholders.		However,	who	gets	
access	to	these	company	resources	depends	on	power	within	the	local	stakeholders	group.			
Marginalized	groups	may	not	be	able	to	have	a	voice	or	access	company	resources,	since	they	do	
not	have	power	and	thus	lack	legitimation	to	influence	companies	to	direct	their	CSR	to	them.						
Cultural-Cognitive	Influence	refers	to	the	tendency	of	individuals	or	groups	to	conform	in	their	
beliefs	about	disputed	matters	of	fact	to	values	that	define	their	cultural	identities	(Marquis,	Glynn	
&	Davis	2007).  Cultural	cognitive	influence	can	be	found	in	the	content	of	meetings	and	
discussions	of	companies	and	communities	in	the	village.		These	discussions	commonly	centred	on	
what	communities	want	from	company	CSR,	rather	than	what	companies	and	communities	can	do	
together	in	the	village.		In	this	way,	the	local	communities	tend	to	pressure	companies	to	allocate	
their	funds	to	selected	projects	that	they	believe	are	in	their	interests,	regardless	of	whether	the	
	 Mandated	CSR	in	Indonesia:	Institutional	and	Stakeholder	Perspective	
 
169	
 
company	agreed	that	such	projects	were	in	fact	in	their	best	interests	or	that	they	were	well	placed	
to	contribute	to	communities.			
These	demands	are	part	of	a	resolution	to	disputes	between	companies	and	local	communities	on	
companies’	negative	externalities	such	as	the	negative	impacts	of	mining	operations	on	their	
rubber	plantation	production	or	oil	spillage	into	the	community	village	river.		Instead	of	solving	the	
communities’	complaints,	for	example	by	minimizing	the	impact	on	rubber	plantations	or	
upgrading	pipelines	to	minimize	crude	oil	spillage,	companies	instead	tend	to	utilize	CSR	as	an	
instrument	of	compensation	for	such	negative	impacts.		In	return,	communities	appear	to	accept	
such	CSR	as	compensation	for	social	and	environment	damage	resulting	from	company	operations	
in	their	village	area.  However,	only	the	‘little	kings’	stakeholders	have	ability	to	demand	
companies’	compensation.		Therefore,	this	compensation	CSR	is	primarily	directed	to	‘little	kings’	
interests,	such	as	directing	company	CSR	projects	to	their	constituents	or	pressuring	companies	to	
adopt	their	development	plans	for	CSR	projects,	creating	the	potential	for	these	stakeholders	to	
utilise	these	CSR	projects	for	their	self-interest.					
7.2.2.	Complying	CSR	Legislation	and	Treat	Local	Stakeholders	in	CSR	Practices	
This	subsection	discusses	the	findings	in	relation	to	research	question	2,	which	is,	‘How	do	Oil	and	
Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia	practice	CSR	and	treat	local	stakeholders?’.		The	differences	
in	CSR	implementation	by	each	company	in	complying	with	the	legislation	and	treatment	of	the	
local	stakeholders	are	thus	discussed	in	this	section.		Based	on	the	findings	presented	in	Chapter	6,	
the	present	research	argues	that	differences	in	company	CSR	strategy	are	a	result	of	the	
differences	in	local	stakeholder	pressures	experienced	by	each	company,	which	lead	companies	to	
build	different	CSR	strategies	for	complying	with	mandated	CSR	legislation	and	dealing	with	local	
stakeholders.	
The	Differences	in	Pressures	and	Strategies			
The	discussion	in	Chapter	2	highlighted	the	existence	of	two	types	of	stakeholder	in	local	
communities	as	a	result	of	the	decentralization	process:	the	powerful	‘little	kings’,	who	have	power	
to	administer	their	territory;	and	‘marginalized’	stakeholders,	who	lack	power	and	a	voice	in	village	
decision	making,	as	they	are	not	affiliated	with	the	little	kings	power.		The	powerful	‘little	kings’	
stakeholders	have	been	aggressively	demanded	for	CSR,	as	they	can	influence	a	company’s	
legitimacy	through	their	power	to	issue	a	local	license	for	the	company’s	operation.			
Each	company	received	different	types	of	external	pressure.		How	the	company	should	respond	to	
pressures	is	suggested	by	Lee	(2011)	and	Carroll	and	Buchholtz	(2006),	the	latter	who	proposed	
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four	CSR	strategies.		Companies	can	choose	four	strategies,	which	are:	obstructionist,	defensive,	
accommodative,	and	proactive	as	presented	in	Table	3.2.		Lee	(2011)	combines	the	institutional	
and	stakeholder	pressures	on	a	company	to	categorize	which	strategy	a	company	will	undertake.		
In	relation	to	the	present	research	context,	the	institutional	pressures	remain	‘high’	as	the	
legislation	mandates	companies	to	deliver	CSR.		Although	the	earlier	discussion	on	research	
question	1	shows	that	CSR	legislation	cannot	be	seen	simply	in	the	form	of	‘hard’	or	‘soft’	laws,	
Indonesian	CSR	legislation	has	become	a	symbol	of	institutional	pressures	that	thereby	exert	
pressure	on	companies	to	distribute	CSR	resources	to	local	communities.	In	addition,	the	local	
stakeholder	pressures	differed	among	the	three	companies	in	the	present	study	depending	on	
their	local	legitimacy,	in	turn	with	respect	to	their	ownership	status.		According	to	Table	3.2,	when	
the	institutional	pressure	is	high,	the	company’s	CSR	strategy	should	lie	between	being	“defensive	
when	the	institutional	pressures	are	intense	and	stakeholder	support	weak”	and	“proactive	when	
there	is	synchrony	in	external	pressures”.		This	means	that	the	different	CSR	strategies	arise	from	
the	different	local	stakeholder	pressures	on	each	company.		However,	the	present	study	finds	that	
the	strategies	taken	by	the	three	companies	do	not	align	with	those	suggested	by	this	model.		
Table	7.1	presents	the	institutional	pressures,	local	stakeholder	pressures,	the	four	strategies	
proposed,	and	the	findings	of	the	present	study	of	the	three	companies.	
Table	7.1.	The	Difference	in	Pressures	and	Strategy	
	 Company	A	(IOC)	 Company	B	(FOC)	 Company	C	(SOC)	
Institutional	
Pressures	(CSR	
Legislation)	
High	
(being	a	Indonesian	
private	owned	company)	
High	
(related	to	resource	
nationalism	issue)	
High	
(the	company	is	the	long	
hand	of	government)	
Local	
Stakeholder	
Pressures	
Medium	
(The	stakeholder	pressure	
may	be	high	but	they	use	
their	political	connections	
to	counter	local	pressures)	
High	
(The	company	received	
local	stakeholder	
pressures	due	to	resource	
nationalism	issue)		
Low	
(The	local	stakeholders	
support	the	company	
because	it	is	owned	by	the	
nation)		
The	Four	
Strategies	based	
on	Lee	(2011)	
and	Carroll	and	
Buchholtz	(2006)	
Proactive	
(The	company	would	
recognize	their	social	
responsibility	and	engage	
with	community	largely	
for	legitimacy)	
Proactive	
(The	company	would	
recognize	their	social	
responsibility	and	engage	
with	community	largely	
for	legitimacy)	
Defensive	
(The	company	would	seek	
to	protect	their	self-
interest	by	passively	
complying	with	legal	
requirements)	
The	Findings	of	
this	Study	
Proactive	
(The	company	engaged	
with	the	marginalized	
groups	in	their	CSR)	
Defensive	
(The	company	complied	
with	the	legislation	by	
approaching	little	kings	to	
maintain	their	self-
interest)	
Accommodative	
(The	company	complied	
with	legal	requirements	
but	took	minimalist	and	
passive	approaches	to	
stakeholder	demands)	
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Table	7.1	shows	the	differences	in	institutional	and	local	stakeholder	pressures	received	by	each	
company	due	to	the	ownership	effects.		Although,	in	this	table,	the	present	research	argues	that	
the	institutional	pressure	remains	high	to	all	companies	as	the	mandate	to	distribute	their	wealth	
to	local	communities	applies	to	all	companies,	the	legislative	environment	in	three	companies	is	
not	the	same.		The	different	preferences	by	companies	for	specific	CSR	laws,	such	as	the	Limited	
Liability	Company	Law	No	40/	2007,	which	is	well-known	by	local	stakeholders,	indicates	the	
strategy	of	each	company	in	dealing	with	local	pressures	by	choosing	the	legislation	that	suits	
companies.	The	local	stakeholder	pressures	are	also	different	in	each	company	depending	on	the	
relationship	of	company	and	local	stakeholders.		Company	A	can	be	categorized	as	having	medium	
stakeholder	pressures,	as	any	high	stakeholder	pressure	appears	to	be	moderated	through	its	
political	connections	to	counter	local	stakeholder	power.		Company	B	has	high	stakeholder	
pressures	due	to	the	tensions	for	this	company	related	to	the	resource	nationalism	issue	in	the	
territory,	while	it	does	not	have	political	connections	to	leverage.		Company	C,	in	contrast,	has	low	
stakeholder	pressures	as	the	company	gains	support	for	being	nationally	owned.		
If	we	relate	these	circumstances	to	the	four	strategies,	the	combination	of	institutional	and	local	
stakeholder	pressures	results	in	the	different	CSR	strategies	in	each	company.	Company	A	can	be	
characterized	as	prdomiantly	proactive,	as	their	stakeholder	pressure	is	medium	(between	high	
and	low),	so	the	company	can	be	predominantly	proactive.		For	company	B,	since	they	receive	high	
institutional	and	high	local	stakeholder	pressures,	they	should	apply	a	proactive	strategy	by	
actively	engaging	with	society	to	minimize	their	negative	impacts	and	to	improve	local	stakeholder	
welfare.		For	company	C,	they	only	receive	high	institutional	pressure	in	the	form	of	CSR	legislation;	
while	the	local	stakeholder	pressure	is	low;	therefore	a	defensive	strategy	is	suitable.			
However,	what	we	would	expect	based	on	the	literature,	as	outlined	above,	does	not	fit	with	the	
findings	of	the	present	study	of	the	three	companies.		For	Company	A,	the	company	actively	
engaged	with	the	marginalized	group	in	a	form	of	‘proactive’	strategy	to	improve	the	local	
stakeholders’	welfare.		However,	different	from	the	four	strategies’	suggestion	that	company	do	
this	for	their	legitimacy;	for	this	company	case,	its	political	connections	enabled	them	to	counter	
the	little	kings’	interests	and	thus	become	proactive.		For	Company	B,	the	present	study	found	that	
the	company	tended	to	apply	a	defensive	strategy,	as	the	company’s	CSR	was	directed	to	fulfil	little	
kings’	stakeholders	demands	in	order	to	gain	local	legitimacy.		Company	C	practiced	an	
accommodative	strategy,	where	they	complied	with	legal	requirements	but	took	a	passive	
approach	to	stakeholder	demands	as	they	had	low	stakeholder	pressures.			
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These	findings	suggest	that	in	the	midst	of	high	institutional	pressures	derived	from	CSR	legislation,	
local	stakeholder	pressures	in	fact	play	dominant	roles	in	the	companies’	CSR	strategies;	indicating	
that	the	power	relations	between	local	stakeholders	and	companies	is	an	important	factor	in	the	
application	of	CSR	legislation.	The	institutional	pressure	from	CSR	legislation	forces	the	company	to	
allocate	and	distribute	projects	for	local	communities,	and	the	findings	show	all	companies	do	that.		
However,	the	application	of	this	CSR	legislation,	according	to	Lee	(2011),	can	be	amplified	if	local	
stakeholders	are	able	to	help	enforce	the	legislation,	or	can	also	be	diminished	if	local	stakeholders	
buffer	the	legislation.		The	companies	thus	utilised	CSR	as	instrumental	approach	to	deal	with	local	
stakeholder	pressures.		For	company	A,	the	proactive	strategy	occurred	because	the	company	
utilised	its	political	connection	to	limit	the	influence	of	little	king	pressures,	allowing	them	to	
engage	with	marginalized	groups.		For	company	B,	the	little	kings	stakeholder	pressures	
encouraged	them	to	use	CSR	as	a	defensive	instrument	to	counter	these	pressures.		For	company	
C,	being	owned	by	the	government	led	them	to	concern	themselves	only	with	institutional	
pressures	from	CSR	legislation,	and	to	be	accommodative	with	stakeholder	pressures,	as	mandated	
by	CSR	legislation	rather	than	be	proactive.						
The	Companies’	Power		
The	discussion	of	company	CSR	strategy	does	not	explain	the	phenomenon	of	companies’	power	to	
influence	institutions	and	local	stakeholders,	as	has	been	revealed	in	the	present	study.		The	
institutional	and	local	stakeholder	pressures	may	play	a	key	role	in	determining	company	CSR	
strategy,	but	in	the	context	of	the	integration	of	political	and	economic	forces	in	the	market,	the	
companies’	power	can	influence	the	way	each	company	builds	their	CSR	strategy.		The	present	
research	found	that	instead	of	passively	adapting	to	their	external	pressures,	companies	actively	
attempt	to	counter	the	institutional	and	local	stakeholder	pressures	by	utilising	their	available	
political	and	economic	power.		In	this	respect,	the	present	research	offers	a	model	of	companies’	
power	in	managing	external	pressures,	for	describing	how	companies	respond	to	these	external	
pressures.							
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			Figure	7.1.	Companies	CSR	Strategies	in	Managing	External	Pressures	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	7.1	illustrates	that	there	are	three	dimensions	that	influence	a	company’s	CSR	strategy:	
macro	level,	meso	level	and	micro	level.		At	macro	level,	Indonesia	has	issued	CSR	laws	and	
regulations	influencing	companies	and	stakeholders	views	of	CSR.		However,	these	laws	and	
regulations	cannot	be	separated	from	political	power	within	a	country.		Furthermore,	in	the	
Indonesian	context,	this	national	political	power	often	has	close	links	with	the	market	and	
economic	forces,	where	some	political	figures	are	also	big	business	owners.		Therefore,	the	design	
of	mandatory	CSR	laws	was	influenced	by	companies’	interests,	as	revealed	by	Rosser	and	Edwin’s	
(2010)	study	of	the	drafting	process	of	Indonesian	CSR	laws.		Furthermore,	analysis	of	various	
relevant	CSR	laws	in	the	present	study	found	a	lack	of	local	government	authorities’	ability	to	
monitor	and	enforce	company	CSR	given	the	absence	of	sanctions	applied	to	companies	for	not	
meeting	their	CSR	obligations,	which	may	reflect	the	business	group’s	influence	on	the	drafting	of	
CSR	laws.						
At	the	meso	level,	the	focus	of	CSR	is	on	benefits	to	local	community	stakeholders.		However,	this	
research	found	distinctions	in	stakeholders	at	the	local	level:	the	‘little	kings’	stakeholders	who	
hold	the	power	to	control	the	local	territory;	and	the	‘marginalized	group’	that	lack	power	and	
resources.		In	relation	to	CSR	implementation,	little	kings	may	dominate	companies’	CSR	
distribution,	as	they	can	influence	the	companies’	local	legitimacy	with	their	power.			Furthermore,	
the	present	research	reveals	that	the	‘little	kings’	stakeholders	may	be	characterized	by	their	self-
Local	Stakeholders	
The	“Little	Kings”	
power	and	interests	
CSR	Legislation	
The	marginalized	
group	
Companies	CSR	
Strategies	
Companies	Power	
(Political	Connection	
and/or	Economic	
Influences)	
	Political	
Connection		
MACRO	
MESO	
MICRO	
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interest	behaviour	in	managing	their	territory	so	that	CSR	distribution	may	disproportionally	
benefit	this	group.			
At	the	micro	level,	there	is	likely	to	be	link	between	the	company’s	power	and	the	companies’	CSR	
strategies.		The	existence	of	CSR	laws	and	stakeholder	pressures	influence	companies’	decisions	
about	CSR.		The	mandated	CSR	laws	have	legitimated	local	stakeholders,	consisting	of	local	
government	and	local	communities,	to	intervene	in	companies’	decision	making	for	CSR.		However,	
the	research	also	found	that	instead	of	adapting	to	these	external	pressures	in	their	CSR	strategy,	
companies	can	actively	attempt	to	influence	the	institutions	and	local	stakeholders	in	order	to	
maintain	their	interests	in	CSR	implementation.		In	this	respect,	there	are	two	powers	utilised	by	
companies	to	manage	external	pressures:	political	connections;	and	economic	influence.		
Companies	that	have	political	connections	at	the	national	level,	such	as	the	IOC	and	SOC,	may	limit	
the	local	power	intervention	by	imposing	this	political	connection.		These	efforts	to	limit	local	
power	intervention	leads	to	two	conditions.		Firstly,	it	allows	companies	to	directly	link	with	
marginalized	groups	without	needing	to	be	concerned	about	their	legitimacy	being	threatened,	as	
illustrated	by	company	A,	the	IOC.		Its	political	connections	can	assist	the	company	in	gaining	its	
local	legitimacy	in	the	district.		Therefore,	having	local	acceptance	from	the	marginalized	groups	is	
more	necessary	for	this	company,	rather	than	legitimacy	from	‘little	kings’.		Secondly,	a	national	
political	connection	may	also	lead	the	company	to	not	be	concerned	with	local	stakeholders’	
interests,	as	applied	by	company	C,	the	SOC.		Their	main	intention	was	to	fulfil	central	government	
interests,	leading	their	CSR	implementation	to	be	focussed	on	following	central	government	
orders.		Lack	of	local	pressures	on	a	company	allows	the	company	to	lack	involvement	with	local	
stakeholders	and	be	proactive	in	design	innovative	CSR	project.	
However,	a	company	that	has	a	lack	of	political	connections	may	still	be	able	to	manage	external	
pressures	by	using	their	economic	power,	in	the	form	of	their	CSR	resources.		In	this	manner,	the	
case	of	company	B,	the	FOC,	shows	how	the	company	relies	on	their	resources	of	CSR	to	engage	
with	‘little	kings’.		The	little	kings’	legitimacy	is	essential	for	the	company	to	operate	in	the	area,	as	
being	owned	by	foreigners	creates	pressure	on	company	operations	in	the	area.		This	company	is	
vulnerable	to	local	protests	to	their	exploitation	of	natural	resources	in	the	area	due	to	a	resource	
nationalism	sentiment	in	the	community,	heightened	during	the	research	period	because	of	its	
profile	as	an	issue	during	the	Presidential	election.		In	this	way,	CSR	was	utilised	as	part	of	the	
company’s	social	risk	mitigation	(Welker	2009).		Therefore,	the	company	opted	to	approach	the	
‘little	kings’	rather	than	marginalized	groups	and	directed	their	CSR	resources	to	support	local	
government	development	plans	in	their	CSR	projects.		These	local	government	development	plans	
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reflect	the	political	promises	made	by	the	‘little	kings’	during	their	election	campaigns,	and	were	
mostly	directed	to	their	constituents;	while	the	marginalized	groups	have	limited	access	to	and	
voice	about	these	projects.						
The	Three	Domains	of	CSR	Implementation		
Table	7.1	and	Figure	7.1	lead	to	the	argument	that	in	complying	with	the	CSR	legislation,	the	
companies	are	still	be	able	to	impose	and	integrate	their	self-motive	into	their	CSR	practice.			In	
this	respect,	Schwartz	and	Carroll’s	(2003)	model	of	three	domains	of	CSR	explains	three	company	
drivers	of	CSR:	legal,	economic	and	ethical.		The	issuance	of	CSR	legislation	forces	the	companies	to	
implement	CSR	solely	based	on	legal	compliance.		However,	the	present	research	discovered	that	
the	enforcement	of	legislation	by	institutional	and	local	stakeholders	can	be	countered	by	the	
companies’	power,	as	the	institutional	environment	in	the	country	allows	them	to	do	this.		
Therefore,	having	mandated	CSR	legislation	does	not	mean	that	the	companies’	legal	compliance	is	
the	only	CSR	driver;	but	companies	can	also	integrate	this	compliance	into	their	CSR	together	with	
ethical	and	economic	drivers.		The	different	perceptions	and	implementation	of	each	company	in	
responding	to	the	CSR	legislation	reflects	these	internal	drivers	of	their	CSR.		The	differences	of	CSR	
domain	in	the	three	companies	is	illustrated	in	Figure	7.2.		
Figure	7.2.	The	Three	Domains	of	CSR	Practices	in	Three	Companies	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	7.2	shows	the	three	domains	of	company	implementation	of	CSR	as	characterized	by	the	
present	research	results.		Each	company	showed	a	different	emphasis	of	domain	in	their	CSR.		For	
company	A,	the	IOC,	their	legal	compliance	has	been	balanced	with	ethical	and	economic	motives.		
Their	direct	links	with	and	CSR	focus	on	marginalized	groups	can	be	categorized	as	an	ethical	
motive	of	the	company	in	complying	with	CSR	laws.		Company	A	also	demonstrated	the	economic	
domain	for	their	CSR	by	their	efforts	to	reduce	CSR	costs.		The	reduction	of	CSR	cost	can	be	
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achieved	through	utilising	the	cost	recovery	mechanism	to	fund	their	CSR	projects.		In	fact,	the	
present	research	found	that	the	distinction	of	cost	recovery	and	non-cost	recovery	is	difficult	to	
operationalize	due	to	one	geographic	area	potentially	consisting	of	exploration	and	exploitation	
(production).		CSR	cost	reduction	may	also	derive	from	the	type	of	approach	that	the	company	
undertook	in	the	implementation	of	CSR.		Company	A	admitted	that	their	frequent	meetings	with	
the	farmer	group	has	resulted	in	the	company	reducing	their	CSR	cost,	as	the	staff	stated,	“their	
demands	are	very	simple	and	even	do	not	need	a	lot	of	money”.					
For	company	B,	the	FOC,	legal	compliance	seemed	to	integrate	with	the	economic	as	their	main	
drivers.			Their	economic	driver	derived	from	their	intention	to	obtain	local	legitimacy	in	the	
territory.		The	company	ownership	status,	as	owned	by	foreigners,	made	local	legitimacy	an	
essential	aim	for	the	company.		In	this	respect,	obtaining	local	legitimacy	may	be	associated	with	
the	economical	domain	for	this	company	as	this	local	legitimacy	would	benefit	them	to	maximise	
production	without	protests	and	disruption,	and	to	extend	their	Production	Sharing	Contract	(PSC)	
with	central	government.		Their	engagement	with	the	little	king	stakeholders	resulted	in	local	
legitimacy	for	the	company,	as	this	type	of	stakeholder	held	power	with	the	majority	of	
constituents	in	the	territory.		In	addition,	the	company’s	closeness	with	the	little	kings	led	the	
company	to	reduce	the	consultation	costs	of	CSR	occurring	from	the	various	demands	of	different	
stakeholders.		In	terms	of	ethical	drivers,	the	company	participant’s	statement	about	“providing	
enormous	funds	for	local	communities”	may	have	implied	that	the	company	had	an	ethical	policy.			
The	participant	indicated	that	the	decision	and	willingness	of	the	company	to	allocate	CSR	funds	
beyond	minimum	legally	mandated	level	is	driven	by	the	company	ethical	policy.		As	McWilliams	
and	Sigel	(2001)	stated	that	ethical	driver	is	related	to	the	behaviour	of	companies	with	their	
external	stakeholders,	the	participant	from	company	B	view	their	ethical	stance	as	being	indicated	
by	the	amount	of	money	that	companies	allocated	to	fund	the	communities	projects.		Meanwhile,	
as	described	in	Chapter	3,	the	politics	of	CSR	suggests	that	the	CSR	cost	spent	by	the	MNC	in	this	
developing	country,	with	its	weak	institutions	and	law	enforcement,	is	still	lower	than	the	cost	
incurred	if	they	invest	in	a	country	that	has	strong	institutions	and	law	enforcement	(Shamir	2004).			
Company	C,	the	SOC,	showed	the	dominance	of	the	legal	compliance	domain	in	their	CSR,	due	to	
the	nature	of	their	ownership.		By	accepting	their	role	as	‘the	long	hand	of	government’,	the	
company	accepted	the	legislation	and	indeed	implemented	their	CSR	according	to	the	direction	of	
central	government.		This	company	did	not	reveal	the	economic	domain	of	CSR	as	a	main	intention	
of	the	company,	as	its	aim	is	to	secure	government	goals	rather	than	profit	goals.		In	terms	of	the	
ethical	domain,	the	company	participant	in	this	study	claimed	that	it	is	in	following	all	the	laws	and	
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regulations	that	the	company	would	give	benefit	to	the	local	communities.		This	suggests	that	the	
company’s	CSR	is	predominantly	driven	by	the	legal	compliance	motive,	rather	than	an	economic	
or	ethical	motive.					
	The	Efficiency	of	CSR	Distribution			
The	mandate	of	CSR	laws	for	companies	to	distribute	their	resources	to	local	communities	leaves	
open	questions	as	to	whom	CSR	resources	should	be	distributed	in	order	to	have	maximum	impact.		
Stakeholder	theory	defines	stakeholders	as	various	actors	that	can	affect	or	are	affected	by	a	
company’s	operations.		The	recognition	of	stakeholders	is	mostly	based	on	these	two	categories,	
“can	affect”	and	“are	affected”,	applying	certain	stakeholder	attributes	to	identify	stakeholders	
that	fit	with	these	categories,	such	as	power	and	influence	(Donaldson,	Thomas.	&	Preston	1995;	
Freeman	2011).		When	this	definition	is	related	to	‘local	communities’	in	the	context	of	the	present	
study,	we	see	that	local	communities	can	in	fact	be	comprised	of	many	groups	or	individuals.		
Firstly,	the	decentralization	of	power	to	locals	has	resulted	in	the	emergence	of	‘little	kings’,	such	
as	the	bupati	(the	head	of	district)	and	staff	in	local	district	government	offices,	the	kades	(the	
head	of	village)	and	his	cronies,	and	the	local	legislative	members.		These	little	kings	hold	local	
political	powers	since	they	have	been	elected	through	local	direct	elections.		Companies	have	to	
deal	with	this	type	of	local	power,	since	it	“can	affect”	companies’	operations	through	the	issuing	
or	withholding	of	local	licenses.		Companies	may	thus	decide	to	prioritize	this	group	in	delivering	
their	CSR	resources	rather	than	distribute	it	to	other,	marginalized	stakeholder	groups.		In	addition,	
companies	are	also	able	to	attain	beneficial	assistance	from	the	little	kings’	power	in	terms	of	
securing	local	licenses.		Secondly,	decentralization	and	the	resulting	power	of	the	little	kings	has	
also	resulted	in	marginalized	stakeholder	groups,	consisting	of	farmers,	women,	poor	and	other	
individuals	that	have	little	power	but	who	“are	affected”	by	company	operations.		The	oil	spillage	
to	a	community’s	river	affecting	community	water,	and	the	disturbance	of	community	life	are	
examples	of	some	negatives	implications	for	local	communities	that	“are	affected”	by	company	
operations	near	their	village.		This	marginalized	group	has	little	power,	which	means	they	are	often	
absent	from	the	stakeholder	list	of	a	company.		Even	if	this	group	is	invited	to	the	company-
community	consultations,	their	voices	in	raising	their	own	issues	tend	not	to	be	listened	to	by	
companies,	due	their	lack	of	influence.		
The	different	stakeholder	engagement	in	each	company	shows	how	each	type	of	company	deals	
with	local	power.		Power	is	an	important	attribute	for	identifying	and	prioritizing	company	
stakeholders	(Mitchell,	Agle	&	Wood	1997).		The	application	of	power	in	a	stakeholder	network	
often	only	describes	the	influence	of	stakeholder	power	to	company	organizations,	assuming	the	
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company’s	power	remains	‘passive’.		The	common	position	of	a	company	in	the	network	shows	
only	the	company	as	actively	assessing	the	power	among	stakeholders,	without	noting	what	power	
that	company	has	(Fassin	2008).		The	present	research	identifies	that	in	fact	companies	actively	try	
to	impose	their	power	and	interest	in	selecting	and	prioritizing	stakeholders.		For	instance,	the	
IOC’s	engagement	with	marginalized	groups	in	the	communities	reflects	the	company’s	ability	and	
effort	to	counter	local	power.		This	implies	a	shifting	of	large	CSR	resource	distribution	from	the	
little	kings	group	to	the	marginalized	group.		Indeed,	this	company	succeed	in	utilizing	this	
engagement	to	make	their	CSR	resource	distribution	more	efficient	by	doing	regular	consultation	
with	this	grass-roots	group	in	the	design	of	their	CSR	projects.		The	FOC	relationship	with	the	little	
kings	group	at	district	level	and	village	level,	by	contrast,	shows	the	reliance	of	this	company	on	
local	power.		The	limited	political	power	of	this	company	urged	them	to	relate	with	this	group	by	
distributing	their	CSR	resources	to	support	the	little	kings’	development	plan	and	interests.		The	
dominant	consultation	with	district	government	and	kades	sees	the	company	ignore	the	
marginalized	group	interests,	assuming	that	supporting	little	kings	agendas	can	benefit	all	
communities,	including	the	marginalized	group.		Being	state	owned	and	having	connections	with	
national	political	power	enables	this	company	to	ignore	power	and	interests	at	the	local	level.		This	
leads	to	the	company’s	lack	of	innovation	in	creating	CSR	programs	to	improve	local	communities’	
life.								
The	distribution	of	CSR	resources	is	important	for	both	little	kings	and	marginalized	stakeholders.		
In	the	case	of	the	little	kings	group,	CSR	resources	are	essential	to	help	them	to	maintain	their	
political	power	within	communities.		The	demands	of	local	legislative	members	and	bupati	on	
companies	to	support	their	agendas	in	company	CSR	projects,	such	as	constructing	roads,	bridges,	
school,	puskesmas	(community	central	health)	and	a	kades	office,	are	all	part	of	these	little	kings’	
promises	to	their	constituents.		Forcing	companies	to	support	their	political	promises	can	maintain	
the	little	kings’	position	in	the	eyes	of	their	constituents.			Furthermore,	the	need	to	raise	money	
during	a	Pilkada	(local	direct	election	for	head	of	district)	and	Pilkades	(village	direct	election	for	
head	of	village)	drives	the	little	kings	to	build	alliances	with	businesses	in	order	to	get	alternative	
resources	for	use	in	these	election	campaigns	(Hidayat	2009).		In	this	respect,	the	distribution	of	
CSR	resources	through	a	little	kings’	network	may	benefit	village	communities	as	the	infrastructure	
is	to	be	used	by	them	and	returns	to	voters	in	the	future.		However,	in	terms	of	CSR	wealth	
distribution,	the	wealth	may	not	fully	reach	all	members	equally	in	the	communities,	considering	
the	little	kings	who	may	use	these	resources	for	their	own	interests.		In	contrast,	the	direct	
distribution	of	CSR	resources	to	marginalized	groups	can	evidently	improve	their	welfare	in	the	
village.		An	organic	farming	project	improves	the	production	of	rice	farming	in	the	village,	and	
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consequently	improves	the	income	as	well	as	the	food	supply	of	local	farmers	and	villagers.		
Furthermore,	the	regular	consultations	between	company	and	marginalized	groups	can	give	
mutual	benefit	to	both.		The	company	can	use	this	local	farmer’s	network	to	deliver	other	CSR	
projects	that	appear	to	be	very	effective	in	their	implementation,	through	such	involvement,	for	
example	in	renovating	a	mosque,	school	and	other	items	of	infrastructure	in	villages,	rather	than	
building	the	new	infrastructures	demanded	by	little	kings.								
This	leads	to	the	discussion	of	the	effectiveness	of	CSR	wealth	distribution.		The	distribution	
through	little	kings’	networks	shows	the	weakness	in	the	current	of	CSR	legislation	
implementation.		The	distribution	through	this	group	reduces	economic	efficiency	of	CSR	resources	
through	poor	allocation,	being	used	for	little	kings’	interests,	reduced	wealth	creation	as	the	CSR	
wealth	is	predominantly	used	to	maintain	political	power,	and	increased	income	inequality	as	the	
resources	mainly	give	benefit	to	the	little	kings	and	their	allies.		On	the	other	hand,	direct	
distribution	to	local	communities	is	found	in	the	present	study	to	increase	company	efficiency	in	
CSR	wealth	distribution,	as	the	wealth	distribution	is	allocated	to	community	needs	and	increases	
wealth	creation	through	generating	income	received	by	marginalized	groups.		However,	the	failure	
of	the	implementation	of	CSR	wealth	distribution	as	mandated	by	CSR	laws	cannot	be	solely	
attributed	to	the	companies.		The	complex	local	environment,	with	the	rising	of	little	kings,	forces	
companies	to	utilize	CSR	resources	in	order	to	conform	with	this	local	power	network.		In	relation	
to	stakeholder	theory,	the	prioritization	of	little	kings	stakeholders	in	company	networks	can	be	
categorized	as	an	instrumental	approach,	in	which	the	intention	of	companies	in	this	relationship	is	
to	gain	local	legitimacy.		In	this	manner,	building	a	close	network	relationship	with	little	kings	is	
necessary	for	a	company	like	FOC	to	attain	local	legitimacy.		The	dominant	power	of	little	kings	in	
the	network	allows	them	to	intervene	in	the	FOC	CSR	projects	and	direct	them	towards	their	own	
interests.		Meanwhile,	other	companies	such	as	the	IOC	and	SOC	may	be	able	to	ignore	local	power	
in	their	network	by	relying	on	their	strong	links	with	national	political	power	to	counter	the	local	
power.	
7.2.3.	The	Importance	of	‘Money	Value’	in	Stakeholders	Expectation	and	Perception	
In	relation	to	research	question	3	“What	are	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	mandated	CSR	and	
their	perceptions	of	the	CSR	practices	of	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	Indonesia?”,	the	
discussion	of	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	CSR	legislation	builds	upon	the	findings	presented	in	
Chapter	5,	and	local	stakeholder	perceptions	of	CSR	practices	from	the	findings	presented	in	
Chapter	6	on	the	outcome	of	CSR	implementation	in	each	company.		Table	7.2	below	describes	the	
expectations	of	CSR	legislation	and	the	perceptions	of	CSR	practices	in	each	company.	
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Table	7.2.	The	Expectations	of	CSR	Legislation	and	the	Perceptions	of	CSR	Practices	
Local	Stakeholders	 The	Expectation	
of	CSR	Legislation	
The	Perception	of	CSR	Practices	
IOC	 FOC	 SOC	
Local	Government	 CSR	as	an	
alternative	
source	of	funds	
for	local	
development	
The	company	is	
‘stingy’	as	the	
company	limited	
the	adoption	of	
development	
agendas	in	their	
CSR	
The	company	
deserved	the	
‘award’	as	the	
company	
adopted	
development	
agendas	
The	profit	of	
this	company	
will	not	go	to	
another	
country	
Local	Community	 CSR	can	give	
benefit	to	their	
household	
income	
	
The	increased	
rice	production	
for	farmer	
income	and	their	
food	supply	
The	project	is	
only	for	kades’	
interest	
The	cash	
given	by	soft	
loan	programs	
is	benefitting	
the	local	
community	
	
Table	7.2	shows	the	expectations	and	perceptions	of	local	government	and	local	communities	of	
CSR	legislation	and	practices.		In	this	respect,	the	local	district	government	and	local	communities	
living	in	the	villages	nearby	the	company	are	the	main	local	stakeholders,	as	stated	in	the	
legislation.		The	expectation	of	local	government	in	this	research	is	heavily	influenced	by	‘little	
kings’.		The	little	kings,	consisting	of	the	elected	bupati	and	associates,	have	power	to	influence	the	
bureaucrats	in	local	government	group.		This	study	explored	the	perspective	of	three	participants	
from	local	government.		The	research	recognizes	the	opinion	of	these	participants	is	influenced	by	
the	context	where	the	power	of	little	king	in	the	area	cannot	be	undermined,	and	the	participant’s	
opinions	have	been	influenced	by	this	power	to	maintain	the	interest	of	little	kings.		Therefore,	the	
opinion	of	local	government	participants	in	the	table	7.2	may	reflect,	and,	or	be	influenced	by,	the	
interest	of	little	kings.		However,	the	research	also	acknowledges	that	there	might	be	different	
opinion	from	other	local	government	members	that	is	not	aligned	the	little	kings	interests.	
This	legislation	gives	legitimacy	to	these	local	stakeholders	to	demand	company	CSR.		Donaldson	
and	Dunfee	(1999)	state	that	demands	on	CSR	are	categorized	into,	firstly,	‘implicit	claims’	of	local	
stakeholders	since	the	demands	do	not	have	explicit	contracts	or	agreements	between	local	
stakeholders	and	company;	while,	on	the	other	hand,		the	issuance	of	CSR	legislation	turns	the	
demand	of	local	stakeholders	into	‘explicit	claims’	as	the	demand	has	been	granted	by	the	
government	through	this	legislation.		This	latter	circumstance	has	resulted	in	increased	local	
government	and	local	community	expectations	in	Indonesia.		However,	who	has	power	to	utilise	
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this	‘explicit	claim’	is	an	important	point	for	discussion	due	the	fact	that	the	legislation	does	not	
capture	these	power	distinctions	within	local	communities.		Mitchell	et.al	(1997)	suggest	that	
stakeholder	power	and	legitimacy	are	salient	in	identifying	the	stakeholders.		In	terms	of	power,	
local	government	has	more	legitimate	power	(Raven	1992)	than	local	community	due	to	its	formal	
authority	position.		Meanwhile,	in	terms	of	legitimacy,	however,	local	community	has	‘normative	
legitimacy’	(Phillips	2003)	wherein	the	company	has	a	moral	obligation.			
The	previous	discussion	on	research	question	2	presents	the	differences	of	company	focus	in	
approaching	local	stakeholders.		Each	company’s	stakeholder	approach	strategy	implies	these	two	
local	stakeholders	in	perceiving	the	company’s	CSR	practices.		The	following	subsections,	derived	
from	Table	7.2,	discusses	the	local	stakeholder	expectations	of	CSR	legislation	and	their	
perceptions	of	each	company’s	CSR	practice	in	fulfilling	these	expectations.	
Local	Stakeholder	Expectations	
The	emergence	of	local	district	government	power	through	decentralisation	has	created	the	
expectation	of	local	government	to	be	able	to	utilise	CSR	companies	as	an	alternative	source	of	
funding	for	local	development.		However,	although	the	legislation	mentions	the	main	beneficiary	
of	CSR	as	being	local	stakeholders,	the	legislation	as	described	in	Chapter	5	does	not	give	authority	
or	power	to	local	government	to	direct	company	CSR.		The	statement	by	one	participant	of	such	
legislation	as	‘banci	(sissy)	legislation’	reflects	disappointment	toward	the	CSR	legislation,	as	a	
result	of	this	lack	of	control	of	company	CSR	in	the	area	and	the	legislation’s	lack	of	enforcement.		
Therefore,	local	government	in	this	area	has	established	a	CSR	forum	to	approach	companies	
operating	in	the	district.		As	enforcing	local	regulation	with	sanctions	was	refused	by	central	
government,	the	CSR	forum	is	utilised	by	local	government	to	engage	companies	in	their	
development	agendas.		Rather	than	setting	punishment	to	the	company	for	not	adopting	their	
development	agendas	in	company	CSR,	local	government,	through	the	CSR	forum,	uses	a	soft	
approach	by	giving	rewards	to	the	company	that	adopt	their	development	agendas,	as	shown	by	
company	B’s	experience.		The	local	government	might	be	able	to	push	a	company	with	a	lack	of	
political	power	to	adopt	their	agendas	in	this	forum.	However,	for	a	company	with	political	
connections	or	direct	links	with	central	government,	the	local	government	may	not	be	able	to	
effectively	utilise	their	power	toward	these	companies.			
For	local	community	stakeholders,	the	legislation	also	raised	their	expectations	toward	company	
CSR	contributions	to	their	household	income.		The	community	might	not	understand	the	content	
of	the	legislation;	the	legislation	is,	however,	a	potent	symbol	for	local	communities	to	request
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company	CSR	contributions.		The	legislation,	as	discussed	in	research	question	1,	might	lack	
enforcement	in	its	implementation;	but	the	aim	of	CSR	legislation	to	benefit	the	local	communities	
has	resulted	in	local	community	expectations	toward	company	CSR.		The	findings	of	the	present	
study	also	suggest	that	the	expectations	of	local	community	derive	from	their	long	historical	
experiences	of	their	rights	being	ignored	by	companies	during	the	era	of	the	Soeharto	regime.		
Many	in	the	local	community	in	the	present	study	assume	that	the	company	operations	in	their	
areas	were	only	to	‘steal’	their	resources,	as	stated	by	one	community	participant.		Therefore,	
mandating	CSR	to	companies	enable	the	local	community	to	demand	benefits	from	companies.		In	
this	respect,	the	community	prefers	the	contribution	of	companies’	CSR	to	relate	to	their	income.		
However,	this	local	community	expectation	might	not	be	fulfilled	by	the	companies,	as	the	
implementation	of	CSR	depends	on	the	power	relations	within	local	communities.		The	company	
may	only	concern	themselves	with	the	expectations	of	little	king	stakeholders,	rather	than	those	of	
marginalized	stakeholders.		Referring	to	an	NGO	participant’s	comment,	CSR	can	be	like	a	‘fire	
extinguisher’	in	which	the	company	can	only	target	CSR	projects	to	the	stakeholders	that	have	
voice	and	power,	while	the	marginalized	stakeholders	expectation	appear	to	be	ignored	by	the	
companies’	CSR.													
Local	Stakeholder	Perceptions	
As	discussed	earlier,	the	preferences	of	companies	as	to	which	stakeholders	they	distribute	CSR	
resources	depended	on	what	kind	of	pressure	each	company	takes	into	account,	and	the	
company’s	power	for	dealing	with	these	pressures.		The	company,	within	this	local	environment,	
has	to	choose	whether	to	focus	their	CSR	resource	distribution	to	‘little	kings’	in	the	local	
government	or	to	‘marginalized’	groups	in	the	local	communities.		Their	chosen	strategy,	which	
links	to	the	company	interest,	consequently	has	resulted	in	different	local	stakeholder	perceptions	
of	their	practices.	
Company	A,	the	IOC,	emphasized	delivering	CSR	projects	to	the	local	marginalized	community,	
resulting	in	the	good	perception	of	the	local	community,	as	their	CSR	projects	in	organic	farming	
have	helped	the	local	community	to	improve	their	welfare	through	the	availability	of	rice	in	the	
village	and	an	increase	of	rice	production.		However,	the	shifting	of	larger	share	of	company	CSR	
resources	to	the	farmers	has	led	negative	perceptions	by	local	government	stakeholders,	as	the	
company	is	not	following	the	‘little	king’	agendas	in	their	CSR	projects.		One	local	government	
participant	even	called	company	A	‘stingy’	for	their	lack	of	contribution	to	their	district	
development	agendas.	
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Company	B,	the	FOC,	in	contrast,	focussed	their	CSR	resource	distribution	to	support	the	local	
district	government	agendas.		This	is	part	of	a	company	strategy	to	obtain	local	legitimacy	from	the	
little	kings	in	the	local	government	to	counter	pressure	derived	from	their	power	with	the	local	
constituency.		The	company’s	support	for	development	agendas,	furthermore,	was	rewarded	by	
the	local	government	through	CSR	awards	given	by	the	bupati.		However,	the	focus	of	company	B	
on	little	kings	at	district	and	village	levels	has	resulted	in	negative	perceptions	from	the	
marginalized	community.		The	local	community	participants	pointed	to	the	failure	of	this	company	
to	build	a	school	nearby	the	community	residences,	owing	to	the	school	being	built	on	the	kades’	
land.		This	created	a	perception	in	the	local	community	group	that	the	company’s	CSR	project	is	
only	based	on	the	little	king	interests.	
Company	C,	the	SOC,	by	contrast,	gained	positive	perceptions	from	local	government	and	local	
community.		However,	this	perception	is	not	solely	because	the	company	CSR	succeeded	in	giving	
positive	impacts	to	the	local	community,	but	is	derived	more	from	the	company’s	ownership.		The	
company	has	lacked	contributions	to	local	government	development	agendas,	but	instead	of	
complaining	about	the	company,	the	locals	perceive	that	the	company	profit	will	not	go	to	other	
countries.		Therefore,	the	local	government	and	local	community	do	not	expect	to	receive	the	
company’s	CSR,	as	the	company’s	profit	will	benefit	and	contribute	to	the	national	and	district	
budgets.		The	community	also	holds	positive	perceptions	of	the	company	as	a	result	of	their	PPEB	
program,	which	is	able	to	deliver	‘cash	money’	in	the	form	of	soft	loans	to	the	community	
businesses.		This	soft	loans	program	in	PPEB	gives	unique	institutional	arrangement	to	SOC,	an	
advantage	to	the	company	to	deliver	direct	cash	money	to	the	community,	as	other	CSR	programs	
under	Oil	and	Gas	law	are	directed	to	deliver	CSR	programs	in	the	form	goods	and	services,	not	in	
the	form	of	direct	cash	money	to	the	community.		Therefore,	the	direct	benefit	in	this	form	
received	by	the	local	community	results	in	positive	perceptions	from	the	local	community.		
The	local	government	expectations	to	make	CSR	an	alternative	source	of	funding	for	local	
development	mean	that	they	also	expect	results	in	terms	of	benefits	to	the	local	community.		
However,	the	present	study	finds	that	this	expectation	involves	a	high	level	of	little	kings	self-
interest	as	the	local	development	agenda	is	built	with	a	lack	of	local	marginalized	group	
participation	and	with	corrupt	behaviour	of	local	government	officials.		On	the	other	hand,	the	
local	community	expectations	to	get	benefit	from	CSR	is	actually	related	to	the	direct	improvement	
of	their	household	income.		Therefore,	the	company	CSR	projects	in	building	basic	infrastructure,	
such	as	renovating	a	head	of	village	office	or	repairing	a	road,	following	the	local	government	
development	agenda	as	practiced	by	company	B,	are	not	linked	directly	to	their	household	income	
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and	might	thus	be	perceived	negatively	by	local	marginalized	stakeholders.		Company	A	and	
company	C	CSR	projects	in	organic	farming	and	soft-loans,	which	give	direct	impacts	on	the	
improvement	of	community	household	income,	are	perceived	positively	by	the	local	communities.		
This	finding	suggests	the	importance	of	‘money	value’	in	CSR	projects	for	local	stakeholder	
expectations	and	perceptions.		Directing	most	of	CSR	resources	to	little	kings	consequently	makes	
the	local	marginalized	group	feel	they	cannot	get	the	money	value	of	CSR	projects	directly.	
Enhancing	the	distribution	resources	to	the	marginalized	group,	in	the	form	of	assisting	their	farms	
and	giving	soft-loans,	results	in	their	perceiving	that	they	get	the	direct	‘money	value’	of	CSR	
projects.				
7.3.	CONCLUSION	
This	conclusion	section	discusses	important	implications,	and	highlights	both	the	theoretical	and	
practical	contributions,	from	the	findings	of	this	study.		Subsection	7.3.1	discusses	the	contribution	
of	the	study	to	the	CSR	literature.		Subsection	7.3.2	discusses	its	potential	contribution	to	CSR	
practice.		Subsection	7.3.3	discusses	future	research	directions.		Subsection	7.3.4	discuss	
limitations	of	the	study.		The	final	Subsection	7.3.5	discusses	future	plans	for	the	researcher.	
7.3.1.		Contribution	to	Theory	and	Literature	
This	research	makes	a	contribution	to	the	CSR	literature	by	illustrating	how	institutional	and	
stakeholder	pressures	affect	CSR	implementation	in	the	context	of	mandated	CSR	legislation.	This	
challenged	the	researcher	to	examine	the	implementation	of	mandated	CSR	legislation	by	three	
different	Oil	and	Gas	companies,	at	the	district	and	village	levels	in	Indonesia.			
The	voluntariness	of	CSR	initiatives	proposed	by	developed	countries	derives	from	the	ability	of	the	
state	to	enforce	a	taxation	system	and	provide	public	goods	and	services	to	all	communities.		In	a	
country	like	Indonesia,	with	weaker	institutions	around	company	taxation	and	less	capacity	for	
public	provision,	the	involvement	of	companies	in	the	development	of	Indonesia	is	important.		
Proposing	a	voluntary	approach	may	not	fit	for	Indonesia,	as	companies	might	as	a	result	perform	
CSR	in	many	ways	similar	to	developed	countries,	such	as	giving	welfare	to	their	employees	and	
their	families,	maintaining	the	supply	chain	network,	or	making	green	technology	for	their	
operational	efficiency.		Mandated	CSR	legislation	in	Indonesia	and	its	emphasis	on	wealth	
distribution	for	the	purposes	of	development	is	undoubtedly	influenced	by	the	disparity	of	
development	among	regions	and	the	history	of	companies’	irresponsible	practices	during	the	
President	Soeharto	era.		
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Literature	on	CSR	public	policy	suggests	possible	interventions	that	can	be	taken	by	government,	
ranging	from	hard	to	soft	approach.		The	Indonesian	CSR	legislation	appears	to	be	‘hard’	in	
mandating	companies	to	distribute	wealth	to	local	communities,	in	actuality	it	is	‘soft’	as	the	
country’s	institutional	environment	is	lack	law	enforcement	and	the	political	environment	allows	
companies	to	negotiate	their	compliance	with	the	legislation.		The	implementation	of	CSR	is	mostly	
influenced	by	the	dynamics	of	local	stakeholder	power	due	to	decentralization	of	power	to	little	
kings.		Therefore,	in	the	weak	of	institutional	environment,	the	operationalization	of	CSR	legislation	
depends	on	companies	-	stakeholder	power	relationship.			
The	major	contribution	of	the	present	research	to	theory	and	literature	is	in	its	explanation	of	
company	CSR	strategy	in	complying	the	legislation	and	managing	the	pressures.		This	study	
demonstrated	that	companies	take	a	range	of	alternative	actions	to	deal	with	external	institutional	
and	stakeholder	pressures.		Companies	try	to	counter	these	external	pressures	by	using	their	
power	in	the	form	of	political	connections	and	economic	influences,	to	implement	CSR	in	ways	that	
is	instrumentally	beneficial	to	the	company.		The	model	offered	by	this	study	can	be	used	to	
understand	companies’	CSR	strategy	in	dealing	with	these	often-intense	institutional	and	local	
stakeholder	pressures.			In	this	respect,	the	CSR	applied	by	companies	in	this	study	showed	that	
their	CSR	is	not	purely	based	on	a	legal	motive,	but	the	companies	applied	their	economic	motive	
in	CSR	to	manage	the	external	pressures.			
Further,	the	CSR	legislation	becomes	an	important	institutional	symbol	for	local	stakeholders	to	
request	company	CSR.		The	stakeholder	literature	has	focused	on	the	assessment	of	salient	
stakeholders	that	can	influence	companies’	operations	and	make	requests	for	companies	CSR.		In	
this	respect,	the	company	assesses	the	various	stakeholders	and	categorizes	them	based	on	their	
power	to	influence	the	company.		However,	the	present	study	offers	a	different	approach	by	
relating	those	stakeholder	powers	to	the	companies’	power	and	interests.		The	power	of	
stakeholders	in	a	local	district	area	may	not	be	salient	to	the	company,	if	the	company	has	political	
connections	that	can	mitigate	this	stakeholder	power.		Furthermore,	less	powerful	stakeholders	
may	become	salient	for	the	company,	if	a	stakeholder	can	align	itself	with	a	company’s	interest,	
such	as	for	building	their	reputation	or	gaining	local	acceptance.			
7.3.2.		Contribution	to	Practice	
The	practical	justification	for	the	present	research	presented	in	Chapter	1	explains	two	opposite	
conditions,	where	CSR	projects	increased	after	the	laws	passed,	but	the	company-community	
relationship	have	been	problematic.		Mandating	corporate	social	responsibility	was	expected	to	be	
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a	“bridge”	to	better	integrate	companies	and	communities.		CSR	that	is	based	on	broad	
stakeholder	engagement	and	benefits	broad	sets	of	stakeholders	can	create	ways	for	company	and	
community	to	stand	and	work	together	to	solve	societal	issues	in	the	village.		To	achieve	this	goal,	
some	improvement	the	mandated	CSR	legislation	and	its	implementation	should	be	considered	to	
better	integrate	development	and	business	interests.		The	legislation	should	focus	on	ensuring	the	
meaningful	participation	of	broad	sets	of	stakeholders	from	local	communities.		The	present	
research	offers	some	implications	and	recommendations	for	CSR	legislation	and	implementation.			
Implications	and	Recommendations	for	Indonesian	CSR	legislation			
Eliminating	Indonesian	CSR	laws	and	regulations	is	not	an	option	recommended	as	a	result	of	this	
study.		The	legislation	provides	important	symbolic	institutional	value	and	can	provide	an	
institutional	space	for	dialogue	between	companies	and	communities.			CSR	is	still	important	for	
Indonesia	to	solve	problems	of	the	development	disparity	between	regions	in	Indonesia.		However,	
this	study	shows	that	there	is	a	weakness	in	the	existing	CSR	laws	and	their	implementation	
regulations.		The	laws	and	their	regulations	ambitiously	intend	to	force	companies	to	be	involved	in	
local	development	issues	without	giving	direction	on	how	to	use	or	distribute	the	CSR	resources.		It	
is	important	for	central	government	to	provide	businesses	with	further	guidance	and	directions	on	
how	to	implement	CSR	in	their	local	districts.		Therefore,	the	existing	CSR	laws	and	regulations	
should	also	acknowledge	to	whom	the	companies	should	engage	with	and	distribute	the	resources	
and	how	the	companies	distribute	them.		In	this	manner,	this	research	recommends	some	steps	
that	need	to	be	taken	to	review	CSR	laws:	
Emphasising	Research.		This	study	revealed	that	CSR	laws	and	regulations	appear	to	be	issued	by	
the	central	Indonesian	government	because	of	pressures	from	local	government	and	local	
communities	to	demand	more	contribution	from	companies	exploiting	their	natural	resources.		
According	to	Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010),	CSR	laws	were	enacted	with	a	lack	of	research	and	study	on	
CSR	issues	during	the	drafting	process.		In	addition,	the	drafting	process	of	the	CSR	laws,	
particularly	Law	No.	40/2007	on	Limited	Liability	Company,	was	compromised	by	several	interests	
in	their	processes,	such	as	the	legislative,	business	associations	and	the	government;	while	leaving	
NGOs	and	the	local	community	interests	behind	due	to	their	lack	of	power	(Rosser	&	Edwin	2010).		
The	need	for	research	on	CSR	issues	is	crucial	for	government	to	have	evidence-based	insight	into	
the	implementation	of	CSR	legislation	in	local	districts.		Government	should	place	greater	emphasis	
on	launching	and	organising	research	projects,	policy	debates	and	conferences	on	CSR	issues	
within	Indonesia	and	across	countries.		A	comprehensive	review	of	the	mandated	CSR	legislation	is	
needed	in	order	to	incorporate	both	local	people	and	business’s	needs;	and	is	perhaps	timely	given	
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CSR	legislation	is	now	almost	a	decade	in	its	implementation	in	the	field.		How	companies,	local	
governments	and	communities	interpret	the	laws	and	regulations	is	a	core	aim	for	such	research,	
so	that	central	government	can	better	decide	how	to	further	legislate	and	implement	CSR	in	
Indonesia.			
Ensuring	Participation	of	Various	Stakeholders.		Many	organizations	and	institutions	from	NGOs	
and	businesses	group	associations	with	an	interest	in	CSR	have	been	established	since	the	CSR	laws	
were	issued.		Policy	makers	might	better	recognize	the	importance	of	their	participation,	opinions	
and	views	in	reviewing	CSR	laws	and	regulations.		Such	perspectives	were	significantly	absent	
during	the	drafting	of	CSR	laws.		Broader	participation	would	ensure	transparency	and	
accountability	in	the	policy	formulation	process	as	well	as	the	greater	effectiveness	of	the	policy.		
For	ensuring	such	participation,	discussions	on	CSR	issues	could	be	encouraged	to	clarify	the	
objectives	of	the	legislation.		In	addition,	electronic	and	print	media	could	be	utilised	to	ensure	
public	participation	and	to	canvass	public	opinion	about	CSR.		Regular	‘talk	shows’	featuring	
businesses,	communities	and	government	as	policy	makers	discussing	CSR	could	be	broadcast	on	
radio	and	television.		The	print	media	could	be	used	to	test	general	public	opinion	about	specific	
CSR	policies.		This	discussion	would	make	CSR	legislation	open	to	citizens	and	thereby	increase	
their	acceptance	of	reviews.	Furthermore,	a	longer-term	vision	and	a	mission	in	formulating	CSR	
laws	and	regulations	with	development	agendas	are	needed,	and	appear	to	be	lacking	in	the	
present	CSR	legislation.		
Overcoming	the	weaknesses	of	CSR	legislation.		Most	importantly,	weaknesses	in	the	CSR	
legislation	analysed	in	this	thesis	should	be	taken	into	careful	consideration	by	government	as	
policy	makers	in	reviewing	the	legislation.	As	emphasised	here,	the	focus	of	CSR	legislation,	
mandating	companies	to	redistribute	companies’	resources,	has	created	confusion	for	companies	
with	regard	to	balancing	this	focus	with	various	shareholder	interests.		In	return,	the	legislation	has	
also	created	local	stakeholder	expectations	and	demands	of	company	resources	for	their	local	
development.		Another	shortcoming	of	the	CSR	laws	and	regulations	is	derived	from	the	definition	
of	CSR	with	which	to	allocate	companies’	wealth	in	the	form	of	CSR	projects	to	local	communities.		
This	definition	may	lead	companies	to	focus	on	local	community	projects	to	be	viewed	as	a	socially	
responsible	company,	with	limited	efforts	to	prevent	the	damage	caused	by	their	operations	on	
local	communities.		Therefore,	the	need	to	clearly	define	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	in	the	
Indonesia	context	is	urgent	to	limit	these	unintended	effects	of	CSR	laws.		
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Breaking	conflicts	of	interest	in	the	CSR	Legislation	review	process.		Rosser	and	Edwin	(2010)	have	
highlighted	the	conflicts	of	interest	of	various	groups	in	the	drafting	process	of	CSR	laws,	involving	
central	government,	local	government	and	legislative	members	from	certain	political	parties.	In	
order	to	achieve	better	CSR	laws,	policy	makers	should	be	rid	of	the	influence	of	this	nexus	of	
interest.	The	empirical	findings	and	secondary	evidence	examined	in	this	study	suggest	that	
powerful	interest	groups	influence	policy	makers	to	formulate	such	CSR	policies	in	ways	that	do	
not	serve	the	interests	of	the	public.	Therefore,	policy	makers	need	to	adopt	a	firm	CSR	policy	
without	being	influenced	by	any	specific	interest	group.		This	can	be	achieved	by	making	
transparency	in	the	drafting	process,	by	conducting	public	consultations	involving	businesses	
actors,	local	stakeholders	and	NGOs.		
Implications	and	Recommendations	for	the	Implementation	of	CSR			
There	have	been	a	number	of	issues	in	the	implementation	of	CSR	examined	in	this	study,	which	
policy	makers	and	businesses	should	consider.		The	power	of	stakeholders	is	a	significant	factor	for	
companies	in	selecting	to	whom	they	distribute	their	CSR	resources.		It	is	also	understandable	that	
the	dynamics	of	their	local	social,	economic	and	political	contexts	shaped	company	decisions	in	
implementing	the	legislation.		It	is	extremely	important,	therefore,	to	place	greater	emphasis	on	
creating	efficient	and	effective	implementation,	so	that	the	legislation	can	achieve	its	objectives	to	
prosper	the	local	people.		Some	recommendations	to	operationalize	the	legislation	in	the	field	are	
here	suggested	for	urgent	consideration.	
Ensuring	community	participation	by	making	CSR	funds	transparent.		CSR	has	been	mandated	
through	a	set	of	laws	and	regulations.		This	forces	companies	to	allocate	resources	to	fund	
community	projects	regularly	in	their	operational	cost	or/and	taking	from	their	profits.		However,	
local	villagers	do	not	have	access	to	knowledge	of	how	many	funds	are	allocated	by	the	company	
for	their	area.		In	addition,	the	Law	No.	14/	2008	on	Freedom	of	Information	obligates	all	
institutions	that	hold	public	information,	such	as	the	funds	for	communities,	to	open	their	
information	to	the	public.		This	means	that	how	much	companies	allocate	in	their	budget	for	CSR	
should	be	categorized	as	public	funds	and	therefore	must	be	transparent	and	openly	accessed	to	
the	public.		Information	on	CSR	is	protected	by	certain	powerful	stakeholders.		This	causes	the	
projects	to	be	commonly	directed	to	this	type	of	stakeholder,	whilst	other	marginalized	
stakeholders	are	unable	to	participate	in	these	projects.		To	improve	this,	CSR	funding	must	be	
transparent	for	all	community	members	so	that	they	can	participate	in	determining	the	community	
projects	in	their	area,	and	even	proposing	their	needs	to	be	accommodated	by	CSR	projects.		
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Monitoring	Behaviour	of	Local	Authorities.		Combating	corruption	in	the	CSR	sector	should	be	of	
concern	to	law	makers.		There	are	areas	of	potential	corruption	in	CSR	implementation	revealed	in	
this	study,	as	powerful	stakeholders	such	as	local	government	officials	and	heads	of	villages	and	
their	allies	have	important	roles	in	CSR.		By	making	CSR	funds	transparent	and	accountable	to	local	
villagers,	they	can	control	how	the	company	CSR	projects	are	distributed	via	the	roles	of	these	
‘little	kings’.		Local	villagers	can	even	assist	companies	to	implement	successful	CSR	projects.		Social	
control	refers	generally	to	societal	and	political	mechanisms	or	processes	that	regulate	individual	
and	group	behaviour	in	an	attempt	to	gain	conformity	and	compliance	to	the	rules	of	a	given	
society,	state,	or	social	group.		An	informal	social	control	can	be	achieved	in	this	way	by	which	CSR	
projects	can	be	internalized	through	socialization	processes.		Socializing	CSR	funds	and	projects	to	
a	community	would	lead	powerful	stakeholders	to	confine	their	behaviour	to	the	narrower	range	
of	what	is	acceptable	given	such	community	standards	(Benson	1990).	
Breaking	Powerful	Stakeholder	Interests	in	CSR	Implementations.		A	nexus	between	companies	and	
powerful	stakeholders	has	diminished	community	participation	in	CSR	projects.		A	clear	
government	policy	at	district	level	on	who	are	local	community	and	who	are	the	main	beneficiaries	
of	CSR	can	break	this	nexus.		Specifically,	the	assumption	that	powerful	elite	stakeholders	can	
represent	the	whole	community	needs	to	be	rethought	in	terms	of	CSR	projects.		The	selection	of	
stakeholders	cannot	rely	on	stakeholder	power	and	influence	as	this	can	diminish	community	
aspirations	and	create	greater	company	dependency	on	powerful	elite	stakeholders.		Breaking	this	
nexus	might	help	more	closely	engage	the	company	with	local	community	groups	and	provide	a	
symbiosis	in	the	relationship	between	the	two.				
7.3.3.		Future	Research	Directions		
This	thesis	may	inspire	future	researchers	in	several	ways.	The	empirical	evidence	derived	from	this	
research	generates	a	thirst	for	an	expanded	study	to	consolidate	the	findings	and	explanations	for	
advancing	knowledge	on	Indonesian	mandated	CSR.		By	limiting	the	research	scope	on	Indonesia	
mandated	CSR	and	its	implementation	in	one	district,	this	study	has	created	a	basis	on	which	
future	researchers	can	expand	the	study	to	other	districts/regions	or	at	the	national	level.		
Indonesia	is	comprised	of	many	areas	that	also	have	abundant	natural	resources	and	similar	issues	
regarding	company–community	relationships.		Other	areas	provide	different	contexts	and	
community	cultures	and	these	may	encourage	future	researchers	to	investigate	variation	in	the	
impacts	of	CSR	legislation	in	those	other	areas.		Hence,	the	design	and	findings	of	this	study	on	the	
Oil	and	Gas	industry	may	encourage	future	researchers	undertaking	investigations	of	different	
industry	sectors	in	Indonesia,	such	as	coal	mining,	gold	mining	or	even	the	plantation	industry.		
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Moreover,	further	studies	could	apply	different	approaches,	such	as	a	quantitative	approach	to	
survey	the	amount	and	the	number	of	CSR	projects	being	delivered	and	their	impacts	to	local	
communities	in	Indonesia.		
Conducting	a	cross-country	analysis	of	mandated	CSR,	especially	in	those	countries	which	have	
issued	mandated	laws	and	policies	such	as	India,	may	offer	important	insights	for	improving	the	
benefits	delivered	by	mandated	CSR.		Furthermore,	a	comparison	could	be	made	among	those	
countries	in	order	to	explore	the	similarities	and	dissimilarities	in	their	mandated	CSR,	and	how	
each	country	operationalizes	a	mandated	CSR.		This	cross-country	analysis	will	help	Indonesia	and	
other	countries	to	strengthen	CSR	policies,	as	well	as	to	learn	new	ways	to	implement	mandated	
legislation.		
7.3.4.		Limitations	of	Study		
Investigating	mandatory	CSR	in	the	context	of	Indonesia	appears	to	be	important	due	to	this	being	
a	significant	gap	in	the	existing	literature.		However,	the	present	research	exhibits	certain	
limitations.		
Firstly,	the	scope	of	this	research	is	limited	as	a	single	country-based	case	study	–	Indonesia.		
Furthermore,	this	research	limits	its	focus	to	investigating	its	implementation	only	in	one	district	
and	on	three	Oil	and	Gas	companies	operating	in	this	district.		How	the	laws	and	regulations	are	
complied	with	in	other	industries	and	other	districts	has	not	been	examined	due	to	limitations	of	
time,	scope	and	resources.	Therefore,	the	present	research	cannot	conclude	whether	the	
compliance	of	CSR	legislation	in	other	industries	and	districts	may	or	may	not	be	different	from	
that	revealed	in	this	study.		
Secondly,	taking	three	Oil	and	Gas	companies	as	a	sample	may	be	a	limitation	of	this	study.	
Relative	to	restrictions	or	limitations,	the	thesis	does	not	offer	a	universalist	or	general	theory	of	
CSR	because	of	the	nature	of	the	case	study	approach	adopted	for	this	thesis.		Given	the	
complexities	of	corporate	social	responsibility,	as	revealed	in	the	thesis,	a	study	could	easily	focus	
on	a	case	study	approach	on	three	Oil	and	Gas	companies	in	complying	with	the	CSR	legislation.		
However,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	this	approach	does	not	support	broad	generalizations.		It	does,	
however,	contribute	to	in-depth	insights	and	allows	us	to	anticipate	the	manner	of	corporate	social	
responsibility	implemented	in	those	three	companies	in	complex	social	contexts.		In	addition,	given	
the	sensitive	nature	of	the	issue,	the	researcher	had	to	consider	possibility	of	access,	for	which	
only	those	three	companies	consented	to	be	interviewed.		Caution	regarding	the	findings	should	
also	be	given	in	that	the	empirical	study	is	entirely	concerned	with	the	socio-economic	and	political	
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context	of	local	districts.	Therefore,	generalising	the	findings	to	other	districts,	regarding	mandated	
CSR,	may	be	difficult	since	institutions	and	cultures	vary	around	the	regions	within	Indonesia	as	
well	as	other	in	other	countries.		
Thirdly,	this	study	has	avoided	an	investigation	of	aspects	to	do	with	the	financial	details	of	
company	CSR	expenditure.		The	empirical	data	analysed	here	mirrored	the	perceptions	and	views	
of	respondents	about	CSR	projects	and	their	relationships	with	local	stakeholders	regarding	those	
projects.	It	is	a	significant	step	to	ask	companies’	respondents	about	their	CSR	financial	resources;	
as	a	result,	questions	about	how	much	money	they	allocate	annually	for	CSR,	or	how	much	money	
they	spent	for	particular	projects,	have	been	consciously	avoided	in	the	study	due	the	fact	that	it	is	
still	very	sensitive	issue.		The	purpose	of	the	study	was	to	investigate	how	the	companies	comply	
with	the	legislation	and	how	they	deliver	projects	to	communities;	while	asking	the	sensitive	
questions	about	how	much	money	they	allocate	and	how	much	money	they	spent	for	particular	
projects	would	influence	the	interview	process.		Estimations	of	CSR	funding	in	fact	would	also	have	
been	difficult	in	Indonesia:	no	single	study	to	date	has	been	able	to	succeed	in	obtaining	access	to	
such	data.		Even	the	local	government	has	had	little	success	in	publishing	this	kind	of	data	due	to	
the	resistance	of	companies	and	the	central	government	to	publicly	provide	such	information.			
Fourthly,	due	to	the	resistance	of	participants	being	recorded	and	given	the	adherence	to	human	
ethical	principles	as	part	of	this	research	I	was	only	able	to	audio	record	with	agreement.		I	relied	
on	field	notes	during	the	interview	to	capture	important	terms	or	labels	mentioned	by	the	
participants	and	then	allowed	time	immediately	afterwards	to	write	these	up	in	some	detail	while	
it	was	still	fresh	in	my	mind.		In	order	to	deal	with	the	possibility	of	me	misinterpreting	participants	
views,	I	had	follow	up	conversations	and	emails	about	the	findings.	
7.3.5.	Reflections	for	the	Researcher	
My	prior	background	working	in	the	research	site	led	to	my	desire	to	investigate	CSR	legislation	
implementation	in	the	local	districts.		After	obtaining	some	findings,	a	comprehensive	insight	on	
what	really	happens	to	CSR	within	the	district	allowed	me	to	think	further:	what	is	my	social	
responsibility	to	the	involved	participants,	particularly	the	local	communities?		This	present	
research	depended	on	professional	and	personal	relationships	with	various	participants	such	as	
companies’	managers	and	staff,	local	government	officials	and	most	importantly	the	local	
community	members.		So	leaving	the	field	can	place	the	researcher	in	an	awkward	position.		
Members	of	these	local	communities	may	become	somewhat	bored	with	research	and	discussion	
conducted	by	government	institutions	and	university	researchers.		Therefore,	in	this	study,	
participants	can	feel	exploited	or	let	down	when	the	study	results	appear	to	not	give	any	real,	
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concrete	contribution	to	the	community,	an	expectation	expressed	by	one	participant,	a	
community	member:		
	 “We	already	tell	our	stories,	we	hope	you	can	do	something	to	our	problems…”	(FGD.2)	
For	the	researcher,	maintaining	relationships	with	participants,	particularly	the	local	community	
members,	is	important.		The	neutrality	view	of	research	may	assert	that	the	ways	society	decides	
to	make	use	of	research	findings	is	not	the	researcher’s	business	(Shaffir	&	Stebbins	1990).		
However,	the	cultural	context	in	the	area	made	the	researcher	want	to	keep	maintaining	
relationships	with	people	in	the	area	to	avoid	them	having	to	feel	that	they	have	been	exploited.		
Research,	that	is,	has	both	benefits	in	itself,	as	a	form	of	information	gathering,	as	well	as	forming	
the	basis	for	social	action.		One	major	action	that	is	needed,	in	this	respect,	to	solve	issues	in	CSR	
implementation	is	to	make	CSR	funds	from	companies	more	transparent	and	accountable	for	all	
community	stakeholders.		This	may	be	able	to	be	achieved,	as	Indonesia	has	issued	a	Freedom	of	
Information	Law	No.	14/	2008,	ensuring	all	public	information	should	have	open	access	for	all	
society.		Therefore,	some	steps	as	a	result	will	be	undertaken	by	researcher.		Firstly,	the	researcher	
will	make	a	summary	of	this	study	to	all	participants	involved	in	this	study	to	give	a	description	of	
the	findings	and	conclusions.		Secondly,	the	researcher	plans	to	be	involved	in	the	CSR	forum	in	the	
district	by	giving	presentations	and	recommendations	to	the	forum	members.		Lastly,	the	
researcher	will	try	to	assist	the	marginalized	community	group	to	access	CSR	projects	by	guiding	
them	to	develop	project	plans	and	introduce	them	to	some	decision	makers	in	companies’	CSR.		
While	these	small	actions	may	not	change	the	condition	in	the	field,	it	is	hoped	at	least	the	
community	will	feel	some	benefit	from	this	study,	and	hopefully	improvements	will	be	able	to	be	
made	for	the	future.			 	
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Appendix	2.	Participant	Informed	Consent	Form	
INVITATION	TO	PARTICIPATE	IN	A	RESEARCH	PROJECT	
PROJECT	INFORMATION	STATEMENT	
Project	Title:		
The	Impact	of	Indonesian	CSR	Regulations	on	Oil&Gas	Companies	
And	Stakeholder	Relationships	
Investigators:	
• Student	investigator:	Rabin	Ibnu	Zainal,
M.Sc	in	Social	Development	(Ateneo	de	Manila	University),	B.Sc.	in	Economic	
Development	(Sriwijaya	University)
• Senior	supervisor:	Associate	Professor	Rosalie	Holian,
PhD	(RMIT	University),	Grad	Dip	Org	Chg	Dev	(RMIT	University),	BBSc	(Hons)	(La	Trobe).	
E-mail:	rosalie.holian@rmit.edu.au,	Phone:	+61399255943	
• Second	supervisor:	Dr.	Warren	Staples
PhD	(RMIT	University),	Master	of	Business	(Research)	(RMIT	University),	Bachelor	of	Science	
(Monash	University).	E-mail:	warren.staples@rmit.edu.au,	Phone:	+61399255964	
Dear	.......,	
You	 are	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 research	 project	 being	 conducted	 by	 RMIT	 University.	 This	 information	
sheet	 describes	 the	project	 in	 straightforward	 language,	 or	 ‘plain	 English’.	 Please	 read	 this	 sheet	 carefully	
and	be	confident	that	you	understand	its	contents	before	deciding	whether	to	participate.		If	you	have	any	
questions	about	the	project,	please	ask	one	of	the	investigators.			
Who	is	involved	in	this	research	project?	Why	is	it	being	conducted?	
This	is	an	RMIT	research	project	being	undertaken	by	student	investigator	Rabin	Ibnu	Zainal	as	a	part	of	his	
Doctor	of	Philosophy	(Management)	degree	requirement,	under	the	supervision	of	A/Prof	Rosalie	Holian	of	
RMIT	University	and	co-supervised	by	Dr.	Warren	Staples	from	the	same	university.		In	this	project	we	will	be	
collaborating	 with	 some	 O&G	 Companies	 managers	 and	 staff,	 and	 their	 local	 stakeholders	 namely	 local	
community	 members	 and	 some	 key	 local	 government	 officials.	 	 The	 project	 will	 examine	 the	 impact	 of	
Indonesia	 CSR	 regulations	 from	 multiple	 perspectives	 from	 the	 company,	 local	 community,	 and	 local	
government.	 	 As	 part	 of	 PhD	 study	 the	 research	 plan	 for	 this	 project	 has	 been	 approved	 by	 the	 Business	
Portfolio	Human	Research	Ethics	Sub-Committee.	
Why	have	you	been	approached?	
We	have	selected	the	organisation	you	work	for	as	one	of	the	prominent	O&G	company	having	operation	in	
Musi	 Banyuasin	 District,	 Indonesia.	 	 Your	 organisation	 has	 also	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	Multi-Stakeholder	
forum	 of	 CSR.	 	 Due	 to	 your	 role	 that	 related	 to	 CSR	 of	 your	 company,	 you	 have	 been	 nominated	 as	 a	
participant	for	this	research.		Because	of	this	consideration,	we	would	like	you	to	participate	in	an	interview	
to	 talk	 about	 your	 perception	 on	 this	 regulation	 and	 how	 you	 implement	 this	 regulation	 in	 local	
communities.	
What	is	the	project	about?	What	are	the	questions	being	addressed?	
Indonesian	CSR	regulations	were	issued	in	2007,	and	it	is	now	time	to	see	what	has	been	the	impact	of	these	
regulations	over	these		five-years.		Thus,	the	project	aims	to	study	the	impacts	of	Indonesia	CSR	regulations	
on	Oil	&	Gas	Companies	and	 their	 relationship	with	 its	 stakeholder.	 	 It	 is	expected	 that	34-50	participants	
from	 three	 groups	 will	 be	 involved.	 	 These	 will	 include	 14-20	 participants	 from	 O&G	 Companies,	 12-15	
participants	from	the	Local	Community,	5-10	participants	from	Local	Government,	and	3-5	participants	from	
regional	and/or	national	level.	
If	I	agree	to	participate,	what	will	I	be	required	to	do?	
If	you	agree	to	participate	in	this	project,	you	will	be	asked	to	give	time	for	40	to	60	minutes	interview.	In	this	
interview	you	will	be	asked	about	your	understanding	on	CSR	regulations	and	the	impact	of	the	regulations.		
You	 do	 not	 have	 to	 pass	 on	 any	 personal	 or	 sensitive	 information	 at	 any	 stage	 during	 this	 interview.	
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Participation	 in	 this	 study	 is	 entirely	 voluntary,	 and	 responses	 will	 remain	 confidential.	 If	 you	 decide	 to	
participate,	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 sign	 the	 Informed	 Consent	 form,	 giving	 permission	 for	 you	 to	 be	 a	
participant	in	study.		
What	are	the	risks	or	disadvantages	associated	with	participation?	
There	are	no	risks	in	participating	in	this	research	project	beyond	the	everyday.		You	are	free	to	withdraw	at	
any	time.	 	The	researcher	will	use	an	audio-recorder	and	take	notes	of	the	discussion	and	interviews.	 	You	
may	request	at	any	stage	that	your	comments	are	not	recorded	or	written	down.		If	you	are	concerned	with	
any	aspect	of	the	interview,	you	should	contact	me,	as	soon	as	convenient	to	discuss	your	concerns	with	you	
confidentially	and	suggest	appropriate	follow-up,	if	necessary.	
What	are	the	benefits	associated	with	participation?	
There	may	be	no	personal	benefit	 to	you	from	participating	 in	 this	 research	study.	 	As	 the	mandatory	CSR	
regulations	 are	 only	 operating	 in	 Indonesia,	 your	 perception	 will	 give	 valuable	 recommendations	 to	 the	
academic	literatures	of	CSR.		A	summary	of	the	outcomes	of	this	research	will	be	shared	with	you	if	you	wish.		
What	will	happen	to	the	information	I	provide?	
The	 information	 provided	 by	 you	 will	 be	 used	 to	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 CSR	 regulations	 on	 the	
relationships	of	companies	and	stakeholders.		The	information	collected	in	the	interviews	will	be	used	mainly	
to	 write	 a	 PhD	 thesis,	 and	 conference	 papers	 and	 academic	 publications	 as	 well.	 In	 any	 reports	 or	
publications	your	identity	will	be	kept	confidential.		The	audio	recordings	and	notes	will	be	kept	securely	in	a	
locked	 cabinet	 at	 RMIT	 for	 a	 period	 of	 5	 years,	 upon	 completion	 of	 the	 project,	 before	 being	 destroyed.		
However,	you	should	be	aware	that	it	may	also	be	disclosed	if	(1)	it	is	to	protect	you	or	others	from	harm,	or	
(2)	if	a	court	order	is	produced	or	(3)	you	provide	the	researchers	with	written	permission.	
What	are	my	rights	as	a	participant?	
As	a	participant,	you	have:	
! The	right	to	withdraw	their	participation	at	any	time,	without	prejudice.	
! The	right	to	have	the	audio	recorder	turned	off	at	any	time	
! The	 right	 to	 have	 any	 unprocessed	 data	 withdrawn	 and	 destroyed,	 provided	 it	 can	 be	 reliably	
identified,	and	provided	that	so	doing	does	not	increase	the	risk	for	the	participant.	
! The	right	to	have	any	questions	answered	at	any	time.	
Whom	should	I	contact	if	I	have	any	questions?	
Rabin	Ibnu	Zainal		
School	of	Management	 	
Building	80,	RMIT	University	
445	Swanston	Street		
Melbourne	Vic	3000	
What	other	issues	should	I	be	aware	of	before	deciding	whether	to	participate?	
There	are	no	other	issues	that	you	should	be	aware	of	before	you	decide	to	participate.	
Yours	sincerely	
Rabin	Ibnu	Zainal	
(DATE)	
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INFORMED	CONSENT	
The	Impact	of	Indonesian	CSR	Regulations	on	Oil	&	Gas	Companies	and	Stakeholder	
Relationships	
RMIT	HUMAN	RESEARCH	ETHICS	COMMITTEE	
Prescribed	Consent	Form	for	Persons	Participating	In	Research	Projects	Involving	Focus	Group	
Discussion	and	Interviews	
PORTFOLIO	OF			 :		Business	
SCHOOL/CENTRE	OF	 :		Management	
Name	of	Participant	 :	
Project	Title	 	 :	The	Impact	of	Indonesian	CSR	Regulations	on	Oil	&	
		Gas	Companies	and	Stakeholder	Relationships	
Name(s)	of	Investigators	 :	(1)	Rabin	Ibnu	Zainal		 	
								
		(2)	A/Prof	Rosalie	Holian	(Senior	supervisor)	
		(3)	Dr	Warren	Staples	(Second	supervisor)	
1. I	have	had	the	project	explained	to	me,	and	I	have	read	the	information	sheet
2. I	agree	to	participate	in	the	research	project	as	a	participant	of	discussion	and	an	interviewee
3. I	acknowledge	that:
(a) I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	from	
the	project	at	any	time	and	to	withdraw	any	unprocessed	data	previously	supplied	
(unless	follow-up	is	needed	for	safety).	
(b) The	project	is	for	the	purpose	of	research.		It	may	not	be	of	direct	benefit	to	me.	
(c)	 The	privacy	of	the	personal	information	I	provide	will	be	safeguarded	and	only	
disclosed	where	I	have	consented	to	the	disclosure	or	as	required	by	law.		
(d)	 The	security	of	the	research	data	will	be	protected	during	and	after	completion	of	
the	study.		The	data	collected	during	the	study	may	be	published,	and	a	report	of	the	
project	outcomes	will	be	provided	primarily	to	RMIT	University.			Any	information	
which	will	identify	me	will	not	be	used.	
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Appendix	3.	Themes	for	Interviews	
	
To	three	selected	Oil	&	Gas	companies;	(managers	and	staffs)	
1. Introduction	
Introduction	on	Researcher	and	Research	Area:	Researcher	self-introduction,	CSR	regulations	and	
The	impact	of	CSR	regulations		
Informed	Consent:	signoff 
2. About	Participant	
To	begin	I	was	wondering	if	you	could	tell	me	a	little	bit	about	your	background	and	experience	in	
this	company?	
3. About	the	Company	
- Times	operating	in	Musi	Banyuasin	Regency	
- Planning	for	expansion	in	this	area	
- The	reason	for	keeping	investment	in	this	area	aside	profit	
- Since	when	has	your	company	been	conducting	CSR?	
4. Perceptions	on	CSR	Laws	and	Regulation	
- What	sort	of	laws	and	regulations	relate	to	your	companies?	Why?	
- What	do	you	think	about	those	CSR	laws	and	regulations?	
- What	is	CSR	in	your	opinion?	
- What	is	the	relation	of	CSR	laws	and	regulation	with	your	works?	
- What	is	the	impact	of	CSR	laws	and	regulations	to	your	company	
5. The	Implementation	of	CSR	Regulation	
- What	kind	of	CSR	project	that	your	company	prioritize?	Why?	
- Who	are	involved	in	the	project?	Why?	How	you	select	the	stakeholder?	Who	recommend	
the	stakeholder?	Do	you	maintain	relationship	with	the	stakeholder)	
- The	result	of	CSR	projects	(has	the	project	satisfied	the	regulators?,	Have	the	community	
got	benefit	from	this	project?)	
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To	Local	Community:	selected	from	the	community	living	near	the	company	location	
1. Introduction	
Introduction	on	Researcher	and	Research	Area:	Researcher	self-introduction,	CSR	Regulations	and	
The	impact	of	CSR	regulations		
Informed	Consent:	signoff 
2. About	Participant	
How	long	you	have	been	staying	in	this	village?	What	do	you	think	about	your	village?	
3. CSR	Regulation	
- Your	understanding	about	CSR	(how	do	you	know?	from	whom	you	know	CSR?)	
- Your	knowledge	of	CSR	legislation	(What	do	you	know	about	the	regulations?	Who	informs	
you	about	the	legislation)	
- Your	expectation	and	opinion	of	CSR	legislation	related	to	the	company’s	CSR	
4. The	Impact	of	CSR	regulations	
- Do	you	know	some	CSR	projects	delivered	by	the	Company	in	your	area?	What	are	the	
projects?	
- What	do	you	think	about	those	CSR	projects?	
- The	involvement	in	CSR	projects	(Are	you	involved	in	designing	those	CSR	projects?	Who	
invite	you	to	involve?)		
- Meeting	with	Company	staff	(How	often	do	you	meet	company	staff?	With	whom	do	you	
always	have	contact?	What	occasions?)	
- The	impact	of	CSR	projects	(Are	those	projects	giving	benefit	to	the	community	in	this	
village?)	
- The	impact	of	Company	to	the	villages	(Do	you	think	you	still	can	accept	the	company	to	be	
operating	in	your	village?)	
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To	Local	Government;	head	and	staffs	 from	Regional	Development	Planning	Body,	Mining	Office,	
and	Environmental	Controlling	office	
1. Introduction	
Introduction	on	Researcher	and	Research	Area:	Researcher	self-introduction,	CSR	Regulations	and	
The	impact	of	CSR	regulations		
Informed	Consent:	signoff 
2. About	Participant	
To	begin	I	was	wondering	if	you	could	tell	me	a	little	bit	about	your	background	and	experience	in	
this	government	office?	
3. CSR	Regulation	
- Your	understanding	about	CSR	(How	do	you	know?	from	whom	you	know	CSR?)	
- Your	knowledge	of	CSR	legislation	(What	do	you	know	about	the	legislation?	Who	informs	
you	about	the	legislation)	
- Your	expectation	and	opinion	on	CSR	regulations	related	to	the	company’s	CSR	
4. The	Impact	of	CSR	regulations	
- Do	you	know	some	CSR	projects	delivered	by	the	Company	in	your	area?	What	are	the	
projects?	
- What	do	you	think	with	those	CSR	projects?	
- The	involvement	in	CSR	projects	(Are	you	involved	in	designing	those	CSR	projects?	Who	
invited	you	to	be	involved?)		
- Meeting	with	Company	staff	(how	often	do	you	meet	company	staff?	With	whom	do	you	
always	have	contact?	What	occasions?)	
- The	impact	of	CSR	projects	(Are	those	projects	giving	benefit	to	the	community	in	this	
village?)	
- The	impact	of	Company	(Do	you	think	the	company	gives	benefit	to	the	community?)	
- Local	policy	(Regarding	CSR	legislation,	what	kind	of	policy	from	your	local	government	to	
assure	this	legislation	is	implemented?)	
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To	others	–	Regional/National	Level	(NGO,	Business	Association,	and	SKK	Migas)	
1. Introduction	
Introduction	on	Researcher	and	Research	Area:	Researcher	self-introduction,	CSR	Regulations	and	
The	impact	of	CSR	regulations		
Informed	Consent:	signoff 
2. About	Participant	
To	begin	I	was	wondering	if	you	could	tell	me	a	little	bit	about	your	background	and	experience	in	
this	government	office?	
3. CSR	Regulation	
- Your	understanding	about	CSR	(how	do	you	know?	from	whom	you	know	CSR?)	
- The	reason	behind	CSR	regulations	(From	your	point	of	view,	why	the	state	should	issue	
these	regulations?)	
- Your	opinion	on	CSR	regulations	(Are	the	regulations	still	appropriate	with	the	current	
conditions?)	
4. The	Impact	of	CSR	regulations	
- The	obligation	of	Companies	(Do	you	think	the	companies	already	implemented	the	
regulations?)	
- The	role	of	local	government	(What	do	you	think	about	the	response	of	local	government	
toward	CSR	regulations?)	
- The	impact	to	community	(Do	you	think	these	regulations	give	benefit	to	community?)	
	
